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We were cut off from the comprehension of our surroundings; we 
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could not understand because we were too far and could not 
remember, because we were travelling in the night of the first ages, of 
those ages that are gone, leaving hardly a sign – and no memories. 
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Introduction 
 
The present dissertation is an attempt at uncovering the role of the mass media in this process 
of creating reality. Language will be of central concern because, in my opinion, by lending 
structure to experience, language is vital to all social processes. 1 However, my concern is not 
with language in the sense of Saussure’s ‘langue’, but with language use in a specific socio-
cultural context at a specific time. The reporting of violence in South Africa’s English 
language press between 1976 and 2002 is what I am interested in. My question is how the 
newspapers have approached the subject of violence throughout this period of political 
transition and in which way their portrayal of the situation has influenced white South 
Africans’ views of their country.  
I will argue that, through the use of culturally salient images, the press manage to influence 
their readers’ perception of and reaction to reality, thus making an important contribution to 
the creation, maintenance, changing, and development of society as a whole. This is not to 
mean that the press have total control over people’s ideas. Rather, by providing them with 
information, they give them an option to build their views themselves. This relative power of 
the media is due to the nature of ideas. While they are often the result of personal experiences, 
even more frequently they are formed by absorbing the knowledge of other people. In modern 
societies the mass media play a growing role in communicating such knowledge. Everyone 
can make use of them to learn about things outside their immediate sphere of experience and, 
what is more, the media enable us to take facts out of their temporal and spatial context and 
insert them neatly into our own world of experiences. 2 
Central in this process of opinion formation are the frames of reference used, as the 
organisation of messages substantially influences the recipients’ understanding of it. For our 
purpose, the term ‘frame’ is understood as the way concepts are associated within discourse. 
The framing of a message is, as Nelson et al. put it, “the process by which a source defines the 
essential problem underlying a particular social or political issue and outlines a set of 
considerations purportedly relevant to that issue” 3. Like windows, different textual frames 
provide the reader with different views onto the world, which in turn reveal different aspects 
of reality. 4 
The world presented in the media should therefore be strictly distinguished from extra-medial 
reality. The latter is made-up of real people engaged in real actions and is thus independent of 
 
1 This theory also lies at the core of the so-called ‘Sapir-Whorf-Hypothesis’, which postulates an intrinsic link between 
language and worldview. (Sapir (1962 (1929): 162) and Whorf (1956 (1940): 212)) 
2 Ginsburg (1994: 5), Herman & Chomsky (1988: 1), Fowler (1991: 121), Altheide (1976: 12), Brewer (1986: 301) and 
Spitulnik (1993: 297) 
3 Nelson et al. (1997: 222) 
4 Fairclough (1992 b: 200), Nelson et al. (1997: 222) and Janney (1999: 263) 
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mediation through the common channels of mass communication. The former on the other 
hand derives its very existence from such mediation. It is composed of images of people and 
their actions as well as descriptions of social relations. Such media representations are never 
exact mirror images of the real world. Language, the very tool used to construct them, 
imposes a certain structure upon them, which is quite distinct from that of extra-linguistic 
reality. It forces the speaker (or writer) to select one of many theoretically possible 
formulations, every one of which contains a certain point of view. No one can ever express all 
there is to say about a subject. Thus, all media representations of the world are by their very 
nature subjective. They are worldviews. 5 
This, however, is not normally how the reporting is seen by its recipients. They often take it to 
be true in an absolute kind of way. To them the reports have a certain authority and are acted 
upon accordingly. This is not only true if they contain direct calls to action – such as Radio 
Mille Collines’ call to arms in the Rwandan genocide – but also of mere factual reporting. 
Such elements as the news offer a platform for erecting the intellectual foundation of a 
society. They create, communicate, confirm, refine, and modify worldviews. 6 
These ideological and theoretical processes of interpreting, evaluating, explaining and 
understanding the world generally take place on a hidden, often sub-conscious level. 
According to Trew they only become visible at times of ideological crises. These are at hand 
when things happen that the persons involved do not consider normal and logical. They are 
events that do not comply with their view of the world and therefore stand as a challenge to 
the correctness of this view and the social order linked to it. If the gap between reality and 
theory grows too large, the two become incompatible and either the world or the worldview 
will have to change. As the real world can only be modified up to a point, the shift generally 
has to happen in the ideological sphere. Thus, the repairmen of the current worldview, as well 
as the proponents of alternative worldviews, get particularly active during such times and the 
mechanisms of theoretical correcting and ideological revolution become visible. 7  
As I will show in greater detail in chapter 2.1, anthropology takes violence to be a crossing of 
culturally defined borders of legitimacy. Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, for example, point out 
that “[w]hat constitutes violence is always mediated by an expressed or implicit dichotomy 
between legitimate/illegitimate, permissible or sanctioned acts” 8. Violence thus stands as a 
challenge to the social order, which means that, if Trew is correct, it should incite an 
appropriate media response. I will show in the course of this paper that this is indeed the case. 
 
5 Fowler et al. (1979: 1), Brink (1989: 81), Whorf (1956 (1940): 214), Dyer (1990: 33), Fowler (1991: 4) and Kress & Hodge 
(1979: 5) 
6 Tomaselli (1996: 45-46), Wodak (2002: 12), Fowler (1991: 4), Schulz (1976: 29) and Carey (1989: 43 and 87) 
7 Trew (1979 a: 97) and Trew (1979 b: 118) 
8 Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois (2004: 2) 
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However, when investigating South Africa, we need to keep in mind that the country has 
experienced a high degree of violence for decades. Individual acts as well as the newspapers’ 
approach to the subject as a whole must be viewed against this background, for, as an integral 
part of public discourse, the media will have to represent violence in society within its 
context. 9 
We also need to be aware of the difference in experience between different people in South 
Africa. While the black 10 population has historically been directly affected by the violence, 
white South Africans have until fairly recently remained largely untouched by it. The political 
protests of the 1960s and 1970s took place entirely in the townships and even the ANC’s call 
in 1985 to “Take the Struggle to the White Areas” 11 did not export large-scale violence to 
white South Africa. The end of apartheid has brought with it a slow democratisation of 
violence, but white South Africans are still less touched by it than their black compatriots. 
Blacks are still victimised disproportionately more often.  
And yet many white South Africans live in constant fear of violence. Their everyday lives are 
over-shadowed by the apocalyptic vision of a terrible blood bath, which will wipe out their 
culture in the not too distant future. 12 Thornton put it in his study of South African society:   
“For most of its history the sense of the end of history, the coming of bloody and final 
conflict, has characterized South Africa’s view of its own history. (…) It is a vision of 
a ‘rolling apocalypse’ in which the predicted end is only just put off by another war, 
another proclamation, another bomb, by segregation, by Apartheid, by the end of 
Apartheid, by ‘one settler, one bullet’, and now by the elections.” 13 
I was personally first confronted with such views in 1995 while I was living in America. I 
worked with a large number of white South Africans all of whom had relatively clear ideas 
about the violence in their country: It is bad, it is getting worse and it is perpetrated by blacks. 
When I investigated the matter more systematically, I found that these views were only voiced 
by whites who had either actively supported apartheid or silently enjoyed its benefits. Black 
 
9 Isaaks (1988: 26) and Riches (1986: 1) 
10 The term black is, unlike apartheid’s other population classifications (white, coloured and Indian). Throughout the 
apartheid years, the government attempted to force people to accept its system of classifying people by the colour of their 
skin because they felt that several small population groups were much easier to control than one large opposition. The 
liberation movements on the other hand, knowing the purpose of the classifications, tried to unite all disenfranchised people 
under one common flag. To achieve this goal, they made use of the same linguistic strategy as the government: naming. In 
order to set themselves apart from the oppressors they chose the term ‘black’ to describe anyone who was not part of the 
privileged white elite. (North (1986: 7), TRC (17th September 1997: Don Mattera, 5) and Dennis Pather in an interview with 
the author, 11th April 2002) 
In this paper I will use the term black in this latter sense. I do so mainly because I believe that everyone has the right to name 
themselves, but also because I feel that, even after its fall, the philosophy of apartheid does not deserve to be given further 
legitimacy by having its terminology made part of everyday language. For the same reason, I have not followed the official 
apartheid practice of capitalising the terms of racial classification. Throughout this paper I have used lower case to avoid 
making the described categories appear given by nature. 
11 ANC (1985: 1) 
12 du Preez (1982: 210), Steinberg (2001: 2), van den Berghe (1965: 3) and Thornton (1994: 14) 
13 Thornton (1994: 14) 
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South Africans or whites who had never supported the political mainstream did not seem to 
share them. 
This led me to ask where these ideas come from. Why do different views of history result in 
such different ideas? My curiosity was further enhanced by a personal factor. To me, 
opposing the violent system of apartheid seemed to be the natural reaction of every thinking 
and feeling human being. I could not understand why the white population, for whom the 
country had technically been a democracy, had supported such an inhumane system for so 
long. Their decision was entirely alien to me. In order to understand them better, I wanted to 
find the factors that had influenced their choices. 
I am hoping to find the main influence in the media, or more specifically in the English 
language press. The newspaper market is clearly dominated by the English groups with 
English language publications accounting for around four-fifths of the total daily circulation. 
Several cities, among them Durban, Kimberly, East London and Pietermaritzburg, have at 
least one English newspaper, but none in Afrikaans. Until the 1985 closure of the Friend in 
Bloemfontein, no city had an Afrikaans paper alone. 14  
Furthermore, although television and lately the Internet are important sources of information, 
newspaper readership is widespread among white South Africans and has been for decades. 
According to a survey carried out by Marked Research Africa in 1968, 72.5% of white South 
Africans read a daily paper on a regular basis and only 15.2% of English speakers never 
picked up a paper. 15 A study done by Giffard in 1976 found that only 3% of urban 
respondents (English and Afrikaans speaking whites above the age of 16) never read a 
newspaper, while many read more than one. 16 In 1980, about 73% of English speaking South 
Africans read a daily newspaper on a regular basis, and in 1984, about two-thirds of all white 
South Africans read a daily. The number for English speaker was even higher. 17  
Newspaper readership as measured by absolute numbers has risen substantially since the 
1980s, but as both, population increase and the rise in literacy, outstripped the increase in 
readership, South Africa’s newspapers are de facto becoming less popular. According to an 
estimate by the World Press Review, only 36% of South Africans use newspapers as a source 
of information. The share of white English speakers among newspaper readers has become 
difficult to assess because, since the end of apartheid, the different population groups are no 
longer listed in separate statistics. However, as, according to the South African Advertising 
Research Foundation’s (SAARF) yearly All Media Products Surveys (AMPS), the total 
readership of English language newspapers has remained stable over the past years, it is safe 
 
14 Hachten  (1984: 269), Phelan (1987: 46) and Jackson (1993: 31) 
15 Potter (1975: 85) 
16 Giffard (1976: 655) 
17 Hachten  (1984: 269) 
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to assume that the English language press still plays an important role as a source of 
information for white South Africans. 18 
In order to show that the South African press has constructed a code, in terms of which the 
subject of violence is described, and that properly understanding this code involves adopting 
the values, assumptions and worldviews which are built into them, I have collected and 
analysed a corpus of over 250 news reports on violence from a number of South African 
dailies 19 printed between 1976 and 2002 20. To get to know the views ordinary white South 
Africans, I spent a total of nine months in South Africa, questioning people in interviews and 
everyday interaction. Finally, to prove my theory that the newspapers’ cultural code of 
violence has actually influenced white South Africans’ views, I compared the concepts found 
in my media analysis with the ideas expressed by the people I spoke with. However, a mere 
correlation is not yet proof of a causal relationship. I had to show that the reporting and the 
emergence of certain ideas are part of complex cultural processes which, studied as a whole, 
can reveal the mechanism of reality formation. Only if I manage to show who used which 
image at what time in order to present people with what version of reality, and to demonstrate 
how these images were constructed as well as how they were received, internalised and used 
by the public, will I be able to find the cultural code that was used to describe the ongoing 
violence and understand how this code is linked to the people’s understanding of the world.  
I will start in chapter 1 by creating a frame of reference for my work in a brief survey of the 
current state of research into the media’s role in culture and society. I have been primarily 
influenced by three disciplines – anthropology, Cultural Studies, and Critical Discourse 
Analysis – and their history as well as their specific use to my work will be the focus of this 
chapter. Next, I will move on to my own research and explain my methods and my strategy of 
approach. The collection of material will play a central role here for this was the biggest 
challenge for successfully completing this dissertation.  
When this preliminary work is completed, I will turn towards my actual subject. The first step 
is to outline the socio-cultural context of the news reports. In chapter 2, I will therefore briefly 
sketch the modern history of South Africa, paying special attention to the aspect of violence 
 
18 Vermeulen (2001: 1) and Biz-Community (2003: 1-3) 
19 I have concentrated on national and regional newspapers, daily and weekly, however, with a clear emphasis on the dailies. 
They were chosen by circulation size, in order to eliminate small local papers that do not have a profound impact beyond 
their immediate communities. Also excluded are specialised publications, such as financial newspapers like Business Day or 
the Financial Mail. The individual issues used were chosen by criteria of relevance (for example to find out how a particular 
incident was reported by a certain paper or to check how newspapers looked on a randomly chosen date in time to find 
developments in the incidence of violence in the news) and, of course, subject to availability. Particularly censored editions of 
more vociferous opposition papers were hard to come by. However, I believe that I have achieved to compile a balanced 
cross section as my corpus. For a detailed list of all newspapers used see the literature list. 
20 I have chosen such a large and divergent sample quite consciously. Although it makes an in-depth analysis of every single 
article impossible, which means that the end result might differ substantially from one that is obtained by looking at certain 
individual reports, I believe that it is still more representative of ‘the press’ as a whole. What I am looking for is not a one-
size-fits-all universal key, but a general pattern. And, as Stuart Hall explained in an interview in 1994, “on the whole, over 
the output of a long period, you would tend to get the hegemonic message more frequently”  (Angus et al. (1994: 263)). 
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and confrontation. From there I will move on to the violence itself. In a series of sub-chapters, 
each dedicated to an individual aspect of the ongoing violence I will try to give the reader an 
overview of the different meanings of the term. Hopefully, this patchwork approach will in 
the end lead to a broad understanding of this infinitely complex subject. 
Before turning to the question of how the ongoing violence in South Africa was dealt with in 
the press, I will use chapter 3 to survey how South Africans’ political views and ideologies 
have developed throughout history, because I believe that if we are to understand how the 
media operate in society, we must first know what exactly the society under review is all 
about. Categorization will play an important role here as in the South African context the 
terms of categorization are strongly charged with ideological significance. Making a 
difference between ‘us’, the category of oneself, and ‘them’, the category of the other, is quite 
important to most South Africans.  
The next task will be to explain how the newspapers fit-in with society as a whole. The media 
landscape in South Africa is quite unique. On one hand, an immense variety of papers have 
existed there over the years, on the other hand the individual categories are relatively 
homogenous. The newspapers written for Afrikaners, English speakers, Indians, coloureds, 
and Africans were clearly distinct from one another. Within these groups, however, readers 
did not generally get much variety. The focus of my attention is, of course, the English 
language press. In an attempt to make their editorial choices more transparent, I will briefly 
sketch their history at the beginning of chapter 4. At the same time, I will also deal with the 
substantial amount of political interference in media affairs through censorship and 
propaganda operations in apartheid South Africa. 
Once I have explored all aspects that influenced South African news reports during the period 
under review, I will turn to the subject of violence in the media. I will first show how the 
reporting has changed in quality and quantity over the years. Next, I will elaborate how the 
ideologies described in chapter 3 become manifest in the language and presentation of news 
reports. Then, in chapters 4.1 and 4.2, I will have a look at what exactly violence is when it is 
reported in the press. What acts are classified as violence? Who is involved? How are they 
described? The question here is not only what is said but also what is not said, because the 
omission of certain stories or of certain aspects of the stories printed is one of the most 
effective ways ideology functions in media texts, because it works at a level that the audience 
is not aware of. No one knows what has been left out and why. We generally accept news 
stories as complete and comprising all there is to know about a certain subject at any given 
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time. This lowers our willingness to question whether we are really presented with a carefully 
chosen section of reality, one that serves a certain ideological purpose. 21  
Then it is time to turn to the linguistic and visual codes that the newspapers constructed to 
explain the world to their readers. I will analyse a number of reports and explain the 
individual elements used in the description of violence. Here the question is no longer what is 
said, but how things are said, as the application of the above-mentioned codes is actually more 
important to the reports’ effects on the audience than their content. I will thus analyse the 
media reports using all semiotic tools available, while at the same time correlating my 
findings with historical documents and first-hand accounts of the reported events, in order to 
make visible the point of view of the text thus contextualising it. 
As my final step, I investigated how white South Africans think about violence. The results of 
this research will be presented in chapter 5. I will try to draw-up a comprehensive image, 
based on my own and other scientists’ research, of what white, English speaking South 
Africans think of their country in general and the ongoing violence in particular. Throughout 
the chapter I will compare this world with that portrayed in the media reports, in order to 
show that clear parallels exist between the two. However, as I have already said, just 
correlating text and context will not be enough to accomplish the aim of this dissertation. I 
have to show that there is a relationship between the two whereby one influences the other. 
Using the method of triangulation (in this case comparing extra-medial reality as documented 
in chapter 2, the media reports and the results of my ethnographic work), I will attempt to 
show that the parallels between the white population’s worldview and the media’s reporting 
of violence cannot be the result of mere coincidence. 
Through this work, I am hoping to render parts of South Africa’s history more easily 
explainable, and to help all of us understand the current situation in South Africa a little 
better. 
1. Defining my Approach: Scientific Background and Methods 
1.1 Scientific Background 
When I first began investigating the mass media, I did so from the point of view of 
anthropology. I saw the media as cultural artefacts and focussed mainly on the texts and 
images used in the reporting. However, I soon found that the media’s relevance for society 
and culture goes much further. As Spitulnik put it, they are “at once artefacts, experiences, 
practices, and processes. They are economically and politically driven, linked to 
 
21 Cirino (1973: 40-42), van Dijk (1989 b: 220) and van Dijk (1991: 114) 
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developments in science and technology” 22. A reliance on but one scientific discipline 
therefore necessarily stands in the way of a full understanding of the media. 23  
As I looked further afield, I found that in recent years scholars, mainly in English speaking 
countries, have often combined sociological theories with the knowledge of the cultural 
sciences, as well as with philosophical speculations, historical approaches and political and 
economic analyses in a new approach kind of media studies. 24 I am planning on following the 
tradition of this holistic research. The subject of my dissertation is a combination of a number 
of different problems that have to be solved individually before the whole can be understood. 
In order to achieve this I have drawn on three sources:  
- Anthropological media studies, a discipline which has focused mainly on the people 
involved in the production and reception of media messages as well as the social 
processes and structures that gave rise to the media texts; 
- Cultural Studies, whose main concern has been documenting the political and 
ideological role of the mass media in society; and  
- Critical Discourse Analysis, a part of linguistics, which, besides studying language, 
also pays close attention to non-verbal carriers of meaning, such as images, page 
layout and position of a report within the media discourse.  
These will be outlined in more detail in the following chapter in an attempt to explain how I 
combined them to form my own, interdisciplinary study of the social construction of reality. 
1.1.1 Anthropological Media Studies 
In 1993, Spitulnik bemoaned the fact that anthropologists had to that date largely managed to 
“neglect the centrality of mass media in twentieth century life” 25. And while there are a few 
exceptions, it is still true today that anthropologists in industrial countries have paid scant 
attention to the mass media. While anthropological linguistics and Lévi-Straussian 
structuralism have spent ample time researching the relationship between culture and 
symbolic structures, and there are emerging wide-scale debates about films and television 
within the field of visual anthropology, a fully-fledged anthropology of mass media is still in 
its infancy. 26  
Until very recently, the study of mass media and society was neigh-on exclusively the realm 
sociology. However, the dominance of quantitative research methods in media sociology, 
especially in America, has led to an increasing appropriation of its work by commercial and 
political marketing interests. In recent years, the gap left by this narrowing of the research 
 
22 Spitulnik (1993: 293) 
23 Kellner (Unknown: 2) 
24 Fairclough (1992 a: 1) and Kellner (Unknown: 3) 
25 Spitulnik (1993: 293) 
26 Orywal et al. (1996: 24), Ginsburg (1994: 6), Tomaselli (1996: 10-11) and Spitulnik (1993: 293) 
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agenda has more and more often been closed by anthropology. Since the early 1990s, the 
discipline has shown an increasing interest in the media as a sphere of cultural action and 
expression, drawing on the work of sociology, but approaching the subject from a completely 
different angle. 27 
Anthropologists do not approach the media trying to find out how messages are transmitted 
through space. Instead, they see them as a means for creating, maintaining, modifying and 
transforming culture through time. Anthropology thus contextualises the media into larger 
fields of cultural practice, paying special attention to those areas that are of relevance for the 
existence of cultural values and shared identities: collective representations (from myths to 
movies), social formations (from kinship systems to newsrooms) and systems of exchange 
(not only transmission of message and market distribution but reciprocal and redistributive 
exchanges, such as community media). More specifically, researchers study how media 
producers put together their texts and investigate the reasons for, and patterns of, media 
consumption by different audiences. And in doing so they focus primarily on social relations: 
Social relations that organise media production and consumption, social relations between 
people and media, and the question of how social relations are mediated by communication 
and information technologies. 28 
This obviously calls for a different scientific approach than traditional media studies with 
their quantitative content analyses and artificially created focus groups have provided. Like 
other kinds of anthropology, the anthropology of mass media is rooted in fieldwork, that is, in 
a reflexive engagement with social actors in the contexts in which they live and work. 
Participant observation is an integral part of the anthropologist’s work. The specific questions 
asked by the anthropology of mass media during such research are not so much driven by pre-
existing theoretical assumptions but derive from the fieldwork experience. It does not ‘test’ 
projected effects on statistical samples but looks at the actual impact of the media in the lives 
of real people. It does not seek to reduce complexity by controlling social variables but rather 
seeks to theorize this complexity. 29 And last, but certainly not least, it employs the 
anthropological perspective. This means that anthropology of mass media is:  
- Holistic: 
Holism posits that objects of analysis and their environments interpenetrate each other 
and even define one other. Anthropology is holistic in that it assumes things are inter-
connected, even if we cannot immediately see the connections. It looks for 
connections between seemingly unrelated things. 30 
                                                 
27 Corner (1980: 73), Ginsburg (1994: 6) and Spitulnik (1993: 293) 
28 Ginsburg (1994: 13), Sanders (2000: 9), Servaes & Lie (1996: 8-9), Spitulnik (1993: 295) and Carey (1989: 43) 
29 Geertz (1994: 26), Ang (1991: 164-166), Ginsburg (1994: 12-13), Carey (1989: 56) and Shi-Xu (2003: 14) 
30 Keesing (1979: 27), Radcliffe-Brown (1987 (1940): xii), Geertz (1994: 17) and Carey (1989: 42) 
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- Relativistic:  
Relativism is a crucial part of anthropology’s strategy for handling difference. 
Anthropology accepts difference as meaningful in its own terms without reducing it to 
universalistic (and inevitably ethnocentric) categories. As most fieldwork takes them 
across cultural lines, anthropologists have learnt that what most people assume to be 
natural and universal is generally cultural and particular. With regards to the media 
this means that anthropology takes all meaning to be cultural and that without 
knowledge of a given culture, the meaning its members find in a medium cannot be 
understood by the researcher. 31 
- Interpretive:  
Since Clifford Geertz’s introduction of hermeneutics into anthropology, human 
behaviour has widely been viewed as symbolic action, which needs to be interpreted 
and whose meaning is to be understood. “What we call our data,” Geertz writes, “are 
really our own constructions of other people’s constructions of what they and their 
compatriots are up to.” 32 Thus, in the act of observing and documenting cultures, we 
automatically interpret them. 33 
- Evolutionary: 
Anthropology assumes that social change is the norm. Rather than positing 
dichotomies like ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, it works with a specific concept of 
culture, which is based on the assumption that innovation, diffusion, borrowing and 
hybridity are normal social processes. 34 
- Empirical:  
Anthropology does not attempt to predict human behaviour. Instead, it attempts to 
understand it by way of observing it. The discipline hopes to render mankind 
understandable by accumulating information about it, by building an archive of 
possible behaviour so to speak, and by subjecting its findings to methods that help it to 
inductively construct a theory of how different cultures organise their world. 35 
The importance of anthropology for my work does not lay in the wealth of previous work on 
mass media to draw on, but in providing me with a set of tried and tested ways to do research. 
The present dissertation is meant to be an ethnography – at least in parts – in the sense of 
interpretive anthropology as practiced by Clifford Geertz. I share with Geertz a dislike for 
objectivism, as I believe that no social scientist can ever be objective in the sense in which the 
                                                 
31 Radcliffe-Brown (1987 (1940): xi-xiii), Kress (1985: 72), Carey (1989: 56-57 and 65) and Geertz (1994: 17) 
32 Geertz (1994: 9) 
33 Clifford (1999: 34), Geertz (1994: 10 and 17-20) and Thompson (1990: 274-275) 
34 McMahon & Quinn (1993: 1), Kellner (Unknown: 3), Geertz (1994: 25) and Carey (1989: 66) 
35 Keesing (1979: 27), Geertz (1994: 17-18), Carey (1989: 56) and Goodenough (1964: 36) 
  11
                                                
word is used in the natural sciences. While it makes no difference to the outcome of an 
experiment in chemistry if the scientist is watching, in anthropology, the mere presence of the 
researcher affects the results of his/her work. I have therefore drawn on Geertz’s advice that, 
if anyone is to profit from an ethnographic work, the writer should not obscure his/her role as 
an interpreter, but admit their biases and allow every subject, including themselves, self-
awareness and agency. This has the added advantage of giving the reader the chance to filter 
out what he/she perceives to be the author’s subjective point of view. The result is 
comparability despite the above-mentioned lack of objectivity. 36  
Thus, according to Geertz, a meaningful account of culture has to go beyond mere 
descriptions; it has to interpret what is observed. If approached in this manner, the work of 
ethnography appears rather like literary criticism – as unravelling the structures of meaning 
and determining their significance in society and, obviously, describing them intelligibly 
within the context of culture. 37 To this end, Geertz suggests a complete break with the old 
definition of what it means to do ethnography – “establishing rapport, selecting informants, 
transcribing texts, taking genealogies, mapping fields, keeping a diary, and so on” 38 – and to 
define the endeavour anew by what “kind of intellectual effort it is: an elaborate venture in, to 
borrow the notion from Gilbert Ryle, “thick description”” 39. Critics have denounced this term 
as a mere catch phrase for the mixing of description and interpretation. But there is more to it. 
A ‘thick’ description is one which acknowledges the depth of culture and digs beyond what is 
visible at the surface to find the complex, hidden layers of significance. And it is an attempt of 
solving the anthropologist’s paradox of wanting to describe a culture from the point of view 
of its members while accepting his/her status as an outsider. 
And as such, cultural analyses are by their very nature incomplete. No matter how often we go 
back to re-assert our findings and no matter how often we have them reinterpreted by our 
informants, they will at all times remain interpretations. There is no getting to the bottom of it 
all, to the pure truth. All we can expect, even from a hermeneutic approach, is a refinement of 
our writing. 40 An ethnography will always present a limited view, a certain section, a passing 
impression of a culture for, besides being bound to the individual writer, they are also 
influenced by the way a particular culture presented itself to him or her at a particular point in 
time. Cultures are always in flux; never can you go back to the same place at a later date and 
hope to find the same things again. This should not be seen as a loss though, because, as 
 
36 Moreley & Silverstone (1991: 154), Cohen & Rapport (1995: 2) and McRobbie (1982: 52) 
37 Clifford (1999: 34 and 40), Geertz (1983: 58) and Geertz (1994: 9-10 and 14) 
38 Geertz (1994: 6) 
39 Geertz (1994: 6) 
40 Geertz (1968: 154), Geertz (1994: 29) Moreley & Silverstone (1991: 161) and Clifford (1999: 13) 
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Geertz has pointed out, the analysis of culture does not need to seek exactness, for “it is not an 
experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning” 41.  
1.1.2 Cultural Studies 
The second important influence on my work has come from Cultural Studies, a discipline that 
emerged in Great Britain during the second half of the 20th century. It is concerned with 
phenomena at the interface between formerly distinct disciplines such as sociology, literary 
analysis and communication studies. Unlike anthropology, Cultural Studies is interested more 
or less exclusively in industrial societies and looks at culture in a highly politicised way and 
essentially from a Marxist point of view. The discipline draws on a critical paradigm in 
formulating its theories, that is, it approaches subjects with an eye on their role in 
constructing, maintaining and changing power relations in a society. 42  
For students of the media, this leads to a multiperspectival approach that combines the 
analysis of the production of culture with textual analysis and audience reception studies. 
Unlike proponents of what Teer Tomaselli has called the “Market / Libertarian / Pluralist 
theory” 43, who take the media to be a neutral transmitter of information controlled by 
audience demands, Cultural Studies see them as important carriers of ideology. They also 
credit the media with a very active role in “selecting and representing, of structuring and 
shaping” 44 events and thus providing audiences with ways of seeing and interpreting the 
world. By assigning meaning to things and events they become (co-) producers, rather than 
merely products, of the social context they emerged from. 45  
So much for the media themselves, but where does this model leave the audience? Are they 
not free to interpret messages in accordance with their views and opinions? Some critical 
theorists, such as those of the Frankfurt School, did claim that media consumers were mere 
passive recipients of pre-fabricated messages who had no understanding of the true nature of 
mass communication and thus no choice but to naively believe what they were told. On the 
other end of the scientific spectrum, the proponents of the libertarian theory pointed at the 
freedom of choice on the part of the audience and argued that people who are informed 
truthfully by a free media will always remain in control of their knowledge. 46  
When scholars of Cultural Studies first turned their attention to the media during the 1970s, 
they tended towards the Marxist power model of communication and argued that the ruling 
classes used the media to force their worldview on unsuspecting, passive recipients and to 
 
41 Geertz (1994: 5)  
42 Fiske (1987: 255) 
43 Teer Tomaselli (1992: 7) 
44 Hall (1984: 65) 
45 McCombs & Gilbert (1986: 2), Hall (1977: 340), Bennett (1982: 295-296) and Glasgow Media Group (1976: 339) 
46 Bourdieu (1991: 168 and 209-213) and Wodak (2002: 20), Hodge & Kress (1988), Kellner (Unknown: 9), Thompson 
(1990: 267-268) and Teer Tomaselli (1992: 10-11) 
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maintain the status quo. 47 However, with time Cultural Studies largely abandoned this rigid, 
deterministic point of view, for it has a fatal flaw: It does not take into account people’s 
ability to think. The audience is not a herd of sheep without a will of their own. They are 
people who can choose if and what they want to watch or read. And they will not accept news 
that portrays a world completely different than what they think is real. 48 Moreover, as several 
researchers have shown, understanding and recall of media messages are greatly dependent on 
people’s previous knowledge. They will generally find and remember what they knew before 
and forget almost everything else. 49 
The only way of solving this apparent incompatibility between media power and freedom of 
choice was to abandon both the behaviourist stimulus-response model of media ‘effects’ 
favoured by sociology and the ‘hypodermic needle’ model advanced by many Marxist 
scholars and instead view the media as a cultural and ideological force with a certain power in 
a broad social framework. This also entailed a move beyond the standard three-stage model of 
communication, sender – message – receiver, to take into account the serious intermeshing 
between these three moments. This new approach was inspired by Frank Parkin’s and 
advanced by Stuart Hall in his groundbreaking research on encoding and decoding. 50 Hall 
pointed out that before there can be a sender or a message an event has to happen, which then 
has to be transformed into a text, a “story” 51 as he put it, and only then can it become a 
“communicative event” 52. Thus, far from being separate, sender and message – producer and 
product as it were – are closely intertwined. One would not exist without the other. 53 
The same is true at the other end of the old model, that of the receiver. As Hall wrote: “Before 
this message can have an ‘effect’ (however defined), satisfy a ‘need’ or be put to a ‘use’, it 
must first be appropriated as a meaningful discourse and be meaningfully decoded.” 54 Thus, 
without a decoder, there is no message. And while the person doing the encoding sets certain 
limits for possible understandings of the message, the one decoding it is not a mere receiver, 
but an active participant in the process of making meaning. 
Applied to news discourse this suggests that, when writing an article, the journalist has in 
mind a preferred or intended meaning, which he/she encodes in the article. During the actual 
 
47 Golding & Murdock (1978: 201 and 213), Chibnall (1977: 3-5), Fiske (1987: 260) and Moores (1993: 12-15) 
48 Kress (1985: 73), Carey (1989: 52 and 54), Östgard (1965: 46) and Fowler (1991: 43)  
49 Hartmann & Husband (1974: 95-96), van Dijk (1988 a: 153-154), Stocking & LaMarca (1990: 295), Bell (1991: 233) and 
Findahl & Höijer (1981: 395-396) 
50 Hall, Stuart, 1973, Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse, University of Birmingham, Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies, Stencilled Occasional Papers, No. 7. Reprinted in 1980 as Encoding/Decoding. In: Stuart 
Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe & Paul Willis (eds.), Culture, Media, Language. London: Hutchinson, 128-138. 
51 Hall (1980: 129) 
52 Hall (1980: 129) 
53 Hall (1984: 56-57), Hall (1980: 129-130) and Morley (1983: 104) 
54 Hall (1980: 130) 
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process of media consumption, the audience decodes the meaning of the text on the basis of 
their own previous experiences – with the media as well as other aspects of the world. 55 
This, obviously, does not always lead to the understanding intended by the author. Cultural 
Studies have identified three positions the reader can take when faced with a text: The 
‘dominant code’, the ‘negotiated code’ or the ‘oppositional code’. If they opt for the first, the 
message encoded in the text is likely to be accepted as intended by the writer. Under the 
negotiated code, readers decode the message partially or resist part of it. For example in an 
article about violence in the South African townships, readers might accept the general 
definition of an incident as a riot, but reject explanations about the causes of this particular 
riot. Considering the multiplicity of messages encoded in every text, this is probably the 
option taken in most instances. The final option, that of an oppositional code, the dominant 
ideology encoded in the text is rejected outright. 56  
The above-described assumptions about the process of news production and the role of the 
audience have had a profound impact on the aim of media research. The purpose was no 
longer to find some absolute truth or real reality behind the message and expose ideological 
distortion of these facts. Nor did researchers any longer feel that a correlation of social factors 
(such as class, creed or gender) with psychological variables of the media consumed 
(credibility, appeal of the message) would help them make solid predictions about future 
behaviour (choice of political allegiance, voting behaviour). The onus now lay on discovering 
how a particular system of representation offers us a way of experiencing the world. 57  
This is not to mean that the accuracy or truthfulness of an article cannot or should not be 
tested by the researcher. However, in order to do so successfully, the researcher has to 
redefine the term ‘truth’. Foucault’s metaphor of “regimes of truth” 58 is helpful in this 
respect. Here, the notion of truth as a state is replaced by one of truth as relationship. A text is 
never intrinsically true or untrue. It can only ever be true in relation to a specific frame of 
reference. Accordingly, the truth of a statement can always be tested in relation to the 
conceptual system of the person making it. 59  
Truth is of undisputed importance to my work. I must investigate if and to what extent the 
newspapers deceived their readers by, either knowingly or unknowingly, providing them with 
false accounts of the facts. However, the question of meaning clearly takes precedence, for 
how can we measure such categories as ‘unrest’, ‘revolution’ or ‘black-on-black violence’ in 
terms of truthfulness? We cannot. No one can count them, photograph them or verify them. 
 
55 Hall (1980: 134-136), Fiske (1987: 260), Hartley (1982: 25), Corner (1980: 78-79), Davis (1993: 38) and Kress (1985: 73) 
56 Hall (1980: 136-138), Hartley (1982: 148), Moreley (1983: 107-110) and Wren-Lewis (1983: 186-187)  
57 Thompson (1981: 99-100), Bennett (1982: 302-306), Fiske (1987: 256) and Carey (1989: 60-63) 
58 Foucault (1980: 133) 
59 Searle (1995: 8), Sayer (1984: 64-67), Ricoeur (1981: 213), Potter (1996: 86) and Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 161-162) 
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All we can do is understand their meaning in any given context and to investigate how this 
meaning came about. 60 This is exactly what I intend to do.  
1.1.3 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
Despite their concern for the communication process, the approaches described above paid 
only scant attention to the linguistic features of media messages. Cultural Studies borrowed 
from semiotics the notion of code as a conventional meaning system, but never looked at the 
signs that convey the meaning. Similarly, anthropology looks at media texts under the 
assumption that language operates as a transparent vessel for meaning. 61 The first attempt at 
studying language in society was made in the 1970s by linguists, especially those who 
followed a critical paradigm. Their interest was with language use in public and institutional 
settings that reflect unequal power relations. 62 Many of them turned away from the notion of 
language, focussing instead on discourse, which was seen as a “systematically organized set 
of statements which give expression to the meanings and values of an institution” 63. 
This emphasis brought “social science and linguistics (…) together within a single theoretical 
and analytical framework, setting up a dialogue between them” 64. Language and society were 
seen as too closely intertwined to be viewed independent of each other. Language is socially 
conditioned, that is, it is the result of its use in social situations. At the same time it is socially 
constitutive, though, in that it shapes these very situations and the social identities of, and the 
relationships between, its users. As such it has the power to sustain and reproduce the status 
quo or to challenge or even change it. 65 The central notion of CDA hence echoes that of 
Cultural Studies: Meaning cannot simply be found in texts. It is constructed in a dialogue 
between the writer and an active reader; it emerges only in discourse. 66  
Researchers therefore do not limit themselves to textual analysis, instead looking at the entire 
communicative event. Fairclough advances an analytical model of concentric squares with the 
text in the middle, surrounded by the discourse practice (text production and consumption), 
and finally the sociocultural practice (the social and cultural structures which give rise to the 
communicative event). For Fairclough, discourse practice mediates between society and 
culture on the one hand and language on the other. 67 This view closely resembles van Dijk’s 
three dimensions of ideological analysis: Discourse analysis, analysis of sociocognition, and 
social analysis. 68 The main difference between the two approaches is the second dimension. 
 
60 Johnston (1996: 82), Geertz (1994: 5) and Hodge & Kress (1988: 122) 
61 Geertz (1964: 57), van Dijk (1985: 2), Jensen (1991: 28), Scollon (1998: 269) and Sayer (1984: 57) 
62 Wodak (1996: 15), Weedon et al. (1980: 209-210), Shi-Xu (2003: 1 and 11) and Fairclough (1995 54) 
63 Kress (1985: 68) 
64 Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999: 6) 
65 de Cillia et al. (1999: 157), Wodak (1996: 15), Kress (1985: 67 and 81) and Fairclough (1992 a: 28-29) 
66 Garrett & Bell (1998: 2-6), Fairclough (1995: 27-28), Fowler (1991: 43) and van Dijk (1988 a: 99) 
67 Fairclough (1992 a: 71-73) and Fairclough (1995: 57-60) 
68 van Dijk (1988 a: 18-26) and van Dijk (1995: 30) 
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While Fairclough takes discourse practices to be the mediator between the text and the world, 
van Dijk’s model favours social cognition and mental models. 69 
This difference in emphasis has resulted in two slightly different approaches to news analysis. 
In the basic dimension, Fairclough focuses on a micro-level analysis of the surface structures 
of media texts, while van Dijk is mainly concerned with the macro-level, that is, the thematic/ 
topic structure of news stories and their overall structural schemata. Still, the two have much 
in common in this core area. Both combine linguistic analysis in terms of vocabulary, 
grammar and semantics with the investigation of rhetorical elements that lend factuality to the 
reports, such as quotations and indirect speech, and the study of textual organisation above the 
sentence level, such as cohesion or turn-taking in interviews. 70 
In the second dimension, the two approaches differ most strikingly. Fairclough’s main 
concern is with the routines of news gathering, news selection, writing and editing. 71 One 
central notion here is that of intertextuality 72. As Fairclough pointed out: “The media help 
build up ‘mnemonic frameworks of definition’ in terms of which news stories are 
subsequently interpreted.” 73 Before an event is first reported, it is still open to a number of 
different descriptions and their associated interpretations. Once it has been captured in an 
article it becomes fixed and generally eludes understanding in any new terms. Any further 
accounts of the event then tend to be based on this first interpretation. 74  
The question of access to the media as sources and distributors of information and the 
practices and contexts of media consumption, do not remain unaddressed, but Fairclough 
approaches them in a strangely ambivalent way. On the one hand, he agrees with Cultural 
Studies that different audiences find different meanings in texts. 75 On the other hand, like all 
Critical Discourse Analysts, he tends to focus on what he perceives to be the intended reading 
of a given text, without using empirical data to support his views. Thus, the analysis of text 
reception in Fairclough is more of an interpretive affair. 76 
Van Dijk on the other hand is interested in the people involved with the text, focussing on the 
cognitive processes that happen during text production and reception. In his eyes, when 
reading a newspaper, people bring with them previous knowledge that helps them establish 
the meaning of the individual text. An understanding of the language used as well as a degree 
 
69 van Dijk (1991: 119), van Dijk (1995: 2), Fairclough (1995: 29) and van Dijk (1998 b: 26-27) 
70 Fairclough (1995: 30 and 57-58), van Dijk (1989 b: 209-213) and van Dijk (1991: 45-47 and 118-119) 
71 Fairclough (1995: 48-50) 
72 This idea is taken from Russian linguist Julia Kristeva, who defined intertextuality as “the insertion of history (society) into 
a text and of this text into history” (Kristeva (1986: 39)). 
73 Fairclough (1992 b: 199-200) 
74 Shotter (1993: 84-85), Fairclough (1995: 48), Potter (1996: 78-79) and Fairclough (1992 a: 101-102) 
75 van Dijk (1991: 42), Fairclough (1995: 15-16) and Wodak (2002: 11-12) 
76 Fairclough (1995: 16) 
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of knowledge of the properties of media genres 77 and the structure of news discourse 78 are 
essential. 79 Equally, text comprehension is influenced by readers’ views of the world and 
their attitudes towards the situations described. According to van Dijk, during the process of 
news consumption, readers subconsciously combine their previous knowledge with the new 
information received to form a ‘situational model’, a mental representation of the type of 
situation described. This model is taken to be the decisive factor influencing what meaning 
each reader finds in a given text. 80  
Similar processes are seen to be at work in text production. Just as readers interpret texts, 
journalists interpret social events and represent them according to models. Their models also 
determine the rules of newsgathering, such as the establishing of beats or the processing of 
source texts, as well as the writing of a news report. In fact, all rules guiding news production, 
from text schemata to news values, can ultimately be described in terms of models. 81  
The third dimension, that of socio-cultural practice, is more uniform again. Closely mirroring 
Ricoeur and Habermas, CDA looks not only the immediate framework of the communicative 
event, but also its economic, political and cultural context. For media analysts this means that 
the political economy and ownership structure of the media houses, the nature of the market in 
which they operate, the political situation in the country under investigation, and the cultural 
background of the journalists and the audience need to be studied before any significant 
findings can be made about the meaning of a certain media text. 82  
CDA’ approach differs markedly from communication studies in that quantitative methods are 
largely rejected and researchers make no attempt to remain objective or uninvolved. Not 
unlike Geertz, they have repeatedly stated that social scientists cannot be neutral and should 
therefore openly formulate their socio-political goals. This is CDA’s relevance for my work. 
Most scholars working in this field have the explicit aim of demystifying social processes that 
allow for injustice, inequality, abuse of power, misleading audiences, and so on. Moreover, 
CDA’s rejection of a formulaic approach to media studies has enabled me to develop my own 
paradigm as a synthesis of the above outlined disciplines, while giving me clear guidance as 
to the appropriateness of individual choices. Thus, while anthropology gave me the analytical 
tools for my work and Cultural Studies laid out a path I could follow during my analyses, 
 
77 The famous panic that broke out after the radio airing of Orson Wells’ War of the Worlds was due to many people 
mistaking this radio drama for a documentary because it made use of all the markers of the documentary genre. This is a clear 
example of how the genre influences the meaning of a text. 
78 The language of newspaper headlines, for example, is highly conventionalised, as is the structure of the reports as a whole. 
Without an understanding of these conventions headlines such as “Police night of madness” (Cape Argus (1st February 2002: 
1)) would make no sense to the reader. 
79 van Dijk (1991: 114-119) 
80 van Dijk (1988 a: 21-26), van Dijk (1988 b: 107-110 and 141-150) and van Dijk (1998 b: 24-31) 
81 van Dijk (1988 a: 27-28), van Dijk (1988 b: 96-100 and 111-124) and Stocking & LaMarca (1990: 298-301) 
82 Fairclough (1995: 42-48 and 50-52) and Thompson (1990: 278-284) 
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CDA supplied me with the perspective from which I viewed my subject and hence a more or 
less clear concept of the problem at hand. 
1.2 Methods 
1.2.1 Information Sourcing 
The aspect that was easiest to approach, but hardest to uncover was the historical reality of 
South Africa. The greatest problem to the researcher arises from the patchy documentation of 
certain parts of history, and the large-scale destruction of documents during and just after the 
end of apartheid. According to estimates by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 
the South African government destroyed 85% of all official documents, between 1960 and 
1994. The sanitation of archives slowed substantially after the change to democracy, but 
small-scale destruction continued until November 1996. In the end, probably less than 5% of 
the original material was saved. 83  
I therefore had to rely largely on secondary sources to reconstruct the history of violence in 
South Africa. Institutions such as the TRC, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the Centre 
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
and the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) as well as numerous individual authors, 
journalists and photographers have devoted much time and effort to what the TRC, citing 
Milan Kundera, called the “struggle of memory against forgetting” 84. Most of my writing on 
South African history is based on their work.  
Another field that I explored partly with the help of literature was that of newspaper 
production in general and the corporate culture of South African newspaper houses in 
particular. Many people assume that the news just happens. It is out there waiting to be found, 
‘gathered’ as the English language misleadingly puts it. This view is rather naïve, though. At 
best we could say that events happen that subsequently get reported as news, but even this 
would be misleadingly simplistic. The news is a cultural artefact, produced according to 
culturally accepted ways of thinking, writing and composing. Every day, there are an infinite 
number of reportable facts, but only very few of them appear in the newspapers. Of the ones 
that do, not all aspects could possibly be reported, so they are trimmed down further to fit the 
mould of a news item. These processes of story selection and production are important in 
determining what messages enter the symbolic arena, and thus what view of the world is 
provided to readers. 85 
In order to find out how and why certain stories made their way into South African 
newspapers, I conducted an extensive literature review. Besides the works cited in the 
 
83 TRC Report, Vol 1, Chap 8, Para 1, 35, 58, 60, 64, 90, 94, 99, and 101 and Merrett (1994: 193-194) 
84 TRC Report, Vol 1, Chap 5, Para 51 
85 Hall (1973: 181), Fowler (1991: 10-11), Reah (1998: 4) and van Dijk (1989 a: 103-104) 
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literature list, I read a number of books on various subjects related to the study of media 
institutions and the production of newspapers that were of no direct use to my dissertation and 
have therefore not been listed. I also conducted a broad search of the Internet for subjects that 
might be of interest for my work. For example, I visited the websites of all major South 
African newspapers and studied the way they presented themselves to the outside world, and 
worked my way through a number of university websites looking at the work done by their 
communications and journalism departments. This gave me a broad base of knowledge on the 
subject of media in South Africa, which I could later draw on during my visit to the 
newspaper offices themselves. 
1.2.2 Participant Observation 
The present situation in South Africa was obviously easier to investigate than the its past, as I 
had the possibility of going there myself and to get to know the country and its culture(s). The 
method I chose to this end was that of participant observation. I moved to Cape Town, rented 
a flat in a white neighbourhood, and did what any normal South African does on any normal 
day – work, shop, go to the cinema and so on. My goal was to become a member of white 
South African society, to understand the culture I was studying from the inside.  
At the same time, I tried to keep enough distance to observe the world around me from a 
researcher’s perspective. This was a perspective I could not have shed even if I had wanted to, 
so reminding myself of it from time to time was my way of keeping it explicit in the resulting 
field notes and, of course, in the present paper. I wanted to avoid the pitfalls of traditional 
ethnography lamented by Clifford & Marcus: 
“The ethnographer’s personal experiences, especially those of participation and 
empathy, are recognised as central to the research process, but they are firmly 
restrained by the impersonal standards of observation and “objective” distance. 
In classical ethnographies the voice of the anthropologist was always manifest, 
but the conventions of textual presentation and reading forbade too close a 
connection between authorial style and the reality represented.” 86 
One more factor motivated me to remain an outsider: My work was not only meant to help me 
understand the world of white South Africans; it was also seen as a critique of this world. My 
ultimate aim was therefore to assess what I and many other whites in South Africa had 
experienced compared with what I could have seen. I tried to see as much as possible of the 
other side of life in South Africa, the life that ‘my whites’ were rarely exposed to. I visited 
Langa, one of Cape Town’s townships, and Bo-Kaap, a neighbourhood within the bounds of 
Cape Town proper that is largely inhabited by coloured people of Muslim faith. I also spent 
 
86 Clifford & Marcus (1986: 13) 
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one day selling the Big Issue, a magazine in Cape Town sold by “socially excluded people” 
87, in front of a supermarket. I frequently travelled by train or minibus taxi rather than by car 
and took long walks through the back streets of downtown Cape Tow
I repeated this approach in all other places I got to, be it big cities like Johannesburg (where I 
spent two months) and Durban (where I was for two weeks), smaller towns such as 
Bloemfontein and Kimberly (I stayed for a week in each) or villages like Cintsa East in the 
Eastern Cape and Springbok in the Northern Cape. In the process I made notes and took 
pictures of anything that seemed of importance to me. These field notes later served as a basis 
for reconstructing my own view of white South African life. 
During my nine months in South Africa I certainly grappled with such problems as 
‘observer’s paradox’ and a feeling of insecurity as to whether I was actually achieving 
anything. Was I really a researcher or just a long-term holidaymaker who happened to talk to 
a few journalists along the way? Was what I was doing ‘participant observation’ as intended 
by anthropology? I was certainly observing South African life, but was I participating? Or 
was my active observing actually preventing me from taking part in every-day life? Did 
people really give me their true opinions or did they, despite my having told them that I was 
researching current affairs and political developments, somehow sense what I was after and 
told me what I wanted to hear? And what about the journalists? They knew my true subject, 
did they feel pestered or offended at my intrusion and I was just too blue-eyed to notice? As I 
explained above, I do not believe that these questions can be answered conclusively. All I can 
do is reflect on them and hope that my introspection will help me find an answer that I 
personally can live with. And so I watched and listened and interpreted, asked some new 
questions and listened again. And in the end, after the cacophony of voices and kaleidoscope 
of impressions had faded and I was back in Europe looking at ‘my material’ I started the 
interpretation process anew. 88 
1.2.3 Interviews 
The next step beyond mere observation was to find people who could answer the questions I 
had and help me patch together an image of the world English speaking South Africans live 
in. First, I went looking in my immediate surroundings questioning neighbours and friends I 
had made. These people knew roughly why I was in South Africa, and volunteered to help me 
understand their fellow countrymen and formulate the interview questions that I would put to 
them. In the next step, I tested these questions during conversations with, for example, my 
friends’ family members and friends. I still avoided and interview-like setting. Rather, 
 
87 Big Issue (Any Issue: Imprint) 
88 I double checked these results agin in a second visit to South Africa in January and February 2005. 
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whenever I met them, I dropped the occasional question and observed the reaction. The 
answers were neither taped nor written down immediately, because I did not want the people 
around me to feel that I was recording their every move. I found out fairly quickly that South 
Africans are weary of being watched. So, rather than making them uncomfortable, I opted for 
memory protocols, short notes of what had been said that I wrote whenever the opportunity 
arose, sometimes very shortly after the conversation if I was on my own for a moment, but 
generally later that same day. At home I transcribed them on my computer in order to have a 
searchable database of opinions, and colour coded some parts for further investigation. These, 
however, were still only sound bites, a random collection of statements that did not really 
amass to a comprehensive viewpoint. 
This could only be found through interviews. Once my questionnaire (see Appendix A) was 
complete, I set out to find people who were willing to speak to me at length and let me pick 
their brains in partly structured, open-ended interviews. I must admit that this task was harder 
than I had anticipated because as soon as I told people what I was up to they generally became 
rather wary of my motives. That said, I should mention that there were a number of people 
who were more than helpful, very forthcoming and seemed almost eager to be able to share 
their views. They gave me the impression that they felt lost and overlooked in the New South 
Africa and despised the fact that, like a redundant piece of software or a week-old newspaper, 
no one was interested in them anymore.  
Another problem I encountered was to find people of varying backgrounds. I was aware of the 
risk that if I only spoke to my friends in Cape Town I would get a skewed picture of South 
Africa. Thus, in order to avoid the pitfalls of familiarity I opted for distance. I asked people I 
barely knew, such as a researcher at Stellenbosch University and a neighbour I had only just 
met, if they could get me in touch with people who might be willing to speak to me. Their 
recommendations amounted to a list of 22 people, unfortunately still mostly in the Cape Town 
area. I contacted all of them variously by telephone or e-mail. If I did not hear back from them 
I wrote or called one more time and after that struck them from the list. In the end, this did not 
lead to the desired snowball effect of ever-greater interest in my work. Only nine people, five 
women and four men (as well as one lady’s 11-year-old daughter), agreed to be interviewed, 
five of them in their own homes, the rest in a café or restaurant.  
My interview partners did not know the real subject of my research, because in order to avoid 
influencing their answers, I told everyone that I was researching politics and current affairs in 
South Africa. The interviews were partly structured, but open-ended, because I wanted the 
results to reflect, as far as possible, the opinions of the people I spoke with rather than my 
views. After my bad experience with recording people who are not used to it I did not attempt 
to tape the interviews and instead opted for writing down their answers. This had the 
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disadvantage that it disrupted the flow of the conversation, but on the other hand enabled me 
to scribble down extra little details like remarks about gestures.  
In general, I was quite happy with the outcome, but I did feel that my sample was neither big 
enough nor really representative of South Africa. Although it included men and women aged 
between their early 30s and mid-60s (my guess) I lacked younger people, people of lower 
socio-economic standing, and, obviously anyone other than Capetonians. In order to find their 
views, I decided to conduct street surveys in several South African cities. I revised my 
questions and compiled a nine-point questionnaire that called for basic yes or no answers, 
which could be further explained if necessary (see Appendix B). This approach was first 
tested during trips to Durban and Bloemfontein – with very bad results. In Durban I spent two 
hours standing at the beachfront and in all this time only managed to get ten people to stop 
and speak to me – including two couples and a pensioner accompanied by her son. I did 
manage to broaden my demographic base, though. In total I spoke with four women and six 
men, including an 83-year-old lady, a 19-year-old (female) student, a homeless man and a 
recent émigré who was only in the country to visit his father.  
The results in Bloemfontein were even more disastrous. There, I strategically positioned 
myself at the entrance to a big, brand new shopping centre that to me was like a trip back to 
the apartheid years: All shoppers and most shop clerks were white while the cleaners were all 
black. I was really looking forward to this experience and enthusiastically approached a 
number of people – to no avail. I stood there being ignored or turned down for over half an 
hour before the first person, a disabled lady in her fifties, felt sorry enough to stop. Or was she 
just too slow to run? After six questions she excused herself and was gone. Still, the next half-
hour proved more productive than the last with four more people, three women (two, of about 
20 and 40, who came together and a teenager) and one man (a pensioner in his 70s), stopped 
and spoke with me.  
Unfortunately after this first hour – I was going to stay for two hours as in Durban – my 
research in Bloemfontein was brought to an abrupt end. The next person to speak to me was a 
security guard who hauled me before the head of mall security. And as if that was not scary 
enough, the man turned out to be a massive Afrikaner, a good two metres tall and not much 
less in width, and was not the sort of person you wanted to be angry with you. When he shook 
my hand I felt as if he was trying to break my fingers, and when asked me, politely and in 
English, to stop pestering his customers and either shop or leave, I opted for the latter. I would 
have continued my survey on this seemingly safe side of the road, but the shops here were 
patronised only by blacks – oh yes, apartheid lives on in Bloemfontein! 
In any case, after this experience I dropped all hopes of getting people to speak to me in 
interviews and continued with my initial approach of asking questions in informal 
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conversations, both with strangers and with people I knew, and later sketching the results 
down on a notepad. This worked – even in Bloemfontein where I had a great conversation 
with a man at the mall the next day – and therefore remained my main source of information 
that the chapter on South Africans’ ideas about their country in general, and violence in 
particular, is based on. 
Interviews were a much more appropriate method when it came to researching the ins and 
outs of news production. I visited a total of 17 newspaper offices in all major South African 
cities 89 and interviewed 35 active and retired journalists, six current or former managers or 
managing editors of a variety of newspaper houses (old and new), seven researchers from 
various universities and independent research institutions as well as spokespersons for the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions, the South African Union of Journalists, the ANC 
(including Pallo Jordan, who, after 1980, was the director of the ANC’S first internal mass 
propaganda campaign), the Office of the State President, the Ministry for Safety and Security, 
the Freedom Front and the apartheid government (Leon Mellet, the former director of 
information for internal media at the Bureau for Information). 90  
Interview subjects were first contacted by e-mail or telephone. If they agreed to speak to me, 
an appointment for a personal interview was set up. Several people did not reply to my 
requests or turned me down, unfortunately including the three journalists I contacted at the 
Cape Times, the editor of the Cape Argus and the people behind the contact e-mail at the 
Daily Dispatch and the Eastern Province Herald, which meant that modern perspectives from 
both the Western and Eastern Capes were missing. Most former employees of alternative 
newspapers were unavailable too, which weighed my knowledge heavily in favour of the 
mainstream press. But the wealth of material and the help I got from everyone else, including 
several former editors of the Cape Times and Rand Daily Mail as well as former contributors 
to the alternative press, including the editor of Umafrika and the news editor of Grassroots, 
meant that the missing voices did – at least in my opinion – not affect the overall quality of 
my data.  
With the exception of one conversation, which took place in a café, all interviews were 
conducted in my contact’s office or home. They followed the same pattern as those I had with 
ordinary South Africans. They were partly structured with open-ended questions. I had a list 
of questions that everyone was asked (see Appendix E), but those were a mere guideline for 
the conversation. Additional questions were asked where it was appropriate, and, if the 
interview veered off in a direction that no longer followed my questionnaire, but was still 
relevant for my research, I did not force the remaining questions on my interview partner, as 
 
89 For a complete list of all institutions I visited see Appendix C 
90 For a complete list of all people spoke with see Appendix D 
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this would have interrupted the flow of information. The interviews were recorded and later 
partly transcribed by myself, except my conversation with a former manager of the Argus 
Group, who wished not to be taped. In this case I took notes during the interview and 
supplemented them later with a memory protocol. I transcribed the language as I encountered 
it, with all pauses, repetitions and interruptions, but edited some of the quotes included in this 
paper in order to make them more readable and render the content more understandable. I 
realise that this kind of editing can and does distort the content as well, but I hope and believe 
that my intervention did not in fact alter the overall message intended by the interviewee. 
1.2.4 Newspaper Analysis 
An important part of my work was dedicated to the investigation of the manifest content of 
news reports, that is, the linguistic and visual elements used as basic carriers of meaning. This 
was meant to help me find what Iser has called “the code underlying the text” 91, the set of 
culturally salient rules that define exactly how violence is to be understood in the context of 
English language press reports in South Africa. My primary concern in this section was with 
the written aspects of the news reports, most importantly their language. Lexical choice, word 
or clause order and the grammatical style strongly influence the readers’ understanding of the 
message and as such warranted close attention. 
Another important element of any newspaper today is the photograph. Pictures have a special 
significance when it comes to conveying meaning to the public. Previous research has shown 
that more people look at the pictures in a newspaper than take the time read the articles and 
that photographs are the one feature most often remembered about a news report. 92 Pictures 
are also interesting to the researcher because, unlike language, they carry an air of objectivity. 
Looking at a photograph gives us a degree of certainty that the things portrayed really 
happened as we see them. 93 Such views are deceiving though. Far from being a “message 
without a code” 94, as Barthes once called them, news photographs are highly stylised means 
of communication, carefully constructed through the choice of equipment, angle, distance 
from the motif, details included, the moment chosen to photograph, the selection of a specific 
shot for publication, its size, position on the page and the accompanying text. The only reason 
we do not routinely notice the code at work is because we have internalised it to a point where 
it becomes transparent. 95 
 
91 Iser (1978: 81) 
92 van Dijk (1988 a: 146), Bollig & Klees (1994: 13) and O’Dowd (1996: 1 and 24-25) 
93 Retief (2002: 69), Barthes, (1977 (1964): 44-45), Bollig & Klees (1994: 13) and Potter (1996: 97) 
94 Barthes (1983 (1961): 196) 
95 Edwards (1997: 222), MacLuhan (1964: 188-193), Hartley (1982: 181), Bignell (1997: 98-103), Corner (1980: 82), 
Tomaselli (1996: 61-65) and Potter (1996: 97) 
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That said, we should not forget that meaning is not inherent in texts or images, but rather 
negotiated in discourse. In order to find the meaning of a report, questions such as that about 
its broader context, the time span a subject was dealt with, the nature of the external referent, 
possible modes of text consumption and the integration of the audience in the process of 
reporting had to be explored. 96 Moreover, to show that the apparent mirror images of reality 
and seeming carriers of truth are really building blocks of one particular reality and windows 
onto just one of many truths, I had to take a closer look at the press reports as a whole, that is, 
at all linguistic and visual components used as basic carriers of meaning as they appeared 
together on the page. The positioning of an article within the newspaper, length and 
presentation of the report, the layout and composition of a page, the size and wording of the 
headline, the captions under the pictures and the use of colours are of equal importance for 
understanding the message that a newspaper is trying to communicate. Such factors give the 
reader clues on the relative importance of the individual elements as well as about the events 
reported, the people involved and the issues behind the reports. 97 
Special attention here was paid to the front page. Most South African newspapers are sold not 
by subscription, but in the street, either by newsagents or by vendors who stand at traffic 
lights and other strategic points in public places. Headlines and photographs that are 
anticipated to increase sales therefore tend to be quite large. “You’ve got to scream at people 
on the street corner,” Tony Heard explained. 98 This has the effect that a large number of non-
readers are exposed to the news every day. They read the headlines when a vendor knocks on 
their car window or see the front-page pictures while walking past a stall. Accordingly, the 
impact of these features on the public is in fact far greater than the sales figures would lead us 
to believe. Many people read parts of a paper without ever buying it. 99 
In fact, I always tried to keep in mind not only the readers, but all people involved with the 
text. Besides the “implied reader” 100 described above, which was defined by Iser as “a textual 
structure anticipating the presence of a recipient without necessarily defining him” 101, every 
text also contains at an expression of its producer’s worldview. As a researcher, I have to 
know both, the producer and the target audience, to understand what meaning a given text is 
intended to communicate. 102 The media analysis was thus only possible after I had already 
begun interviewing journalists and managers and had to be conducted in close coordination 
with further interviews. However, the meaning of a text when it is read by a real person is 
 
96 Sepstrup (1981: 138), Lindkvist (1981: 27) and Shi-Xu (2003: 12) 
97 Jalbert (1983: 284), Kress & van Leeuwen (1998: 186-188), Iser (1978: 9-10 and 21), van Dijk (1989 a: 115) and Sepstrup 
(1981: 137) 
98 Interview with the author, 17th May 2002 
99 Develotte & Rechniewski (Unknown: 2), Ferguson (1998: 130) and O’Dowd (1996: 82) 
100 Iser (1978: 34) 
101 Iser (1978: 34) 
102 Hartley (1982: 87), Reah (1998: 35), Schudson (1991: 152) and Gans (1979: 238) 
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quite different from the meaning encoded by its author. The problem of understanding can 
therefore not be solved by an exclusive focus on the author. I had to keep my interview 
transcripts and field notes close at hand throughout the entire media analysis in order to 
remind me from what position the articles before me would be viewed. For the same reason, I 
frequently took my results back to the people whose ideas I was investigating to check that 
they still found themselves in my text.  
But enough general information. What exactly did I study? During my media analysis I 
looked at over 200 issues of 19 newspapers. Five of those, Natal on Saturday, the Sunday 
Times, the Sunday Tribune, the Sunday Independent and the Weekly Mail / Mail and 
Guardian, were weeklies with a national reach and two, the East Cape Weekend and the 
Saturday Independent were regional weeklies (the latter in KwaZulu Natal).  
Of the daily papers I studied, four were circulated in Gauteng: Johannesburg’s three big 
dailies, the Rand Daily Mail (closed in 1985), The Citizen, and The Star with its weekend 
editions, the Weekend Star and the Sunday Star (closed in 1994), as well as the Pretoria 
News. In the Western Cape I focussed exclusively on Cape Town and its two newspapers, the 
Cape Times and The Argus / Cape Argus, along with the Weekend Argus, which is published 
both on Saturdays and Sundays. In the Eastern Cape I looked at the Eastern Province Herald 
from Port Elizabeth, and the Daily Dispatch, an East London-based morning daily. In 
KwaZulu Natal, I included three newspapers, one, The Natal Witness, from Pietermaritzburg 
and two from Durban: The Natal Mercury / The Mercury and the Daily News. In the Northern 
Cape I only included the Diamond Fields Advertiser in Kimberly. I could not find a single 
issue of the now-defunct Friend from Bloemfontein, so the Free State, along with 
Mpumalanga, Limpopo and North West, is not represented in my survey. 103  
I also briefly looked at the City Press, a Johannesburg-based weekly, the World and its 
follow-ups, the Post and the Sowetan, as well as the Daily Sun (all Johannesburg morning 
dailies), and their weekend editions; the Post (Natal) and Leader, two papers aimed at 
KwaZulu Natal’s Indian population; Isolezwe, a Zulu-language daily in KwaZulu Natal; 
Umafrika, a Zulu weekly and former alternative newspaper from Durban that was revived in 
2002; a number of alternative papers from the 1980s and 1990s including the Weekly Mail, 
New Nation, South and Vrye Weekblad; the Afrikaans weekly Rapport; Cape Town’s 
Afrikaans daily Die Burger; and Johannesburg’s Die Beeld and Die Transvaler (both morning 
dailies). However, they were not included in my analysis. The first group is aimed mostly at a 
black readership, and, as my interviews have shown that they are seldom read by whites, 
therefore had no immediate relevance for my work. The same is true of the alternative press. 
 
103 For an overview of the ownership structure and circulation / readership figures in 2002 of the newspapers in my sample 
see Appendix F 
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These papers had grown out of the black population’s discontent with the mainstream press’ 
inadequate reporting of the struggle against apartheid, and with the exception of the Weekly 
Mail and Vrye Weekblad their readership was predominantly black. The third category is a 
different story altogether. The Afrikaans papers were generally quite similar to the English 
press in their use of symbols, although during the apartheid years they did convey a slightly 
different, generally more conservative worldview. Still I have chosen to disregard them in the 
present survey because, while they are read occasionally by English speakers, they are not an 
important source of information for them and therefore did not have much influence over their 
views and opinions.  
The period of time under review was very long, so obviously I could not view, let alone 
analyse every edition of every newspaper. Instead, I opted for a mix of targeted and random 
sampling, in the hope that this would cover every eventuality. On the one hand, I analysed all 
newspapers available to me around a number of known incidents of violence, among others 
the Soweto Uprisings of 1976, the killing of Steve Biko in 1977, the ANC bombs at the 
SASOL oil-to-coal plant and the Pretoria air force headquarters, the shooting in Uitenhage in 
1985, the Jeppe station necklacing in 1990, the Boipatong massacre in 1992, the vigilante 
attack on gang leader Rashaad Staggie in 1996, and a riot on Pretoria’s trains in 2002. This 
was supposed to provide me with a guaranteed insight into the way violence was described in 
the press during the different periods under review. Moreover, I surveyed a few dates that 
were highly politically charged, such as the tenth anniversary of the Soweto Uprisings, the 
declaration of the partial and first national states of emergencies in the 1980s, the unbanning 
of the ANC in 1990 and the period before the first democratic elections in 1994. This was 
done to see how the newspapers dealt with such situations. On the other hand, in order to see 
what the news looked like on an ordinary day, I randomly chose and analysed a number of 
papers on a number of days between 1976 and 2002.  
A problem I encountered was that of different editions. Most of the major newspaper in South 
Africa, such as The Argus / Cape Argus and The Star, publish more than one edition daily. 
Some produce up to four editions a day, more at times of rapid development, such as on the 
day of the Soweto Uprisings. 104 I have used all material I could find for any given day, but 
as, not all libraries stock every edition of every paper the choice was frequently made for me. 
Furthermore, the British Newspaper Library in London and the Library of Congress in 
Washington D.C. received special overseas editions of some newspapers, which frequently 
differed considerably from the editions of the same newspaper published in South Africa. 
They were therefore of no use for my research. However, as I have consulted a number of 
 
104 Tyson (1990: 69) 
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different archives 105, I am confident that I have acquired a large enough cross-section to 
make representative statements on a newspaper’s content on any given
2. Violence in South Africa – Some Insights 
 
Violence plays a particularly important role for South African cultural identity. Many cultural 
units (for example tribes, peoples, ethnicities, social classes, and even the nation as a whole) 
have emerged after an act of violence, and the feeling persists that one’s own group only 
exists due to this act. The colonial conquest, the Mfeqane, the Great Trek and the Battle of 
Blood River, the Boer War and the fight against apartheid each gave rise to a new social 
order. Accordingly, these violent incidents have come to be associated with positive feelings 
to many South Africans and violence has, beside its destructive powers, acquired the role of a 
creator of good things. 106 It is therefore of central importance for any study of South African 
culture to explain the violence that has shaped the country into what it is today. I will attempt 
to do so in the present chapter. 
2.1 Some General Observations about Violence 
Before turning my attention to the specific forms of violence common in South Africa, let me 
briefly touch upon the phenomenon of violence in general. At first look, the meaning of the 
term violence seems to be fairly clear. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, for 
example, defines it as 
“1 a: exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse (as in effecting illegal entry 
into a house)  
     b: an instance of violent treatment or procedure 
2: injury by or as if by distortion, infringement, or profanation” 107  
However useful this definition might be to everyday language users, it is very simplistic and 
therefore of no use to the scientific study of violence. It accurately describes only active 
physical and psychological violence, that is, violence as a form of conduct. Structural violence 
on the other hand, which has been defined by Johan Galtung as “the violence (...) built into 
the structure (...) [which] shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life 
chances” 108, violence as a condition so to speak, is ignored here.  
 
105 Namely the two above-mentioned libraries; the South African National Library in Cape Town; the libraries at the 
Universities of Cape Town, Natal (Durban Campus) and Witwatersrand; all the newspapers’ available online archives; and a 
number of private collections. 
106 Vogelman & Lewis (1993: 4) and Thornton (2002: 43-44) 
Thornton, however, points out that this is a popular misunderstanding because violence is by no means the origin of the new 
identity. It is merely a condition in society which makes it possible for people to reconsider their old identities thereby 
making room for a new identity building discourse. (Thornton (2002: 43-44)) 
107 Merriam Webster’s Online Dictionary, Search word ‘violence’ 
108 Galtung (1969: 171) 
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When describing the situation in South Africa, however, one should at least acknowledge this 
type of violence for apartheid is a clear example of a violent structure. The policy of racial 
separation was based on the oppression and exploitation of the majority of the people by a 
small minority. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu said in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech: 
“Violence is not being introduced into the South African situation de novo from the 
outside by those who are called terrorists or freedom fighters, depending on whether 
you are oppressed or an oppressor. The South African situation is violent already, and 
the primary violence is that of apartheid, the violence of forced population removals, 
of inferior education, of detention without trial, of migratory labour systems.” 109 
Apartheid has given rise to huge differences in the rates of unnecessary death, disease and 
physical and social disability between blacks and whites. For example, between 1959 and 
1989, black mine workers were 77% more likely to be killed in an accident than their white 
counterparts. 110 The probability of falling victim to crime, too, was influenced by skin colour. 
During 1984-86, a person classified as coloured was roughly ten times more likely to be 
murdered than a white South African. Blacks (in the official sense) were victimised 20 times 
more often. 111 Furthermore, there are clear indications that this violent meta-structure was the 
cause of the extremely high rate of interpersonal violence in South Africa. 112  
The importance of institutional violence should therefore not be underestimated. Still, I have 
chosen to not explicitly deal with either structural or psychological violence in the present 
dissertation. Both will, obviously, form part of the context for my research, but for reasons of 
space and relevance 113 my focus will be on physical violence. Hence, when I speak of 
violence I mean a violation of a person’s physical integrity.  
This field is still broad enough. And it maintains plenty of ambiguity. Webster’s Dictionary 
duly refrains from explaining what constitutes “violent treatment” in individual instances. But 
this is exactly what many anthropologists working on the subject have been trying to do for 
decades. One of the central questions anthropology is trying to answer is where the border lies 
between violence and other forms of behaviour, that is, for the factors that make an action an 
act of violence. Is a light slap given in joking an act of violence? How about a bullet that fails 
to hit its target, a strike that misses, or, conversely, a harmless joke that has gone wrong and 
hurt someone? Are they examples of violence? According to Thornton “this is the genuinely 
 
109 Quoted in Mufson (1990: 82) 
110 Marks & Andersson (1990: 45) 
111 Marks & Andersson (1990: 56-57) 
112 Cock (1990: 67), Hoffmann & McKendrick (1990: 4) and Marks & Andersson (1990: 30-31) 
113 Tomaselli has pointed out that structural violence has penetrated life in South Africa to such a great extent that it was a 
permanent state of affairs. As such it did not make good material for news reporting which concentrates on events rather than 
conditions. (Tomaselli (1998: 14) and Tomaselli et al. (1987: 26)) 
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anthropological question about violence since it asks, What is the nature and function of 
violence in the activity of being human.” 114   
Many social scientists today have come to an agreement that violence does not constitute a 
static phenomenon and can therefore not be objectively defined. The term has got no absolute, 
ever-valid meaning; it is a prime example of an ‘essentially contested concept’, defined by 
Gallie as “concepts the proper use of which essentially involves endless disputes about their 
proper uses on the part of their users” 115. We should therefore not confine ourselves to asking 
what shape violence takes in a certain context and why it occurs. The scientist has to take one 
step back and must ask him/herself why the phenomena they observe should be classified as 
violence in the first place. 116  
They should also keep in mind who has classified them as such. Was it the scientist who 
described certain actions as violence, or was it one of the parties involved? The relevant 
information about the classification of certain acts as violent can only be understood from an 
emic perspective, from an inside point view so to speak, for some acts may be seen as 
harmless by one group, but considered violent by another. Another problem arises with the 
realisation that the perpetrator’s evaluation of a situation often differs considerably from that 
of the victim. We can find numerous examples for this in South Africa. When, for example, 
during the apartheid years, police were using tear gas to break-up a demonstration, they 
themselves did not have the impression of violently acting upon people. The demonstrators, 
on the other hand, felt very much attacked. 117 
As I have hopefully shown, violence cannot be defined purely descriptively. It has a 
normative element. The subjectively perceived legitimacy of an act is decisive for determining 
whether it is seen as violent. 118 In anthropology the concept of culture plays a central role for 
defining legitimacy. Thus, violence is not just an assault against a person’s physical or 
emotional integrity. In order to qualify as violence, an act has to transgress culturally set 
boundaries of legitimacy. 119 The present dissertation follows a definition advanced by 
McKendrick & Hoffmann in seeing violence as  
“destructive harm ... including not only physical assaults that damage the body, but 
also ... the many techniques of inflicting harm by mental or emotional abuse. It is 
generally understood (...) as measured or exaggerated harm to individuals either not 
socially prescribed at all, or else beyond established limits, and is often socially 
 
114 Thornton (2002: 50) 
115 Gallie (1956: 169) 
116 Riches (1986: 1), Hoffmann & McKendrick (1990: 3) and Degenaar (1990: 70) 
117 van der Westhuizen (1982: 9-10) and Riches (1986: 4) 
118 Riches (1986: 3), Hoffmann & McKendrick (1990: 3) and Degenaar (1990: 72-74) 
119 Orywal et al. (1996: 13), Barfield (2003: 483) and Hoffmann & McKendrick (1990: 3) 
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defined to include processes that originate as authorised, measured force, but that go 
beyond the prescribed conditions and limits.” 120  
However, finding the boundaries of legitimacy is particularly problematic in the South 
African context, because, as I have mentioned, the standards of what can be considered 
adequate in a given situation differ greatly. Whether an act is qualified as legitimate use of 
‘force’ or as destructive ‘violence’ depends on the social position of the observer. This was 
especially true during the period of apartheid, but remains relevant even to this day.  
Furthermore, in apartheid South Africa (cultural) legitimacy and (judicial) legality were far 
from the same. Much of the violence perpetrated by the agents of the state, was legal, but 
lacked support from the majority of the population and can thus be considered illegitimate. 
The ANC’s armed struggle on the other hand was seen as a legitimate fight against an 
oppressive regime by most South Africans (if not by many whites), but was quite clearly 
illegal. Even today the gap between legitimacy and legality has not entirely been bridged. 
Many illegal acts, such as the death penalty, corporal punishment and revenge attacks on 
suspected criminals, enjoy a high degree of support from the population. 121 
The only possible solution to this problem is to differentiate between several kinds of 
legitimacy. Not only the legal level is relevant for classifying an act of violence as 
illegitimate. The socially accepted view of reality and the subjective impressions of the 
individual participants also come into play. The question of the legitimacy of a certain act 
may, therefore, in some cases really be answered differently by different people. 122 In this 
paper, I will therefore concentrate on acts that are seen as illegitimate by a substantial portion 
of the South African population. In dealing with them, I will try to take into account how the 
individual participants experienced a situation as well as checking the legitimacy of the act on 
a legal and social level. 
Before I move on to take a closer look at the specific shape the violence has taken in South 
Africa, I should briefly pause to discuss the concept of political violence. Many authors make 
a distinction between violence of the criminal and political type, the former being free of 
ideological motivations while the latter is directed at the defence, disruption, or destruction of 
a normative order. However, as we will see in the following chapter, the division is not that 
easy to make. The term ‘political violence’ seems to be even more difficult to grasp than that 
of violence in general. As Tomaselli has pointed out, “like the term “terrorism,” definitions of 
 
120 Hoffmann & McKendrick (1990: 3)  
This definition is, according to the authors, derived from Walter (1969: 8 and 12). My own copy of Walter’s text does not tie 
up with these quotes though. However, this makes the point of view expressed no less valid and I have therefore decided to 
make it my own in this dissertation. 
121 Hoffmann & McKendrick (1990: 3), The Big Issue (February 2002: 7) and Thornton (1990: 139-140) 
I also found a few proponents of the death penalty among my interviewees. 
122 van der Westhuizen (1982: 9-10) 
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“political violence” tend to be normative, revealing more about the viewpoint of those who 
use them than about the phenomenon itself.” 123  
So what exactly does the expression mean in the context of public discourse in South Africa? 
Tomaselli explains the apartheid viewpoint as follows:  
“Official South African (…) accounts of political violence assume that it is only used 
against the state. Violence used on behalf of the state is tacitly ignored, or seen in 
terms of “law and order”.” 124  
Those who doubt the validity of such a statement coming from a Marxist-influenced English 
speaking scholar can turn to publications from the other side of the ideological spectrum. 
Afrikaans researcher T. J. van Heerden, for example, wrote in an article on Ideological 
Violence, published in 1982 by the pro-government University of South Africa in Pretoria:  
“The following acts are all viewed as forms of ideological violence.  
a) Verbal abuse (abusive language) towards the police, as symbols of the authority 
structure (…).  
b) Written smears and incitements in the form of posters, pamphlets, handbills, 
slogans on walls or other written material.  
c) Noise by shouting or singing whereby (…) the police are demoralized.  
d) Attacks on individual policemen (…), for example, abusive language, spitting and 
physical assault. 
e) Attacks on police equipment, vehicles and buildings. 
f) Throwing of objects (…). 
g) Barricading roads (…) to impede access of police vehicles and flow of ordinary 
traffic. 
h) Destruction, damage and arson (…) 
i) Looting of residences, shops and offices. 
j) Use of explosives and firearms.” 125 (Italics in original.)  
Most of these acts are explicitly described as directed against the state or its representatives 
and the rest constitute acts that, at the time of writing, were mostly perpetrated by opponents 
of the government. Moreover, a number of items are included that I would personally not 
describe as violence, such as “verbal abuse” or “spitting”. It would appear then that any attack 
on the existing order in van Heerden’s eyes constituted an act of ideological violence. State 
violence such as torture, on the other hand, is not listed, as if the state were incapable of ever 
committing acts of ideological violence.  
 
123 Tomaselli (1991 a: 22) 
124 Tomaselli (1991 a: 22) 
125 van Heerden (1982: 196-197) 
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This view was also reflected by the mainstream press. The prototypes of political violence in 
news reports were riots, unrest, and acts of ‘terrorism’. The state’s violent response to the 
uprising received a different label. Depending on the newspaper and the incident described, it 
could be anything from ‘maintaining law and order’ to ‘suppressing the black population’ or 
at times even ‘police brutality’, but never ‘political violence’. In the present dissertation I will 
not accept this definition, even if the people and institutions under scrutiny did. In South 
Africa violence was committed for political reasons by numerous state agencies. And, as 
Claridge has pointed out, “when a state uses violence as a means of coercing society rather 
than defending it, it initiates an abuse of the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of force’” 126. It 
becomes violent.  
I have so far completely ignored one aspect that needs to be addressed in the discussion about 
political violence in South Africa: the fighting between different political groups in the 
townships. The apartheid government had quite consciously tried to de-politicise the struggle 
and accordingly did not include these in its definition of political violence. The liberation 
movements on the other hand knew of the political nature of their undertaking and of the 
political motives behind their opponents’ onslaught and accordingly defined these fights as 
incidents of political violence. So did the people involved, for even if they themselves were 
not actively political, they felt that they were being targeted for political reasons. I fully agree 
with this assertion and will therefore include any violence that is justified using a political 
ideology, or is a means to a political end, in my definition of political violence.  
I acknowledge that this definition has many disadvantages and leaves many questions open. 
What, for example, qualifies as a political goal or statement? And how do we deal with 
persons who pursue entirely non-political goals under the cover of other peoples’ political 
actions? Such problems, however, are small compared with the shortfalls of van Heerden’s 
definition and I will deal with them on a case-by-case basis. What is most important is that I 
include state violence in my analysis of political violence, treating it as equal to the violent 
resistance to government authority. I will, however, always keep in mind that in doing so I am 
extending the definition of political violence beyond that of the texts under scrutiny. 
2.2 The History of South Africa, a History of Violence 
Violence is a recurring theme in South African history books. It played a more than just 
marginal role in the local tribal societies, it was the key to colonisation, and it was perfected in 
modern times by the apartheid regime. It was also an important tool for the adversaries of the 
colonial government and the resistance movement against apartheid. Almost every aspect of 
 
126 Claridge (1996: 48) 
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modern South Africa can be linked to the violent conflicts of the past. 127 Apartheid in 
particular has had great influence on what the country is like today. In the following sub-
chapters I will therefore provide a brief sketch of that era before moving on to look at the 
amount and character, of violence during the period under investigation. 
2.2.1 The Birth of Modern South Africa 
South Africa as we know it came into being in 1910 after centuries of armed conflict. After 
the second Boer war the English colonial rulers understood that the Afrikaners would never 
bow to them in fear. They gave up trying to suppress their aspirations to nationhood and 
instead adopted a strategy of cooperation. Great Britain did not merely annex the conquered 
Boer Republics, but first granted them limited self-government and, on 31st May 1910, all 
four colonies 128 at the Cape were fused together in an independent, federative state, the 
Union of South Africa. English and Dutch were granted the same status as official languages 
and every one of the new provinces could decide for itself what rights to grant the non-white 
population. 129 Louis Botha, an Afrikaner, was named the Union’s first prime minister. When 
it came to writing a constitution for the new nation, the English made it their primary goal to 
secure peace among the white population. They dropped their liberal principles and gave in to 
the Afrikaners on many points – generally at the expense of the non-white South Africans. 
The former enemies had become equal partners while even the most loyal Africans lost most 
basic rights. The road to apartheid was clear. 130 
2.2.2 The Rise of Apartheid 
Just after the founding of the Union, the Afrikaners, embittered about their defeat in the South 
African war and not satisfied with their standing in the new state, established the National 
Party (NP). During the first half of the 20th century, the party’s main role was to stand up for 
the rights of the underprivileged Boers. They did so using a wide range of means, from 
newspapers (meant to shape and strengthen their readers’ sense of cultural and national 
identity) to the guerrilla organisation ‘Ossewa Brandwag’ (O.B.) that fought the English 
speaking rulers by violent means. These more radical elements were eventually silenced in 
favour of a concerted effort to win the hearts and minds of white South Africans within the 
realm of mainstream politics. The big break-through came in 1948 when the NP won the 
parliamentary elections by a short margin. 131  
 
127 Vogelman & Lewis (1993: 4) and Byrnes (1996: Introduction, p. 2) 
128 The formerly British Cape Colony and Natal and the formerly independent Boer Republics of the Transvaal and the 
Orange Free State. 
129 Voting rights were handled differently in the four former colonies. The Cape Province and Natal based their franchise on 
land ownership thus excluding blacks, who were not allowed to own property, but including coloureds and Indians. The 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State did not allow any non-whites to vote at all.  
130 Byrnes (1996: Introduction, p. 3 and The Formation of the Union of South Africa, p. 1) 
131 Heard (1991: 134), Hachten & Giffard (1984: 47) and Byrnes (1996: Introduction, p. 4) 
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The party’s ascent to power under the leadership of D.F. Malan marked the beginning of a 
new era in South Africa: 40 years of narrow-mindedness, self-righteousness and racism 
combined with a new kind and previously unseen levels of violence. 132 One of the first 
apartheid laws, basically the basis for the entire ideology of apartheid, was the Suppression of 
Communism Act of 1950. The new social order of racial separation and the related 
suppression of a large portion of the South African population were justified with the need to 
defend South Africa against an immanent communist takeover. 133 And despite the country’s 
growing isolation from the non-communist west, this ideology of anti-communism was 
maintained throughout the entire apartheid period. 134 Numerous repressive laws as well as 
the atrocious acts of violence committed in the name of the state were justified not just by 
pointing at the ‘swart gevaar’ (black peril) in the shape of the black liberation movements, but 
also the ‘rooi gevaar’ (red peril), the supposed communist onslaught. 135 
The threat was not one of violence though. The anti-apartheid movements were strongly 
influenced by Ghandi’s teachings and his teaching of passive resistance. Their motto was 
‘Civil Disobedience’. The African National Congress (ANC), the biggest and oldest party to 
rally for the rights of the black population, the Pan African Congress (PAC), an africanist 
organisation which had broken away from the ANC in 1959, and the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) met inhumane working conditions with strikes, rulers’ arrogance 
with boycotts, and the unjust laws with demonstrations. The 1950s were not an era of 
violence, but the years of the Freedom Charter and the Defiance Campaign. 136 
The government, however, saw the Freedom Charter as “instigated by the Stalinist 
communists” 137 and passive resistance as a dangerous attack on the state, and fought the 
protesters by violent means. The situation came to a head in 1952 when police opened fire on 
a prayer meeting in East London. This sparked a riot that quickly spread to Port Elizabeth and 
Kimberly. 138 This was the excuse the government had been waiting for to crush the passive 
resistance once and for all. Parliament passed a number of new repressive laws and banned all 
organisers of the campaign, including the leadership of the ANC. Hundreds of activists were 
arrested and, during the notorious ‘treason trial’ of 1956-1961, 156 people of all colours and 
creeds were tried for, and found innocent of, high treason. 139 
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2.2.3 The 1960s: The Lighting of the Fuse  
In 1958, H.F. Verwoerd was elected prime minister. His time in office was dominated by the 
rigorous enacting of ‘separate development’ (a euphemism for apartheid). Verwoerd’s big 
goal was to separate every aspect of South African life along what he called ‘national’140 
lines, which really meant along the lines of language and, ultimately, skin colour. 141 F.W. de 
Klerk explained this strategy in the NP’s submission to the TRC:  
“How could we defend ourselves against expansionist international communism and 
terrorism and yet make all South Africans free? The solution that we came up with 
was “separate development”. We thought that we could solve the complex problems 
that confronted us by giving each of the ten distinguishable Black South African 
nations self-government and independence within the core areas they traditionally 
occupied.” 142  
And so it came that division of the country into white areas, which took-up 87% of the 
country even though only 20% of the population was officially classified as white, and black 
‘traditional’ tribal areas (also misleadingly known as ‘homelands’) that were established on 
the remaining 13% of the territory was written into law. 143 In 1970 all blacks were to lose 
citizenship of (‘white’) South Africa and officially become citizens of one of the 10 
homelands. In fact, between 1976 and 1981 only four homelands – Boputhatswana, Venda, 
Ciskei and Transkei – took this step. Still, a total of 26 million people lost their South African 
nationality. From then on, they were merely guests in the areas outside the Bantustans who 
were tolerated while they were of use to whites (by providing cheap labour) and deported 
when they were no longer needed. 144  
During the early 1960s the liberation movements intensified their efforts to bring down 
apartheid by means of mass protest. The policy of separate development and the much-hated 
pass laws 145 associated with it were the most common cause for demonstrations. The ANC’s 
protest campaign was meant to reach its peak on 31st March 1960, but it never came to that. 
 
140 The idea of separate ‘nations’ inhabiting South Africa was frequently voiced throughout the apartheid years. Rhoodie, for 
example, explained in his propaganda work The Paper Curtain: “The basic situation in South Africa is that different nations, 
Black nations differing from each other, and a White nation have been forced together in one country through an act of war – 
the Anglo-Boer War – and British colonial rule.” (Rhoodie (1969: 128)) Such talk served mainly one purpose: to give a 
semblance of rationality to the policy of ‘divide and rule’ thus justifying the continued suppression of the black population in 
the name of, as Rhoodie so eloquently put it, not “committing cultural genocide”. (Rhoodie (1969: 129)) 
141 Laurence (1979: 55), Tomaselli (1996: 70) and Hellmann (1972: 15-16) 
142 de Klerk (Unknown: 4) 
143 Dedial (1995: 2), Coetzee (1972: 141-142), Leatt et al. (1986: 122-123) and Silke (1997: Part 1, p. 2) 
144 Silke (1997: Part 1, p. 2), Kane-Berman (1991: 75), North (1986: 35-36) and Campbell (1987: 175) 
145 They were based on a law issued in the Cape Colony in 1760 which forced all slaves to carry a pass when they were 
unaccompanied by their owners. The Population Registration Act (‘Pass Laws’) of 1950 extended this to all black males. But 
the passes were more than just a means of identification. Persons classified as black were not allowed to move freely in South 
Africa (particularly not in the white areas) and the reference books listed all areas the holder was permitted to enter. Blacks 
had to be able to present their pass to any policeman requesting it. Persons, who could not show their pass or were found in 
an area their pass was not endorsed for, risked arrest and/or deportation to the homelands. Between the passing of the 
Population Registration Act and the abolition of passes in 1985 this happened 17 million times! (Reeves (1960: 4), Byrnes 
(1996: The PAC and Sharpeville, p. 1), and The History of Apartheid (Unknown: 1)) 
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The PAC called upon its supporters to leave their passes at home on 21st March and to go to 
their local police station to offer themselves for arrest. However, in several townships, instead 
of arresting demonstrators, the police started randomly firing into the crowd. In the most 
infamous of these incidents, which became known worldwide as the Sharpeville Massacre, 69 
people lost their lives and over 180 were injured. Of the 185 shots that hit a human target, 155 
had entered the bodies from behind. 146 This unnecessary show of force gave rise to a wave of 
demonstrations that often ended in more violence. The government reacted on 24th March 
1960 by declaring a state of emergency in 122 of the 265 South African districts. It would last 
for 156 days, during which 18,303 people (18,079 of them black) were arrested and the ANC, 
the PAC, and the SACP were declared ‘unlawful organisations’. 147 
In the face of such massive government repression, the resistance movements began to doubt 
their strategy. Most of the protest campaigns’ organisers had been arrested and charged with 
high treason, and the police reacted as vigorously as ever to offences against the racist laws. 
The Sharpeville Massacre and the events afterwards had shown to the opponents of apartheid 
that neither the police nor the government could be convinced peacefully to change their 
ways, and that non-violent protest would not gain them any sympathy from the white 
minority, either. 148 
So, in June 1961 a group of ANC members around Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Walter 
Sisulu, and Govan Mbeki decided to launch a violent campaign against the oppressors. During 
a secret meeting they founded Umkhonto we Sizwe (Speer of the Nation), known as MK. 149 
Speaking on the ANC’s underground radio station Radio Freedom, Walter Sisulu explained: 
“In the face of violence, men struggling for freedom have to meet violence with violence.” 150 
MK’s principles were clear from the beginning. They would restrict their activity to sabotage 
of strategic government installations. No humans were to be harmed under any circumstances, 
not even the members of the apartheid state’s police and army. 151  
The PAC, too, created an armed wing, Poqo (the Xhosa word for ‘pure’, ‘alone’), and a group 
of white opponents of apartheid formed a militant organisation called African Resistance 
Movement (ARM). Unlike MK, these two groups were not opposed to violence against 
people whom they considered to be representatives of the system. 152 They had started their 
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attacks during the first half of 1961 with a number of smaller hits. A broad campaign was 
planned for 1962, but their struggle was over before it started. 153 Poqo went down when its 
leader Robert Sobukwe was arrested and sent to prison. ARM carried out a number of 
successful bombings, but soon their leaders, too, were arrested. John Harris, one of the 
bombers, was sentenced to death and hanged the same year. 154 
MK’s strategy was different. They took their time and thoroughly planned their campaign. 
They began their armed struggle with a series of bombings in Johannesburg, Durban, and Port 
Elizabeth, on 16th December 1961. At the same time the fighters distributed thousands of 
leaflets with the new MK manifesto:  
“The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit 
or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no 
choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our 
future and our freedom.” 155  
The explosions happened on a symbolic day, the ‘Day of the Covenant’. On 16th December 
1838, the Boers had defeated the Zulu army under king Dingane in the Battle of Blood River. 
In choosing this day for their attack, MK aimed straight for the heart of apartheid’s 
ideological structure: the Afrikaners’ national pride. 156  
Pretoria could not leave this declaration of war unanswered. A countrywide search for all 
known Umkhonto fighters was initiated, which would soon prove successful. The first catch 
was the most spectacular one. On 5th August 1962, not even one year after the first bombings, 
Nelson Mandela was arrested in Natal. 157 The remaining leaders were apprehended another 
year later on a farm in Rivonia near Johannesburg. In 1964, in the legendary ‘Rivonia Trial’, 
they were all sentenced to life imprisonment. 158 This greatly dampened the struggle to bring 
down apartheid. The ANC’s and the PAC’s influence on the South African population waned. 
The black population’s will to resist was broken. 159 
2.2.4 The 1970s: The End of Peace and Quiet  
After a decade of quiet in the townships, the government under Prime Minister B.J. Vorster 
felt they were in a very safe position. The liberation movements had disappeared from public 
view, and South Africa’s black population seemed apathetic; it was almost as if they had lost 
any drive to fight. Time had come for the people in power to secure this pleasing state of 
affairs for all eternity. In unison with the NP and the Broederbond, a secret Afrikaner 
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association, Vorster made the decision to get blacks to permanently accept white rule. The 
system of ‘Bantu Education’, in particular, was to be redesigned to this end. 160  
In 1974, the Minister of Bantu Education, Michael C. Botha, announced that Afrikaans would 
from then on be used on an equal basis with English as a medium of instruction in all 
government-run schools for blacks. This decision was met with strong resistance from pupils 
and parents. In Soweto, kids began boycotting classes. Soon, others across the country 
followed. The protest grew stronger with time. From May until the beginning of June 1976 
small protest marches were held where the kids tried to inform the public of their views. 
These demonstrations frequently led to violent encounters with the police. 161 
Still, nobody expected what was to come on 16th June. In the morning, thousands of school 
kids 162 assembled peacefully in the streets of Soweto with the intention of marching to 
Orlando West Stadium. They were chanting slogans, giving the black power salute and carried 
placards that read “Down with Afrikaans” or “If we must do Afrikaans, Vorster must do 
Zulu!”. 163 Eyewitnesses said they were excited and happy, 164 but the Cillie commission that 
was later set-up to investigate the events claimed that “the marchers appeared to be in an 
aggressive mood” 165. This assertion was shared by the police who tried to get the children to 
turn around using their standard methods of crowd control: They marched in with dogs and 
guns and confronted the pupils in front of Orlando West Junior Secondary School hoping they 
would be impressed by the open display of strength and dissipate quickly and quietly. How 
wrong they were!  
What happened next is still unclear. The policemen claimed to have called upon the masses to 
disperse. In reaction the students had begun throwing stones at their vehicles. Some of the 
officers later said that they had responded with tear gas, others mentioned warning shots. Only 
when none of these measures worked, so the police claimed, did they start shooting at the 
demonstrators. The students and other witnesses, however, reported that the police had started 
shooting without warning. 166 The truth will most likely remain unknown. One thing is sure, 
though. Chaos did not erupt until the first child, thirteen-year-old Hector Petersen, was killed 
by a hale of bullets. 167  
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The police had expected their heavy-handed approach to have the same effect as in 
Sharpeville. It did not. The students did not flee, but began attacking the symbols of white 
power: administrative buildings, schools, bottle stores (shops that held a license for selling 
alcohol to blacks), beer halls, police cars, and even the policemen themselves. Two officials 
of the West Rand Board were beaten to death. The demonstration quickly grew into a fully 
fledged riot. The police intervened in the usual manner and tried to quell the unrest with 
violence. The number of victims was never clearly established. According to officials 25 
people lost their lives and 200 were injured. Others placed the death toll nearer 100. 168 
Throughout 1976 the unrest spread to the other townships and even some rural areas. The 
individual incidents generally followed the same basic pattern as the initial uprising in 
Soweto. The result was generally the same, too: great losses on the part of the protesters, no 
losses on the side of the police. 169 Again, there is disagreement about the exact number of 
victims. Police files show that between June 1976 and February 1977 a total of 575 people, 
including 134 children under eighteen, were killed. Policemen were responsible for 451 
deaths. 170 Many people feel that even these numbers are grossly underestimated though. On 
1st May 1977, the Institute of Race Relations published a list of casualties collected from 
alternative sources with a total of 618 names. Kane-Berman re-examined their calculations 
and found a shortfall of at least another 43, making the total 661. 171 Ellis & Sechaba are of 
the opinion that even this figure is too low. 700 deaths and a minimum of 4,000 injured 
persons, they say, are more reasonable numbers. Besides, the authors point out, around 6,000 
were arrested. Most of the victims were under 20 years of age. 172 
The police eventually succeeded in getting the unrest under control, but life in South Africa 
would never be the same again. Whites had been violently awoken from their dream of peace 
and prosperity and black people had rediscovered their fighting spirit. 173 As Percy Qoboza, 
the editor of the World, told an English journalist in August 1976: “The days of the good 
Kaffir and obedient Bantus belong to the ox-wagon era which is never going to return.” 174  
For a large number of young activists the road back to a normal life was closed after the 
events of 1976. They were wanted by the police or were subject to frequent random arrests, 
most schools were closed, and the kids had aged years within a few months. Most of them 
soon left South Africa to join the ANC’s fighters in exile. By the middle of 1977 roughly 
4,000 youngsters had been recruited into Umkhonto we Sizwe’s camps in Angola. They 
 
168 Ellis & Sechaba (1992: 81), Brink et al. (2001: 58-91), Kane-Berman (1979: 2), SAIRR (1977: 57) and Hirson (1979: 182) 
169 TRC (22nd July 1996: 4), Hopkins & Grange (2001: 191-192), Kane-Berman (1979: 26-36) and North (1986: 42-43) 
170 Byrnes (1996: Soweto 1976, p. 1), Merrett (1994: 104) and Hachten (1984: 4) 
171 Kane-Berman (1979: 27) 
172 Kane-Berman (1979: 7) and Ellis & Sechaba (1992: 82) 
173 Malan (1990: 78), Tutu (1999: 9), Waldmeir (1997: 23), Franks (1987: 179) and Ellis & Sechaba (1992: 83) 
174 Quoted in Sanders (2000: 180-181) 
  41
                                                
expected to return to South Africa within a few months fully trained and armed with 
Kalashnikovs, ready to start the revolution they longed for. The majority, however, would not 
see their home country again for at least a decade. 175  
2.2.5 The 1980s: Violence, Reform, and Checkmate 
Pieter Willem Botha’s election as Prime Minister in 1978 marked the beginning of a new era 
of violence in South Africa. He brought the military establishment, which he had built up and 
nurtured during his time as Minister of Defence (1966-1978) into politics with him. The new 
men in power paid less attention to day-to-day politics than to the country’s internal and 
external defence structures, which soon earned them the name ‘securocrats’. 176 Their main 
preoccupation was to fend off the ‘total onslaught’, an imagined communist attack in which 
the country’s black population and liberal politicians across the world were believed to take 
part, but which was thought to be ultimately directed from Moscow. The attack was believed 
to be happening at all levels of public life, “ideological, military, economic, social, 
psychological, cultural, political and diplomatic” 177. The defence therefore had to take these 
institutions into account as well. It was out of this belief that ‘total strategy’ 178, was born. 
Slowly, laws were enacted and a huge bureaucratic machinery was created, which brought 
every aspect of life in South Africa under the influence of the military. 179  
Ironically, the 1980s were not only a decade of massive militarization and violence, but also a 
time of reforms. In order to appease the international community, domestic economists, and 
the opponents of apartheid, P.W. Botha began loosening or even abandoning some apartheid 
laws. However, the changes were mainly cosmetic. Botha did away with ‘petty apartheid’, 
such as the racial segregation of public life as well as the prohibition on marriages across the 
colour line, and, under pressure from economists, he also liberalised the labour laws. Even the 
much hated pass laws were finally abolished. 180 However, the homeland policy was not 
changed, South African citizenship was not restored to those who had lost it and blacks were 
still not given a voice in politics. 181 
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Botha’s followers fiercely disputed this, pointing at the constitutional reforms of 1983. From 
then on, blacks could elect so-called ‘community councils’ that were responsible for the 
administration of black townships. 182 Coloureds and Indians were even given their own 
chambers in parliament. This, however, was a token gesture rather than an act of political 
empowerment. During separate sessions they were only allowed to decide matters pertaining 
to their own population groups, while the white chamber’s decisions were binding for every 
South African. In joint sessions whites held 178 seats compared with 85 coloureds and 45 
Indians and thus retained an absolute majority at all times. 183  
Accordingly, black voters were neither interested in the parliamentary elections nor in the 
elections of community councillors. In Soweto a mere 5% of the electorate went to the polls. 
In Port Elizabeth the figure was 11%, in the Vaal Triangle 15%, in Durban 19%, and on the 
East Rand 20%. And in the parliamentary elections of 1984 only 30% of coloureds and 20% 
of Indians went to vote. 184 The extra-parliamentary resistance to apartheid on the other hand 
was as fierce as ever. Botha’s feared ‘total war’ was soon to become bloody reality in South 
Africa’s townships. 185 
The great revolt started on 3rd September 1984, five days after the election of the coloured and 
Indian chambers of Parliament. On 2nd September, during the demolition of a squatter camp in 
Bophalong, a policeman shot the captain of the local football team. The next morning a group 
of enraged township residents took revenge by setting fire to several administrative buildings 
and killing three of the community councillors. At the same time in Sebokeng, another group 
set out on a peaceful march to the township’s administrative office to hand in a petition 
against the latest rent increase. They were unaware of the ongoing violence. They got about 
half way before they were stopped by the police, who, in the belief that they were facing more 
rioters, opened fire. 186 From then on chaos reigned in the townships of the Vaal Triangle. 
Within a few days, 31 people were killed. Soon, the unrest spread and a wave of destruction 
rolled through South Africa. 187  
The revolts would turn into a revolution, which would go on for more than three years and 
cost more than 3,000 lives. The ‘comrades’, young street fighters claiming to be followers of 
the ANC, (see chapter 2.3.5 for more details) drove the police out of the townships and began 
patrolling the streets. They set up ‘People’s Courts’ to deal with criminals and collaborators of 
 
182 The community councils were pseudo-administrative bodies created by the apartheid government in 1983 to give blacks 
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the racist regime. The community councils were dismantled and replaced by the residents’ 
street committees. New civic and church organisations were formed from these grassroots 
structures, which cooperated closely in their efforts to rid the townships of white rule. In 1983 
they jointly founded the United Democratic Front (UDF), a nation-wide anti-apartheid 
organisation closely affiliated with the ANC. Following Oliver Tambo’s call to make the 
country “ungovernable” 188, they organised strikes, boycotts and attacks on white businesses 
and the administrative institutions of the apartheid state. 189  
Under pressure from the new recruits of the Soweto generation, the ANC also revised its 
policy on violence. While before, only acts of sabotage were officially approved, the fighters 
now no longer worried about the loss of human lives. At first, only members of the security 
forces became a target. Then the farmers in the border regions were added to the target list 
because they had joined civil defence units set up by the army. And finally bombings where 
carried out in places where even civilians were at risk of being killed. The new tactics also 
called for the fighting to be taken out of the townships and to increasingly carry them out in 
the white parts of the country. 190 The fighters were hoping to shake up the white population 
and to make them aware of the war going on in their own country. In the final months of 
1985, the ANC distributed a flyer calling to “Take the Struggle to the White Areas” 191. 
The next logical step would have been an unrestrained terror campaign against all whites, but  
despite repeated calls to that end the ANC’s leadership did not take it. Their enemies were not 
ordinary white South Africans, but “the racist army, police, death squads, agents and stooges 
in our midst.” 192 Unfortunately, the ANC was not the only resistance movement in South 
Africa. Oliver Tambo had little control over many young fighters and could not prevent them 
from mounting a number of attacks that were aimed solely at white civilians. 193 
In reaction to these developments as well as South Africa’s growing international isolation, 
President Botha approved the full implementation of the ‘total strategy’. As white South 
Africans had the whole world against them, they could now act as the securocrats had always 
wanted and try to root out the communist threat by any method at their disposal. The South 
African air force was sent out to bomb supposed ANC military bases in Harare, Gaborone and 
Lusaka. 194 In South Africa itself, a state of emergency was declared on 20th July 1985 in 36 
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districts and more than 5,000 soldiers were sent into the townships to quell the unrest. A total 
of about 30,000 people (around 3,000 of them women and children), more than during the 
entire time since the Sharpeville massacre taken together, were arrested. 195 On 12th June 1986 
the state of emergency was extended to cover the entire country and the emergency legislation 
was upgraded. Public gatherings were prohibited, several organisations were declared 
unlawful, and the press restrictions were tightened substantially. 196  
However, the government’s view of the situation had changed since the early 80s, and so had 
its security strategy. By the late 1980s, the government relied more and more on covert and 
informal tools of repression such as death squads and “a counter-revolutionary guerrilla force 
which is employed according to guerrilla tactics to annihilate revolutionary guerrillas” 197. 
This role was assigned to various vigilante groups that received increased support from the 
government and anti-ANC organisations such as Inkatha. The aim of this new strategy was no 
longer to isolate the people from the instigators of the ‘total onslaught’, but to regain control 
over the townships by killing opponents of apartheid and sowing fear among the extra-
parliamentary opposition while at the same time wooing the rest of the black population. 198 
And so it came that in the midst of a large national crisis, many townships roads were paved, a 
sewage system was constructed and new houses were built. All together the government 
initiated a total of 1,800 building and renovation projects in townships across the country. 199 
The image of the SADF, too, was given a makeover. Military personnel and equipment were 
used to build recreational facilities and soldiers were employed in schools and clinics in the 
townships. This upgrading drive was accompanied by a massive propaganda campaign aimed 
both at advertising the status quo and at discrediting the liberation movements. 200 
On the other hand, those townships considered being the liberation movements’ strongholds 
became subject to a full-blown military offensive. 34 areas, including all townships in the 
Vaal Triangle, Atterdidgeville, the townships of Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth as well as the 
squatter camp Crossroads were entirely locked off from the outside world, buildings were 
searched, and many residents were arrested. Langa, one of Uitenhage’s townships, was razed 
to the ground. 201 One year after the declaration of the second state of emergency, 97 
townships were occupied by the military. By the end of 1987 calm was at least partly restored 
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in South Africa’s black areas, but below the surface the uprising continued. In February 1988 
the UDF was banned, but quickly re-emerged in the guise of the Mass Democratic Movement 
(MDM), ready to organise more boycotts, strikes and protest marches. No matter what the 
government did, it could not achieve its aims; the black population’s resistance against 
apartheid would not be broken. 202 
Still, nobody expected the end of white minority rule to be only a few years away. The first 
step was taken thousands of kilometres from Pretoria, in Moscow. Gorbachev’s Perestroika 
and the swift end of Soviet communism robbed the securocrats of their enemy. As Allister 
Sparks put it, “for the new ideologists of Pretoria the Gorbachev revolution poses a crisis no 
less severe than the death of Satan would to Christianity.” 203 If the ‘total onslaught’ is over, 
who needs a ‘total strategy’? Botha tried to revive Afrikaner nationalism by pointing to the 
dangers that black empowerment would have for white survival in Africa even after the fall of 
communism, but few South Africans seemed to listen anymore. In September 1989, after a 
stroke, Botha threw in the towel and retired from the presidency. 204 
2.2.6 The 1990s: The Decade of (Violent) Change  
His successor Frederik Willem de Klerk was really not the open-minded reformer he is hailed 
as today. He was the head of the NP’s Transvaal branch, one of the nationalists’ most 
conservative wings. Within the NP he had always stood on the side of verkramptes (Afrikaans 
for ‘conservative’). In 1976 he had firmly backed the policy of teaching black children in 
Afrikaans. In 1986 he was present at a meeting where a list of “politically sensitive people” 
205 was tabled and its “shortening” 206 was discussed – a fact which he denied in front of the 
TRC. He knew about ‘Operation Marion’, which involved the training of paramilitary forces 
linked to Inkatha, in order to fight the UDF more effectively. 207 De Klerk was no more 
moderate than Botha; he just had a different leadership style. He ended the rule of the military 
and handed the country’s administration back to the civilian authorities. 208 
He was aware of the stalemate between a government that could not be ousted by force and a 
popular movement that could not be crushed. He knew that he had to initiate talks with the 
black population if he wanted to end the violence. First he went looking for so-called 
‘moderate’ black leaders, but he soon had to learn that the ANC was the only organisation 
whose credibility would not be threatened by negotiations. So the talks were taken up again 
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behind closed doors. 209 But de Klerk needed something to calm the black population. The 
negotiations had to be made official. This is why, in October 1989, de Klerk surprised the 
world by releasing nine ANC leaders, including Walter Sisulu, from prison. Then, on 2nd 
February 1990, he took the last decisive step towards the end of apartheid by unbanning the 
ANC, the PAC, the SACP, and 58 other political groups and announcing the release of all 
remaining political prisoners. On 11th February 1990, after 27 years in prison, 71-year-old 
Nelson Mandela was finally set free. 210 
Most white people expected the worst from these supposed anti-white terrorists. But much to 
their surprise, no massacres followed their release. Blacks did not go on a wild rampage; they 
did not attack their former oppressors, and did not attempt to get compensation for the 
decades of oppression by robbing whites of their possessions. 211 Instead, the ANC accepted 
de Klerk’s offer of negotiations. On 6th August 1990, it ended its armed struggle and returned 
to where it had left off 40 years earlier: national politics. 212 
However, majority rule was really not de Klerk’s aim. His plan was more like a revamped 
version of Verwoerd’s separate development: Independent of their numbers, every population 
group should be given equal say in political matters, so that no one would be able to dominate 
the others. Not surprisingly, this plan never had a chance of being implemented. Once they 
sensed the chance of true political empowerment, the black population was not willing to 
settle for anything less. De Klerk should therefore be seen as a victim rather than the architect 
of reforms. Like a skier who set off an avalanche, all he could do, was try to not get pulled 
under by the force he had unleashed. Controlling it was soon out of the question. 213 
However, the NP did not give in without a fight. Even after the unbanning of the ANC, covert 
operations against the enemies of white rule did not stop. According to the South African 
defence ministry, during the fiscal year 1991/92 alone more than 21.5 million Rand was spent 
on secret operations. A substantial part of this money was probably used to incite violence 
among the black population. The state supported various warlords, vigilante groups and 
Inkatha, who in return protected government installations or killed people who were valuable 
to the ANC in the negotiations. 214  
However, death did not only come to activists. It seemed like a black skin in general was a 
qualifying characteristic. Between the end of August and the end of September 1990 alone, 
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700 people lost their lives in the civil wars in the townships. 215 Observers pointed out that the 
violence always increased when another step towards a democratic order was imminent. 
During the months following Nelson Mandela’s release from prison, around 460 people died 
and in September 1991, just before the signing of the National Peace Accord, about 280 were 
killed. 216 On the other hand the violence receded noticeably whenever the NP would have 
been put at a disadvantage by it, for example after the publication of the ‘Inkathagate’ scandal 
(see chapter 2.3.7). 217 
However, the high levels of violence in South Africa after 1990 cannot be sufficiently 
explained just by the nationalists’ attempt to destabilise the country. What other things have 
contributed to the situation? The causes of the violence lay, paradoxically, both in the 
apartheid system and in its demise. 218 Apartheid’s biggest contribution to the problem was 
the increasing militarization of life in South Africa, which began shortly after the NP’s rise to 
power. 219 Violence had been omnipresent in the lives of (black) South Africans 220 under 
apartheid. Both its opponents and its proponents, considered it a legitimate means for gaining 
and maintaining power, for pursuing one’s interests, and for solving conflicts. 221 So in a way 
the violence in the 1990s just followed the normal trends. It would have increased even 
without the end of apartheid. As Simpson & Rauch put it: “De Klerk’s reform initiatives of 
February 1990 simply threw open the doors on a tide already on the move.” 222 
This leads us right to the next reason for the sad development of violence: the end of white 
minority rule did in fact contribute to the heightened levels of violence albeit not as its former 
supporters claimed. The control mechanisms were slowly perishing, but were not replaced by 
an effective new order. The government simply lost control. Warlords, aggressive political 
groupings such as the IFP or the right wing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), as well 
as ordinary criminals took advantage of this legal vacuum. 223 The impoverished population, 
too, saw in the demise of the old system a chance of finally expressing their discontent. And 
as the normal democratic channels were still closed to them, they did so in the only way they 
knew they could: through violence. Accordingly, new centres of violence appeared in the 
black residential areas, for example around the townships’ taxi stands. 224  
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The situation was aggravated by the fact that many members of the police, the military and the 
different secret service units, militias and paramilitary groups did not identify with the new 
state and therefore made no attempt to help the authorities restore calm. On the contrary, 
many were wishing for a return of apartheid and were hoping that the talks between the ANC 
and the NP would still fail. For this reason, and, of course, in order to make a profit they also 
actively participated in offences. 225  
Despite all obstacles, the negotiations produced a positive result and the first non-racial 
elections were set to be held on 26th April 1994. To the surprise of most observers, neither 
violence nor a boycott spoiled South Africa’s first non-racial election. The voting even had to 
be extended until 29th April to accommodate the more than 22 million voters who stood in 
queues in front of one of 9,000 polling stations, sometimes waiting for hours to take their 
chance to choose their country’s government for the first time in their lives. As expected, the 
ANC won a landslide victory taking 62.6% of the votes or 252 of 400 parliamentary seats. 
The NP was supported by 20.4% of voters, the IFP managed 10.5% and seven other parties 226 
won at least one seat in Parliament. Nelson Mandela was elected president by unanimous 
decision. 227 
Although the power vacuum was finally filled after his taking office on 10th May 1994, the 
violence in South Africa did not come to an end. It did, however, change its character. Most 
acts of violence were no longer an expression of a political opinion. 228 In the new South 
Africa, violence has become what it is in any other country: an ordinary, apolitical crime. 229  
2.3 The Character of Violence in South Africa 
Creating an appropriate classificatory system for the different forms of violence in South 
Africa has proved to be quite difficult. Some categories, such as that of ‘unrest’, describe such 
a large field that, unless further qualified, they do not mean much. Other terms seem relatively 
clear, but can only be applied to specific phenomena if the ideological and cultural 
background of the person who is using them is known. The violence of the opponents of the 
apartheid regime, for example, was classified as terrorism by the South African government 
while the liberation movements themselves saw their struggle as a guerrilla war. 230 A similar 
pair of terms is that of ‘riot’, as the way the government saw the black population’s struggle, 
and ‘uprising’, as the people themselves classified their fight. Many terms overlap forming a 
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chain of interlocked word fields rather than a row of clearly separable individual concepts. 
This problem arose for example in relation to ‘vigilantes’, ‘death squads’ and the ‘third force’. 
This does not mean that the phenomenon of violence in South Africa cannot in some way be 
described systematically. It can, and I have done so in the present chapter. My terminology is, 
however, not as unambiguous as would generally be expected in science, and the individual 
concepts are by no means clear-cut. On the contrary, I will try to emphasise the contradictions 
and the overlap between them in order to show just how complex and multi-faceted the 
violence in South Africa is and just how much the individual definitions depend on the point 
of view of the observer. The weakness of my approach is a loss of precision in my own 
definitions, but I have chosen to accept this in order to remain true to my view that reality in 
South Africa is not one but many, even within the scientific context. 231 
2.3.1 Maintaining Power a All Cost – Government Sanctioned Police Violence 
Exerting violence is an integral part of normal police work. However, the SAP’s ‘law and 
order policing’ involved brutality that by far exceeded the levels of violence required for 
maintaining order. They would clearly fall into the category defined by Claridge as state 
terrorism: The “systematic threat or use of violence (…) with the intention of communicating 
a political message to a group larger than the victim group by generating fear and so altering 
the behaviour of the larger group”. 232  
Certainly, a large section of the black population suffered violence at the hands of state 
agents. Torture, extra-legal executions of opponents and bombings were all standard features 
in the apartheid state’s repertoire of violence. Even the civilian population was not safe. The 
South African security forces 233 often displayed sadistic pleasure when they were breaking 
up protest marches. 234 In a random survey conducted in 1985 by the Eastern Province 
Herald, one third of all township residents questioned said that they had been assaulted by 
policemen or so
In the present sub-chapter I want do give an overview of all methods used by the apartheid 
state in its war on the country’s population in order to show just how far the NP was prepared 
to go in order to hold on to power and briefly reflect upon the changes in the violent state 
structure after the transition to democracy. 
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a)  ‘Legal Police Killings’  
The term ‘legal police killings’ is one of many euphemisms that the apartheid system created 
for hiding its own cruelty. This seemingly neutral expression is a disguise for the often cold-
blooded murder of numerous opponents of apartheid in the name of law and order. But unlike 
the secret death squads described in chapter 2.3.2 the killer cops operated in the open and 
were protected from prosecution by South African law. Members of the SAP were allowed to 
use lethal force in order to protect persons or property, to prevent an offender’s escape from 
arrest, or to disperse riotous or otherwise dangerous crowds. The taking of human lives was 
justified by pointing at the victims’ behaviour. The killer was relieved of any responsibility 
for his/her actions. 236  
The prototype of a legal police killing in South Africa is probably the Sharpeville Massacre: 
White policemen open fire on a group of unarmed black protesters for no apparent reason, 
frequently killing dozens by shooting them in the back as they ran away. Generally, the 
incidents were not even investigated, but if there was an inquest, the police generally claimed 
that the protesters had been a rowdy mob threatening their safety. They were always cleared 
of any wrongdoing, despite compelling evidence that their stories were false and that they had 
in fact intended to inflict maximum loss of life. The scenario was re-enacted so often in the 
following decades that soon no one wondered how they had come to happen: The Sharpeville 
Massacre in 1960, the slaughtering of hundreds of black youths during the student protest in 
1976/77, the Mamelodi Killings and the Queenstown Shootings in November 1985, the 
Shooting at Uitenhage in March 1985, the Winterveld Killings in March 1986, the Sebokeng 
Massacre in March 1990, are just a few examples of riot control SAP style. 237 And the 
number of casualties was frightening. Between July 1985 and June 1986 alone, 1,113 people 
were killed by police in so-called ‘unrest incidents’. 238 
b) The Kitskonstabels 
During the 1980s, many of the ordinary police units were withdrawn from the townships. 
They were replaced by the military, by vigilantes, and by the so-called kitskonstabels (the 
Afrikaans word for ‘instant policemen’), thugs recruited from among unemployed blacks who 
had not joined in the struggle against apartheid. Many also had close ties to Inkatha and felt 
more loyal to the party leaders than the people they were meant to serve. One of the former 
recruits testified to this to the TRC:  
“As they were police, they knew very well that they have to work under the 
instructions of the IFP, for example killing people who were UDF members. (...) 
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[T]hey were not taking instructions from police ... they were taking instructions 
directly from the IFP.” 239  
In 1986, a total of 16,000 of these ‘municipal policemen’ were sent into the crisis-struck areas 
after a mere six to eight weeks’ training. 240 As expected, they did nothing to curb the 
violence in the townships. On the contrary, they launched their own campaign of terror and 
substantially heightened the level of fear and violence in the townships. 241 As the Catholic 
Institute for International Relations (CIIR) put it:  
“From the beginning they used excessive violence. Their brutality created an 
atmosphere of fear that was aimed not only at activists but at intimidating entire 
communities. The behaviour of the new police is characterized by an arrogant 
disregard for the law.” 242 
Between February 1987 and 1989, 49 township residents died at their hands and by February 
1988 they had been served with five Supreme Court interdicts restraining them from unlawful 
conduct. The CIIR documented numerous accounts of men, women, and children who were 
beaten, shot and tortured for ‘crimes’ such as walking down the road while the kitskonstabels 
were on patrol. 243 
The kitskonstabels did not limit themselves to small-time attacks, though. The Trust Feed 
Massacre of December 1988, for example, was the work of IFP-supporting municipal 
policemen. Along with a unit of white policemen, several black units stormed a memorial 
service in a church near New Hanover. Eleven people, two of them children under eighteen, 
whose only crime had been to pray for the victims of police violence, lost their lives during 
the incident. 244 Brian Mitchell, one of the policemen involved later explained: “We attacked 
the UDF because we regarded them as the enemy and Inkatha as an ally.” 245 
The aim of these random acts of violence, namely to instil fear among the township 
population, was quickly attained. The people grew more and more weary and soon only left 
their homes whenever they absolutely had to and only stayed outside as long as necessary. 
Attending public gatherings, particularly protest marches against apartheid, had become a 
hazard to life and limb; therefore, demonstrations grew less and less frequent. As an Eastern 
Cape policeman explained in an interview: “... now everyone is afraid of going to jail without 
any reason, no one is causing trouble.” 246 
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c) Torture 
In apartheid South Africa torture was a standard feature of police work. No political trial 
passed without accusations of torture being raised against the police or prison personnel. 
Politicians to this day maintain that they did not condone the use of violence against detainees 
and that they did not know about what was going on behind the closed doors of prisons and 
police stations. Such claims of ignorance would be unacceptable as an excuse even if they 
were true. But they ring increasingly hollow in the light of the facts uncovered by the TRC 
and the statements made at various commissions and trials by former police officers. 247 
Former Vlakplaas commander Eugene de Kock, for example wrote in his book: 
“When legislation was passed that allowed for detention without trial, another step 
was taken in the development of death squads. This particular piece of legislation led 
to a kind of subculture among the security police. We began to believe we were 
supermen who could behave ruthlessly in the name of patriotism and state security. 
The state had made torture legitimate.” 248 
This testimony shows that torture was not the work of rogue elements who had acted without 
the consent of their superiors. It serves as a powerful indictment of the apartheid state as a 
whole. We can only guess how common torture really was during the apartheid years, for no 
systematic documentation exists. There are several indicators, though, that draw a chilling 
picture. In 1982, the Detainees’ Parents Support Committee published a survey documenting 
the cases of 175 detainees, 83% of whom had been tortured. 249 A few years later, a study by 
the Department of Psychology of the University of Cape Town revealed that 85% of prisoners 
questioned had been tortured. 250 In a similar study in Johannesburg 72% of former inmates 
stated that they had been tortured and 97% of those showed actual signs of physical abuse. 251 
According to the SAIIR, in 1987 a total of 1,030 prisoners were admitted to hospital with 
injuries they had sustained while in jail. 252 
The most common methods of torture were beating and kicking, sleep deprivation, and 
stubbing cigarettes out on the victims’ skin. Equally popular were different forms of electric 
shock treatment or suffocation. Less frequent, but by no means an exception was suspending 
prisoners in mid-air, often hanging head first out of a window, or forcing them to remain 
standing in the same place, frequently on a pile of bricks, to hold a position, such as an 
imaginary chair, or to make them crouch with their arms spread for hours. They were often 
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completely naked and blindfolded. Sometimes the policemen let insects crawl over their 
victims’ bodies to make it harder for them to remain still. And these were only the less 
horrific methods. Researchers also documented incidents of prisoners having burning 
matchsticks inserted under their finger- and toenails, being cut with a knife, having their 
finger- or toenails crushed with bricks, having petrol poured over their body and being set 
alight or having their face scrubbed with a hard brush. 253  
Even very elaborate methods of torture soon became so widespread that they were given 
proper names. For example, there was the ‘helicopter’, where a prisoner’s hands and feet were 
tied behind his back with a wooden stick inserted between the ties. He/she was then hung 
from the ceiling by a rope attached to the stick. While up there, policemen kept whipping 
them with sjamboks making them spin in the air. There also was the ‘submarine’ during 
which the victim was forced down under water until he nearly drowned or when, alternatively, 
a wet bag was pulled over his head until he was close to suffocating. The ‘telephone’ was 
popular, too. This was the name for the practice of attaching wires to the victim’s nipples or 
genitals and repeatedly sending electrical current through the lines. 254 
Since the end of apartheid the use of torture as a means of extracting information from a 
suspect is no longer officially sanctioned. However, it seems to be a habit that is hard to break 
for some policemen – both black and white. During 1996, Amnesty International documented 
a number of cases of torture and ill treatment of criminal suspects and homeless people and 
throughout the year torture equipment was seized under court order from several police 
stations across the county. 255” In total, more than 5,300 complaints of assault were logged 
against the police in 1997. 256 Since then the situation has improved substantially. During the 
first ten months of 1998, the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) received only 13 
reports of torture in police custody and another 103 complaints of assault or attempted 
murder. 257 The methods reported have remained largely the same: beatings, suffocation, 
electric shocks and cigarette burns. 258 
d) Death in Detention 
During the apartheid years it was frighteningly common for jailed freedom fighters to die in 
prison. Even the government could not deny the magnitude of the problem. During a speech 
in May 1976 the Minister of Police declared that 92 people had died in detention during the 
year 1975. 259 For 1976 he owned up to 117 deaths and by 1977 the number had climbed to 
 
253 Brewer (1986: 114), Harrison (1981: 221), Malan (1990: 286), Pauw (1991: 101) and Sparks (1990 a: 222) 
254 TRC Report, Vol 3, Chap 3, Para 78, Sparks (1990 a: 222), Tutu (1999: 109-110) and Brewer (1986: 114) 
255 Amnesty International (1997: 3) 
256 Human Rights Watch (1998: 2) 
257 Amnesty International (1999 a: 2) 
258 Hamber (1997 a: 3), Amnesty International (1999 a: 3) and Amnesty International (1999 b: 1) 
259 SAIRR (1977: 122) 
  54
                                                
128 awaiting trial prisoners. 260 In 1985 the SAIIR documented the deaths of 24 unsentenced 
and 194 sentenced prisoners. In 1986 the numbers reached 105 for unsentenced and 151 for 
sentenced prisoners. 261 The situation was a little better for people held in custody without a 
charge having been laid against them. Exact numbers are impossible to come by, as no one 
kept a systematic record of deaths in detention. The most comprehensive account can be 
found in the final report of the TRC. Scattered throughout the document’s seven volumes, I 
found the names of 89 people who died in police custody between 1960 and 1994. 262 But 
even the commission said that the real number is probably much higher. 
Their killing followed a frighteningly regular pattern: They were more often than not arrested 
without reason and held over some time in a police station or a jail where they were 
questioned about their supposed terrorist activities. During interrogations they were frequently 
subjected to severe torture. If they did not survive this ordeal, the policemen fabricated a story 
to make the murder appear like an accident or a suicide. The police’s storytellers were not 
very inventive though, using a few tales over and over again, barely changing the details. If a 
person had died from gunshot wounds, the authorities generally claimed that they had tried to 
escape or that they had attacked the officers who had to shoot in self-defence. The others had 
either supposedly hanged themselves with their shoe laces or clothing, tripped and fell as they 
were trying to escape, or slipped and fell in the shower. Some even supposedly leapt out of 
windows. Their bodies were manipulated according to the declared cause of death. 263  
The end of apartheid brought the end of such frightening practices; it did by no means put an 
end to deaths in detention, though. An SAPS report released in 1997 indicated that between 
January 1994 and June 1996 a total of 497 people had died in detention or as a result of police 
action. These numbers are questionable, though. The independent Human Rights Committee 
reported 379 deaths in detention during 1994 alone. 264 Under mounting pressure from human 
rights advocates, the new government revised the curriculum for new police trainees to focus 
more on detainees’ rights and improved the police’s internal control mechanisms. The number 
of deaths has gone down steadily since. In November 1998 the ICD was investigating the 
cases of 187 suspects who were shot by policemen during arrest in the first nine months of the 
year. Some of these were most certainly genuine attempts to stop criminals from getting away 
or cases of self-defence, but the ICD and numerous human rights watchdogs still expressed 
concern about the ongoing culture of lawlessness in the SAPS. 265 
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2.3.2 Death squads 
As the war of liberation in South Africa intensified during the 1970s, numerous secret 
services, such as the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB), one of the SADF’s most notorious hit 
squads, and the counter-insurgency unit at Vlakplaas, began executing opponents of apartheid 
whenever they could not be silenced legally. The number of government-sponsored killers is 
still unknown, but they were certainly more numerous than former officials like to admit. And 
most of the time they operated not without the knowledge of the Cabinet, as President de 
Klerk and his ministers later claimed, nor with tacit approval from apartheid’s politicians as 
some apologists try to make us believe, but with an official government mandate. 266 
During the 1980s in particular, murdering anti-apartheid activists was an effective tool in the 
regime’s struggle to maintain power. Among the victims were prominent personalities like the 
ANC’s lawyer Griffiths Mxenge, his wife Victoria and David Webster, a Professor of 
anthropology at the University of Witwatersrand, as well as less known activists, such as Eric 
Mntonga, the director of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA), 
Sicelo Dhlomo, a member of the Detainee’s Parents Support Committee (DPSC), who was 
murdered in 1988 along with ten other anti-apartheid activists and the ‘Cradock Four’. 267 
Eugene de Kock, the last leader of Vlakplaas, even implicated South African death squads in 
the murder of the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme in January 1986. 268 
The killers did not just target individuals, though. Large-scale attacks on anti-apartheid 
organisations were not uncommon either. On 14th March 1982, the ANC’s offices in London 
were severely damaged in an explosion and on 7th May 1987, the secret service planted a 
bomb in the headquarters of the ANC-friendly Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU). On 1st September 1987, Khotso House in Johannesburg, a building which housed 
anti-apartheid organisations like Black Sash and the South African Council of Churches 
(SACC), exploded and in October of the same year the offices of the South African Bishops 
Conference (SACBC) in Khanya House burned out completely after an arson attack. 269  
In their operations, the death squads used a wide range of methods. Mines were popular, most 
commonly in the form of booby-trapped household items that exploded upon use. 270 In other 
situations of activists were simply poisoned or shot, often by so-called ‘askaris’, captured 
ANC activists who had been talked or forced into switching sides. 271 They often left false 
clues at the site of the murder, so that police, who were unaware of their existence, suspected 
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people who were in no way related to the government, for example burglars or enemies of the 
victim from the ranks of opponents of apartheid. 272 Other victims just disappeared without 
anyone knowing what had happened to them. In order to cover up the killing, the murderers 
generally burned the bodies. 273 While relatively easy at home, killing anti-apartheid activists 
outside South Africa was a more difficult task. The government did have killers who operated 
internationally, but their job was risky and they were used only occasionally. The preferred 
means for eliminating expatriate opponents were letter bombs. 274  
No one knows exactly how many people died at the hands of the government-sponsored 
killers. According to ANC estimates, between 1974 and 1989 the South African death squads 
took the lives of around 100 people. Another 200 survived attacks. 275 In his study of 
Apartheid’s Death Squads Jacques Pauw even talks of as many as 225 opponents of apartheid 
who were executed by Vlakplaas men alone. 276 
For years the government denied the existence of death squads and, despite large amounts of 
circumstantial evidence, no one could prove that they were real. Proof was finally produced 
on 20th October 1989, when, only hours before he was to be executed for murder, Butana 
Almond Nofemela signed an affidavit stating, among other things, the following: 
“In 1981, I was appointed a member of the Security Branch’s assassination squad, and 
I served under Captain Johannes Dirk Coetzee (…). 
Some time during late 1981 I was briefed by Brigadier Schoon and Captain Coetzee to 
eliminate a certain Durban attorney, Griffiths Mxenge. (…)  
I was involved in approximately eight other assassinations during my stint in the 
assassination squad, and also numerous kidnappings.” 277 
On 17th November 1989 Vrye Weekblad published a long interview with Captain Coetzee, in 
which he confirmed Nofomela’s allegations and explained the reasoning behind the death 
squad operations: “There are people who want to take the country and who must be killed. 
(…) Let the bastards burn at the stake.” 278  
2.3.3 The Military Occupation of the Townships 
Resistance against apartheid increased substantially in the 1980s and on 6th October 1984 
President Botha responded by dispatching army units into the townships to, as Minister of 
Law and Order Adriaan Vlok put it, aid in “controlling the unrest” 279. As often before, 
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Soweto and the townships of the Eastern Cape were the first to be hit, and from October 1984 
soldiers patrolled the streets alongside the riot police. 280 
On 23rd October 1984 the military presence was upgraded with the launch of ‘Operation 
Palmiet’ (‘Bullrush’). At 2 a.m. 7,000 policemen and soldiers occupied Sebokeng and 
completely sealed it off from outside contact. The police conducted a house-to-house search 
protected by soldiers armed with R1 rifles lining the streets at 10-metre intervals. 354 people 
were arrested. A similar scenario was repeated during the next few days in Boipatong and 
Sharpeville. By the beginning of the following year, most of the country’s townships were 
under military occupation. According to the Minister of Defence, by the middle of 1985 the 
government had a total of 35,372 soldiers deployed in 96 black areas within South Africa. 
Most of them were conscripts, often on 24-hour standby. 281 The psychological stress this 
caused these poorly prepared young men should not be underestimated. It has been amply 
documented in literature 282 and was confirmed by my South African informers. Fear, feelings 
of powerlessness and even self-hatred were voiced on several occasions. 283  
Such emotional strain certainly played a role in the soldiers’ violent behaviour towards the 
local population, for, despite the government’s repeated claims that they were deployed for 
the protection of black civilians and the restoration of law and order, they treated the locals 
like enemies. One inhabitant of Crossroads described his people’s relationship with the 
occupying army as one of predator and prey: “Today’s army is lions. They hate a person. If 
one of the police or army come towards you, you are so scared. You know that the first thing 
they may do is beat you up and then shoot you.” 284 
While rapes of township women or random attacks on passers-by were not unheard of, young 
black men were the security forces’ favourite targets. The DPSC reported that soldiers 
frequently picked-up children for no apparent reason and held them in military vehicles or 
remote rural areas for several hours. Many of the young victims told stories of beatings or 
torture in detention. 285 In February 1986 the Minister of Law and Order finally admitted in 
parliament that 500 complaints had been logged against the security forces. However, only 
one policeman had been convicted. 286 
By 1987 the mass uprising against apartheid had been seriously weakened and the soldiers 
began to withdraw from the townships. The role of putting down the revolt was now 
increasingly given to so-called ‘conservative’ blacks, municipal policemen and vigilantes. 287 
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2.3.4 Terrorism or Guerrilla War? – The Liberation Movements’ Fight Against 
Apartheid 
Even today there is no consent on how to classify the liberation movements’ fight against the 
apartheid regime. Depending on the perspective from which the phenomenon is analysed, the 
evaluation of it changes and so does the apparent character of the acts. The government in 
Pretoria along with a large portion of South Africa’s white population perceived the anti-
apartheid activists’ actions – correctly – as an attack against their political order. They took 
the status quo to be just (and justified) and therefore classified any attempt (violent ones in 
particular) of changing it as an act of terrorism. 288  
On the other side stood the ANC and its allies who felt that they were fighting a “people’s 
war” 289, a guerrilla war against illegitimate oppression. As today’s deputy president and one 
time ANC fighter Jacob Zuma put it: “We are fighting a war of liberation against the 
apartheid regime and against colonialism of a very special type.” 290 The freedom fighters saw 
the status quo – equally correctly – as unjust (and unjustified) and took their fight to be a 
defence against this injustice. Accordingly, they called their struggle a ‘guerrilla war’, a term 
which carries a positive connotation in this context.  
The NP always claimed that the ANC was waging a campaign of terror against South Africa’s 
white civilians while hiding behind innocent black bystanders. 291 The liberation movements 
on the other hand frequently emphasised that they only targetted civilians when they 
cooperated actively with the military. As for the township population, the ANC did not take 
them to be bystanders, but considered them an integral part of its own organisational structure. 
Seen this way, the fighters were not hiding from anyone, especially not behind the civilian 
population. To them it was the South African state that was inflicting terror on South Africa’s 
innocent black population and opponents of apartheid of all walks of life. The figures tend to 
support this latter view. At the height of the ANC’s struggle against apartheid during the late 
1980s, their attacks claimed an average of 40 victims per year (1986-1989), compared to 
almost 1,000 victims yearly due to police action. 292 
Such mutual finger pointing is not uncommon in political struggles. Ever since the French 
Revolution, people have been quick to call political opponents ‘terrorists’. 293 But why has the 
argument about the appropriate label for the liberation movements’ fight at times been carried 
out with so much passion? In my opinion it is due to the fact that the terms under discussion 
do not merely refer to an independent extra-linguistic reality, but instead shape reality itself. 
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This is not to mean that the real world phenomena actually change; they do not. However, 
they appear different to the outside observer. By constantly labelling the ANC in a negative 
way as ‘terrorists’ and ‘communists’ “committed to the violent overthrow of the present 
system of government for the purpose of seizing total power for itself” 294 the government 
achieved what Bell citing Davis and Walton calls “closure” 295: Their psychological exclusion 
from mainstream society and the denial of legitimacy of any of their actions. The dispute in 
South Africa was thus not about linguistic details. Rather, both parties sought to determine the 
character of their fight with the help of language. At the centre of the argument stood the 
legitimacy of one’s own actions. 296 
I personally agree with the ANC’s point of view that the black population was unjustly 
suppressed and that the South African state used terror as a means of sustaining white power. 
As such I doubt the legitimacy of the government and its views. At the same time, though, I 
believe that the liberation movements’ use of violence in the struggle for justice sometimes 
crossed the boundary of legitimacy and appropriateness. They clearly left South Africa’s 
white population in a state of terror. I will therefore choose sides in this argument only 
tentatively, and leave the reader to decide whether the acts of violence described in the 
following chapter constitute terrorist attacks or battles in the fight for freedom and justice. 
This lack of clarity might make the individual acts less tangible, but this is a setback I accept 
knowingly. I am also aware that any attempt at remaining neutral is damned to failure, but I 
will at least try to keep both positions in mind.   
a) Bombings 
Bombs were an important tool in the liberation movements’ armed struggle against apartheid, 
because they enabled fighters to inflict a lot of damage without too great a risk of getting 
caught. 297 The saboteurs were particularly active in 1962 and 1963. During the first three 
months of 1963 alone the SAP registered around 300 cases of sabotage. 298 The number of 
attacks dropped substantially after the leaders of Umkhonto we Sizwe and Poqo were arrested, 
but when the black population’s resistance against apartheid picked up again after the Soweto 
Uprisings, the number of bombings increased as well. 299 According to Mortimer, 170 
bombings were carried out between October 1976 and October 1983. Between 1977 and 1984 
a total of 83 people lost their lives during these attacks. 300  
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When the liberation movements intensified their efforts to bring down apartheid in the 1980s, 
the number of bombings increased substantially. For the period September 1984 to August 
1985 the police noted 92 cases of ‘sabotage’, most of which consisted of bombings. The 
following year that number rose to 101. During the following years the trend remained 
unbroken. Between September 1985 and August 1989 a total of 1,013 acts of sabotage were 
carried out successfully in South Africa. The number of victims also rose substantially as MK 
no longer tried to prevent the loss of human life and activists who were not committed to the 
same ethical standards as the ANC took-up arms against apartheid. Between 1984 and 1987 
acts of sabotage took the lives of 134 people. 301  
b) Mines 
When the ANC first took up arms in the 1960s, they avoided the use of mines because, unlike 
bombs, mines clearly target humans. However, when in the 1970s, the liberation movements 
enlarged their range of targets to include supporters of the system, they began using mines 
which were valued for their destructive impact. 302 
Limpet mines were the most widely used variety. From November 1985 until the end of the 
armed struggle in February 1991, 487 limpet mines exploded throughout the country, killing 
22 people and injuring 373. 303 Limpet mines were also the weapons of choice of rogue 
freedom fighters who targeted civilians. Incidents included limpet mine explosions in a 
restaurant, a sports club, a gaming hall, and an art gallery. 304  
Anti-tank mines, too, were increasingly buried in the rural areas along South Africa’s northern 
border. There, MK targeted border patrol vehicles as well as local farmers whose self-defence 
units were integrated with the military’s security system. The government provided them with 
arms, including automatic weapons that could otherwise be legally carried only by the 
members of the armed forces. Therefore, the ANC did not treat them as civilians, but 
considered them to be ‘hard’, military targets. 57 mines exploded on farms between 
November 1985 and February 1991. 25 people lost their lives and 76 were injured. 305  
As far as anti-personnel mines are concerned, it would seem reasonable to believe the ANC’s 
claim that they were never used during the struggle. In 1980, before the organisation extended 
its struggle to include soft targets, the ANC declared its adherence to the Geneva 
Conventions, which explicitly prohibit the use of land mines. I have found no credible 
evidence that they ever broke this commitment. 306 
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c) ‘Civil Disobedience’ and ‘Public Violence’ – A Brief Explanation 
In the South African context, the expression ‘civil disobedience’ is used to describe any form 
of more or less widespread civilian resistance against certain laws or conditions associated 
with apartheid. Throughout history it took many shapes, such as consumer boycotts, strikes or 
demonstrations. Civil disobedience itself is not a form of violence. The organisers did, 
however, at times use violent means to enforce their campaigns (see chapter 2.3.5 for more 
details) 307. Even if the disobedience campaign itself was peaceful, on occasion, it led to 
violence. Peaceful demonstrations, strikes, and rallies, generally turned violent when the 
police stepped in. The result was so-called incidents of public violence, such as the massacres 
described above or the riots and unrest that I will now attempt to explain. 308 
d) Unrest / Onrus 
The term unrest covers a wide variety of real-world phenomena. Thus, without further 
qualification, it really means nothing. However, if it is investigated as a part of the whole 
word field of popular resistance, unrest is an interesting concept. First and foremost, unrest is 
never a private affair. In order for something to qualify as unrest, it has to happen in public. 
Furthermore, unrest is never about individual persons; it always involves groups of people. 
Similarly, although the word unrest is always used in the singular form, it never denotes a 
single act. Unrest can therefore not be committed. It comprises a number of acts that are 
temporally related and have a common cause or background. Unrest frequently has a political 
background, although this is not a necessary prerequisite for the classification of an incident 
as unrest. Unrest can be the result of a planned campaign, but generally it arises 
spontaneously. Unrest is necessarily opposed to order and therefore, even if it was planned 
ahead, it always contains an element of chaos. Bearing all this in mind, du Preez defined the 
term ‘unrest’ as “acts of violence and disorder, often unorganised, in character, carried out by 
various groups of persons, contrary to the concept of law and order” 309. 
Unrest can take many different shapes: violent protest marches or demonstrations, uprisings, 
rebellions or revolts, riots, and series of loosely connected acts of destruction, plundering, or 
public violence against persons. While all kinds of unrest mentioned above have happened in 
South Africa in the recent past, the range of acts of violence committed in the process was 
generally limited. While random assaults on people and general looting did take place, 
demonstrators commonly followed the ANC’s call and limited themselves to attacking 
government targets. During the apartheid years these were policemen, soldiers, community 
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councillors and suspected collaborators as well as government installations and the property 
of those considered to be traitors of the blacks’ cause. 310  
Finally, I should add a note of caution. As with so many other words, the term unrest is 
ideologically biased in the South African context. As will become clear later, it was 
introduced to serve the apartheid government’s agenda of discrediting the popular uprising 
against oppression. It did so by sub-consciously appealing to people’s like of order. South 
Africa’s white population saw themselves as distinctly different from blacks in their respect 
for peace and calm. Accordingly, when referring to un-‘rest’, that is, the absence of calm, the 
authorities and the mainstream media implied that they were describing actions taken by the 
black population, thus confirming people’s negative stereotypes.  
e) From Riot to Revolution 
Webster’s Dictionary defines a riot as “a disturbance consisting of wild and turbulent conduct 
of a large number of persons, as a mob; uproar; tumult.” 311 Thus, riots or uprisings, a term 
frequently used in South Africa to describe the same incidents from a different perspective, 
are a particularly violent kind of unrest. But what exactly sets a riot apart from other kinds of 
unrest? Webster’s leave this question unanswered. In my opinion the term ‘riot’ is, much like 
that of violence, un-definable. It is an impression, a feeling, a fear. One thing is sure, though: 
Unlike similar terms the word ‘riot’ clearly carries a negative connotation. As such, it gives 
those who label an act as a riot, the power to pass a value judgement on the people involved in 
it. What happened in Soweto on 16th June 1976 has often been called the ‘Soweto Riots’ by 
opponents of revolutionary change. 312 Unlike the alternatives ‘uprising’ or ‘protest’, this 
label serves to obscure the historical context (one does not riot for or against something) of 
the events and makes it easy not to mention the fact that the initial violence that had sparked 
the event had been perpetrated by the police, for, despite Jon Qwelane’s observation that “it 
was very difficult to tell who was actually rioting, the pupils or the police” 313, by definition 
policemen on duty do not riot.  
Moreover, the term ‘riot’ makes its referent appear as a geographically and temporally limited 
event. By calling what happened in South Africa in 1976 a series of ‘riots’, the government 
indicated that each was a local affair that would be over in a few days. This, however, is a 
gross misrepresentation of the situation. It may have started as a fairly locally restricted 
demonstration, but it soon grew into a nationwide protest. It was a symptom of a larger 
political development, which took place on a national level. The more appropriate label is 
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therefore the name by which the events became internationally known: the Soweto Uprisings. 
This term also indicates that this was a large-scale revolt against an oppressive system. 314 
Many observers go even further and describe the violence that shook South African townships 
during the apartheid years as the visible symptom of an ongoing civil or revolutionary war. 
While this is certainly not appropriate for describing the situation during the 1960s and 1970s, 
during the 1980s and the early 1990s the townships of the big cities did indeed resemble 
battlefields. 315 But were the bodies in the streets really victims of a war? I cannot come to a 
conclusive answer; I will therefore let the involved parties speak for themselves. 
The ANC has frequently described its fight against apartheid as a ‘people’s war’. The concept 
was explained in detail in the publication The African Communist: “By people’s war we mean 
a war in which the liberation army becomes rooted amongst the people who progressively 
participate actively in the armed struggle (...).” 316 Mortimer, in the SADF submission to the 
TRC, agrees that there was in fact a  
“revolutionary war in South Africa [that] lasted for more than forty years, but it 
escalated during the period 1980-1990. The main role players were on the one hand 
the ANC (MK), and to a lesser degree the PAC (APLA), assisted by several mass 
democratic organisations and on the other hand the South African Government.” 317  
Brigadier Hermanus Stadler, on the other hand, declared during the two trials of ANC fighters 
in the 1980s:  
“The ANC cannot be regarded as being at war with the South African government. 
 (...) South Africa was at war with Angola, but inside South Africa only acts of terror 
 took place. (...) There is a definite difference between terror and war.” 318  
f) Urban Terrorists / Guerrillas 
Urban terrorism took an important place in black resistance during the 1980s. The term covers 
all individual acts of violence committed in the cities that were part of the greater effort to rid 
the townships of white control. The South African street fighters modelled their tactics on 
those of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) of Northern Ireland. Their targets were the white 
oppressors’ police and army, along with traitors and collaborators from the townships. Their 
weapons of choice were hand grenades, AK-47 assault rifles, bombs and mines. 319 
As the conflict in the townships intensified, the number of attacks on the security forces 
increased. According to official statistics, a total of 238 armed attacks on policemen were 
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carried out during the first ten months of 1988 alone, compared with 234 in the whole of 
1987, 230 in 1986, 136 in 1985 and 44 in 1984. During a four-year span the number of attacks 
on members of the security forces rose by 640% (from 3.6 per month in 1984 to 23.4 per 
month in 1988). Although, by attacking the police, the street fighters meant to ultimately 
strike the white government, skin colour was not a factor that influenced whether one became 
a target. The main determinant was a person’s attitude towards the NP regime. Accordingly, 
black kitskonstabels were frequently among those killed. 320 
2.3.5 The ‘Comrades’ 
During the 1980s township residents, for the first time in decades, became more organised in 
their struggle against apartheid. The political part was taken by community organisations led 
by older township residents, while the military side was almost entirely in the hand of the 
township youths. These ‘comrades’ were organised in paramilitary units and were secretly 
instructed in the techniques of revolutionary warfare by MK fighters who slipped into the 
townships at night. Soon, the young fighters emerged as the liberation movements’ storm 
troops in the townships. They were in charge of developing the military strategy, oversaw 
specific action, watched over strikes, and made sure that boycotts were observed. They were 
also called out whenever military intervention was needed. In Crossroads, the comrades 
erected huge metal shields to protect stone- and petrol-bomb-throwers from police fire. In 
Alexandra, they dug ‘tank traps’, trenches about a metre deep, to stop police vehicles from 
entering the township. In other places they strung barbed wire across the street at the height of 
a person standing in an armoured vehicle. 321  
Although the comrades considered themselves to be representatives of the ANC, they were 
not really a part of the Congress’ organisational structure. They mainly unemployed young 
men from the townships who, during their search for an alternative to apartheid, eventually 
came across the only organisation that had been fighting for black empowerment for any 
length of time and was still alive inside South Africa. 322 The comrades were different from 
previous generations of ANC activists, though. Most of them were young fighters of the so-
called ‘Soweto generation’. They had experienced the government’s violence first-hand at a 
very young age and thus took it to be a legitimate means for attaining one’s political aims. 323 
Because of their positive attitude toward the use of violence and their limited loyalty to the 
principles and the leaders of the ANC, the comrades were ambiguous figures. On one hand, 
their contribution was vital for the people’s revolt of the 1980s. On the other hand, their 
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methods were questionable and their targets were not always thoughtfully selected. All too 
often their wrath was directed toward ordinary people who merely tried to maintain a little bit 
of normality in an otherwise insane world. Shopping in a white-owned store, for example, was 
a risky undertaking during the consumer boycott of the 1980s, as was the consumption of 
alcohol. Large cars and modern hairstyles, too, were forbidden, for in the comrades’ eyes, 
they constituted attempts at imitating the European bourgeoisie. 324 
To ensure their orders were followed, the comrades set up checkpoints at bus stops and along 
the roads entering the townships where they searched commuters’ cars and bags for goods 
from white stores and smell their breath for alcohol. The punishment for shoppers who broke 
the consumer boycotts was severe, as was that for workers who did not adhere to strikes, 
students who attended classes during school boycotts or anyone who did not follow the, at 
times outrageous, demands of the comrades. People who had violated consumer boycotts were 
forced to eat their purchases, including soap and cleaners. Those who smelled of alcohol were 
given the ‘omo treatment’, named after the cleaner that was forced down their throats until 
they began vomiting and women with permed hair had their heads shaved. 325   
In many townships the comrades set up so-called ‘People’s Courts’, makeshift tribunals used 
to try criminals and suspected collaborators. More than mere courts, they generally acted as 
plaintiff, judge and hangman, and verdicts were generally carried out on the spot. While they 
probably did help to reduce crime in the townships, the comrades often committed cruel acts 
of violence against those convicted of political offences. Convicted spies and collaborators 
were often tortured and at times even sentenced to death and shot, burned or stoned. 326  
2.3.6 ‘Necklacings’ / Burning People Alive 
During the mid-1980s a new phenomenon emerged in the townships of South Africa: 
‘Necklacings’ – the act of placing a tyre filled with petrol around a person’s neck and setting 
it alight. The practice rose to fame because of its use in the grassroots struggle against 
apartheid and it is frequently equated with township justice as passed by the ‘People’s 
Courts’, but Ball has convincingly argued that  
“the phenomenon does not simply belong in the political arena, it is a punishment used 
also against criminals, rapists, murderers, shebeen owners, other ethnic groups, 
witches and wizards.” 327 (Italics in original.) 
Out of a random 65 burnings between 1984 and 1993 that she investigated, 39 had happened 
following witchcraft accusations, five were so-called ‘muti murders’ 328, four were murders 
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without any known motive and two were punishment for criminal conduct. The remaining 15, 
that is only 23%, were politically motivated. 329 
Also, despite what the apartheid government tried to make people believe 330, necklacings 
were neither invented nor officially sanctioned by the ANC. However, unlike many civics and 
parties such as AZAPO, who explicitly condemned the use of the necklace, the ANC felt a 
certain ambivalence towards it. Some individual ANC-members, among them high-ranking 
personalities such as Chris Hani 331 and Winnie Mandela 332, did speak-out in favour of 
necklacing enemies, but the organisation’s official leadership, including Oliver Tambo, 
strongly opposed such methods. 333 However, after looking at the evidence presented before 
the TRC, I no longer doubt that angry individuals during the 1980s and 90s frequently made 
use of the necklace to rid themselves of political opponents and to purge the townships of 
traitors – at times with the tacit approval of the ANC. 334 
How many people died in this gruesome manner is unclear. According to Cock, between 1984 
and 1987 around 400 people were killed by the necklace method and another 200 were burned 
alive. 335 The Institute of Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria even claimed that as 
many as 672 people were burnt to death between the beginning of 1984 and June 1987 and 
that “approximately half” 336 of these were necklaced. 337 In his submission to the TRC South 
Africa’s former President F.W. de Klerk claims that, in total 541 people died of the necklace 
between 1st September 1984, and 31st March 1993, and 36 were injured but survived the 
attacks. 338 The police statistics show 406 necklace murders for the time between September 
1984 and December 1989, as well as 28 people injured by, but survived the necklace. 
Furthermore, the records show 395 cases of people being burned alive without a necklace and 
150 survived attempts to kill people by burning them. 339  
These numbers only refer to the apartheid years, though. The necklace was by no means put 
out of service in 1994. However, finding modern figures has proven impossible. The SAPS 
does not list necklacing separately in its statistics and a search on the police website came up 
empty. Similarly, research institutes seem to have lost interest in the phenomenon. 
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2.3.7 Moderate, but Only on the Surface: Inkatha 
Inkatha ka Zulu was founded in 1928 by the Zulu king Solomon kaDinuzulu as a cultural 
movement meant to preserve Zulu traditions in the face of westernisation. It was revived in 
1975 as Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, the National Cultural Liberation Movement, by 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi. From the beginning, Buthelezi and his movement were ambivalent 
figures in the South African power play. On the one hand, Buthelezi portrayed Inkatha as the 
only legal liberation movement and himself as a friend of the ANC. 340  
On the other hand, his appointment as ruler of the homeland KwaZulu in 1976 drove a wedge 
between him and the Congress. What to him was merely a way of obtaining a degree of 
power, to them represented a despicable act of treason. The final blow came in 1980, when 
Oliver Tambo announced from Zambia that Buthelezi had “emerged on the side of the enemy 
against the people” 341. After this humiliation, Buthelezi decided that, if he did not have the 
liberation movements behind him (or below him, as his critics say), he would improve his 
own position by taking a clear stand against them. 342  
He founded vigilante groups throughout the country that consisted mainly of disenchanted 
migrant workers. The insular character of the hostels they lived in had prevented them from 
integrating with the surrounding communities and their squalid living conditions 343 were a 
perfect breeding ground for violence. They had first clashed with township youths in 1976 
when they refused to take part in boycotts and protests. In the 1980s Buthelezi organised them 
like the old Zulu impis, in an attempt to inspire them to fight non-Zulus with the same 
fierceness as Shaka’s armies had done. 344 
The party who profited most from this split among the black population was the regime in 
Pretoria. Apart from reducing the overall level of resistance to apartheid, the emergence of a 
black party that was interested in maintaining the political status quo allowed the government 
to finally outsource the messy business of fighting anti-apartheid activists in the townships. 
Inkatha was from now on hailed as a ‘moderate’ black organisation worthy of support. 345  
The two parties’ cooperation went a lot further than the politicians admitted publicly. Both 
sides vehemently denied it, but there was no doubt that they had combined forces in the 
violent onslaught against the township population. 346 The first incidents happened as early as 
1976, when journalists from the Rand Daily Mail and The Star saw policemen drive hostel 
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dwellers around Soweto, and others overheard them instructing hostel residents to stop 
destroying buildings belonging to the West Rand Administration Board and “fight people 
only” 347 or to eat well so they could “kill on full stomachs” 348. 349  
During the riots of the 1980s, it became quite normal for Inkatha to support the police in their 
fight against opponents of apartheid. In return, the police adopted a hands-off approach to 
their attacks on the township population. 350 For example in 1987 over 734 UDF supporters 
were arrested under the emergency regulations with the stated aim of reducing violence in the 
townships. They were accused of being responsible for at least 62 unrest related deaths. On 
the other hand, of the several hundred Inkatha members accused of at least 125 killings in 
1987 not a single one was detained. 351 
The end of apartheid did not, as might have been expected, put an end to Inkatha’s violent 
behaviour. On the contrary, just as the ANC laid down its arms, Buthelezi’s followers tried to 
establish themselves as a political force with even greater brutality. In July 1990 Inkatha 
entered national politics in the shape of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) whose members soon 
made political activism in the townships a risky undertaking. Inkatha followers frequently 
attacked ANC marches and funerals, as well as church services and night vigils in the 
townships around Johannesburg and Pretoria. 352  
It all began on 22nd July 1990 when Inkatha followers descended on Sebokeng after a rally, 
killing 27 people. From there the violence spread to the surrounding areas of the Reef. The 
main focus of hostilities was a small area south of Germiston known as Katorus (Katlehong, 
Thokoza, Vosloorus) which, at one stage, accounted for about half of all violent incidents 
reported in South Africa. 353 The police were repeatedly accused of openly cooperating with 
Inkatha’s murder squads and of supplying them with arms and intelligence. 354  
The ANC’s suspicions about a secret alliance between the apartheid government and the IFP 
were finally confirmed in July 1991, when the Weekly Mail uncovered what was soon to 
become known as the ‘Inkathagate’ scandal: Under the framework of ‘Operation Marion’, the 
government had channelled substantial amounts of money and arms to Buthelezi’s men with 
the expressed aim to mobilise people of “Zulu culture” 355 in order to “neutralise” 356 the 
UDF. This strategy included non-military means such as the funding of an IFP-aligned trade 
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union, the United Workers’ Association of South Africa (UWASA), to counter the influence 
of COSATU. More important was the military support, though. In 1986, 200 Inkatha fighters 
were taken to the Caprivi Strip and trained in techniques of anti-revolutionary combat by 
former Renamo instructors from the SADF. When they returned to South Africa, they either 
joined the KwaZulu Police or set-up paramilitary units known as Self Protection Units 
(SPUs). 357 During the following years, they spun what the Goldstone Commission in its final 
report called “a horrible network of criminal activity” 358, which included the kidnapping and 
murder of prominent members of the ANC, the UDF and COSATU, often along with their 
families, and sowing fear in the townships through random acts of violence, all in an attempt 
to bring the process of political change to a halt. 359 
These revelations may have damaged both parties’ reputations, but they did not end their 
cooperation. In 1997 the Mail & Guardian uncovered that, between September 1993 and the 
eve of the elections in April 1994, the KwaZulu government under Chief Minister Buthelezi 
had paid millions of Rands to a number of white policemen and Vlakplaas operatives to train 
a reserve of 8,000 paramilitary fighters. 360 They seem to have done their work well. In the 
run up to the elections, as many as 300 people were murdered in KwaZulu Natal every month. 
Since then, violence between supporters of the IFP and the ANC has steadily declined, partly 
due to the peace efforts made by Nelson Mandela and Mangosuthu Buthelezi and partly due to 
the battle weariness of both parties. By 1999 the death toll had fallen to about 10% of the pre-
1994 level. However, the old ANC-IFP rift was still very visible before the 1999 elections 
when about 100 people were killed and injured in the province. Fortunately, by 2004 violence 
was no longer an issue. But by the time it ended, the low-level civil war between Inkatha and 
the ANC had claimed more than 20,000 lives. 361 
2.3.8 Fighting Violence with Violence: Vigilantes 
The general definition of vigilante as “a body of men self-organised for the maintenance of 
order and the administration of summary justice in communities where regular authority is 
lacking or inefficient” 362 does not satisfactorily explain their role in the history of violence in 
South Africa. In fact, when analysing any aspect of South African society, one always has to 
keep in mind that South Africa is really not one society, but many. While the divisions are 
numerous, the most profound split is between the old, white ruled apartheid state and the new 
democratic nation. The different realities in the two South African states necessarily brought 
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with them entirely different kinds of violence. And while in some cases this split is clearly 
visible in the vocabulary, in others, the old words simply acquired a new meaning. One of 
those was the term ‘vigilante’.  
As Johannesburg human rights lawyer Nicholas Haysom explained, before the 1994 elections,  
“the term “vigilantes” connotes violent, organised and conservative groupings 
operating within black communities, which although they receive no official 
recognition are politically directed in the sense that they act to neutralise individuals 
and groupings opposed to the apartheid state and institutions.” 363  
From 1985 on, gangs such as the A-Team, AmaAfrika, Mabangalala, Amandoda, Patakis and 
The Eagles began attacking prominent personalities from the ranks of the UDF and other anti-
apartheid organisations. The majority of their members were migrant labourers living in the 
township hostels. In most cases they actively supported Inkatha. 364 Others were township 
residents who for some reason had ill feelings towards the comrades. For them, becoming a 
member of a vigilante group was a chance at revenge. 365 
The apartheid government was repeatedly accused of supporting the vigilantes in an attempt 
to privatise the mechanisms of oppression. 366 Officials always denied support of, let alone 
cooperation with, the vigilantes, but the two sides obviously worked hand in hand. The 
vigilantes lent substantial support to the government in its fight against the liberation 
movements in areas that were inaccessible to the police, such as Crossroads, KwaNobuhle or 
Queenstown. In return they were protected or supported by the police and were generally 
allowed to use the resources of the township councils or of the homeland governments. 367 
The government’s black surrogates soon posed a greater threat to the people than the security 
forces. During the late 1980s, an average of 162 people were killed in vigilante attacks every 
month. 90% of all people who were killed in the political violence during that decade died at 
the hands of vigilantes. In reaction, the comrades set-up so-called ‘Self-Defence Units’ 
(SDUs) to protect the township population, which soon started a veritable war between them 
and the vigilantes. Pietermaritzburg and the surrounding regions were particularly hard hit. By 
March 1989, over 1,200 people had been killed in vigilante violence or counter-vigilante 
attacks in the Pietermaritzburg area. 368  
After 1994 these pro-apartheid vigilantes were disbanded, but soon a new kind of vigilante 
emerged in the townships. These new vigilantes are experiencing massive growth in areas 
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where the local population is fed-up with the police who, in their eyes, do nothing to curb the 
rampant crime. Similar to the street committees and people’s courts of the 1980s, the 
vigilantes of the 1990s have grown out of peoples’ need to lead a normal life, free of fear and 
violence. 369  
“It’s real justice,” Chester Mpotulo, a street justice committee member in Lower 
Crossroads (Cape Town) told The Big Issue, “because the police are corrupt and often 
collude with criminals. If we hand over a criminal to the police, tomorrow he is back 
and will commit more acts of terror. But if the mob takes over, criminals and rapists 
will be gone, six foot down, forever.” 370 
Unfortunately, the parallels between the community structures of the 1980s and today’s 
defenders of law and order are not limited to the reasons for their emergence. They also 
evolved along similar lines. At first, they really attracted law-abiding citizens who wanted to 
fight crime in their direct surroundings in a transparent and fair manner. These honourable 
principles were soon abandoned though. First, the methods of punishment became more 
severe, with people resorting more and more often to violence. Then, the democratic structure 
of the movements was abandoned and the pseudo-legal proceedings of old were dropped. 
Suspects were no longer notified of charges brought against them and were deprived of their 
chance to defend themselves. The sentences were carried out as soon as possible. This soon 
led to the final step, namely the abandoning of mild sentences. Instead, suspects were brutally 
attacked without warning and often executed on the spot. 371 
2.3.9 Tsotsis 
The so-called tsotsis were youth gangs active in South Africa’s black areas during the 1970s. 
They were purely a township phenomenon, independent of any other youth organisations in 
other areas and at other times. 372  
Unlike the comrades and vigilantes of the 1980s, the tsotsis were not motivated by politics. 
They were mere criminals not unlike those in the American inner cities. Their activities 
greatly resembled those of the black youth gangs of the United States and the gangs that have 
emerged in recent decades in the poor areas, especially in Cape Town: robbery, (non-political) 
murder, rape and the sale of narcotics and, while it was still illegal for blacks, of alcohol. 
Some people, mainly government supporters, also claimed that tsotsis had dominated the 
Soweto uprisings 373 or committed acts of ‘terrorism’ otherwise generally ascribed to black 
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freedom fighters. While it is true that tsotsis probably took the opportunity for looting during 
riots in the townships, the allegation of major involvement was not confirmed by observers 
and has to be dismissed as ideologically motivated. 374 
2.3.10 Warlords 
In South Africa the term ‘warlord’ does not describe the leader of a paramilitary or terrorist 
organisation, as is often the case elsewhere. South African warlords were the heads of 
criminal gangs that emerged during the 1980s among the disenfranchised township youths. 
They were involved in organised crime, such as drug smuggling and the sale of illegal 
firearms, and often fought other warlords and their gangs for power and territory. 375 Unlike 
the tsotsis, they were also active in politics. Only very rarely did warlords opt to support the 
ANC, because neither power nor financial profits could be gained from such cooperation. 
They generally aligned themselves either with the apartheid government or Inkatha. In return 
their followers were not arrested by the police and were, in some cases, even supplied with 
weapons, money and other materials by the state. 376  
2.3.11 The ‘Third Force’ 
Although the kinds of violence described so far have been very different in character, they 
have had one thing in common: The perpetrators and their aims were known and the factors 
that caused the violence were relatively clear. This would change during the period of 
transition. Increasingly, acts of violence seemed devoid of reason as neither their background 
nor the motives could be explained. Even the agents remained largely unknown, and they 
were simply called the ‘third force’. 377 And as so often, we do not even know how many 
people died at their hands. According to figures given by the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service these random attacks claimed nearly 11,000 lives between 1990 and 1994. 378 The 
ANC even talks of 12,000 victims. 379 
Three different kinds of violence were commonly associated with this sad chapter in South 
African history. First, there were massacres: Large groups of unidentified black men would 
roam the townships killing whomever they came upon. As Everatt has put it  
“in classic Renamo style, blind terror has been unleashed against the black population. 
(...) Six people a day are murdered as they travel to or from work, as they drink in 
taverns or beer halls, as they walk down the street or as they sleep in their beds.” 380  
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Beer halls, shopping centres and funeral marches were particularly common targets. 381 In the 
Transvaal alone, 944 people died in such massacres between 1990 and 1992. 382  
South Africa’s trains and train stations also increasingly became the scene of violence during 
the early 1990s. The killing of passengers soon reached such a frightening regularity that it 
was even awarded its own name. The perpetrators were mainly large groups (up to 300 
people) of unidentified men armed with knives, guns and metal bars. Sometimes they would 
board trains and start randomly stabbing, shooting or hacking at passengers before throwing 
them off the moving train. At other times they stood on the platforms unloading automatic 
weapons at incoming trains, or they were on the train themselves shooting at the waiting 
passengers in a station. 383 According to the TRC’s final report, at least 572 people died in 
more than 600 attacks on trains between 1990 and 1993. 384  
The third phenomenon to reach fame in South Africa during the early 1990s were the so-
called ‘taxi wars’ that erupted after the privatisation of the transport sector. The original 
argument was about the right to use certain taxi stands. 385 The conflict escalated in 1991 
when taxi drivers began conquering and defending territory by force. In some areas the issue 
gained a political dimension with some drivers supporting the ANC and others fighting for 
Inkatha. Then the township population got involved to defend the ANC drivers while the 
hostel residents stood behind Inkatha’s taxis. But then the character of the conflict changed. 
More and more often the attacks seemed random and senseless. Unidentified assailants fired 
shots at taxis or threw hand grenades into the crowds waiting at taxi stands for no apparent 
reason. Most victims were not politically active and their only crime had been to want to ride 
in a taxi. This new intensified war cost 200 lives in 1992 alone. 386 
Some observers believed that this was an attempt by Inkatha to maintain its position as a third 
force between the ANC and the NP even after the old animosities began to fade. 387 Others 
took it to be white racists who wanted to prove that blacks were unable to rule a country. Yet 
other people thought that the third force was really the apartheid government in disguise, and 
finally, there was a fourth group who believed the third force to be the result of a cooperation 
of all the above-mentioned actors. 388 
The government vehemently denied the existence of a third force and rejected claims of police 
cooperation with Inkatha or right-wingers. However, in 1993 a commission of inquiry under 
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the chairmanship of Judge Richard Goldstone found ample proof of the existence of the third 
force, and showed that the violence had been the result of years of close cooperation between 
Inkatha, the police, the army and the secret services, and that more recently right-wing groups 
had also been involved. 389 One party’s name, however, was cleared. Despite confirming that 
high government officials had known about the illegal dealings, the Commission did not find 
the NP collectively guilty of involvement in the third force violence. 390  
2.3.12 Visible and Still Non-Existent: ‘Black-on-Black Violence’ 
The concept of ‘black-on-black violence’ is interesting to the student of South African society 
because it contains a paradox that is present in many apartheid terms, but is rarely this easily 
exposed. It clearly illustrates the white way of thinking along racial lines and the apartheid 
discourse while not saying anything about its supposed referent, the violence among the black 
population. The term can be easily defined and illustrated using examples from South African 
history, thus creating the impression that it simply reflects reality. As we have seen in the 
previous chapters, bloody conflicts erupted during the 1980s between the members of black 
groups with different political programmes and different goals. The Eastern Cape became the 
scene of numerous fights between members of the UDF and followers of the Black 
Consciousness movement Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) while in Natal the 
conflict between the UDF and Inkatha led to increased violence. 391  
And yet, despite overwhelming evidence for the existence of a specifically black kind of 
violence, I agree with researchers who see the term ‘black-on-black violence’ as a product of 
the apartheid government’s propaganda machinery and feel it should be rejected. 392 While it 
is true that the majority of violence in South African police statistics 393 is perpetrated by 
black people against other blacks, it does not, as the term implies, happen because the people 
involved are black. If this were the case, it would have to cover all forms of violence 
involving blacks. However, black policemen, government officials and foreigners do not 
qualify as potential participants. The image of violent blacks depends on their participation in 
extra-parliamentary politics in South Africa. This undermines the validity of the concept. 394 
So why was the term ‘black-on-black violence’ created? On the one hand, the expression is 
meant to establish in the minds of the white population ideas of untamed primitives murdering 
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each other in blind fury. References to such images came in handy whenever the 
representatives of white South Africa needed to play a trump card during the talks with the 
ANC or when facing the world public. If they needed to convince people that blacks should 
not be allowed to rule South Africa, all it took was to say ‘black-on-black violence’ for 
everyone to think of wild murdering Africans. 395 This strategy seems to have worked. In one 
of my interviews a man explained to me: 
“Do you know why the term ‘black-on-black violence’ was created? The media only 
ever reported the violence by the government, the police and the army, in the 
townships. This created a wrong picture; everybody thought it was all their fault. So 
they decided to show people that it’s not just whites that are violent. The worst are the 
blacks who commit violence against their own kind. This is what ‘black-on-black 
violence’ means: It shows people that it’s not just whites that are bad. The blacks prey 
on their own.” 396 
This statement clearly shows the government’s rationale, giving people a well-known 
bogeyman in the shape of the wild African, thus completely absolving the proponents of the 
status quo from their responsibility for the killings. This plan seems to have worked, for even 
repeated accusations that the men leading the lynch mobs were disguised whites wearing 
surprisingly well-polished army boots seems to have done no harm to its endurance. 397  
Which brings us to the second cause for the creation of the concept of ‘black-on-black’ 
violence. It helped to separate things that, according to logic, would belong together: 
Supporters of apartheid murdering its opponents, regardless of skin colour. This contributes to 
the obscuring of the common background shared by the different kinds of violence making it 
less tangible and distracting from the government’s involvement. 398 
2.3.13 The Role of the White Right-Wing 
There have been violent right-wingers among the Afrikaners since the founding of the Union 
of South Africa. However, more centrally organised groups that pursued a pre-planned long-
term campaign of violence against the civilian population were not founded until the 1980s. 
When it became clear that the end of white rule was at hand, organisations such as the 
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and Orde Boerevolk 399 stepped-up their activities. 400 
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During the second half of 1990, militant right-wingers were implicated in 14 bombings and at 
least 45 assaults that cost the lives of 26 people and injured 138. Chris Hani, the prominent 
leader of the SACP, was among the victims of this onslaught. Not only political activists were 
targeted, though. The majority of victims were in fact civilians. For example, in July 1990, a 
group of right-wing extremists ambushed a bus near KwaMashu near Durban killing seven 
passengers and injuring a further 27. 401 In 1991, among other incidents, right-wing farmers 
blocked several roads in Pretoria randomly attacking people, and, in a more openly political 
incident, a group of extremists stormed an NP assembly in Ventersdorp killing three people 
and injuring more than 50. 402 
Bombs were also frequently used in the right-wing fight against change. For example, in 
March 1990 a mosque in Nelspruit was blown up, and in May 1990 a bomb severely damaged 
Melrose House, the site where the Anglo-Boer War Treaty had been signed. Only a month 
later, the NP’s offices in Auckland Park, Johannesburg and Roodepoort were targeted. The 
following two months saw attacks on the home and the business of Clive Gilbert, a member of 
the liberal Democratic Party, on a Jewish centre in Johannesburg, on the homes of an NP town 
councillor and of a member of the Kagiso Residents Organisation in Krugersdorp as well as 
the offices of the alternative newspaper Vrye Weekblad. In August 1990, a bomb damaged the 
offices of COSATU in Pretoria, and in September another bomb exploded outside the offices 
of the Afrikaans newspaper Beeld. In 1991, the right-wingers blew up a high school in 
Pretoria, a courthouse in Sabie, COSATU House and a number of post offices. In 1992, 
Lowveld High School in Nelspruit, several more post offices and a power station were 
destroyed in a series of blasts, and in September 1993 a shopping centre in Bronkhorstspruit 
was destroyed. 403 I have only mentioned the most striking blasts; many more happened 
during the early 1990s. It is, however, difficult to reconstruct the full extent of the right-wing 
attacks because frequently neither the groups who had officially claimed responsibility for the 
attacks nor the convicted perpetrators’ ideological background were noted in the police 
statistics. The same is true of the exact number of victims, so the true impact of the right-wing 
bombings will probably remain unknown. 404 
After a military coup in BophuthaTswana in 1994 the AWB sent troops, supposedly to protect 
the local population from the ANC’s communist criminals. However, when they arrived, the 
right-wingers apparently changed their mind and began shooting at the people they had 
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initially come to guard. They rode through the streets of Mmabatho mowing-down passers-by. 
The BophuthaTswana defence force soon arrived and fought back. The result of this day of 
attempted cooperation between a tyrannical homeland leader and a white paramilitary outfit 
was a total of 53 deaths – three of them were white attackers, the remaining 50 were black 
civilians who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. 405 
The militant right wing has calmed down substantially since 1994. They are by no means a 
spent force, though. For example on 30th October 2002, a group calling itself the Boeremag 
(‘Farmers’ Force’) set off nine bombs in Soweto and one in Bronkhorstspruit, killing one 
person. 406 
2.3.14 Farm Attacks – Political Violence, Crime or Non-Existent? 
Symptomatic of the political zeitgeist after 1994 was the emergence of a new category of 
violence, the so-called ‘farm attacks’. In many ways it is not unlike the apartheid term of 
‘black-on-black violence’, seemingly neutral, while being highly ideological below the 
surface. Rather than describing an existing referent in extra-linguistic reality, it in fact created 
the phenomenon it stands for, and in doing so imposes on language users a racialised view of 
reality. A ‘farm attack’ is not just any kind of violence that happens on commercial farms, but 
rather a very narrow sort that can basically be defined as an attack against white farm owners 
by black outsiders. The conservative grouping Action: Stop farm attacks, for example, 
explained in a memorandum in 2000:  
“Farm attacks, in this context, refer to essentially criminally inclined attacks on the 
farming community, irrespective of the motives. (…) Cases related to domestic 
violence, drunkenness or the “normal” interaction between people, do not warrant 
attention in this regard and have been excluded.” 407 
The authors then embark on a five-page pseudo-ethno-historical explanation of the differences 
between what is variously called the ‘Bantu’, ‘African’, or ‘Black’ view of the role of land 
and that of the Europeans. 408  
‘Farm attacks’ are thus seen as a symptom of an underlying clash of civilisations exacerbated 
by the anti-apartheid struggle’s “hatred against the Afrikaner or farmer” 409. As such they are 
believed to constitute a politically / ethnically motivated and organised attack on the Afrikaner 
people as a whole, a campaign to force whites off their land in order to prepare for Zimbabwe-
style land grabs. 410 This view was reinforced by the fact that the term was only coined after 
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the end of apartheid, thus creating the impression that the attacks themselves were a new 
phenomenon. This, in fact is not the case. As we have seen in chapter 2.3.4 b, during the 
1980s, the government began to integrate farms into the military defence system of the 
country, a role that the farmers took-up happily. This made them prime targets for ANC 
attacks, which in turn heightened their fear of, and hatred for, the liberation movements, and 
by extension the black population in general. The stage for conflict between white farmers and 
poor blacks was therefore set long before Nelson Mandela’s release from prison. 411  
Something has changed about the nature of attacks on farms, though. The majority are no 
longer motivated by military or political aims. With very few exceptions those actions 
commonly described as ‘farm attacks’ constitute incidents of armed robbery no different from 
those experienced by city and township dwellers on a daily basis. The victims are not chosen, 
as the term implies, because they are farmers, but because their homes are remote and often 
ill-protected, and they have relatively valuable assets. Just like the illicit businesses in the 
townships and informal settlements, they make a prime target for criminals out to make a 
quick buck. 412 Of the 3,544 farm attacks recorded in 1998-2001 the government’s Committee 
of Inquiry into Farm Attacks identified 2,644 cases with a clear motive. Of those, 89.3% were 
robberies, 7.1% were cases of intimidation (such as crops being burnt), 1.6% were labour 
related disputes and only 2.0% had a racial or political motive. 413 
Clearly, farm attacks are not clearly directed at whites. Moreover, they are a lot less common 
and less lethal than is widely assumed. According to the Committee of Inquiry into Farm 
Attacks, 147 people were killed on South Africa’s farms in 2001. This amounts to a total of 
0.69% of all murders in South Africa. Rapes during farm attacks, another sore point in the 
white community, should also be put into perspective. In 2001, about 12.3% of female victims 
of farm attacks were raped, but rapes during farm attacks constituted only about 0.13% of all 
recorded rapes. Moreover, 71% of all rape victims during farm attacks were black. 414 
2.3.15 Criminal violence with no political background  
Crime in general and criminal violence in particular has moved to the centre of public 
attention in South Africa since the 1994 election. This has created the impression that it was 
an entirely new phenomenon. This, however, is not true; crime has been rampant in South 
Africa for decades and the townships were especially hard hit. For example, for the period 
November 1975 to October 1976 police statistics showed a total of 1,149 murders in Soweto 
alone, which means that residents were being killed at a rate of more than three per day. 
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Official statistics also registered 509 armed robberies there between August and October 
1976. 415 Crime rates went up as the years passed and the socio-economical situation of the 
black population deteriorated. During the decade between 1980 and 1990, the number of  
‘serious offences’ rose by 22% in the police statistics and ‘less serious’ ones were up by 17%. 
Reports of murder increased by 32%, rape by 24%, and burglary by 31%. 416 
Lack of education, unemployment, alcoholism, and frustration with the political situation 
drove people into the arms of crime. Gangs, too, played a role in perpetuating violence, 
particularly in the coloured areas of Cape Town where they had been active since the 1940s. 
They were involved in the sale of illegal liquor, drugs and stolen goods, money lending, 
extortion, illegal gambling, and prostitution. Rapes and robberies were also common among 
gang members as were street battles with other gangs. Many gangs also had links to the 
powerful prison gangs that control most aspects of life in South Africa’s jails, a fact that 
contributed to the perpetuation of the cycle of violence in gang warfare. 417  
During the time of transition crime increased further as the state’s grip on the townships 
loosened. This is not to mean that township dwellers were intrinsically violent and it took an 
occupying army of white policemen to keep them in check. On the contrary, apartheid is 
largely to blame for rendering violent solutions to conflict acceptable to a large portion of the 
South African population. 418 Many township youths had grown up with violence; they had 
witnessed the conflicts of the 1980s, and the police brutality and the countless massacres of 
the early 1990s. Often they were forced to take sides or join a gang for protection. Today, 
these “children of violence” 419 act in the only manner they know – violently. 420 Accordingly, 
although the murder rate fell by 7% between 1990 and 1994 as political violence declined, 
assault was up 18%, rape 42% and robbery 40%.  
The situation was further exacerbated because the police were not trained or equipped for 
ordinary police work. The SAP spent their time in the black areas harassing the population 
and – in the case of many local policemen – using their powers to line their pockets. And 
while crime in white areas was fought vigorously, this fight was not carried out by the same 
means as it is in a democratic state, but simply by using the repressive laws of apartheid. 
Moreover, as the SAP’s official historian confirmed, crime was only of secondary importance 
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to the police. Only 10% of the personnel were dedicated to fighting it, the remaining 90% had 
the task of maintaining the status quo. And that in itself at times involved grave transgressions 
of the law as well as collusion with wanted criminals. All together this facilitated the 
establishment of a subculture of violence in the townships. 421 
The retreat of politics from violence and its subsequent replacing with apolitical crime caused 
a number of secondary changes. During the apartheid years, violence happened mainly in the 
public and semi-public (such as prisons) spheres. Most acts of violence were committed in the 
streets. This has changed in recent years. Since 1994, the violence has retreated almost 
entirely from the public sphere. The most common scenes of violence are now in the semi-
public (for example in the workplace) and private spheres (for example in the victim’s home) 
– with one exception: car hijackings. 422 In 33.8% of cases of assault and in 27.9% of rapes 
reported to the SAPS in 1998, the attacker was a relative of the victim. 423 In more than half of 
all murders of women in 1994, the male partner was the perpetrator. And in an unofficial 
study on marital rape, 43% of the respondents admitted to having been raped by their male 
partners. 424 In fact, the majority of assaults (1998: 54%) and of rapes and sexual assaults 
(68%) now happen in and around the victim’s home. 425 
This development also had an influence on the groups of people commonly victimised. The 
victims of the political violence during the 1960s to 1980s had mainly been politically active 
young men such as freedom fighters, policemen, and soldiers. The criminal violence of the 
1990s on the other hand had entirely different targets. 426 The victims were no longer chosen 
for belonging to a certain political or social group, but according to the promised success of 
the criminal act. They were more than ever weak and defenceless people such as women, 
children and the elderly. 427 According to the Minister of Law and Order, the number of rapes 
of young girls increased by 23% between late 1989 and late 1990. Assaults against children 
under 14 increased by nearly 55% and those against people over 50 by 44.5%. 428 In 2000, 
21,438 cases of rape or attempted rape of children were reported to the police. According to 
the Child Protection Unit of the SAPS, a child is molested every 25 minutes in South Africa. 
Interpol statistics show that in 2002 South Africa had the highest incidence of rape and rape-
homicide in the world; the rape-homicide figure of 17 per 1,000 of the population is 12 times 
higher than in the USA and 40 times higher than in the Scandinavian countries. 429 
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Much could be said about the actual acts of criminal violence perpetrated in the new South 
Africa, but most of it would, from a cultural scientific point of view, be banal. I could 
describe the murders and robberies and list the bloody details of the assaults or I could analyse 
the crime statistics, but that would not be a meaningful contribution to this dissertation, for, 
like so many official documents in South Africa, they do not really say anything about reality. 
I would, however, like to illustrate the problem with determining the actual level of violence 
in South Africa, so in the next chapter I will briefly analyse the sources available to the 
researcher today. 
2.4 A Quantitative Analysis of Violence in South Africa 
It is impossible for us to know today the extent of violence during the apartheid years. We 
remember certain individual violent outbreaks that claimed large numbers of victims, but the 
majority of incidents have slipped from memory. The NP government did keep crime 
statistics. These, however, did not reflect accurately what happened in the country. 430  
Firstly, the majority of violent crimes were never reported to the officials. Black victims in 
particular would not have turned to the officials for help, because they were often the 
perpetrators of the violence. Furthermore, people who did go to the SAP were at risk of 
becoming the target for retribution by militant blacks who did not tolerate any collaboration 
with the oppressors. 431 Whites, too, tended to only report certain crimes. Domestic violence, 
for example, was not generally brought to the authorities’ attention. It was widely considered 
to be a private affair of no concern to the police. Some people even thought it to be normal for 
men to beat their wives or girlfriends. 432 
Secondly, only a small portion of reported crimes made the statistics. Reports from blacks 
were often neither filed nor investigated. Instead they simply disappeared in some dark corner 
of the police station. 433 Also, crimes against the black population were frequently withheld 
from the records when the perpetrators were working with the police and, of course, if the 
perpetrators were policemen themselves. 434 Furthermore, none of the crimes reported in the 
Bantustans appeared in the South African crime statistics, because the government in Pretoria 
considered these to be separate territories. 435 
Finally, we should not forget that violence and crime are not synonymous terms. Under 
apartheid, white employers viewed violence as a legitimate tool for handling black employees. 
Farm hands, domestic staff, and mine workers were frequently subjected to severe brutality 
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and mistreatment such as the withholding of food or humiliating medical exams, not to 
mention death and injury due to negligence on the part of mining companies and farmers. 
These cases also rarely made the courts. 436   
A more realistic picture of the violence during apartheid could be obtained from studying 
alternative sources, such as the files stashed away in police and secret service archives, as well 
as notes taken by military personnel and the prison administration. Unfortunately, these are no 
longer complete. The destruction of records described in chapter 1.2.1 has done a lot to 
obscure the extent of violence during the apartheid years. 437 But even if all relevant 
documents had survived, exact figures could still not be given. Even at the time the acts of 
violence were committed, reports of the number of victims differ greatly. Thornton has 
illustrated this point using the number of victims of the shooting at Uitenhage. According to 
the residents of Uitenhage’s two townships, Langa and KwaNobuhle, 43 died in the massacre. 
The commemorative plaque erected at the site lists only 29 names. The Kannemeyer 
Commission, which convened to investigate the events of 21st March 1985, stated that the 
number of victims did not exceed 20. And the numbers given in media reports at the time 
ranged from 19 to 43. 438 
Despite the limited reliability of any numbers given in relation to violence in South Africa, 
there is no doubt that the overall levels of violence were high between 1960 and 1990. It was a 
widespread phenomenon even during the early decades of apartheid and reached endemic 
levels in the 1980s, when both the government and the liberation movements greatly increased 
their efforts to win the political conflict using violent means. According to Manganyi & du 
Toit, the fights between the police and black protesters claimed 2,987 victims between the 
beginning of the unrest in September 1984 and 31st December 1987, alone. As a comparison, 
according to the same authors, in the violent outbursts of 1976/77 only 575 people were killed 
and the number of violent deaths that occurred during the state of emergency in 1960 was so 
small it was not listed separately in the statistics. 439 
Violence during the apartheid years was not always committed for political reasons. Purely 
criminal violence was just as rife, especially in the poorly policed townships. Quoting police 
statistics of these years, van der Westhuizen gives the following numbers for “murder and 
related crimes of violence”: 1973/74: 18,228; 1974/75: 19,238; 1975/76: 19,174; 1976/77: 
20,173; 1977/78: 18,655. 440 The number of robberies recorded in the official statistics grew 
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from 36,474 in 1973/74 to 43,718 in 1977/78. 441 Rape, too, did not only emerge in the 1990s, 
as is often said, but was a huge problem during the 1970s and 1980s. Between 1973 and 1977 
an average of 15,500 rapes were reported to the police every year. This number grew to 
16,000 between 1980 and 1990. 442 However, when it comes to rape, these figures should be 
looked at with caution. According to calculations by the National Institute of Crime 
Prevention and Rehabilitation of Offenders (NICRO), the actual number or rapes was much 
higher even then. In their opinion only one in 20 rapes is reported to the police, which means 
that about 380,000 women were raped in South Africa every year – this is equivalent to an 
average of 1,000 per day. 443  
During the 1980s, the central government lost complete control of wide areas of the country. 
According to the SADF’s submission to the TRC, between September 1984 and August 1989, 
roughly 48,000 cases of ‘unrest and rioting’ were recorded in South Africa. 444 The exact 
number of victims is, as always, disputed. Cock says 3,500 died as a result of the political 
violence between 1984 and the early months of 1989. 445 The Race Relations Survey 1987/88 
of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), on the other hand, talks of 3,400 
victims for the time span September 1984 to September 1988 alone. 446  
During the time of transition, the dividing line between crime and politics became 
increasingly blurred as violence exploded in all statistics, official or otherwise. The police 
recorded around 22,000 deaths nationwide between September 1989 and December 1991. 447 
KwaZulu and Natal as well as the PWV area were particularly hard hit, as supporters of the 
ANC and the IFP were fighting bloody street battles there. Officials estimated that 12,000 
civilians along with 2,000 soldiers were involved in the conflicts. 448 According to the ANC, 
between July 1990 and the end of 1993, more than 12,000 people were killed and at least 
20,000 injured. This means that such attacks claimed more than ten victims every day. 449 
Byrnes gives lower numbers for 1993, stating that 4,300 people had died as a result of 
politically motivated fighting. 450 This corresponds to the numbers given by the Human 
Rights Commission who assume an average of 366 deaths per month. During the early 
months of 1994, and in particular during the run up to the election, the level of violence 
increased again. In April 1994 three times as many people were killed than during the 
                                            
bertson (1998: 1) and Vogelman & Lewis (1993: 2) 
wn: 28) 
79) and Byrnes (1996: Crime and Violence, p. 1) 
vernment Response, p. 2) 
441 van der Westhuizen (1982: 30) 
442 van der Westhuizen (1982: 22) and Vogelman (1990 b: 96) 
443 Vogelman (1990 b: 96), Ro
444 Mortimer (Unkno
445 Cock (1990: 44) 
446 SAIRR (1988: 2) 
447 Byrnes (1996: Crime and Violence, p. 1) 
448 Johnston (1996: 78-
449 ANC (1996 b: 26) 
450 Byrnes (1996: Go
  84
ections in April 1994. 
ousebreaks 20%.  In 
455
cs 
increased by 15% and that of violent crime by 22% between 1994 and 1999 (see fig. 1). 456  
previous months. 451 The TRC finally estimated that a total of 14,000 South Africans had died 
in politically motivated violence between 1990 and the presidential el
452 
Criminal violence, too, rose to unseen levels. According to Simpson, during 1992 an average 
of 77 South Africans were murdered, 68 raped and 775 assaulted every day. 219 were robbed, 
201 had their cars stolen and 709 had their houses burgled. 453 Between 1990 and 1994, 
assault was up 18%, rape 42%, robbery 40%, vehicle theft 34% and h 454
1992, South Africa had one of the highest crime rates in the world.  
The election did not put an end to the bloodshed. On the contrary, the violence increased 
further. According to Schönteich & Louw, the rate of total crime recorded in official statisti
 
Figure 1: Percentage change in selected crimes recorded between 1994 and 1999 (Source: Schönteich & 
                                                
Louw (2001: 4)) 
It is quite likely that these figures still do not reflect the true extent of violent crime in South 
Africa, for the old problems of underreporting and poor recording persist to this day. 457 A 
study conducted by the HSRC in 1997 concluded that only 73% of crimes are reported to the 
police. 458 A number of violent offences, such as assault, domestic violence and, most 
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still do not record their own crimes. The number of acts of 
 
uth than 
                                                
importantly, sexual assault are notoriously underreported. The SAPS itself admit that they are 
probably told only about one in 35 rapes. 459  
Another problem with the statistics lies in the lack of what observers have termed an 
‘information culture’ in South Africa. According to a committee instituted by the Minister of 
Safety and Security in 1997 to study the reliability of crime statistics, data entry into the 
police database is patchy, due to inadequate training, lack of manpower, and technical 
problems with an unnecessarily complicated system. 460 Furthermore, the police are still not 
particularly open to reports from citizens. A study conducted in Johannesburg in 1999 showed 
that 14 out of 15 women who went to report a rape were turned down. 461 This is aggravated 
by the fact that the police still do not record all crimes reported to them. The data is added to 
the statistics as it pleases the person in charge of putting them in. Some of them are recorded, 
some are not. 462 And the police 
violence committed by policemen either in the line of duty or while they were not on official 
business is thus hard to guess. 463 
We can be fairly confident though that the discrepancy between the police statistics and 
reality is much smaller today than it was before 1994. An increase of violence in the statistics 
should therefore not uncritically be equated to an increase in the actual level of violence. 464 
While there is no doubt that after the end of apartheid violence increased not merely on paper,
many researchers agree that the statistically documented explosion of violence did not happen 
in reality. The incidence of violence simply grew along the same lines as the years before. 465 
But even without a massive increase of violence, South Africa is now at the top of the world’s 
murder league. In 1994, 69.5 out of every 100,000 South Africans were murdered, compared 
with an international average of 5.5. 466 In 1995, the police registered approximately 21,000 
crime-related deaths; twice as many as deaths in motor vehicle accidents. 57 out of 100,000 
people were killed in South Africa that year, making the murder rate six times that of the 
United States. And a screening of hospital records – a source much closer to the tr
crime statistics – showed that in 1996, around 2,500 people were treated every day for bullet 
wounds, stabbing wounds, and injuries sustained in physical attacks or fist fights. 467 
Yet, not all is bad news in South Africa. According to the SAPS and a number of outside 
observers, the incidence of violent crime peeked during the mid-1990s and has been falling 
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since 1996. 468 For example, the incidence of common assault fell by 2% between 1996 and 
1997, that of burglary by 0.9%, that of indecent assault by 1%, that of murder by 5%, that of 
robbery by 0.6%, that of attempted murder by 1.9% and that of explosive acts by a striking 
39.5%. 469 This trend was confirmed by Human Rights Watch in 1998. 470 Unfortu
was up a startling 28.9% between 1994 and 1997. 471 And, although less people were killed 
every year, in 1998, South Africa still registered a frightening 18,000 murders. 472 
In July 2000 the Minister of Safety and Security placed a moratorium on the release of police 
crime statistics, in order to investigate “concerns regarding the integrity and reliability of 
certain crime statistics used for operational planning” 473. This, however, does not mean that 
no information was available. A report by the Crime Information Analysis Centre of the 
SAPS published in 2001 showed a continually falling murder rate with 33.3 reported cases per 
100,000 of the population for the time period between January and September 2001. And 
while other violent crimes showed no such decline, no substantial increase could be observed 
either. 474 In 2003, the SAPS released the newly revised crime statistics. In this document the 
2001 figures were corrected upward to 47.5 per 100,000 and the numbers for 2002 were 
recorded as 47.8 per 100,000. 475 Whatever the case
crime rate in South Africa, and along with it the incidence of violence, is no longer rising. 
Both have finally evened out at a fairly high level. 476 
3. Anti-Communism, Nationalism and Liberalism: Political 
Discourses in South Africa  
 
Before turning my attention to the newspapers’ reporting on violence, I must further examine 
one last aspect of South Africa’s extra-medial reality: the political discourses the reporting 
drew on. When dealing with the media, the researcher has to keep in mind at all times that 
they are not moving on the level of reality, but on a superordinate plane. The study of the 
media is not the study of reality. Nor is it a look at mirror images of the world. Like maps, 
media reports are culturally constructed artefacts. They are in one way or another similar to 
reality, but they must under no circumstance be equated to it. 477 The author’s concept of 
reality is an important factor shaping the report at every
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is always influenced by the 
 members of different 
cultural, religious or social groups. 
Afrikaans newspaper 
an and French Huguenot 
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original) 
predestination and the em
                                                
story to the way the facts are presented. Thus, the reporting 
ideological framework that the journalist moves in. 478   
3.1 The Nationalism of the Afrikaans Population 
Afrikaner world view is strongly influenced by what Leatt et al. call “corporate ethic” 479, an 
ideology which perceives people not so much as individuals, but as
480 As Willem van Heerden, the former editor of the 
Dagbrecht, explained in a paper in 1972: 
“The country’s population is a community, not of individuals but of peoples, 
consisting of a white nation, eight separate Bantu nations, nearly two million 
Coloureds (persons of mixed blood) and some half-a-million Indians.” 481 
The origins of these ideas most likely lay in the fact that early Dutch colonialists were 
confronted with a wealth of unknown cultures in Southern Africa. Defining the in-group in 
opposition to these ‘others’ seemed the natural choice, even as Germ
immigrants arrived in Africa. The psychological boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them
drawn between Europeans and Africans and the similarities among the latter as well as the 
dissimilarities with the former were emphasised. 482 
This collectivist view was probably further exacerbated by the Calvinist faith of the Dutch 
settlers. Two different arguments are brought forth in literature to support this claim. Akenson 
elucidates how, taking guidance from “the concept of One People (…) articulated in the 
Hebrew scriptures [, the Afrikaners] came to believe that they constituted one volk
483. Van den Berghe applies Max Weber’s argument of a link between the belief in 
ergence of collectivism to the Afrikaners. He argues that 
“a belief in predestination leads to anxiety about one’s salvation, and that one tries to 
resolve the uncertainty by seeking outward signs of God’s grace. (…) Skin colour 
seemed the most obvious, indeed the almost inevitable choice in South Africa, all the 
more so that practically all dark-skinned people were in fact “heathens,” and that 
darkness was traditionally associated with sin and evil in the Christian world view.” 484 
Here also lies the origin of the assigning of value to group membership. Christianity is viewed 
as good while everything else is considered bad and threatening – hence the incorporation of 
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the Arab word for non-believer (‘Kaffir’) into Afrikaans as a derogatory term for blacks or the 
AWB’s composing their flag out of the number 7, the Biblical symbol for the apocalypse. 485 
Such ideas were fostered and underwritten by the work of Afrik
particularly anthropologists. These so-called Volkekundiges made the contrast between the 
‘eie’, the self, and the ‘anders’, the other, the centre of attention. And in their eyes the self and 
the other did not merely stand on opposite ends of the cultural spectrum. Scholars like Cronje 
viewed the ‘uitheemse’, the foreign element, as a threat to the self. 486 
This led many to believe that the survival of the individual depends 
up in a pure form, untouched by outside influences. It was therefore seen as imperative 
ect individual cultural groups in a multicultural society.  487 As P. J. Coertze, one of 
unde’s most influential scholars, stated in an article titled Akkulturasie, in which he 
of the dangers of a descent into “the sewer of integration” 488: 
“It is necessary for us to take all measures to ensure the diversity and the separate 
development of different ethnic groups in the future. All factors which may still 
to foster a growing-together and an integration into a greater
be systematically removed, otherwise we shall not avoid
This obsession with cultural purity soon grew into racism, which became an intrinsic part of 
the Afrikaner identity and, along with its religious justifications, survives to this day. 490  
3.2 Political Thinking Among English Speakers 
Generally, South Africa’s English speakers have claimed to have nothing to do with the 
Afrikaners’ intolerant backwardness. They see themselves as ‘liberals’, which meant that to 
them the individual is of supreme importance and his/her interests come before that of the 
community. The role of the state is seen to be to nurture this individualism. Historically, they 
have opposed both socialism and nationalism. They favoured a European-style democracy, 
supported small government and a strong and independent judiciary. Ideologically, this meant 
that they believed in the freedom and equality of all men, regardless of race, creed, sex or 
culture. This also entailed strong support for freedom of speech and 
to undue interference in the individual’s personal and economic life. Political stability, they 
argued, could be achieved only through social justice and economic prosperity. Furthermore, 
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oups that 
k supporters of the political and economic establishment such 
e and the out-group standing for all negative attributes. 
where these did not exist, they should be achieved through evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary means. Violence of any kind was strongly opposed. 491 
This, however, was only the theory of it all. In practice, liberalism among English speaking 
South Africans was a rather conservative affair. Far from striving towards the ideal of total 
equality of all South Africans, most were content to achieve freedom and prosperity for 
themselves, and otherwise maintain the status quo. 492 The antagonism with the Afrikaners 
was therefore not so much over the rights of the black population, but rather over the question 
whether the English speakers’ individual rights should be curtailed in the na
apartheid. However, the English speakers’ support for individualism was not as strong as they 
claimed. Even they viewed society as a conglomeration of racial and cultural gr
strongly influence the individual’s outlook in life. This allowed them to see the racism of 
apartheid and the stratification of society as natural and thus acceptable. 493 
3.3 Where the Two Camps Meet: White Opinion in South Africa 
Throughout the period under review South African thought was dominated not only by group 
thinking in general, but more specifically by the binary opposition of identity and alterity, of 
‘us’ and ‘them’. To divide the world in two is by no means unique to South Africa. It is a 
century-old trait of European thought that can be traced as far back as ancient Greece. 494 It is, 
however, of special importance to many white South Africans as it was the founding idea of 
their society. During apartheid, the central players were the state and the liberation 
movements. The former, the in-group, was perceived as ‘white’, even though besides the 
white population it included blac
as the homeland administrations and so-called moderate black leaders. The out-group in turn 
was called ‘black’, even though it included a number of whites. The term really stood for the 
negative opposite of the in-group, the ‘radicals’: the liberation movements, the township 
youths and the trade unions. 495  
These two groups were not only seen as facing each other from opposite ends of the political 
and cultural spectra, but were also assigned opposite places on a good-bad axis with the in-
group representing everything desirabl
As a result, the former came to be associated with such attributes as civilisation, education, 
moderation, order and peacefulness, while the latter came to represent everything Europeans 
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had long feared about the ‘heart of darkness’: wildness, chaos, primitiveness, uncontrolled 
eruptions of passion and violence. 496  
This intellectual edifice was again underpinned by the work of Volkekunde. Influenced
Russian anthropologist Sergei Mikhailovich Shirokogoroff’s ‘ethnos-theory’, they biologised 
cultural roles and identities, claiming that a person’s culture is in some way inherent in their 
genes. Each cultural group was claimed to have a distinct – God-given as some more pious 
Volkekundiges put it – nature, which was described using seemingly neutral, but de facto 
evaluative adjectives such as ‘civilised’ and ‘primitive’ or ‘Christian’ and ‘traditional’. 497 
These word fields served to assign to the people they referred to a spot on the cultural 
evolutionary ladder that, in the scientists’ eyes, all peoples had to climb. However, such 
evolution was seen to be possible only in a limited way, for, while cultures could advance, 
people’s nature was thought to set clear boundaries to how far they could go. 498 Compared to 
highly developed whites (at times called ‘Europeans’ even though the NP insisted that 
Afrikaners were the white tribe of Africa), blacks (at times called ‘Africans’) were taken to be 
one of these undeveloped, ‘lower’ cultures. And one of the visible signs of this lack of cultural 
sophistication was seen to be their attitude to violence. As Cloete put it in an article published 
in 1982 by the University of South Africa: “Even in modern Black communities, the (…) idea 
that violent action is inadmissible is not yet internalised, and many members of the
nities still regard it as acceptable form of behaviour.” 499 
rprisingly, as graduates from Afrikaans universities made their way into apartheid 
cracy, the idea that blacks were impulsive and violent and needed guidance from 
to prevent them from killing each other became firmly entren
thinking. 500 B.J. Vorster, the Minister of Police under P.W. Botha, for example, explained: 
“The multiracial composition of our population (…) results in the Police having to 
persuade people who fundamentally differ from the white man and even from each 
other and who respect their own distinct norms, to obey laws they do not understand 
and maintain a kind of order which is foreign to their nature.” 501 
This statement is also indicative of another aspect of o
Africa. Even in the face of massive evidence of whites regularly committing barbarous acts of 
cruelty, they were rarely described in these terms. It was as if it were unthinkable whites to be 
violent savages. As Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok declared: “It can also be justly 
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claimed that the Force has, in the principles on which its duty has been performed, always 
maintained Christian norms and civilized standards.” 502 
The presentation of the ongoing conflict as one between wild savages and peaceful Christians 
served to de-politicise the violence in South Africa and to lay the blame on evil powers 
beyond the country’s borders. Since its creation, the NP’s main goal had been to convince the 
white population that outside their country’s borders africanists and communists were waiting 
to take away everything they had worked for. They felt that this would convince people that 
apartheid was the only way to prevent the end of their world. 503  
After 1990 the government sought to abandon the discourse of racial diff
it with a new ideology of humanity as one and South Africa as a so-called ‘rainbow nation’ in 
which all people would live as equals. 504 Such terms can be deceiving, though. Most whites 
did not want to be part of a metaphorical colour soup. Their vision of the rainbow was that of 
a loose collection of clearly separate group living side by side – an ethnically based federalist 
state, in which each faction (including each of the separate ‘Bantu nations’) would be given 
considerable territorial autonomy under a weak central government. 505  
Not all people shared this view of the future though. A number of leaders, most prominently 
Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, were sincere in their attempt to break down the old inter-
group boundaries. Their task, however, was a formidable one in 
Africa. This was one reason why, rather than trying convince people that the old groups were 
no longer relevant, they attempted to construct a larger group that everyone could identify 
ith – the ‘rainbow nation’. They were only partly suw
was dear to many. As we have seen above, some Afrikaans speakers considered the continued 
existence of their population group to be a prerequisite for the survival of the individual. 
Therefore, they often rejected the new nation as unworkable. 506 
4. Paper Voices: The Representation of Violence in South 
Africa’s English Language Press 
 
I believe that by now the character of the violence in South Africa, as well as the changing 
framework within which the English language press has operated has been made sufficiently 
clear. It is now time to proceed to the actual media analysis. My approach here is 
First, after a brief description of the history and character of the newspaper houses, I will 
examine the quantitative aspects of the reporting in terms of what Herman & Chomsky have 
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called the “propaganda model” 507. Attention here will be paid predominantly to the relative 
importance of violence as an item of news as expressed by the frequency of reports, space 
dedicated to the subject, layout of the individual articles, and the position in the paper. This 
forms the background to, and sets the stage for, the analysis of the articles’ content.  
The next step is to find out how the papers’ ideological background affected their reports. 
People often see press reports as mirror images of reality. I reject this view, for it obscures the 
boundary between the real and the symbolic. Newspaper articles are squarely located in the 
symbolic world and are never mirror images of anything ‘out there’. They always contain a 
point of view. 508 In order to find just that, the point of view from which South African 
readers have been looking at violence in their country, I will first look at the role of ideology 
in the reporting in general. 
newspapers take as violence: What is reported? What is ignored? Then I need to see what 
weight is given to individual incidents and which aspects of them are given prominence. 
Finally, when all this has been made sufficiently clear, my focus will shift to the angles taken 
and the people portrayed in the reports. Who is seen to do what? And how are these actions 
explained? In asking these questions I will try to discover along which lines violence is 
viewed at what stage in South African history. 509 
In this part of the analysis I will draw extensively on the theory of framing. Acc
proponents, frames work by organising reality into clearly distinguishable categories, thus 
turning an amorphous flow of impressions into a series of events. These are then assigned 
meaning by being described in terms of previously known discourses. 510 So, what frames are 
used to describe violence in the South African press? Is it a problem of security? Of mental 
health? Of culture? Knowing this will give me an understanding of the general repertoire of 
thoughts available to South Africans to understand the violence in their country. 
Once all this is achieved and the newspaper reports are no longer viewed as transparent I can 
move on to the final step in my analytical process: a micro-level analysis of the content of a 
representative cross-section of reports. I will make use of the methods developed by Critical 
Discourse Analysis and social semiotics, that is, an a
their cultural context, to find the images used for describing violence. I believe that these are 
more than just random metaphors chosen on a case-by-case basis, but commonly shared 
symbols with clearly defined meanings, which have come to denote the different kinds of 
violence at different points in history. Viewed as a whole, they combine to form a cultural 
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code, a language of violence so to speak. In my opinion it is this code which truly influences 
the readers’ understanding of the media message. 511  
4.1 Getting to Know the Messenger: The English Language Press in 
South Africa 
Throughout the period under investigation, he
South Africa was dominated b
Newspapers and South African Associated Newspapers (SAAN), which, in 1987, changed its 
name to Times Media Limited (TML). For a while, a number of independent, liberal, English 
publications existed, but they were swallowed one by one by the large publishing houses. The 
political and ideological orientation of the sector was consequently fairly uniform as well. 
They were economically liberal, but socially conservative, and advocated ideals such as 
freedom of opinion and global cooperation. 512 
4.1.1 The Apartheid Years 
During the apartheid years, as the influence of 
English press quickly took on the function of extra-parliamentary opposition. This role should 
not be overstated, though. The English papers might have thought of themselves as the “voice 
of the opposition” 513, but their being largely white bourgeois institutions prevented them 
from speaking out for the true opponents of apartheid, namely the black working class. 514 As 
Dennis Pather explained: “They may have paid lip service to their opposition to apartheid. 
Some of them. But not to the extent where they stood side by side with us and, stood up and, 
made sacrifices.” 515  
In most cases, this was not due to maliciousness, but simply the result of the cultural context 
the papers belonged to. The English press essentially inhabited a white, middle-class world. It 
was owned, run and staffed mainly by white middle-class men and catered mainly to a white 
middle-class audience. “In outlook,” Tony Heard, the editor of the Cape Times admitted, 
“those running the paper, including myself, had a “white” outlook – indeed, were captiv s o
history, of generations of lingering prejudice.” 516 And the English middle class opposed 
apartheid not because of its inherent racism, but because it was stifling economic growth. 
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ly, they pressed for government-friendly reporting. 518  
nto the 
interest in 
Opposition to the government was also reduced by the fact that the press was essentially 
controlled by South Africa’s large mining companies 517 who quite plainly profited from the 
oppression of the black population. Apartheid provided them with a near unlimited supply of 
cheap labour with no rights to speak of, so it would have made no sense for them to advocate 
an end of it. Therefore, not surprising
This is not to mean that the English press was the public relations arm of South Africa’s big 
mining houses. In general they enjoyed a large degree of editorial independence. But everyone 
knew who they were working for, a factor which did influence their choices at least sub-
consciously. 519 As a result, the English language newspapers did not offer an alternative to 
government discourse, but rather a slightly different version thereof. 520 They fought mostly 
on minor issues, such as an abolition of separate amenities and the pass system, but left the 
basis of apartheid unquestioned. 521  
There were a few exceptions to this rule: Donald Woods, the editor of the Daily Dispatch, 
Tony Heard, the editor of the Cape Times and the staff of the Rand Daily Mail, which, under 
the editorship of Laurence Gandar, Raymond Louw and Allister Sparks, developed i
only true opposition to the NP. The Mail was also the first white newspaper to hire a journalist 
dedicated entirely to black affairs, and to run stories about the every-day life of the black 
population. 522 This course had clear effects on its readership. According to Akhalwaya, by 
the early 1980s, 72% of the Mail’s reads were black. As a consequence, few white companies 
were interested in advertising with the paper. Eventually the owners reacted by creating a new 
paper from the profitable financial section, Business Day, and, on 30th April 1985, closing the 
Rand Daily Mail (along with the Sunday Express and the Sowetan Sunday Mirror). 523 
At first this seemed to be the end of the opposition press in South Africa. 524 However, during 
the 1980s many South Africans, particularly the black population, developed a keen 
politics. They had enough of the government’s interfering in their lives and rejected the 
mainstream media that presented an image of reality that had nothing to do with their daily 
experiences. The time was ripe for filling the communications vacuum without the help of 
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ns I will not include them in my 
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he government, it was also the only English newspaper that 
supported the NP and its apartheid policies openly and unapologetically. 528 When, in 1978, 
after the end of apartheid. The first 
                                                
large media houses. 525 In the coming years, a number of new independent publications 
sprung up that became known as the ‘alternative press’. Unlike the mainstream media, they 
did not use the government-created language of separatism, nor did they centre their reporting 
on the lives of the white population, but advertised unity and colour-blindness instead. 526  
As important as these publications were, for several reaso
analysis. Firstly, as they admitted themselves, they stood outside the official South African 
discourse, and an examination of their articles would therefore not further my aim of 
understanding the world of the mainstream press. Secondly, with their small circulation of 
between 10,000 and 80,000 copies, and their often irregular publication cycles, they were not 
a big factor in the English language media market and therefore had little influence on public 
opinion. Besides, and this brings us to my third and most important reason for leaving them 
out, even those alternative newspapers published in English were mainly read in the 
townships and by opponents of apartheid (including whites), not by the average English 
speaking South Africans that I am trying to understand. 527 
An entirely different story altogether is that of The Citizen. Launched on 7th Septemb
with money secretly supplied by t
revelations of the state’s funding of The Citizen reached the public, the government was 
forced to sell the newspaper to Perskor, an Afrikaans press group, for the discounted price of 
the printing press it owned. By then it was on the verge of breaking even, so Perskor, who 
amalgamated it with its Financial Gazette, had no problems maintaining it throughout the 
following years. And it was not just scraping by, either; The Citizen grew into one of the 
biggest success stories in South African newspaper history. In 1996 its circulation reached a 
daily average of 138,071 and by 1998 it was the third largest daily in the country. 529  
4.1.2 The Situation after 1990 
The South African media landscape changed substantially 
to feel the effects of the transition was the alternative press. They had largely relied on 
donations from opponents of apartheid for funding and after 1990 the money quickly dried-
up. Some alternative newspapers attempted to morph into commercial ventures, but they were 
too small and their readers had too little buying power to be of any interest to advertisers. 
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 its stable. In 1994, Independent Newspapers bought the Cape Times 
ny. 534 Shortly 
agiso Trust, 
                                                
With the exception of the Weekly Mail, which was saved by an injection of money from the 
British Guardian in 1995, none of the alternative newspapers survived the transition to 
democracy. 530 Today, it is called Mail & Guardian and, with a circulation of nearly 40,000, 
has become an important factor in the South African media landscape. 531 These later edition 
of the paper have therefore been included in my analysis.  
In the mainstream newspaper market, the first and probably most consequential change was 
the buyout, in three stages (completed in 1999), of the Argus Company by the Irish 
Independent Group and its subsequent name change to Independent Newspapers (in 1994). 
The deal was a big blow to black empowerment, not least because the company had taken a 
number of steps during the preceding years, which had clearly put it in the lead in the English 
newspaper market. 532 In 1985, the Argus Group closed the loss-making Friend and added 
The Natal Mercury to
from TML in a much-criticised behind-the-scenes deal, and finally, in 1995, it launched the 
Sunday Independent in direct competition with the Sunday Times. 533 
Still, the English press did not stay entirely in white hands. In October 1996, the black-owned 
National Empowerment Consortium took effective control over Times Media Limited when it 
acquired 35% of the shares of Johnnic, TML’s newly founded holding compa
thereafter, the company sold 50% of shares and joint management control of its two business 
publications, the Financial Mail and Business Day, to Pearson, the UK-based publisher of the 
Financial Times. 535 Finally, in 2000, the Evening Post in Port Elizabeth was closed due to 
mounting losses. 536  
The Citizen, too, changed into black hands when, in 1996, Perskor merged with K
one of the most prominent new black-run investment groups. The group was sold two more 
times in the following years, and in 1999, finally ended-up as a joint venture between Caxton 
Publishers and New Africa Investment Limited (NAIL), another major black empowerment 
company, that, in 1993, had bought the Sowetan from the Argus Company. 537  
Despite such fundamental changes in ownership, the English press was slow at adjusting to 
the new South Africa. Continuity was most marked with regards to the target audience. A 
newspaper’s primary source of income is the sale of advertising space, and, while a few black 
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ite. 
staff – but they certainly do not represent an impassable hurdle. If 
the cur
racial d
4.2 
odel’, an analysis that, 
 
people grew wealthy relatively quickly, the most profitable readers were taken to be wh
Blacks were for a long time only of marginal interest to the mainstream press. 538 
One look into the newsroom of an English language newspaper in South Africa during the 
1990s also quickly revealed some of the shortcomings of the new era. While the number of 
black journalists went up steadily and a number of blacks were promoted into editorial 
positions, their numbers did not reflect their share of the overall population. Especially the 
second tier of power, the sub-editors who get to decide on newspaper layout, write headlines 
and edit stories, is still mostly white. The reasons for this are numerous – from racism to lack 
of properly trained black 
rent trends continue, South Africa should in the not too distant future overcome the 
ivide in the newsrooms. 539 
An Analysis of News Reports in Terms of the ‘Propaganda Model’ 
In the present chapter I will investigate the link between the attention devoted to the subject of 
violence in the South African press and its importance to South African culture. However, this 
is no mere content analysis. We cannot assume that a subject that attracts little media interest 
is of little importance to a culture, nor is it true that the topic that is given the most attention is 
the one most cared about. Therefore, the question I have to answer is not what is reported – 
although this aspect is certainly interesting and will be touched upon – but how a situation as 
a whole is portrayed. This is why I have opted for the ‘propaganda m
according to its creators, 
“focuses on (…) [the] inequality of wealth and power and its multilevel effects on 
mass-media interests and choices. It traces the routes by which money and power are 
able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government 
and dominant private interests to get their message across to the public” 540.  
However, I see the world differently than Herman & Chomsky, which has clear implications 
for my work. They postulate a unidirectional line of influence from “money and power” via 
the media to “the public”. I on the other hand strongly believe that the idea of direct media 
influence has been refuted by Stuart Hall’s research into coding and decoding. As I have 
shown in chapter 1, media consumers are not mere receivers of someone else’s prefabricated
message, but active participants in the communication process.  
So, if I reject their basic premise, in which way is Herman & Chomsky’s model useful to me? 
It is beyond doubt that the political economy of the media, the media culture of a country and 
the ideological environment in which the media operate, shape the public’s understanding of 
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anda 
implies
control
such a ays does, in my view, lack proof. 
ent interference in media 
), a large publishers’ association, in 1978: 
“The freedom of the press is not a civil liberty and the public do not have the right to 
. Privilege can not be allowed to be abused and create a state of unrest and 
background 
against
I believ
stories 
a) 
The NP’s may have frequently assured people that their country stood on the side of the free 
munist) oppression, but this did not prevent them from 
the message they convey. Therefore the authors’ initial question – How does the socio-
political context in which the media operate influence their reporting? – is one which should 
be addressed here. And their ‘propaganda model’ lends itself to this kind of investigation. I 
would, however, prefer to call my approach the ‘ideology model’. The term propag
 that there is active and wilful intervention on the part of the powerful interests that 
 the media. And while, as I will show, the apartheid government interfered extensively, 
sweeping claim that everyone in power alw
4.2.1 Factors that Influenced the Amount of Reports on Violence 
The reporting of violence in the South African press is primarily influenced by one thing: the 
point in time at which it is published. During the apartheid years, violence was continuously 
underreported. This was in part due to the newspapers’ editorial policies and their audience’s 
likes and dislikes, but by far the biggest influence was governm
affairs. Freedom of expression was not granted any special protection under either of the two 
constitutions that were in force during the apartheid years, and the government never kept its 
dislike of the concept a secret. As Louis le Grange, at the time Minister of Public Works, 
explained to the Newspaper Press Union (NPU
be informed
chaos in the name of press freedom.” 541 
The NP believed in the media’s power of persuasion and identified it as an important site of 
the struggle for the hearts and minds of South Africa’s white population. 542 And they fought 
this war incessantly and on all fronts by censoring media output, releasing masses of 
propaganda and planting spies in the newspapers’ editorial offices. According to Mortimer, a 
former general in the SADF, these moves had one common goal: “The population had to be 
influenced to accept and support the national aim”. 543  
In the following sub-chapters, I will briefly sketch the ideological and legal 
 which the press operated before moving on to the actual analysis of the media reports. 
e that this is vital for understanding the choices that led to the publication of certain 
and the elimination of others. 
Censorship 
world in the fight against (com
                                                 
541 Quoted in Brewer (1986: 333) 
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bounda
impriso
evised, the far more 
de of caution rather than risk 
was argued that by 
interfering with the media. It merely meant that they were unable to introduce a censorship 
law as such. Instead, individual clauses aimed at restricting press freedom were hidden in over 
100 other laws. 544 Moreover, there was no centrally organised pre-publication censorship, as 
mple in the Soviet Union. The responsibility for staying within the government-defined 
ries lay entirely with the newspaper houses who faced fines, bannings, and 
nment of their staff if they did not comply. 545 As Tony Heard explained:  
“We didn’t have in-office censors. The system that had been d
effective form of censorship, the best form of censorship, is not to have a boring little 
man or woman with a blue pencil, you know, a boring little censor in the office. (…) 
The best way is to make the press censor themselves.” 546  
This system of outsourced control often worked to the government’s advantage, because even 
the most progressive editors generally decided to err on the si
government repercussions. 547 During our interview even liberal editor Tony Heard admitted:  
“I was a marvellous censor and at times I did pick stuff out. Far more than I’d want to 
admit to today. But, sure, you know, sometimes you’re terrified, it’s late at night, the 
story arrives on you desk, suggesting that we are invading Angola, for instance. And 
you say, hang on, let’s talk about that tomorrow, you know.” 548  
Articles about violence, particularly of the politically motivated sort, often struck out. For 
one, widespread coverage of the township unrest might have created the impression that the 
government was no longer in full control of the situation. Furthermore, it 
reporting their actions, the media would give the opponents of apartheid a platform to voice 
their views, something that had to be prevented at all costs. 549  
Many owners and managers shared this view, so the newspapers’ self-censorship often 
exceeded what was mandated by law. Over the years, they entered into several agreements 
with the government promising, among other things, not to hinder or embarrass the police, to 
inform a senior officer before publication of “information concerning crime or State security 
which has been obtained by the newspaper independently of the police, to enable such officer 
to advise whether the information should be published” 550, and to use information about 
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ain silent about the actions, or rather the existence, 
ersive 
statements’, promoting an unlawful organisation, encouraging people to take part in protest 
actions, aggravating feelings of hostility, and weakening public confidence in the termination 
of the state of emergency. 556 Journalists could enter unrest areas only by special permission 
and had to obtain written permission for publication of what they had seen. 557 Hence, most 
newspapers that were even remotely critical of the government had no choice but to use the 
material supplied by the only official source of information at that time – the government’s 
‘Bureau for Information’. 558 
Many English language newspapers began carrying notices on the front page informing 
readers that there were things they were not telling them about. Others periodically carried 
reminders that specific articles had been censored, or printed articles with unfinished or partly 
blacked out sentences to show how much information was actually missing (see fig. 2). 
                                                
defence matters from official sources as far as possible and to have all other articles 
authorised and, if necessary, edited or commented by the government. 551  
During the state of emergency, that is, almost throughout the entire 1980s, the South African 
government successively outlawed virtually all reporting of violence. 552 In November 1985, 
publication of visual footage of the unrest was banned and any journalists who wanted to 
report on political violence had to be accredited with the police or the government’s Bureau 
for Information. 553 On 12th June 1986, new press restrictions came into force that prohibited 
the reporting of political protests, including consumer boycotts, strikes, demonstrations, and 
the funerals of unrest victims. The names of detainees or victims of the unrest could not be 
mentioned either, and the media had to rem
of conscientious objectors. 554 In December 1986 special press regulations were posted in the 
Government Gazette, which made reporting on the violence in the townships without 
authorisation from the government virtually impossible. 555 The publication of any details of 
security action or the fate of detained persons became illegal, as did making ‘subv
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Figure 2: Nothing left to say: Weekly Mail, Jun th th
Such measures were eventually declared
e 20  1986: 1 and 8  August 1986: 1 
 illegal, though, to create an illusion of normality, 
 that, if 
which ensured that the public remained ignorant of the true extent of official interference. 559   
This is not to say that, if people had wanted to, they could not have found ample proof of the 
ongoing censorship. The Sowetan, for example, tried to alert its readers of the prohibition on 
political comment by choosing such strange subjects as the potato for its weekly column. 560 
The Weekly Mail circumvented the new legislation by replacing the blacked-out spaces with 
the instruction “For further information telephone your Minister” 561 and adding the relevant 
civil servant’s office and home numbers. And on 12th December 1986, under the title “The 
emergency made simple” 562, the newspaper listed all restricted topics and told readers
they wanted to discuss them, they should “Simply phone these numbers and ask for 
permission” 563. The contacts given were the President, all senior government ministers, the 
Bureau for Information, the head of the National Intelligence Service and the Secretary of the 
State Security Council.  
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other hand did not bother with such elaborate methods of 
ften charged and generally 
ss
th  the police had 
rnalists and to copy their 
This also had the much-welcomed effect that opponents of apartheid lost confidence in the 
ed 
The mainstream press on the 
defiance. Their readers would not have bought empty newspapers for long, which would have 
led to substantial losses of sales and advertising income. Therefore, rather than annoying 
everyone, they opted for cooperation with the authorities. “Pictures of rugby and beauty 
queens have replaced township unrest on many front pages,” Tony Heard lamented in 1987. 
“The habit of compliance dies hard.” 564 
Besides direct forms of censorship, many indirect methods were used during the 1970s and 
80s. In an attempt to prevent journalists from doing their job the police confiscated their press 
cards or car keys, called them in for questioning so that they missed important appointments, 
or had their notes and films stolen. Many black journalists and most employees of the 
alternative press were at some point banned, hassled or attacked by policemen. Their homes 
and offices were targeted by bombers and vandals. They were o
found guilty of offences against the press laws or sent straight to prison without trial. There 
they were often tortured or held in solitary confinement for long periods of time. 565  
The list of harassments is, unfortunately, too long for the present paper, but I do believe my 
point has been made clear even without specific examples. To anyone interested in the extent 
of intimidation and prosecution of journalists, I recommend Stewart (1986) who lists 14 pages 
of arrests and attacks just for the time period between September 1984 and 1986. 566  
b) Spies in the Newsroom 
Another strategy for controlling the media, which combined elements of censorship and 
propaganda as well as intelligence work, was the planting of spies in all media houses. The 
agents made frequent reports to the police about their colleagues’ transgre ions, told their 
superiors of the organisational structure of the media houses and gave them information that 
might later be of strategic importance. 567 Journalists’ research was of interest, too, because 
they often had access to information about the liberation movements at
trouble obtaining through questioning. It was easier to spy on the jou
notes and pictures. At times the spies themselves were the liberation movements’ contacts in 
the media and got access to dissidents through their work. Former spy Craig Williamson told 
the TRC: “You were legitimately able to gather authentic information (...) and via you that 
information would get to the South African Security Forces.” 568  
mainstream media when they noticed that the information they gave to journalists often end
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hen they entered the townships. Hence in an attempt 
nce had a censoring effect. The knowledge that they were surrounded by spies 
Not unlike ordinary Germ
‘hear n
why they could afford a m
                                                
up with the police and that promised articles were rarely printed. 569 This lack of trust could 
have serious consequences for journalists in the field. Especially during the 1980s it was not 
unheard of that reporters were attacked w
to protect themselves, many reporters began to rely entirely on information from the 
government or ignore the townships altogether. 570 
The agents also had the power to eliminate troublesome journalists by wrongly accusing them 
of being spies, thereby ruining their reputation, or at least to prevent them from publishing 
unwanted material by stealing their notes or manipulating their equipment. 571 But even their 
mere prese
made journalists paranoid and distracted them from their work. Much energy was lost on 
hiding important material to prevent it from falling into the wrong hands. 572  
c) Let’s not Go There – The Attitude within the Media Houses 
The serious misrepresentation of the ongoing violence was not only due to government 
interference though. The press itself was also to blame for failing to accurately represent the 
situation in the townships. Editors who did not want to publish stories about political violence 
or the struggle of the liberation movements used the media regulations as an excuse to reign in 
their more critical reporters. Some did it because they themselves supported the status quo, 
but most of the time, important information that could legally be printed was omitted for fear 
of alienating readers and advertisers. 573  
ans during the Nazi years, many white South Africans adopted a 
o evil, see no evil’ mentality. They enjoyed the life they had and preferred not to ask 
aid, a gardener and a childminder – all of them black of course – on 
just the main breadwinner’s salary, or why they did not have to get out of their cars to pump 
petrol, let alone ever clean a car window. 574 And the mainstream media made it easy for them 
to forget.  
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along w
 the Johannesburg 
 interview: 
“The townships and the areas outside of where they lived were like something in the 
ito e Cape Times, 
d  them; I 
For example, at the end of 1976, the Sunday Times Extra, the Times’ township edition 575, 
printed a list of the known victims of the Soweto Uprisings. This significant piece of 
information was nowhere to be seen in the white edition. 576 Similarly, The Argus was lucky 
that two of its reporters, Denis Cruywagen and Willie de Klerk, were the only journalists to 
witness the infamous ‘Trojan Horse Incident’ in 1985. But instead of capitalising on this fact,
aced the story on page three, illustrated with only tiny pictures. It would take the more 
eous Cape Times to really follow-up the event. 577 Even the Rand Daily Mail went 
ith the game. Lacob gives an example from 1982 when a colour picture of a bombing 
in Soweto appeared on the front page of the township edition only. The same slot in the white 
edition was given to a story about a leopard that had given birth to cubs in
zoo. 578 As Mike Tissong explained to me in an
distance, which they didn’t really know and didn’t want to know. And the people who 
took decisions on the newspapers also reflected that.” 579 
Several other journalists I spoke with agreed with this assertion 580 as did some of the editors 
interviewed by O’Dowd. For example Godfrey Haines, the chief sub ed r at th
explained: “You don’t want to shock people so that they actually turn away. You want them 
to buy the paper.” 581  
However, the public were not the only ones who, over time, lost interest in the violence. The 
journalists also grew tired of the uphill struggle against the censorship machinery and 
resigned themselves to doing what they saw as the best they could. 582 “We tried to break the 
law,” a former manager of the Argus Company explained, “but mainly abided by the law to 
stay open.” 583 Even Ken Owen, one of South Africa’s most outspoken journalists, admitted:  
“Somewhere along the line we all had to make compromises, and we ma e
mean, we made them. Some of them were quite shameful compromises and some were 
perhaps better. But we all compromised. If you stayed here, you compromised.” 584 
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editions that served to entrench the old mental divisions between blacks and whites and to perpetuate the lower standing of 
C (17th September 
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579 Interview with the author, 17th July 2002 
580 For example Babs Abba Omar (5th June 2002), Thabo Leshilo (24th July 2002) and Ken Owen (30th
581 Quoted in O’Dowd (1996: 97-98) 
582 Lacob (1982: 51), TRC Report, Vol 5, Chap 8, Para 93 and Mai st
583 Interview with the author, 13th March 2002 
584 Interview with the author, 30th May 2002 
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 when they attack the government. Similarly, black 
journalists are reproached for acting disloyal towards their own population group. 589  
ther. In May 1998, Newton 
revoked and was deported from 
 double life until after the 
election. According to former colleagues who decided to reveal their own role to the TRC, 
some of them were still in fairly senior positions when the Commission held its media 
hearings. And there can be no doubt that they were still passing information on to the police. 
SABC television producer Jacque Pauw, for example, found that in December 1994 one of his 
colleagues had leaked his notes for an episode of the current affairs series Agenda to the 
                                                
Others were probably not too interested in fighting in the first place and used the emergency 
regulations as an excuse to not have to deal with uncomfortable stories. 585  
d) Press Politics in the New South Africa 
Obviously things have changed a lot since the end of whites-only rule. Press freedom is 
among the basic rights granted by the new South African constitution 586 and is largely 
respected by the new government. In a survey published in 1998 Washington-based Freedom 
House ranked South Africa’s press freedom 15th among 186 countries. 587  
Not all is rosy, though. A number of apartheid laws that limit press freedom remain in force 
and hang like a Damocles’ sword over the heads of the media. The new government is careful 
when applying these regulations, but it still does use them every once in a while. 588 
Moreover, even the new people in power have shown their scepticism towards critical 
reporting. High-ranking government officials, including Presidents Mandela and Mbeki, have 
repeatedly attacked journalists for the content of their articles. White journalists and media 
houses are often accused of racism
And the government does not limit itself to purely verbal attacks ei
Kanhema, a journalist from Zimbabwe, had his work permit 
South Africa after having uncovered a weapons deal between the ANC government and Saudi 
Arabia. 590 In another high-profile case in July 1998, Cape Town journalist Thabo Mabaso 
was arrested without reason and beaten by police in Guguletu. As a result of the incident he 
lost sight in his left eye. 591 And just before the 1999 elections, Swiss journalist Jean-Philippe 
Ceppi was arrested under the 1982 Protection of Information Act and held in custody for three 
days for the supposedly possessing secret military papers. In fact the documents had been 
declassified and he had received them legally and openly from the TRC. 592  
A number of spies also remained in their jobs and continued their
 
585 Teer Tomaselli (1992: 128) and Jackson (1993: 152-153) 
South Africa 1996, Chap 2 Bill of Rights, Section 16 
1999: 31-32), van Rooyen (1994: 1-2), Comtask (1996: 14) and IJNet (2000: 1) 
0), IJNet (2000: 1-2) 
e author, 24  July 2002 
586 See Constitution of the Republic of 
587 IJNet (2000: 1), GCIS (1999: 1) and Retief (2002: 26-27) 
588 Freedom House (
589 Sparks (1999: 80), Pottinger (Unknown: 1-2), US Department of State (1999: 76), Retief (2002: 20
thand Thabo Leshilo in an interview with th
590 Kanhema (1998: 1), IPI (1999: 1), CPJ (1998: 1) and US Department of State (1999: 6) 
591 IJNet (2000: 2), IPI (2000: 2) and US Department of State (1999: 6) 
592 IPI (2000: 1) and Berger (1999: 8) 
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police. 593 And in 2000, the South African National Editors’ Forum (SANEF) revealed that 
agents for the new Defence Intelligence (DI) had attempted, and in some cases probably 
succeeded, to recruit journalists as spies. 594 But none of these things is half as bad as in the 
old days. And, as journalist Mike Masipa has pointed out: “The treatment of the press in 
South Africa is generally a picnic compared with violations of press freedom elsewhere on the 
continent.” 595 
4.2.2 The Quantitative Changes in the Reporting of Violence 
a) Cover me with Violence: The Soweto Uprisings 1976 
Due to the relative freedom of speech during the beginning of the time period under review 
here, the Soweto Uprisings were still extensively covered in the English language press. 596 
All afternoon papers ran it as their lead story on 16th June and updated it as the events 
unfolded. The Star, for example, changed its cover page at least 597 four times that day to keep 
up with the developments in Soweto. In the Late Final Edition, six articles and two pictures 
covering most of the front page are dedicated to the Soweto Uprisings, reducing the former 
lead story, a conflict between Botswana and Rhodesia, to an almost insignificant little two 
column piece in the bottom right corner below the fold (see fig. 3). 
                                                 
593 Mail & Guardian (20th December 1995: 1), TRC (16th September 1997: John Horak, 6) and TRC (16th September 1997: 
Vic McPherson, 3) 
594 Retief (2000: 146-147), CPJ (2000: 2) and TRC (16th September 1997: John Horak, 6-7) 
595 Masipa (1998: 1) and IJNet (2000: 1) 
596 Magubane (1989: 98), Business Day (21st January 1997 b: 4) and Tomaselli et al. (1987: 111) 
597 I was unable to establish exactly how many editions were published each day, so the numbers given here reflect the 
number of different editions I found and analysed in different libraries. 
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Figure 3: The Star, 16th June 1976 (Late Final Edition): 1 
The Argus updated at least five times (four editions on Soweto) and in the end dedicated the 
entire front page to Soweto (see fig. 4).  
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Figure 4: The Argus, 16th June 1976 (City Late Edition): 1 
The uprisings – or ‘riots’ as most papers called the events – received more attention inside the 
newspapers with photo spreads and features in The Star on pages 3 and 7 and in The Argus on 
page 27. The morning papers painted a similar picture the next day. The Cape Times filled its 
front page as well as pages 2 and 10 with pictures and articles about Soweto, The Natal 
Mercury featured the uprisings on pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 and the Rand Daily Mail filled the first 
five pages and half of page six with articles and images of the events. They also published an 
opinion piece on page 15.  
Most newspapers kept this up well into the next week. The Cape Times for example still 
carried the riots that had by then spread across most of the country as its lead story on 22nd 
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g a child running, about to be shot from 
June. Also, the viewpoints from which it was covered were broad, with newspapers like The 
Star, the Rand Daily Mail and the Sunday Express giving ample space to leading blacks, such 
as the mayor of Soweto, – if not to the students themselves – to voice their opinions. The Star 
also published a picture on 19th June 1976 showin
behind (see fig. 5). 598  
 
Figure 5: Crowd control SAP-style – shoot first ask questions later (or not as the case may be) (Source: 
The Star (19th June 1976: 3)) 
However, bias already started to creep into the reporting. For example, while it is true that the 
picture in figure 5 is a great example of the press uncovering police brutality, the linguistic 
clues work against this message. The people are barely discernible and we cannot make out 
any personal features. The reader therefore has to rely on the caption to find out what exactly 
is happening. This, however, does not say that a child is about to be shot by a policeman but 
rather that a “rioter has seconds to live” 599. This sentence serves both to pit the reader’s 
sympathies against the kid by using a negative term to describe him, and to absolve the 
policeman of any guilt in the killing. It is phrased in a way that puts the student, who is in fact 
n 
s 
ge is 
is focussed on the students, 
   
the passive person in the real-life situation, into the grammatical agent position. The actio
thus becomes closely associated with him, while the real-life agent, the policeman, i
nce and thus less present in people’s mind. This messacompletely absent from the sente
underlined by the visual elements of the image. The picture 
                                              
 July 1996: 7) 598 Brewer (1986: 78) and TRC (22nd
599 The Star (19th June 1976 b: 3) 
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e never accepted as equal to their white colleagues. 601 Their articles were 
always met with scepticism, frequently double-checked by white colleagues, and more often 
than not completely rewritten to suit the tastes of white readers. 602 As Mike Tissong told me: 
“These stories that came in were always submitted to white seniors and their life 
experience was not that which was being submitted in writing by black journalists. So, 
a lot of the time, those stories were not used, a lot of the time they were not believed 
by their superiors, so they would be cut to very brief inserts into the paper, which 
killed the impact of those stories.” 603 
As a result, the real extent of the revolt was never made public. Nor were the student leaders 
interviewed in the white press and their opinions and reasons for protesting were never given 
the coverage they deserved. 604  
b) Quietening Down: Mid-1976 to 1985 
The reporting on political violence declined steadily after the Soweto Uprisings. An analysis 
of a cross section of English newspapers on a randomly chosen day after the government had 
regained control of the townships shows a drastic reduction of the number of reports on 
violence. By the middle of July 1976 the press had returned to its usual reporting of white 
affairs, terrorism in other countries (meant to signal to the white population that their country 
was nothing special, so there was nothing to fear) and gossip about celebrities, sport, and petty 
crime. The Argus, for example, worried about terrorism in Ireland 605, Idi Amin 606, life on 
Mars 607, and mixed cricket 608. The ongoing violence in the country was only touched upon 
in articles about ‘unrest incidents’ or school closures. 609 
                                                
relegating the policeman to a secondary position on the periphery of the events. He is blurred, 
a mere outline, with no weapon – no instrument for inflicting violence – to be seen. 
Furthermore, while the caption speaks only of “this rioter” 600, we are actually shown three 
people, a fact which further confuses the situation. 
Besides such ideological slants in the reporting, newspapers showed bias against blacks on the 
organisational level as well. Although they depended on black journalists for news from the 
townships, they wer
 
600 The Star (19th June 1976 b: 3) 
601 Mike Tissong in an interview with the author, 16th July 2002, Mail & Guardian (14th June 1996 a: 1-2) and Tutu (1999: 
174) 
602 Mail & Guardian (7th March 1997 b: 1), Garman (1997 b: 2-3), TRC (17th September 1997: Mike Tissong, 2), TRC (17th 
September 1997: Thami Mazwai; Jon Qwelane, 4) and Dennis Pather in an interview with the author, 11th April 2002 
603 Interview with the author, 16th July 2002 
604 Hirson (1979: 187-188), Brewer (1986: 78) and Kane-Berman (1979: 6-7 and 47) 
 The Argus (22  July 1976 b: 10) 
7 The Argus (22nd July 1976 a: 3) 
 The Argus (26th July 1976 b: 1) 
609 See for example The Argus (26th July 1976 a: 1) and The Argus (28th July 1976: 1) 
605 The Argus (22nd July 1976 c: page unknown) 
606 nd
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The clashes between police and demonstrators around the first anniversary of the Soweto 
Uprisings received even less, and a lot less dramatic, coverage than the original events. The 
language was more sober with talk of  ‘unrest’ and ‘shooting’ rather than ‘riots’ and ‘arson’. 
The imagery was toned down noticeably as well with the traditional symbols of crowds, fire, 
and stone-throwing (which I will analyse in detail in chapter 4.6) rarely depicted. Below are 
the two front pages of the Rand Daily Mail on 17th June 1976 and 17th June 1977 respectively 
(see figs. 6 and 7). 
 
thFigure 6: Now it’s here… (Source: Rand Daily Mail (17  June 1976: 1)) 
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Figure 7: … and now it’s gone! (Source: Rand Daily Mail (17th June 1977: 1)) 
Note the difference in language and images used and in the relative prominence given to the 
violence. In 1976 there was talk of a “flaming night” 610 and riots that “rage” 611 along with 
images of a truck on fire, all of which fed into the fire symbolism described in chapter 4.6.2 b. 
The issue in 1977 writes of “shootings” 612 and uses an image that cannot immediately be 
associated with violence. And even though another article about a “flare-up” 613 in the Eastern 
                                                 
610 Rand Daily Mail (17th June 1976 a: 1) 
611 Rand Daily Mail (17th June 1976 a: 1) 
612 Rand Daily Mail (17th June 1977 a: 1) 
613 Rand Daily Mail (17th June 1977 b: 1) 
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n 14th September published only the government’s point of view in a 
lead article titled “Kruger rejects world outcry” 614, later changed to “Kruger – Biko death 
exploited” 615 and illustrated only with a passport-photo sized mugshot of Biko. The Argus 
managed to get the news of Biko’s death into its last edition on September 13th under the 
headline “Top black leader dies in detention” 616, but printed no pictures. The next day The 
Argus carried a front page lead and three stories on page 3, but still no pictures.  
Only two papers dared to break the mould: the Daily Dispatch and the Rand Daily Mail. Both 
gave the murder the attention, if not the name (it was generally called ‘death’) it deserved and, 
even more importantly, made the slain leader appear human by describing his life’s work 
rather than just his death, and illustrating their articles with large pictures of Biko. On 14th 
September, the Daily Dispatch dedicated its whole front page to him including a large picture, 
and the Rand Daily Mail published a long lead article (it covered the left third of page one) 
titled “World outcry over Biko death” 617 as well as an opinion piece titled “Steve Biko” 618 
and a small article about the reaction of the US government to the news of Biko’s death on its 
front page. They were complemented by a picture of Biko, which showed him from the waist 
up with his hands folded. On page two we find a continuation of the lead article under the 
headline “Steve Biko dies in detention” and two small images of a vigil held in his honour, 
one of a crowd of mourners and one of two individual mourning women as well as the 
continuation of the front-page article about the US reaction. On page nine, the entire top third 
is dedicated to an article titled “My friend Steve Biko” 619 with the sub-headline “A personal 
tribute by DONALD WOODS editor of the Daily Dispatch”. It is illustrated with a mugshot 
of Woods and a large picture of Biko from the waist up facing the camera. 
The amount of violence shown in the press was reduced yet again by the early 1980s with 
only such spectacular events as the ANC bombing of the air force headquarters in 1983 
receiving any serious attention. The coverage of violence went up again in 1984/85 just before 
the declaration of the first state of emergency. The shooting in Uitenhage on 21st March 1985 
for example received wide coverage. The Star made the shootings its lead story in the Late 
                                                
Cape does serve to enhance the effect of the lead story, the overall impression remains that 
what happened in 1976 was a huge story that deserved the entire front page, but the repeat in 
1977 was definitely not worthy of such attention. 
Similarly, Steve Biko’s death on 12th September 1977 was only reported briefly and from a 
very narrow perspective. The Star did not mention the black consciousness leader at all on 
13th September and o
 
614 The Star (14th September 1977 a: 1) 
615 The Star (14th September 1977 b: 1) 
616 The Argus (13th September 1977: 1) 
619 Rand Daily Mail (14th September 1977 c: 9) 
617 Rand Daily Mail (14th September 1977 a: 1) 
618 Rand Daily Mail (14th September 1977 b: 1) 
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ample 
Final edition of that day and on 22nd March the Daily Dispatch, The Argus, the Rand Daily 
Mail and The Star all devoted their cover pages to the events. The newspapers stayed on it, 
too, with the Cape Times, the Daily Dispatch and the Rand Daily Mail still reporting updates 
on their front pages on the 26th March. The Sunday Star (of 24th March) also devoted 
space to the shootings with most of the front page and all of page two explaining and 
analysing the events. 
 
Figure 8: The Rand Daily Mail, 22  Mnd arch 1985: 1 
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e front page of the Rand Daily Mail on 22nd 
March 1985 (see fig. 8) and compare it with that on 17th June 1976 (see fig. 6) we will find 
that the language as well as the visual make-up of the page have been greatly sanitised. 
No longer is the reader presented with either the raw anger of the township population in the 
shape of burning vehicles, nor with the mighty force of the apartheid government as 
symbolised by the soldiers we saw before. Instead we are shown a relatively calm township 
scene. Although the potential for violence is depicted in this photo in the shape of a Casspir, 
we are spared any more thought-inspiring views.  
In the headline the paper employed a similar strategy of speaking without actually saying too 
much. “17 dead in East Cape bloodbath” 620 we are told. But what does it mean? Who are the 
killers? Who are the victims? Why did it all happen? And how? At first sight we do not know.  
Only in the much smaller kicker (a headline above the headline), which would be overlooked 
by anyone except interested parties, do we find out that “Police fire on 4 000 funeral marchers 
in Uitenhage” 621. And yet, the overall impression that the article conveys when compared to 
the reporting of the Soweto Uprisings is that the killing of these 17 marchers constitutes a less 
outrageous act of police brutality than that of four protesters on June 16th 1976. It is true that 
we cannot measure violence by the numbers of lives lost, but I think we should keep in mind 
the effect that such reporting has on people’s evaluation of the situation. 
There is another reason why the reporting during the mid-1980s need to be looked at with 
caution. For propaganda reasons the government allowed the publication of more material on 
violence during this period than they really wanted to. When it became clear that declaring a 
state of emergency could no longer be avoided, the government started to look for ways of 
justifying this step to the white electorate. Therefore, in the hope of heightening anxiety 
among whites about the situation in the townships, the media were given a little more freedom 
to report the ongoing violence there. The central question when looking at these years is 
therefore no longer if acts of violence were mentioned in the press, but how they were 
reported. While for the 1960s and 70s the number of reports on violence can easily be used as 
a barometer to judge press freedom, for the 1980s this would lead to an overly positive 
impression of the situation. 622 
Still, one look at a newspaper from that time will show that the era of relative freedom was 
over once and for all. If we take, for example, th
c) And then There was Silence: The State of Emergency 
With the proclamation of the first state of emergency the reporting about violence changed 
drastically. Since the banning of visual footage of the unrest in November 1985, the only 
                                                 
620 Rand Daily Mail (22nd March 1985 a: 1) 
621 Rand Daily Mail (22nd March 1985 a: 1) 
) 622 Jackson (1993: 145) and Posel (1990: 156
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thing the newspapers could produce were visually bland reports that made it easy to forget 
what the text was trying to highlight (see fig. 9). 
 
Figure 9: No violence, just security and peace (Source: Cape Times (13th June 1986: 1)) 
After December 1986, when publication of information about the townships that had not come 
from government sources was declared illegal, the unrest was almost completely hidden from 
the white media audience. 623 By the late 1980s the reporting on violence had been reduced to 
a list of ‘unrest incidents’ and casualty listings from various hospitals. For example, on 7th 
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 10 were admitted to 
ctor said between 15 and 20 patients were 
d for birdshot and buckshot wounds during the night. At least 5 patients had been 
ad been shot dead.” 625 
The ar
sentenc
was “b tions” (see fig. 10).  
September 1989, The Star ran a small story on its front page under the title “At least 4 killed, 
100 hurt in Cape violence” 624. The beginning read: 
“At least 4 people died last night and an estimated 100 men, women and children were 
injured during a night of violence which saw burning barricades and running battles 
between police and Cape Flats residents. 
A Groote Schuur Hospital spokesman said 40 people had been admitted during the 
night with birdshot wounds. 
A Gatesville Medical Centre spokesman said doctors treated at least 20 people, 
including children between 4 and 8, for birdshot wounds. Another
Woodstock Hospital with birdshot wounds. 
At Tygerberg Hospital, a casualty ward do
treate
booked into theatre for stomach bullet wounds and x-rays had shown 2 of them to 
have been shot in small arms fire. 
In Khayelitsha ambulancemen said they had been called to collect a 69-year-old 
woman who h
ticle shows no overt sign of censorship, such as blanked out spaces or unfinished 
es, in the article itself, and only a small note next to it indicating that the newspaper 
eing produced under the severe restrictions of the emergency regula
 
Figure 10: Not quite the same coverage as 1976 (Source: The Star (7th September 1989: 1)) 
An uncritical reader or one not willing to see the enormous effect that the censorship had on 
the press could well make him/herself believe that they are really getting all The Star had to 
say rather than all the authorities allowed them to say. And he/she would probably soon come 
to the conclusion that reading such boring enumerations of birdshot wounds and hospital 
                                                 
624 The Star (7th September 1989: 1) 
625 The Star (7th September 1989: 1) 
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 and could next time be skipped altogether. 
agraphs: 
23-year-old woman, Ms Liziwe 
lockemann, said. 
make no sense unless it was opposed to a ‘marked’ vehicle and no one except the police 
 place – while the latter 
nd kill people (and not the police, either). Unfortunately, 
w people actually bothered to dissect the articles as I have just 
 the dark about the situation 
 state of emergency. 
names was not really worth the time and effort
Thus, by rendering the reporting uninteresting, the government actually achieved a news 
blackout without imposing one. I should just briefly point out, though, that the interested 
reader could, and most likely did, get quite a bit of information out of these lines: Four people 
were killed, at least one of them shot dead by the police. Roughly 100 more were injured, 
some of them seriously (as the operating theatre and the x-rays indicate) when police opened 
fire (no one else uses birdshot) on township residents (the unnamed victims are never 
policemen), including women, young children and elderly folks. This information can be 
further supplemented with what we are told in the following par
“The Cape Flats was effectively cut off from the rest of the Peninsula by scores of 
barricades which straddled the main roads. 
(…) 
Police headquarters confirmed last night, in an interim unrest report that “police made 
use of tear-smoke, rubber bullets and birdshot to dispense mobs” in the Peninsula. 
Two earlier reports said that a policeman was injured in a stone-throwing incident in 
Manenberg. 
At Khayamundi, just outside Stellenbosch, a 
Masokanye was killed when buckshot was used to disperse a group of people, a 
University of the Western Cape lecturer, Ms M F
(…) 
Eyewitnesses last night said a man in an unmarked bakkie had opened fire with live 
ammunition in the area about five yesterday afternoon.” 
This account is followed by another brief list of injured people, mostly birdshot wounds, and a 
note that about 130 youths had been detained in Mitchell’s Plain. Again this text does not 
seem to say a lot. But if we dig deep, we find that really all victims spoken about so far, with 
the exception of the policeman, were killed or injured by police (who have now officially 
admitted to having used birdshot). We are also told that a plain-clothes policeman had been 
driving around the Cape Flats with the intention to shoot and kill residents. Where do I get 
that from? The unmarked bakkie and the live ammunition. The former is a hidden reference to 
a cop – bakkies were generally driven by whites, the reference that it was unmarked would 
would have got through the barricades and into the are in the first
clearly indicates an intent to injure a
as my research has shown, fe
done to recover their hidden messages. Most largely remained in
in their country during the
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 always provided news. You didn’t 
cent of the old apartheid era. In the top right 
corner 628
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 yesterday. 
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Ooster wnship. The headline reads “Photographer 
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d) The Lid Finally Blows: 1990 to 1994 
The day of reckoning came in 1990, and while the change did not come overnight, it did 
happen quite quickly. Within a few weeks of the end of the state of emergency, the number of 
reports about violence exploded. 626 If we look at the newspapers of 2nd March 1990 (1 month 
after the unbanning of the ANC) with those of 19th April 1994 (1 week before the first non-
racial election), we find that the reporting in 1990 still loo s very much like that of the la  
1980s: Some newspapers carried some stories out (mainly political) violence. By 1994 they 
have clearly changed their attitude. Violence and crime have moved to the centre of attention. 
As Thabo Leshilo, the editor of the Pretoria Ne
“During apartheid, journalism was easy. Politics
have to go looking and one journalist could write three stories in a day. Now it is not 
like that anymore. Crime has become the new apartheid. It is easy.” 627 
The Star, for example, did not carry any reports about violence on 2nd March 1990. The Cape 
Times printed two reports that were reminis
on page five readers were told of “Street battles and stonings in Cathcart”  in an 
without pictures. Then, underneath, there is “Natal attack: Man shot” 629, an article 
t any illustrations, whose opening paragraph reads: 
“One man was reported killed and 46 injured in unrest related incidents of stone-
throwing and arson, police here said
A crowd attacked a private dwelling and shot a man dead at Table Mountain in Natal. 
Police used tear-smoke, rubber bullets and birdshot to disperse a crowd that stoned 
private vehicles and a private dwelling at Matlokeng, near Zastron.” 630 
Four years later violence is suddenly a major issue in both papers and is at times even given
ttention than the impending elections. The Star of 19th April 1994 carried no less than 
cles about violence. The lead story that day was about the killing of photographer Ken 
broek during an assignment in Thokoza to
slain in action” 631 and the story is illustrated with the last picture Oosterbroek took before he 
was shot. At the bottom of the page, roughly in the middle, we read “March ‘bid to kill 
Mandela’” 632 in a story wit
                                           
ber & Lewis (1998: 1) and CNN Interactive (1998: 1) 
ly 2002 
taccato style, I did not cut anything out of the text. 
626 Simpson & Rauch (1993: 6), Ham
627 Interview with the author, 24th Ju
628 Cape Times (2nd March 1990 a: 5) 
629 Cape Times (2nd March 1990 b: 5) 
630 Cape Times (2nd March 1990 b: 5) 
The story was really written in this s
631 The Star (19th April 1994 a: 1) 
632 The Star (19th April 1994 b: 1) 
633 The Star (19th April 1994 c: 2) 
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 attention: “Child found mother’s body, says 
ery day life than they could and 
ed robbery, hijacking. You know, all this violence, … 
for someone to shoot you dead for a cellphone. It always happens. And people just 
don’t want to read it anymore.” 641 
And Dennis Pather confirmed: “Readers … the guys that buy the paper, they’re saying I’m 
faced by all this violence. I’m tired. Don’t give me the daily diet of negative news. Just death, 
death, death.” It would seem that they were quite right in their assessment. I heard similar 
arguments time and again in my interviews with ordinary South Africans. As a lady told me:  
“I don’t read newspapers. If you live in South Africa you must just ignore it all and 
focus on the positive things. If you live here you must be crazy to read newspapers. I 
don’t want to know what’s going on.” 642  
And another confirmed: “I don’t read papers because I get angry and frustrated by all this 
nonsense. I know a lot of people who think like this. People would rather stay ignorant and 
get on with their lives.” 643  
                                                
the two front-page reports are continued, all without illustrations. Page six is dedicated to Ken 
Oosterbroek’s obituary, which is titled “An eye for violent drama – and beauty” 634 and 
illustrated with Oosterbroek’s photographs. Page twelve is entirely dedicated to violence with 
the following stories vying for the readers’
witness” 635, “ 5 policemen charged with 4 murders” 636, “Aim of roadblock was to assault 
‘kaffirs’, court told” 637, “I would never harm my child” 638, “Man killed in mob attack” 639 
and “Pensioners hurt in pay point stampede” 640. The Cape Times on that day looked similar 
with a total of 15 stories about violence, five on page one, three on page two, one on page 
three, two on page four, and four on page five. 
e) Longing For the Good Old Days: 1994 and After 
The new formula of showing ever more violence in return for ever higher sales did not work 
for long, though. People soon grew weary of the daily horror stories and stopped reading 
newspapers. There was more violence visible in their ev
wanted to cope with. As Gerald Shaw put it:  
“You know, what has happened, (…) is that criminal violence is now underreported, 
because the readership of the media … has it up to here. Can’t stand it anymore. 
Horrible rapes, child abuse, arm
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e two, both 
ent of 11th August 2002 
reported the case of a Portchefstroom man who had assaulted the referee at a rugby match on 
rglaries or fraud – got a little more attention 
For the newspapers this attitude meant lower sales and less advertising, a loss of income that 
led them to change their editorial concept. Johann de Villiers explained: “At one stage we 
religiously reported everything we could get our hands on. And then we started backing off 
because we thought the time had passed.” 644  
A random sample of newspapers from 2002 confirms that, by then, violence was no longer the 
centre of the press’ attention: The Mail & Guardian of 8th March 2002 carried no news reports 
about violence. In the Daily Dispatch of 17th April I found two small stories on pag
about incidents of murder in the Eastern Cape. The Sunday Independ
its front page. The Cape Times of 11th November 2002 published a small, 1-column story 
about the search for six right-wingers suspected of being responsible for a number of bomb 
blasts in Soweto the month before. The Cape Argus of 12th November 2002 did not carry a 
single report about violence. Crime – such as bu
overall, but violence was no longer a big story.  
The notable exception was The Star. The first issue I pulled out of my pile was that of 18th 
July 2002 which contained a total of nine articles about violence, including one on the front 
page (though not the main story) and two smaller ones on page two under the heading “Crime 
Count + Crime Busters” (see fig. 11) 
 
Figure 11: Crime Count + Crime Busters – the apocalypse one  at a time (Source: The Star (18th July  bite
2002: 2)) 
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Just to make sure that I had not looked at a particularly violent issue I also counted the reports 
in the issue of 16th July, which also contained nine reports on violence, including four in the 
“Crime Count + Crime Buster” section on page two, and that of 4th November, where I only 
found six articles on violence and no “Crime Count + Crime Busters” 645, however, the lead 
story was about several rapes of teenagers during the National Children’s Day celebrations in 
Johannesburg. A conclusion is therefore hard to draw, but overall I would still say that The 
Star stands out among the newspapers of 2002 in the amount of violence reported. 
4.2.3 Insert: The Newspapers’ Changing Approach to Violence 
Before concluding this chapter, I should briefly mention that not only the total amount of 
violence seen in the newspapers has changed with time, their approach to the subject evolved 
too. Reports about relatively similar events in the same newspaper will be completely 
different at different points in time.  
necklacings at different times in South African history. They were all taken at the time of the 
event and either these or similar photographs were published in several commercial 
newspapers in South Africa. Figure 12 shows the necklacing of Maki Skosana, figure 13 
depicts the killing of Lindsaye Tshabalala and figure 14 is a picture of Rashaad Staggie 
burning to death after members of PAGAD had thrown a petrol bomb at him. 
Figures 12, 13 and 14 for example are press photos that were used to illustrate reports about 
 
Figure 12: The last moments of Maki Skosana (Source: The Star (20th May 1985: 4)) 
                                                 
645 Ending this column was a conscious decision. As Jeremy Gordin told me: “We used to have a crime column in The Star, 
use it’s just such bad news all the time.” (Interview with the author, 31st July 2002) but we decided to ditch that beca
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Figure 13: Worthy of a Pulitzer Prize – the slaying of Lindsaye Tshabalala (Source: Weekend Argus (15th 
September 1990: 6)) 
 
Figure 14: The slow demise of a gangster – Rashaad Staggie dying outside his Cape Town home (Source: 
Cape Times (5th August 1996: 1)) 
When comparing the three pictures, we notice that over the years photographers moved closer 
to the events. The inhibition about graphic depictions of violence disappeared.  
In figure 12 Maki Skosana is not really visible. The image is quite blurred and we can only 
guess who or what it is that is being kicked. Only the article, titled “Funeral mob batters and 
burns ‘spy’ at Reef burial” 646 tells as that we are looking at the gruesome murder of a human 
is a lot more explicit. We can see a person, on fire, being assaulted by 
er step further. True, it is no more explicit, nor closer to the 
being. Figure 13 
another. Figure 14 goes yet anoth
                                                 
646 The Star (20th May 1985: 4) 
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o knew Rashaad Staggie would probably be able to make out it was 
s the ability to identify the victim in 
a photograph, worked as a strong factor against publication while by the time of the Staggie 
usly no longer a deterrent. In 1993 the Cape Times had decided against 
 a
, 
ilar increase in drama and explicitness as in the 
apter, I will move in the opposite direction, 
namely towards a search for elements that the reports have in common. My aim is to uncover 
view from which 
 describe violence at different times can be interpreted. First I 
 as studied for example by critical linguistics. Then the 
victim than figure 13, but unlike the previous two it reveals the victim’s face. Looking at this 
photograph, anyone wh
he. And as we will see in chapter 4.6.4 b, in the early 1990
murder it was obvio
using a photograph that showed Chris Hani’s face in an article about the SACP leader’s 
murder. 647 Staggie’s murder on the other hand was covered from ll angles on the front page 
above the fold. Anyone who looked could not help but see it. 
Similarly, while during the 1970s dead bodies tended to be shown – if at all – from a distance 
and lying face down, by the early 1990s exposed faces were no longer anything special. On 
the contrary O’Dowd found in her study of news photographs accompanying reports on 
political violence during the transition period that “photographs were further selected that 
were potentially visually offensive – that is, containing blood, bodies and/or graphic 
depictions of murder.” 648 This was confirmed in her interviews with newspaper editors. Fred 
Fitzgerald, night editor of the Daily Dispatch told her in 1994: “Three, four, five years ago we 
would seldom show a body on page one. These days we do it more often.” 649 
The same is true of textual representations. Explicit verbal descriptions of violence rarely 
appeared in earlier news reports. However, as time passed, newspapers became more graphic 
in their descriptions. 650 If we look for example at the headlines of the articles accompanying 
the images above we will find a sim
photographs. “Funeral mob batters and burns ‘spy’ at Reef burial” 651 we read in 1985. By 
1990, we had moved on to a “Slaughter in Soweto” 652 and by 1996 we reached a “Night of 
bloody execution” 653. 
4.3 The Loci of Ideology 
In the last chapter, I mainly concentrated on the differences between reports from different 
time periods. This helped me understand the relative importance of violence in public 
discourse at different times. In the present ch
the underlying ideology in order to create an understanding of the point of 
the individual images used to
will focus on ideology in language,
                                                 
647 O’Dowd (1996: 96) 
648 O’Dowd (1996: 32) 
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as much 
ressive papers like the Rand Daily Mail and 
next step is to see what other, non-linguistic, devices were used to communicate political 
views and ideologies.  
4.3.1 Linguistic Choice as an Expression of Ideology 
a) Vocabulary 
Lexical choice is an important tool for establishing ideology. Words help us to categorise the 
world in terms of the ideological systems, which they represent. 654 Thus, whether we call an 
MK operative a ‘terrorist’, a ‘freedom fighter’, a ‘guerrilla’ or a ‘revolutionary’ says 
about ourselves, our ideology, and our attitude towards the person described as about him/her. 
Similarly, a newspaper’s use of euphemisms like “restoring peace in South Africa’s burning 
townships” 655, “quell the unrest and stop the violence, thuggery, intimidation, arson, assault 
and murder” 656 or “controlling crowds” 657 to describe the actions of the security forces 
during the 1980s as opposed to terms that may amplify their violent behaviour, such as 
“massacre” 658, “Police ‘reign of terror’” 659 or “bloodbath” 660, was not only an indicator of 
the genre of the publication (in fact, the question of genre has only become important since 
1994 as the newspapers have diversified) but also of its stand towards the behaviour of those 
government forces involved. The terms in the first group were more often found in 
conservative publications like The Natal Mercury and The Citizen or the populist Sunday 
press, while the latter were generally used by prog
the Cape Times or the alternative press.  
The same is true for less obviously ideological words. The newspapers have a multitude of 
wordings at their disposal that help them to show approval or disapproval of certain actors or 
events. If, for example, the ANC is described as “fleeing” in the lead story of The Star of 26th 
January 1986 (“ANC flees Lesotho” 661), if people are said to be “rampaging” 662 or on the 
“rampage” 663, if they are called a “mob” 664 or if violence is talked of as “senseless” 665, we 
can be fairly sure that the author of the article is not in favour of the person(s) involved. This 
stand becomes even more clear if terms are used, which cross the line to verbal abuse, such as 
“terrorist” 666, “savage” 667 or “savagery”  668.  
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upposedly’, 
f Mr. Kinikini and 
e crowd 
                                                                                                                                                        
On the other hand the newspapers can use terms of endearment, praise, or admiration to 
describe actors or events. If policemen or soldiers are said to have had “no alternative but to 
order fire in self defence” 669 or to have “fired to save their lives” 670, the press signal 
understanding for their situation. More strikingly, several newspapers openly applauded a 
SADF raid into Botswana in 1985. “SADF units blast ANC in Gaborone,” 671 The Star wrote 
triumphantly. And, in a headline that was to make history, the Sunday Times’ praised the 
“Guns of Gaborone” 672. Incidentally, the press kits that these articles were based on had been 
prepared by a team of government propagandists under the auspices of Stratcom. 673  
Language offers its users many more possibilities of distancing themselves from what is said 
or of showing approval of, or solidarity with, the people and situations described. One 
common way to achieve the former is through distance markers such as ‘s
‘allegedly’, ‘purportedly’, while inserting adverbs such as ‘certainly’, ‘likely’, ‘probably’ or 
‘surely’ can have the opposite effect. Another method that the newspapers have frequently 
employed is the use of indirect speech. Here, the key to ascribing values generally lies in the 
words used to describe the action of speaking. If people are said to have ‘claimed’ or 
‘maintained’ something, the newspapers signal that they do not fully agree with the assertion. 
More neutral terms, such as ‘said’, ‘told’ or ‘spoke of’ leave it much more open to the reader 
to find their own interpretations of the text, and in the case of ‘assured’ or ‘guaranteed’ the 
preferred reading would generally be favourable.  
The above-mentioned elements can obviously be combined to increase their effect. For 
example, in a story about the burning to death of a community councillor in Kwanobuhle, the 
Daily Dispatch of 25th March 1985 published the following sentence: “The chanting crowd 
reportedly danced on the charred remains of people they said were those o
his son.” 674 Here we find two distance markers, “reportedly” and “said”, which together 
indicate that the events possibly happened as reported, but there is a chance that they might 
have been different. The first level of insecurity is whether the victims are really Mr. Kinikini 
and his sons. The information came from the killers themselves, whom, as the distance marker 
indicates, the newspaper does not take to be a very reliable source. Also in doubt is the 
dancing of the crowd. An unnamed source told the newspaper about it, but for reasons that are 
not immediately obvious the writer chose not to use the factual formulation ‘th
danced’, but opted instead for inserting the word ‘reportedly’.  
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port of the majority of blacks.” 677  
bination of “Mr. Botha said” and “It was clear that” is not meant to 
communicate the opinion of the state president, but something that the newspaper takes to be 
m
not unlikely that, by the time he/she 
reaches
opinion of one m s helps to make the sentence appear more factual. 
The last asp
modali odge as “indications of the degree 
of likelihood, probability, weight, or authority
one of the m
‘should’, ‘m
that’ ‘claims that’ are, just as bably’, ‘likely’ and the like, 
clear indicators of the newspaper’s position 
Let us consider an exam
a countrywide state of emergency, President Botha addressed the world and explained that he 
                                                
An example where an indirect quote is used to signal agreement with the content is an article 
on page five of the Pretoria News of 13th June 1986. Under the headline “Entire country 
target” 675 President Botha is granted a lot of space to explain his reasons for the declaration 
of a national state of emergency. Somewhere in the middle of the article we are told that “Mr. 
Botha said violence had also increased in white areas.” 676 Note the use of the neutral ‘said’ as 
opposed to ‘claimed’ to make a claim that is not supported by any further evidence. Botha is 
clearly accepted as an authoritative source whose words do not need to be questioned further, 
and the newspaper itself is painted as a neutral conveyor of information. The paragraph that 
follows the sentence above is entirely written as an indirect quote of Botha. Somewhere in the 
middle we reach a sentence that is a clear endorsement of Botha’s standpoint: “It was clear 
that black revolutionaries did not enjoy the sup
In my opinion this com
factual information. Botha, described positively as “Mr.” rather than just by his name or, as 
some papers did at times, by the familiar initials ‘P.W.’, is merely the messenger whose 
authority underlines the validity of the message. I have several reasons to take this point of 
view. For one the newspaper does nothing to either distance itself from what is said or to 
signal to the reader that there are alternative views about the situation. Secondly, the distance 
between the last time the speaker is entioned and the sentence I quoted is fairly long for a 
newspaper text. Botha is last referred to at the end of the last paragraph. He is not even 
present in the vicinity of the words quoted. It is therefore 
 the sentence, the reader has forgotten that he/she is actually reading the subjective 
an. Thi
ect of ideology at the level of lexis that I want to give attention to here is that of 
ty. CDA identified modality, defined by Kress & H
 the speaker attaches to the utterance” 678, as 
ajor sites of ideology in language. Modal auxiliaries such as ‘may’, ‘can’, 
ight’ or ‘could’ and verbs that express mental processes such as ‘think that’ ‘feel 
 the above-described adverbs ‘pro
towards the events and persons described. 679  
ple. When, on 12th June 1986, the South African government declared 
 
) 
 135), Fowler (1991: 64) and Kress & Hodge (1979: 122-123) 
675 Pretoria News (13th June 1986 a: 5) 
676 Pretoria News (13th June 1986 a: 5
677 Pretoria News (13th June 1986 a: 5) 
678 Kress & Hodge (1979: 122-123) 
679 Thompson (1990: 287), Kress (1983:
  128
essive Cape Times on 
b) 
Syntax is an im
the part of the writer. The way in which elem
weight
structured in e 
front section, which is generally thought of as the focally most significant part, while less vital 
facts ar 682
Khayelitsha m  in the Cape Argus 
of 19th February 2002 we find the following section: 
 
                                                
would not be forced into dealing with internal matters in a way imposed on him by outside 
opinion. On 13th June, two newspapers quoted this speech in the main headlines on page one: 
“SA will ‘go it alone’ if necessary” 680 wrote the Natal Mercury, and the Cape Times stated 
“SA may ‘go it alone’” 681 (see fig. 9) They are quoting the same speech, but convey two 
different messages. The more conservative Mercury chose the factual ‘will’ indicating the 
government’s determination, leadership, and dedication. The more progr
the other hand opted for the less certain ‘may’, a modal verb that merely indicates a 
possibility, not a fact. The government is leaving all options open, including unilateral action. 
This formulation portrays South Africa as much more careful, as a country that shows a lot 
more concern for international opinion than that described by the Mercury, and as one that is 
much less keen to be isolated internationally. 
Syntax 
portant means for coding worldviews, often without any conscious choice on 
ents are ordered within a sentence can add 
 to certain aspects while reducing that of others. In news texts, sentences are often 
 a way that reflects the article’s priorities. Important information is placed in th
e placed further in the back.  For example, in an article about the bail hearing of a 
an who was accused of “being the leader of a lynch mob” 683
“The lynching incident has been described by police as one of the more horrific cases 
of street justice. 
The three were accused by residents of being part of a gang that had robbed and 
murdered a number of business people in the area. 
Their lynching came days after the police released three other men whom the 
community had handed over to the police, accusing them of being leaders of the gang. 
The three dead men have not been buried yet as the police have asked their families to 
wait for DNA testing to confirm their identities.
Following the lynching, more cases of vigilantism were reported in Khayelitsha, with 
one man being beaten to death and another having a scorching steam iron placed on 
684his back.”  
 
680 The Natal Mercury (13th June 1986: 1) 
681 Cape Times (13th June 1986 a: 1) 
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Note t
referen
attentio thor chose a passive construction, presumably 
 use of Afrikaans as medium of instruction. 
9.30 a.m. – Crowd estimated by police at 4 000 - 5 000 had confrontation with small 
police group which tried to stop procession and take placards. This led to stoning of 
police and shooting incident in which boy of 13 killed and seven children injured by 
gunfire. All police withdrawn from vicinity of Orlando West High School.” 
(…) 
2.30 p.m. – Column of police vehicles and men moved off from the area of the 
Orlando West High School. Most of huge crowd had dispersed. 
3 p.m. – Large groups of youths reported moving in various areas stoning cars of 
whites and Blacks. Police and anti-terrorist force arrived from Johannesburg in 
camouflage suits and with light machine guns. (…)” 687 
Generally, the school children appear in the front part of the sentences. They “moved from 
school to school”, they “had confrontation” and they are “moving in various areas stoning 
cars”. The policemen on the other hand appear in the initial section of only two sentences, the 
one where they “moved off from the area” and where their replacement from Johannesburg 
arrived. Thus, in the sections quoted, the children are clearly focussed on in a negative way 
enon, albeit from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, can be found 
hat each sentence, and even more strikingly each paragraph, starts either with a 
ce to the lynching or to the victims. The lynching is put at the centre of the reader’s 
n in the first sentence, for which the au
for the very reason of emphasising his subject. This theme is then taken-up in two other 
sentences thereafter, constituting a red thread through the entire section. After these sentences, 
there is no longer any doubt what the article considers to be important.  
The strategy of ‘fronting’ can also be used to de-emphasise negative behaviour by members of 
the in-group by placing them later in a sentence, just as negative behaviour by the out-group 
can be emphasised through placement early in a sentence. 685 Compare for example how the 
actions of the police and the demonstrators on 16th June 1976 were portrayed in the following 
article (titled “How a demo became a riot” 686) in the Natal Mercury: 
“7-9.30 a.m. – Groups of high-school children moved from school to school carrying 
placards and demonstrating against
and portrayed as the more active and aggressive force. 
A similar phenom
in the following section of a lead article from the Cape Times of 25th October 1985: 
“On this, the policemen, watched by the major, rapidly closed up on the young man 
and without warning assaulted him. 
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t-group. They are described as agents of 
negativ
probab  be amply clear 
that the
negativ d not only at the beginning of the 
While one policeman struck the man on the head with his baton, drawing blood from a 
gaping wound and causing him to collapse on to the pavement, the others stood over 
him threateningly, with sjamboks.” 688 
The Cape Times clearly constructs the police as the ou
e behaviour: Assault, striking the man, drawing blood, causing him to collapse. I 
ly do not need to elaborate much further on this example, as it should
 grammatical agent position is used to make the reader more aware of the policemen’s 
e behaviour. As in the last example they are mentione
sentence, but at the beginning of every paragraph, a strategy that is not only used in the 
quoted section, but frequently throughout the entire article and in the headlines of two 
adjacent smaller articles which read “Bo-Kaap violence: Police shoot pupil” 689 and “Police 
beat, arrest press” 690. Even the pictures on this page communicate a message of police agency 
in the face of not much else (see fig. 15).  
 
Figure 15: All dressed up and nowhere to go – police in central Cape Town (Source: Cape Times (25th 
October 1985: 1)) 
Besides emphasising certain actions or events, the initial part of a sentence, the “theme” 691 as 
Fairclough has called it, serves to establish certain facts as given and therefore unquestionably 
true. It is the text producer’s point of departure, and as such sets the agenda for the rest of the 
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an who was allegedly stoning 
licemen – the emphasis is clearly placed differently in the two 
 insurgents, including three women were shot and killed at 
o in different ways. This last sentence acknowledges the police’s 
involvement in the group’s killing, however it distracts from their responsibility by putting 
of a passive clause. Agency is instead moved to the objects of the 
sentence. For example in the Cape Times’ lead article on 22nd July 1985 we are told of “the 
three people who died in unrest on Saturday” 692. And while that formulation is in itself quite 
plainly ideological (people generally do not just drop dead in unrest, they are killed), I want to 
draw your attention to two of the examples they list:  
“In the Eastern Cape, police shot dead Mr. Edward Dolm
a security camp for black policemen in Morhenvell on Saturday night. 
In Zwide, near Port Elizabeth, a youth was killed when police dispersed a crowd with 
birdshot after an attack on a policeman’s house.” 693 
In the first example, the relative clause at the end of the sentence elaborates on Dolman and 
his actions, whereas in the second example it is the behaviour of the police that is under 
investigation. Thus, although in both cases similar events happened – police shot dead a 
person who was attacking po
sentences. This is achieved with the help of a handy tool English language provides the writer 
with: passivisation. Passivisation is most commonly used to de-emphasise negative behaviour 
among the in-group. In a passive sentence the agent of the real-world action becomes the 
grammatical subject, thus de-emphasising his/her involvement in, and responsibility for, the 
action. If an act is attributed to someone who appears in the agent position of the sentence, 
their involvement becomes more obvious and readers tend to hold them more responsible than 
if they appear in any other roles or if they are not mentioned at all. 694  
Consider for example the first sentence of the above-cited Argus article:  
“Nine suspected ANC
police roadblocks near the Swaziland border over the past week, Law and Order 
Minister Mr Adriaan Vlok announced.” 695 
And the explanation given a few sentences later:  
“The Mozambique group and those killed by police formed part of a “planned influx 
of ANC terrorists” who had received instructions to execute large-scale acts of 
“indiscriminate terror, irrespective of race, age or creed” on June 16, the anniversary 
of the Soweto riots, said Mr Vlok.” 696 
Again the two sentences in fact refer to the same action – policemen killing nine people – 
however, they do s
them in the object position 
                                                 
692 Cape Times (22nd July 1985: 1) 
us (17th June 1988: 3) 
e 1988: 3) 
693 Cape Times (22nd July 1985: 1) 
694 Fowler et al. (1979: 98-99), Fowler (1991: 70-73), van Dijk (1988 a: 81) and van Dijk (1998 b: 32-33) 
695 The Arg
696 The Argus (17th Jun
  132
 Maputo” 698. In the first case the people responsible for the raid are explicitly 
 strong active sentence ‘police shot and killed children in 
h as “a 13-year-old African schoolboy, Hector 
Peterson, was shot dead” 699, “one pupil was killed during the shooting” 700, or “two men and 
e ebody 
real-life action: the victims. The first sentence goes another step further at absolving the SAP 
of any guilt by entirely deleting them from the relevant clause. Nine insurgents were killed, 
we are told. The killers, however, cannot be found. We have to use our cultural knowledge 
about such things as ‘insurgents’ and ‘roadblocks’ to deduce that the people manning the 
roadblock were in fact responsible for the deaths.  
Similarly, compare the two headlines The Argus used for the same article about an air force 
raid into Mozambique in two different editions. In the City Late Edition the paper declared 
“SAAF raids Maputo” 697. By the time of the last Late Final Edition this had been changed to 
“ANC blasted in
mentioned. In the latter example on the other hand the agent is deleted. The action thus seems 
more closely connected to the real-life subject, the ANC, which now appears in the 
grammatical agent position.  
This strategy was also widely employed in the reporting of the Soweto Uprisings. When, for 
example, the police opened fire on demonstrating school children in Soweto in 1976 most 
newspapers refrained from using the
Soweto’, opting instead for passive clauses suc
a woman were shot dead (…) in a crowd looting a liquor store” 701. In all cases the shooters 
are completely absent from the articles. The subject position is in all three cases left to the 
victims, attaching the action to them, as if it were an attribute of these people or the result of 
something they had done. 702  
Another common way to de-emphasise agency is through nominalization. Nominalization 
enables the writer to describe actions using a single noun and at the same time turns processes 
and activities into states and objects. For example, in the description of the events in 
Uitenhage on 21st March 1985 as a “shooting” 703. A full sentence – ‘som one shot som
in Uitenhage’ – is turned into a single noun. This serves to obscure the context of the event 
because the ‘where’, ‘why’, ‘how’ and, most importantly, the ‘who’, the persons involved in 
the shooting, are completely deleted and their identities are irrecoverable even if we 
reconstruct the full sentence. This way, the newspaper avoids ascribing responsibility for the 
action described. 704  
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hy the students were protesting, what the clashes 
n given as one of the 
may be important for choosing what topics are reported, they do not explain why they are 
as 
ce an equally predictable 
 more accessible than those of 
                   
An even more striking example is the following sentence from The Natal Mercury of 17th 
June 1976: “Drunkenness and hooliganism took over from the students’ protest earlier in the 
day, which led to bloody clashes with the police and a number of dead.” 705 This remarkable 
string of nominalizations actually manages to hide more information than it conveys. We are 
not told who the drunken hooligans were, w
with the police were all about and, most importantly, how “a number of dead” came about. 
But the non-critical reader will quite easily find the intended meaning - hordes of drunken 
blacks were put back in their place. The rest really did not matter to a white South African 
reader in 1976. 
As this example shows, nominalization has another effect that can easily be used to serve an 
ideological function: It gives the things described an air of absoluteness that a verb phrase 
cannot match. Actions can be reversed, whereas objects are difficult to change. For example, 
if we say that the apartheid government was banning the ANC or the black consciousness 
movement, the event described appears a lot more temporary and reversible than if we had 
talked about a ban of the ANC. 706  
4.3.2 To Speak or not to Speak – Quoting  
Before moving on to an analysis of the imagery used in newspaper reports on violence, I want 
to briefly touch upon the question of news sources and quoting. Far from being free of 
ideology, the choice of persons and organisations that are given the opportunity to voice their 
views directly, and the way these views are put across, carry important implications for the 
meaning of the overall article. If it is done in the context intended by the speaker, being 
quoted is a privilege because it gives credibility to the statement expressed and emphasises the 
importance of the person or group expressing it. And more often than not, the people with the 
greatest direct access to the media are also covered in a favourable way. 707 
News practices promote the coverage of people, organisations and institutions in positions of 
economic, political or social dominance and power. Ease of access is ofte
main reasons. Journalists have to generate news quickly and continuously and therefore rely 
heavily on existing and accessible news sources, such as political institutions, the police, big 
companies and, of course, other news media. However, while such institutional constraints 
generally viewed from an establishment point of view. Many non-dominant groups, such 
trade unions or student federations, are well organised and produ
stream of press releases. Their representatives are frequently
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political parties or big businesses, and, as was the case with the student representatives in 
Soweto during the 1970s, they are often more cooperative when it comes to setting dates for 
interviews or press conferences. Still, these sources are generally shunned by the mainstream 
media. The newspapers rarely report from their point of view and their requests and actions 
are frequently discredited in the reports. 708 
During the apartheid years, the English language press drew heavily on official sources, such 
as the wire service of the South African press Association (SAPA) or the Bureau for 
Information. But it was at times of conflict, that their reliance on the government was greatest, 
and even the more critical papers printed state-supplied information, claiming that one-sided 
information was better than none. 709 But many did not even look for alternative sources. 
Most newspapers made no attempt to interview the students involved in the 1976 uprising or 
the civic leaders of the 1980s, let alone ordinary black people who made up the majority of 
the victims of apartheid. Instead, they sough
nd leaders, members of the judiciary, police and army, and occasionally white civilians 
d witnessed certain events. 710 As Hugh Lewin, a former journalist and commissioner 
TRC, observed with a measure of frustration about the crime reporting in The Star: “It 
the police, it quotes police sources, it quotes Vlok [then Minister of Law and Order], it 
Intelligence sources, it quotes nobody else.” 711  
d more to do with their standing in society than with ease of access. For one they could 
ressure on newspapers, either through legislation or by means of withdrawing support 
ting access to information. 712 More importantly though, institutions and persons with 
artley called “representative status” 713 are accepted as authoritativ
because of that status. They are assumed to represent the ideas of the majority and are thus 
granted the privilege to define reality. Their output is often reprinted with relatively little 
editing by the individual journalists. Their common sense categories, their interpretations, and 
their language are largely taken over by the newspapers. 714 Or, as Karl Marx put it: “The 
ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.” 715  
An example that Mike Tissong told the TRC is indicative of this state of affairs: When six 
young men died in Duduza township after their hand grenades had exploded prematurely, he 
received a tip that the supposed MK operative who had supplied them was in fact an agent for 
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ing the apartheid years Johann de Villiers, the 
media to exclude the voice of the oppressed. 721 
                   
the secret service. He wrote a story about how the security police had infiltrated the Duduza 
cell in order to kill the young activists. Unfortunately, his superiors at The Star did not seem 
to like what they read and passed the story on to their (white) crime reporter. He obtained the 
official police version of the events and rewrote the article into a story of a ‘mystery blast’ 
that had killed poorly trained terrorists. 716 Today we know that the man who had supplied the 
grenades was Joe Mamasela, an askari working for Vlakplaas. The murders had been 
approved by the Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, probably with full knowledge 
of President P. W. Botha. 717 So how could a big newspaper like The Star be misled in this 
way? It certainly did not help that the crime desk was headed by Craig Kotze who later 
admitted to having been a police spy 718, but the deciding factor was that his superiors were 
just too stuck in the mainstream mindset to even consider Mr. Tissong’s story. 719 When I 
asked him about his newspaper’s attitude dur
senior executive editor of The Star, told me: 
“We would go out and we would get information from the police, which was the 
official information. And then obviously they [the black reporters] would collect 
information from the struggle side. And quite often these two things were totally, 
diametrically opposed. And you had to sometimes make a decision, what you carried. 
And they said that we were too hooked into the official side of things. We finally 
addressed this thing through a system, which we did in the 80s, of saying “they said 
and they said”. (…) We would say: “The police said.” And then we would quote the 
official statement by Colonel so-and-so. And then we would say: “They said.” And 
then we would give them a UDM leader to see what they said.” 720 
Quite plainly, The Star described by Mr. de Villiers is an entirely different paper than that of 
Mr. Lewin and Mr. Tissong. He seems to be convinced that his paper’s reporting was well 
balanced between official sources and the “struggle side”. I very briefly surveyed (this was by 
no means a scientific content analysis!) 30 issues of The Star in my corpus and found that I 
must agree with the latter two gentlemen. The UDF is not an organisation that is generally 
spoken to, but rather a clear example of someone that is talked about. I am sure that my small 
sample did not help, but I saw none of their leaders quoted, while plenty of government 
officials voiced their opinion. It is true that, due to media restrictions, many opposition leaders 
could not be quoted, but in many cases the censorship laws served mainly as an excuse for the 
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to coordinate the 
 First was 
 state propaganda 
machinery. The Western diplomatic source who had supposedly supplied the information on 
Slovo, later turned out to have been Craig Williamson, a security police spy. 724  
There were exceptions, and I should not suppress them. In 1976, Oliver Tambo and David 
Sibeko of the PAC addressed the United Nations and, as the previous Minister of Justice had 
exempted speeches at the UN from the no-quoting laws, newspapers now had an opportunity 
to relay their views. Unfortunately, in the light of the Soweto Uprisings, the current Minister, 
J. Kruger, warned the press that he had “not given my permission for publication” 725. Only 
the Cape Times defied the ban – and got away with it. 726 In 1980, Die Transvaler was fined 
75 Rand for quoting Thabo Mbeki. In 1984, the Cape Times was taken to court for quoting 
Donald Woods, the exiled ex-editor of the Daily Dispatch, and The Star was fined for 
publishing a quote by ANC leader Oliver Tambo saying that he could not be quoted. 727 In 
                                                
I also think that Mr. de Villiers’ mistaking the UDM, a political party that only emerged in 
1997, with the UDF, a civic organisation that was founded in 1983 
grassroots struggle against apartheid and dissolved in 1991, is indicative of the attitudes of the 
majority of mainstream South African journalists. I heard similar mistakes as well as quite 
obvious racialisms such as ‘brown people’ several times during my interviews. Many white 
journalists were, and are to this day, oblivious to the pervasiveness of racism in their thinking. 
This had clear effects on their reporting. They knew that they had to give some attention to the 
events in the townships, but, like most white South Africans, they were just not interested in 
the what, the why and the how of it all. In reality, they were quite content not to have to leave 
the cultural mainstream and venture into the unknown territory of extra-parliamentary politics. 
After all, many of the agreements they reached with the government over the use of leaked 
and unofficial information were voluntary. 722 
Moreover, despite their professing to balanced reporting, some English papers would print 
government allegations of ANC involvement in violence, even though they knew that they 
would not be allowed to print the organisation’s reaction. 723 For example, in 1984 The Star 
published allegations that former SACP leader Joe Slovo had killed his wife, in order to end 
an unhappy marriage. Today we know that this accusation was untrue; Ruth
assassinated by Vlakplaas. But back then anything sounded possible. And because he was a 
banned person, Slovo could not be given a chance to deny the allegations. And as in the case 
of the killings in Duduza, The Star managed to get itself misled by the
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The mo e of defiance occurred in 1985, when on 4th November, the Cape Times 
ublish eard had conducted with Oliver Tambo in London 
on 30th
since th 729 e 
nd arresting Heard, who was later charged under the Internal Security Act. More shocking 
was SA
through r, SAAN’s Managing Director, John 
ing, s rges 
against Heard were dropped, but his relationship with the newspaper’s management had been 
erman 730
But no shed in defiance of the 
 a cartoon necklacing and quoting ANC leaders to thousands of 
1986, the Sunday Star and the Durban edition of the Sunday Times published interviews with 
Winnie Mandela. Both papers received warnings from the government. 728 
st famous cas
p ed an interview that editor Tony H
 October. It was the first interview with an ANC leader to be published in South Africa 
e organisation’s banning.  The police reacted predictably by confiscating the tap
a
AN’s reaction. Publicly the board of directors tried to polish its liberal credentials 
 Heard’s brave act of defiance. Privately, howeve
ent him a letter of reprimand. In 1986, the Cape Times was fined 300 Rand. ChaK
ently damaged. A year later he was fired as editor.  
t all quotes by banned persons we find in the press were publi
p
ban. If it suited them for propaganda purposes, the government occasionally cleared selective 
quotes for publication, or it quoted banned persons in its own publications and subsequently 
permitted the press to publish such quotes. In these cases, the speaker was either discredited, 
or his/her words were used to give credence to opinions he/she does not share. 731  
For example, when shortly before the 1987 parliamentary elections anonymous propagandists 
sent postcards depicting
people worldwide, the Sunday Times was allowed to reprint it (see fig. 16). 
 
Figure 16: Free necklaces for everyone (Source: Sunday Times th (29  March 1987: 21)) 
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e right 
em for publication. 
d cast the ANC in a poor light. 733 For 
er Louis le Grange authorised the SAPA 
to send out an interview that Oliver Tambo had given to a Harare newspaper. Tambo had 
The image on the left shows a car tyre with candles on it like a birthday cake and on th
is a gory drawing of a burning person with a hammer and sickle next to him. The text reads: 
“THE ANC  
A CELEBRATION OF DEATH  
 
‘We want to make the death of collaborators so grotesque that people will never 
think of it.’ 
… ANC spokesman Tim Ngubane at California State University, October 10, 1985. 
 
‘The strategy of burning sell-outs seems to have paid out well in the ultimate 
end.’ 
…Voice of Freedom broadcast, October 7, 1985 
 
‘With our boxes of matches and our ‘necklaces’ we will liberate this country’ 
… Winnie Mandela, April 13, 1986 
 
Execution by fire has claimed 800 lives in the past two years. Innocent victims are 
burnt to death with gasoline-soaked tyres around their necks.” 
 
The accompanying article, titled “Anti-ANC card riddle” with a sub-header “Slick artwork 
shows the horrors of ‘necklace’ killings in gory detail” 732, explains that this card was sent out 
worldwide in an attempt to discredit the ANC and that no one knows who it came from. To 
this day we do not know who was behind this sick joke, but it certainly served the cause of the 
government very well by scaring the white electorate into coming out in favour of the NP at 
an unprecedented rate.  
Similarly, the South African Press Agency (SAPA) would occasionally carry quotes of 
banned persons with the explicit remark that the government had cleared th
However, these were generally taken out of context an
example in February 1985 Minister of Law and Ord
stated in no uncertain terms that apartheid had to end and that the only way to bring it down 
was through armed struggle. The editor of SAPA explained: “The request was granted, since 
Tambo lived up to his local image.” 734 
Today the situation has obviously changed. The newspapers frequently quote sources critical 
of the government and, as I will further elaborate in chapter 4.6.4 b, the victims of violence. 
However, this does not mean that they now quote in an objective or balanced way. No 
newspaper can ever achieve that. Accordingly, the South African press still seek out those 
sources that confirm their views and tends to disregard all others. But in this it no longer 
differs from the press anywhere else in the free world. 
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this structure and clearly show its changes in order to prepare the ground for an evaluation of 
the ima first look at what acts are covered in the reporting on 
violenc
in this eople are 
a) 
During  in the press was 
UDF, AZAPO and Inkatha – as incidents of political violence. 
er hand, was largely ignored. Occasionally, a court reporter’s story would 
ocussed on the trial proceedings rather than the crime. And 
t a news organisation would put relatively little effort into 
4.4 Characterising Violence – The Structure of the Message System 
Now that we are aware of the possible hidden meanings behind certain journ
 to take to a closer look at the content of news reports on violence and find out exactly 
olence is portrayed. Here we find that once again the time at which an article was 
ed plays a crucial role in determining its content. At first look this is not surprising. A 
ment as far-reaching as the end o
consciousness of a country.  
However, the changes that the reporting 
tforward political terms such as a shift from pro-apartheid to pro-democracy. The 
n of the English press in South African society was never that easy to define. Rather, as 
e I have shown in the previous chapters, they constituted a kind of extra-parliamentary 
ion to the NP, but never fully rejected 
stratification. Accordingly, although the reporting after 1994 reflects the altered self-image of 
the newspapers and the changed extra-medial reality, the relevant changes were much subtler 
and took place on the deeper structural level. In the present chapter, I will attempt to un
ges placed on top of it. I will 
e and what relationship there is between them, and then try to discover who is involved 
violence. Throughout, I will also pay attention to how these events and p
evaluated and from what point of view. This should provide me with a satisfactory picture of 
the structure of news reports in the South African press at any given time. 
4.4.1 From Politics to Crime – What is Violence? 
Acts of Violence Covered During Apartheid 
 the apartheid years, most of the violence to get any serious attention
political, which, as I mentioned above, was defined largely as violence against the state. State 
violence, if it was acknowledged at all, was generally presented in terms of ‘strength’, ‘force’ 
or ‘law and order’ or, in the case of the more critical papers, as ‘police brutality’ or ‘abuse of 
power’, but never as ‘political violence’. There was, however, more to political violence as 
defined by the media than to that defined by the NP. Much to their credit, the English press 
largely resisted the government’s attempt to depoliticise the black population’s struggle and in 
their reporting labelled the fighting between the various political groups in the townships – the 
Crime, on the oth
ge  tt published, but hey generally f
w s  thahile it is under tandable
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ces on the part of the 
editor. Gerald Shaw, for example, told me: 
 couple of paragraphs.” 736 
Instead
among
politica rated using an example: 
iolence and death.” 737 
This is
Uprisin 02 in the Cape Argus about 
commu
If we look at the two side by side, it is impossible to distinguish which of the events described 
ppened. This is provided by short accounts later in the articles: “The 
                                                
gathering such minor news, this practice served as an important filter on the reporting of 
violence. As early as 1973, the British Sociologist Stanley Cohen observed: 
“[In] South Africa where overt political unrest and protest is low, “ordinary” crime 
and delinquency, especially violence is extremel
homicide and execution rates) but the public definition presents exactly the opposite 
balance.” 735 (Italics in original.) 
In some cases this under-reporting was the result of conscious choi
“I don’t know whether it was a national policy, but the Cape Times began to not report 
… violent crime. I mean in the main road Rondebosch here, there would be an armed 
hold-up at a steak house, and it wouldn’t be reported in the Cape Times. Or if it was, it 
was reduced to a
 the newspapers focussed largely on such things as ‘riots’, ‘unrest’ or ‘faction fights’ 
 the black population. In doing so, they often obscured rather than emphasised the 
l origins of the conflicts. My point is probably best illust
“Flaming night 
Riots rage – Army on standby 
Troops were on standby outside of Soweto last night while thousands of angry 
Africans set fire to buildings and cars after a day of v
 the headline and the lead of the Rand Daily Mail’s main story about the Soweto 
gs. Let us now compare this to an article published in 20
ters in whose anger with the poor service of the rail company boiled over:  
“Rioting commuters attack trains 
Chaos reigned this morning as rioting broke out at Mabopane and Saulsville railway 
stations, with at least one building set alight and vehicles stoned.” 738 
had political motivations and which was the result of purely criminal behaviour. The term 
‘riot’ provides readers with a rough idea of what happened, but it does not give them an 
explanation why it ha
rioting was triggered off by a clash between police and pupils who were demonstrating 
against enforced instruction in Afrikaans.” 739 And: “This morning’s actions followed an 
incident yesterday evening when angry commuters vented their anger about train delays on a 
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f a Durban café, “black-on-
black” four people by the security forces – but takes all of them to 
be “unr
itive and linguistic category 
sion, chaos, and disorder; it is the opposite 
Yet the two are not synonymous. Unrest is largely a 
black p trated by whites) and it is neither 
                                                
Metrorail motor coach and two coaches at the Bosman Street station.” 740 The fact that the 
first incident was not so much 
system and its ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy can be silently ignored without the reader feeling that 
he/she is being presented with incomplete information. 
Moreover, terms like ‘riot’ and ‘unrest’ group completely different acts together, with the 
result that they often have no definable meaning at all any more. Just a quick scan of my 
material for example produced an amazing array of ‘unrest incidents’: 
“Unrest 
Two people were reported injured when their cars were pelted,” 741 
wrote The Argus on 3rd June 1980, and provides us with our first type of ‘unrest-related’ 
violence: stone throwing. On 26th March 1986 the Cape Times described the ‘unrest’ after the 
shooting in Uitenhage: 
“The deaths of two Uitenhage residents who were attacked by a mob wielding pa
have pushed the unrest death toll since Thursday to 31 in the Eastern Cape where 
several incidents of arson were reported yesterday.” 742 
Thus, we have our second kind of ‘unrest-related’ violence: mob attacks. Like stone-throwing, 
these would rise to prominence in the reporting about violence in the townships becoming 
almost the prototypical ‘unrest-incident’. The Pretoria News of 16th June 1986 enlarges our 
repertoire of ‘unrest incidents’ even further with this report: 
“A total of 22 people have been killed and 77 wounded or injured in unrest incidents 
since the declaration of the state of emergency last week. 
The worst casualties occurred in the Durban beachfront blast on Saturda
three people died and 69 we
Of the other 19 deaths, 15 were killed in “black-on-black”
killed by security forces, according to weeken
Information spokesmen.” 743 
The article speaks of a number of different things – the bombing o
violence and the killing of 
est incidents”. 
So what is ‘unrest’? I would personally say that it is more a cogn
than an event in extra-linguistic reality. It is confu
of ‘peace’. It is violence so to speak. 
henomenon (only the police shooting was perpe
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y Gordin put it: “The sub-text always used to be that 
the sav
The ter e government. The 
it provided them with a good and easy 
story. They knew it was happening, they knew where and they had the government’s ‘unrest 
o welcomed by the state – in fact it is not really clear 
rnment – because it had the effect of 
individual incidents described while at the same time 
exagge  For example, when the Pretoria 
ck-on-black” incidents” 745 the reader tends to see less 
violenc  unrelated murders. Conversely, the 
“deaths imes give the reader the 
any further details.  
Moreover, the newspapers often included phenomena in the categories of ‘riot’ or ‘unrest’, 
the violence described. Examples include 
looting ctivities of ‘tsotsis’ in the shade of the Soweto Uprisings. 
This le tical acts and crime with the result 
nrest’ as criminal behaviour. Thus, while the cover-
terms  still seen as forms of political violence, their political 
now explained with the black population’s natural 
organised, nor target-oriented. As Jerem
ages are at it again.” 744 
m ‘unrest’ had some added advantages for the newspapers and th
newspaper liked ‘unrest’ because, at least for a while, 
reports’ as an easy source. term was als
who first created the label, the media or the gove
reducing the violent appearance of the 
rating the size of the area affected by the violence.
News writes that “15 were killed in “bla
e than he/she would if the article had reported 15
 of two Uitenhage residents” 746 written about by the Cape T
impression that all of Uitenhage is in turmoil without having to give 
which really did not have anything to do with 
 during riots or the criminal a
d to a substantial blurring of the line between poli
that white readers soon saw all forms of ‘u
‘riot’ and ‘unrest’ were
background was lost. Instead they were 
predisposition to criminal behaviour. Just a quick look at the headlines after 16th June 1976 
shows how closely the concept of ‘riot’ is linked to the theft of white property:  
“BURNING, LOOTING”  
(The Star 17th June 1976 (Stop Press Edition), main headline, p. 1) 
“ROADBLOCK SET UP ON LOUIS BOTHA”,  
sub-headline: “Killing and looting in Alexandra”  
(The Star 18th June 1976 (City Late Edition), main headline, p. 1) 
“BLACK BACKLASH”,  
sub-headline: “2 looters beaten to death” 
(The Star 19th June 1976 (City Late Edition), main headline, p. 1) 
  “Pupils loot vans at Orlando roadblocks”  
(Rand Daily Mail 17th June 1976, p. 6) 
“Newsmen roughed up as students grab cameras”  
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(Rand D
  
(Rand D
arliamentary opposition. 
during the apartheid years. Only the most spectacular cases made the papers, generally tucked 
er there was rarely ever an article about a 
out arrests or about 
(Rand Daily Mail 17th June 1976, p. 6) 
“Police guard white suburbs”,  
kicker: “90 dead, 1000 injured as riots and pillaging sweep Reef”  
(Rand Daily Mail 19th June 1976, main headline, p. 1) 
“Pillage as beer and blood flow”  
aily Mail 19th June 1976, p. 1) 
“Mobs on rampage in East Rand townships”  
aily Mail 19th June 1976, p. 2) 
“Looting and Death in Alexandra” 
(Rand Daily Mail 19th June 1976, p. 3) 
“VIOLENCE FLARES AGAIN IN SOWETO”,  
kicker: “Stoning, looting, burning, bid to march on hospital”  
(The Argus 17th June 1976 (City Late Edition), main headline, p. 1) 
“Looting, burning as riots continue”  
(Cape Times 17th June 1976, main headline, p. 1)  
“SOWETO EXPLODES”,  
sub-headline: “A day of deaths, burning, looting”  
(The Natal Mercury 17th June 1976, p. 1) 
“Mob on the rampage”  
(The Natal Mercury 17th June 1976, p. 2) 
Looting or rampaging were not the main themes in the reporting, but they enjoyed a certain 
degree of prominence that would forge in the heads of uncritical readers a close association 
between riots and looting. This was method was not only employed by more conservative 
publications such as the Natal Mercury. Even the Rand Daily Mail, which otherwise tried to 
be slightly more critical of the police, gave ample attention to the criminal aspects of the 
events. There was one exception though. Among the newspapers I surveyed one stood out for 
its lack of sensationalism: the Daily Dispatch. The leading stories were not unlike those of 
other newspapers, but some smaller articles were strongly critical of the government and even 
lent a voice to the extra-p
Before I leave the time of apartheid behind, I must briefly pause to describe what forms of 
violence got little or no attention in the press at that time, as the subjects that are taboo can say 
just as much about the newspapers’ priorities and the culture that they are part of as those that 
are widely covered. As I mentioned above, crime of all kinds was seriously underreported 
away somewhere on the inside pages. Moreov
violent incident that had just happened. Most of the reports were either ab
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 more horrific crimes reported, if 
to worry too much and 
dea is encompassed perfectly in a headline from The Argus of 12th June 
                                                
court cases and convictions of criminals. This created an impression that crime was under 
control at all times. It was not something that just happened and was not dealt with. If a 
violent crime took place, the police were shown to be on it and the courts were functioning 
well by prosecuting the accused and punishing them for what they had done. Unsolved crime 
was almost non-existent. Jeremy Gordin confirmed my findings: 
“I’m talking about crime, and quite serious domestic crime, domestic violence (…). 
So, but I don’t think that … I think very little of that, I know very little of that was 
reported. OK. So, you got very little of that. You got
it was black-on-white violence. I’m talking about criminal violence now.” 747 
Mr. Gordin touched on three other subjects that got fairly little attention. One was criminal 
violence among blacks. The newspapers seemed only interested in odd little incidents that 
illustrated the savageness of young township dwellers. The true extent of crime and 
victimisation among the black population was never really a topic. Equally little attention was 
given to black crime against whites. This surely had something to do with the fact that, due to 
the separation of residential areas and the SAP’s heavy-handed policing, this was a fairly rare 
occurrence. However, considerations of reader interests and politics certainly played a role. 
Too much attention to such attacks might have caused white readers 
react by not buying the papers anymore, as happened after 1994.  
Domestic violence, too, was only rarely reported and, if it was covered, it was defined in a 
very narrow way. Strikingly, the term ‘domestic violence’ did not appear in any of the papers 
in my sample before the end of apartheid. I came across a few articles about men appearing in 
court for having killed or injured their wives and/or children, and even found the word ‘abuse’ 
in a headline in the Cape Times (“Wife abuse No 2 crime in M Plain” 748), but ‘domestic 
violence’, marital rape and child abuse were non-existent as far as the media were concerned. 
Moreover, the overall image that emerged from the reporting was that violence in the home 
was mainly perpetrated by men who had snapped under stress but were otherwise entirely 
peaceful people. This i
1986 above an article about a man who had killed his wife and her suspected lover: “Solomon 
‘not a violent man’” 749 
The newspapers displayed a similarly nonchalant attitude towards whites who assaulted their 
black compatriots. The practice of ‘kaffir-bashing’, a much-loved past time among rural 
whites, was completely ignored by the press and violence on farms, in mines, and in private 
homes received next to no attention. Researchers who conducted a survey for the Institute of 
 
) – Note that this is about crime in a coloured area! 
747 Jeremy Gordin in an interview with the author, 31st July 2002 
748 Cape Times (8th November 1984 a: 10
749 The Argus (12th June 1986: 5) 
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t was instead 
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neighb
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personn d vigilante 
al attitude it deserved. Most 
two days, none called it a ‘murder’, and all but 
the Rand Daily Mail and the Daily Dispatch relied on government statements and reactions 
dweller
quite a bit of
Criminology at the University of Cape Town in 1991 found only 33 press reports during the 
previous five years about cases where farmers had been charged with assaulting or murdering 
workers. 750 My own work revealed a similar degree of underreporting. My whole corpus of 
newspapers before 1990 contained only one article on the subject. On 16th June 
Morning Final Edition of the Rand Daily Mail carried a small article on page five titled 
“Wood splintering ‘led to death’” 751. It described the case of a man with an Afrikaans name, 
who had hit an unnamed “worker” with a plank for dropping a piece of wood. The worker 
later died of the injuries. No further information was given.  
Finally, there was the subject of state violence. As I said above, violence perpetrated by the 
agents of the state did not fall under the category of ‘political violence’, bu
 presented as ‘strength’ or ‘use of force’. This label, however, was only used to 
e security force action in the townships and, to a limited degree, the SADF’s raids into 
ouring countries. But as we have seen in chapter 2, there was much more to 
ment violence than that. Torture, the killing of detainees by the police and prison 
el, the activities of the numerous death squads, the government-sponsore
violence, or the kitskonstabels’ reign of terror in the townships were not covered by such 
terms. In fact, from what I could see, they were barely covered at all.  
High-profile cases, such as the death of Steve Biko, could not be completely ignored, 
although even Biko’s murder did not get the attention or the critic
newspapers only carried the story for one or 
from overseas politicians for their coverage. Less prominent cases of torture or killings of 
detainees were largely ignored. Some of the more critical newspapers did occasionally point 
out the appalling behaviour of South Africa’s law enforcement agencies and prison personnel, 
but their voices were few and far between, limited by the strict rules on reporting from prisons 
and easily countered by such stories as the Natal Mercury’s “Torture occurs in SA but ‘claims 
are exaggerated’” 752. 
The same was true of the violence perpetrated by the kitskonstabels. Cases such as the ‘Trojan 
Horse Incident’ were reported, but their day-to-day crimes remained hidden. Vigilante 
violence on the other hand was dealt with entirely differently. The violent deeds committed by 
the government’s black surrogates, be they the witdoeke in Crossroads, Inkatha-aligned hostel 
s on the Witwatersrand, or ‘conservative’ vigilantes such as the A-Team, received 
 attention. However, the victims’ and witnesses’ reports that police, soldiers, 
                                                 
750 Institute of Criminology, UCT (1991: 26) and Marinovich & Silva (2000: 7) 
751 Rand Daily Mail (16th June 1976: 5) 
752 The Natal Mercury (23rd April 1986: 14) 
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white p
the vio
mentio
covered lack’ violence or inter-ethnic strife. 
. And so, I, I didn’t believe the ‘third 
elderly woman robbed at gun-point in her home; an unidentified dead body found in 
eople with painted faces, or people wearing well-polished army boots were involved in 
lence, or that the police had protected the attackers against township residents were not 
ned until after the unbanning of the ANC. 753 Before 1990, vigilante violence was 
 under the broad heading of ‘black-on-b
And last, but not least, we have the death squads, which were persistently ignored by the 
mainstream press. It is hard to assess today whether they did this out of caution or ignorance. 
A former manager of the Argus Group argued for the latter when he told me: “We did not 
suppress information we just didn’t know what was going on.” 754 Others, on the other hand, 
openly admitted to having known of state sponsored killings and either having disbelieved 
their sources or having done nothing about it. Ken Owen for example admitted: 
“I couldn’t bring myself to think that they [the government], … were bloody 
murderers. And I couldn’t link them up with … I thought that the evil began lower 
down at the level of the police. We knew that the police kept beating up people. But I 
thought that they were doing this unlawfully
force’. I was very sceptical about it. That was a grave mistake I made.” 755  
In my opinion this statement stands as an indictment of the entire English language press. If 
Owen, who was one of apartheid’s fiercest critics in the mainstream media, had heard about 
the violence but rejected the information as ill-founded rumours, I cannot imagine anyone in 
the commercial press being interested in such contentious stories. 
b) Acts of Violence Covered After 1994 
The mainstream newspapers’ approach to violence changed with the elections in 1994. 
Political violence more or less disappeared from the pages of the daily press. Only the most 
spectacular cases, such as the sudden increase in violence in KwaZulu Natal before the 1999 
elections or the series of right-wing bombings in Gauteng in November 2002, made the 
headlines. Instead, the newspapers were full of stories about crime. Murder, rape, robbery, 
assault, car hijackings also and gang violence became favourite new subjects. Police violence, 
too, received a lot of coverage, as did violence against police officers. This new approach to 
violence is probably best illustrated by an example. In 1997, the London Economist ran a 
story on crime in South Africa and used a daily round-up of violence in Johannesburg taken 
from page two of The Star as an illustration of the problem: 
“two women raped at gun-point in a hair salon; a bank robbed by five armed men; an 
                                                 
753 See for example Pretoria News (6th Septemb th ther 1990: 1), The Star (6  September 1990: 1) and Cape Times (14  September 
ay 2002 
1990 b: 2) 
754 Interview with the author, 13th March 2002 
755 Interview with the author, 30th M
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roblem. 
 it comes to reporting violence. Political violence 
bout racist 
ism in general. Even the more victim-centred article in The 
                                                
the street; security guards robbed by armed gunmen; two more security guards robbed 
at gun-point; one policeman shot dead; a man found murdered in his home; a couple 
robbed at gun-point in their home: a man robbed at gun-point; one dead body found; 
another dead body found in a park.” 756 
Despite its simplifying nature this summary is very helpful in two ways. For one, it illustrates 
the difficulty people – even media professionals as we can see – have distinguishing between 
text and reality. The Economist quotes The Star (a prime example of explicit intertextuality by 
the way) not in order to make a point about its reporting of violence, but in order to illustrate 
the phenomenon itself. The media text is thus seen as proof of the existence of the p
The second way in which the report helps me is that somehow, even without trying, it hit the 
nail on the head. It shows that violence as portrayed in the South African newspapers in the 
late 1990s consisted of criminal acts committed by nameless, faceless perpetrators in public 
places, or by intruders into helpless victims’ homes. I could not have summed-up the 
newspapers’ approach any better even if I had tried.  
Obviously, this is not the full extent of violence in South Africa today. The newspapers today 
still have a number of blind spots when
within the black community, for example, has by no means stopped. It has, however, nigh on 
disappeared from the news. 757 The Mail & Guardian was the only paper in my survey that 
regularly covered incidents of political violence that did not traverse the colour line. 758  
White employers who assault their black staff are also still fairly safe from the media. Only 
the most severe cases are reported. The ongoing racism and racial violence on South African 
farms and in the country’s mines is not generally highlighted. The same goes for racially 
motivated attacks in every day life. In my entire sample I only found two articles a
such incidents. One was the killing of a black man by a “white businessman” 759, which was 
reported only in the Mail & Guardian of 17th May 2002. The other was the appearance in 
court of five white men accused of beating a black teenager to death in the Northern Province, 
which was widely covered in the press throughout the duration of the trial in 2002. However, 
in this case, background information and historical analyses were sorely lacking. 
For example, in an article on 1st February 2002 The Star describes the events, explains the 
perpetrators’ explanations for having attacked the young man and quotes their racist slurs. It 
does not investigate the victim’s story (apart from calling him a “suspected poacher” 760) and 
does not go into the issue of rac
 
756 The Economist (13th December 1997: 18) 
757 For accounts of the levels of political violence in 1994-1999 see for example Hamber (1999: 3) and in 2002 see for 
003: 2-4) 
l & Guardian (26th April 2002: 8) 
ay 2002: 12) 
ry 2002: 1) 
example (US Department of State (2
758 See for example Mail & Guardian (12th April 2002: 8) and Mai
759 Mail & Guardian (17th M
760 The Star (1st Februa
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lain the background of the crimes in South African history and 
ccused’s anger with poachers who trespass onto their property and cost them 
ave no sympathy for wealthy racists who 
e townships are fairly violent places, but they 
ng the m
 reasons behind the individual acts as well as the overall extent 
outsiders who had invaded the private homes of their victims. Violence perpetrated within the 
private home by members of the same household, or close friends and family members, was 
764 
 
Herald on 20th April 2002, which covered the last day of the trial that saw the conviction of 
two of the men, does not exp
racism. They are merely described as individual events. The papers presuppose that the reader 
will know of the tension between poor blacks and white farmers without realising that they 
will see this conflict merely from their own side. Thus, a wealthy white person will 
understand the a
money. Many poor blacks on the other hand will h
reserve all the land for themselves while black children starve. And the superficial reporting 
of the press certainly did nothing to further people’s understanding for each other. 761 
Similarly, while there were numerous reports about acts of violence in the townships, readers 
were not generally made aware of the overall context within which they were committed. As 
Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo pointed 
out in their work on news values, long-term developments and general states of affairs do not 
lend themselves to being made into news stories; events on the other hand do. 762 
Accordingly, newspaper readers are told that th
receive very few explanations as to why. 
One last type of violence that is only now beginning to receive the attention it deserves is 
domestic violence. Child abuse, spousal abuse, and assaults on elderly family members, 
especially in the white community, were only scarcely reported duri id-1990s. This 
was partly due to the fact that domestic violence did not appear in the crime statistics as a 
separate offence. Listing incidents in other categories served to hide the extent and lethality of 
domestic violence and helped conceal domestic violence from the probing eyes of the press, 
for other crimes frequently make the headlines when the statistics are released. 763  
The newspapers really woke up to the problem after a number of high profile cases of child 
rape in late 2001 and early 2002. Since then the papers have frequently reported cases of 
domestic violence and, unlike with many other forms of violence, have spent some time and 
effort to try and investigate the
of the problem. However, despite this substantial shift in focus, by and large, violence was 
still described as something that happens mainly in public places or was perpetrated by 
proportionately underplayed. 
                                                
 Lang & Lang (1981: 675) 
761 The Herald (20th April 2002: 3) 
762 Galtung & Ruge (1965: 64-71) and
763 Bollen et al. (1999 a: 1) 
764 Simpson (1996: 2) 
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merely describing individual in
townships w
This separated the individual acts from history and obscured the fact that they were 
violent system of apartheid. Neither their context nor the 
amined, and the incidents were not scrutinised. 
This way, readers were not given an adequate
inadvertently misinterpreted them.   
pers carried such headlines 
w distinct 
inc here were a few 
headlin
the ev
happening in the townships were not isolated incidents of violence, but a countrywide 
lently put down by the state, was never 
4.4.2 Of Incidents and Patterns – A Look at the Relationship Between the Acts of 
Violence Described 
The present sub-chapter is meant only as a brief insert, an explanation of an aspect of the 
reporting on violence that needs to be given if we are to properly understand the message 
conveyed as a whole. It is the question of how the newspapers contextualised the violence 
they described. 
a) 1976 to 1992: A Series of Violent Incidents 
During the apartheid years and the early 1990s most newspapers confined themselves to 
cidents of violence. Even during the mid-1980s when the 
ere in constant uproar, the press wrote of ‘riots’, ‘unrest incidents’ or ‘shootings’. 
 general 
mere symptoms of the underlying 
connections that existed between them were ex
 framework for understanding the reports and 
765
When, for example, after the initial outbreak of violence in Soweto in June 1976, several other 
demonstrations across the country ended in bloodshed, the newspa
as “More riots in Soweto” 766, “Widespread rioting in Pretoria areas” 767, “Killing and looting 
in Alexandra” 768, and “Fresh riots erupt” 769, insinuating that the riots were someho
idents confined to certain geographic areas and unrelated to each other. T
es, such as “50 dead as riots spread” 770 and “54 dead as riots spread” 771, that portray 
ents as linked. However, the true connection between them, namely that what was 
uprising by the oppressed population that was vio
openly addressed. No matter how hard critical journalists tried to address this problem, the 
overall focus was on the isolated incidents while the failures and crimes of the government 
were greatly underplayed. 
A similar picture emerges when we look at the reporting during the 1980s. There was a lot of 
talk about “incidents of arson” 772, “unrest incidents” 773, “incidents of unrest” 774 and the 
                                                 
765 Frederikse (1987: 221) 
766 Daily Dispatch (17th June 1976 a: 1) 
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e’ and the like. The 
ence escalated on the trains on the 
mainstream discourse and their explanations were shunned. It took most of the commercial 
press a few years, a huge body of evidence as provided by the alternative newspapers, and the 
                   
like, with the occasional reference to those having been reactions to police brutality, but no 
general indictment of the violent system of apartheid as a whole. 
The newspapers still maintained this approach to violence for a while after the unbanning of 
the ANC. For example when in 1990 two men started randomly attacking commuters at 
Johannesburg’s Jeppe station, the newspapers talked of a ‘random massacr
articles were all fairly similar in pointing out that there was no motive, no explanation and no 
sense to the violence – and that the people involved were black. Both the Pretoria News and 
The Star for example wrote: 
“Two unknown gunmen opened fire on a crowd of commuters at Jeppe station in 
Johannesburg, killing five people and injuring at least 14 in what has been described 
as a motiveless and senseless attack. 
Four of the dead were women. Both the gunmen and their victims were black.” 775 
And the Cape Times reported: 
“Nine people were shot dead and 27 injured in random massacres here last night as bands 
of men opened fire on commuters and township residents. 
• Five commuters died instantly when two black men opened fire on a crowd at Jeppe 
railway station. Fourteen were injured, eight critically. 
• Four people were killed in Soweto’s Naledi Extension when the occupants of a 
minibus fired at people in the streets and into homes. Thirteen were injured. 
At Jeppe the gunmen struck without warning. The victims were all black. 
Police spokesman Colonel Frans Malherbe said two men walked up to a crowd of 
commuters at Jeppe station and opened fire with two handguns “without rhyme or 
reason”, killing four women and a man.” 776 
b) The Emergence of Crime Waves after 1992 
The old view of the violence as consisting of a series of individual and inexplicable incidents 
slowly began to change in 1992, when the viol
Witwatersrand. Now the newspapers started questioning the official truth that each incident 
represented an isolated case. 777 They were neither the only ones nor the first ones to do so. 
The alternative press had written about ‘taxi wars’, ‘death squads’ and the ‘third force’ since 
the early 1990s. 778 However, back then their views were considered too radical for 
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This, however, is not all there is to the South African crime wave(s). It is only the first and 
most general step. The specific ways in which the newspapers approached violence and crime 
also influenced the creation and appearance of these waves. Journalists did not, as Mr. de 
Villiers said, simply report “everything we could get our hands on” 781. If they had done this, 
every newspaper would have ended up the size of an encyclopaedia and would have been 
unmanageable for readers. Editors were faced with huge amounts of reportable stories every 
day and had to somehow make a choice. And in this they were guided not only by audience 
demands and accessibility of sources, but also by what Galtung & Ruge have termed 
“consonance” 782. They frequently concentrated on a particular theme and presented 
individual items in groups that reflected their choice.  
For example, after the rape of a nine-month-old baby in Upington in October 2001 the 
newspapers produced a string of stories on baby and child rape. “Babies in front line of new 
war” 783 the Sunday Times wrote. “Please daddy, don’t rape me” 784 the Cape Argus pleaded. 
“Limpopo policeman accused of raping his kids” 785 the Mail & Guardian said. And there are 
Goldstone Commission to accept that the ongoing violence was somehow connected. Only 
then did they take on the terminology of the alternative press. Thus, to anyone who relied 
exclusively on the mainstream media for information, these wars and feuds would have 
appeared to be a new phenomenon. We have here a clear example of crimes being defined on 
the basis of what is going on in the newsroom, not in extra-medial re
A similar development took place in the reporting about crime. What before 1994 had been 
reported as a small number of unconnected incidents now turned into what the Mail & 
Guardian of 18th April 1997 called “the crime wave besetting South Africa” 779. This is not to 
mean that the newspapers’ approach to crime reporting changed radically during the mid-
1990s. The impression of an ever-growing crime problem was not created through in-depth 
analyses and reports about the historical context of the individual acts or the socio-economical 
situation in the country, but mostly by the sheer number of crimes reported and the way they 
were approached by, and presented in, the newspapers. As I have already explained in chapter 
4.2.2 d, after the 1994 elections the press turned its attention away from political violen
increasingly turned the spotlight on crime. If we compare the newspapers during the early 
1990s with those of 1994/95, it is easy to get the impression that, since the end of apartheid, 
South Africa has turned into a country overrun by violence and
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ly striking enough to keep 
like the
acts du
robberi nk robberies” 790. 
The sec
On 12th ar printed what at first look appeared to be one article under the 
headlin
many more stories of the same sort to be found. Soon enough, such an increase in the 
reporting led people to believe that South Africa was facing a wave of child rapes. The BBC 
for example reported in October 2002, “South Africa is in the grip of an unprecedented 
increase in the most despicable crime - baby rape” 786. Scientific evidence on the other hand 
shows that the phenomenon of child and baby rape was not new. 787 
Focussing on one subject was only possible if the newspapers could be relatively certain that 
readers would not get bored by it though. Child rape was certain
people interested for a while. Other, more mundane crimes, however, were not. Thus, if an 
editor decided to pick up a more common theme he/she had to find a different way of making 
it interesting. The strategy here was similar to that described above, except that the themes 
were created to be used only once, in one issue of a paper, and then be dropped again. Much 
 classification of the violence in the townships during the 1980s as ‘unrest’, individual 
ring the 1990s were thus subsumed under such headings as “a spate of armed 
es” 788, “schoolboy shootings” 789 or “the growing wave of ba
ond example is a good case in point of the construction of a crime theme in the press. 
 June 2002, The St
e “Schoolboy shootings stun suburbs” 791 (see fig. 17). 
 
Figure 17: Shooting spree or media phenomenon? (Source: The Star (12th June 2002: 2)) 
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s of 29th April 2002 that reads more 
ain, on Saturday. Ricardo Jackson was shot in his left 
t in his buttock and died on the way to the hospital.  
A Kuils River man bled to death after suffering multiple stab wounds. No arrests have 
, the general public’s view 
                                                
Only when we begin reading does it become clear that what seems like two sub-sections are in 
fact two separate articles, “Model pupil gunned down” 792 and “Son held over father’s 
murder” 793, written by completely different authors about entirely unrelated incidents. The 
first article describes the shooting of a 19-year-old pupil in the township of Eldorado Park by 
one of his classmates. The second is about a 17-year-old boy from Primrose, a suburb of 
Germiston, who gunned his father down during an argument in their home. Their only link 
was that they were both committed by teenagers on the same day. 
Sometimes the paper took this approach even further, addressing a whole theme in one article 
under such headlines as “Four die violently in city over the weekend” 794 or “Police night of 
madness”. 795 The former was an article in the Cape Time
like a listing of everything unpleasant that happened in the area during the previous two days:  
“Police spokeswoman Nina Kirsten said the body of an 18-year-old man was found 
with multiple bruises in an open field in the Joe Slovo settlement in Langa. She said he 
was allegedly beaten to death after he stole from a resident.  
The body of Kurt Malan, 17, of Kewtown, Athlone, was found with eight bullet 
wounds yesterday. 
One man died and another was injured when shots were fired at their vehicle in 
Beacon Valley, Mitchell’s Pl
hand. Frederick Samuels was hi
been made. 
Six armed men fled with R 190 000 after robbing the Grassy Park Hotel in Victoria 
Road on Saturday.” 796 
As in the case of the “schoolboy shootings”, the individual incidents have nothing in common 
except that they all happened within the right time frame for publication. A slightly critical 
look will, however, reveal a pattern that might explain why, out of all the incidents of 
violence that were reported to the police that weekend, these five were chosen for publication: 
They all involved men and they all happened in black areas. Accordingly, they not only fit the 
papers’ schedule, but also their and, as I intend to show in chapter 5
of what violence is like in South Africa. 
The second example cited above is the headline to an article that appeared in the Cape Argus 
on 1st February 2002. Again the theme, policemen caving in under pressure, is introduced in 
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olls them 
e surface when in fact there were three distinctly separate 
part as 
ost striking characteristics of the system of 
p identities.  
This understanding of the world was clearly reflected in the newspapers’ reporting of 
ent 
rs of law and order, terrorists, communists or freedom 
n or white. The violence was therefore not described as acts 
the headline. It is further refined in the sub-headline “One dead, one shot, one disarmed”. 797 
And again the article links three incidents that were de facto unrelated – one officer’s suicide, 
one officer’s taking his family hostage and one officer’s attempted suicide – and r
into one. That is not to say that they might not have had a common origin, but according to 
the article they did not. The dead officer had financial problems, the hostage-taker did 
complain about work-related stress, and the third man was overwhelmed by the recent deaths 
of two close friends (and had supposedly complained to colleagues about a lack of career 
chances for white officers). So once again the reader is left with an impression of a series of 
cases that are connected on th
incidents that might have had a common structural cause. 
Sometimes the newspapers were even less subtle about creating their themes and left even less 
of the actual process of meaning making to the reader. In those cases, rather than just relying 
on the power of suggestion, the newspapers quite openly called their theme a ‘wave’. On 24th 
June 2002 the Cape Argus for example talked of a “wave of at least six armed robberies” 798 
to describe incidents that had happened between Friday and Sunday in places as far a
Green Point and Kraaifontein. Strangely enough the paper quotes a policeman as having ruled 
out that this was the work of a gang, but gives no information as to why such disparate 
incidents would constitute a “wave”. 
4.4.3 The Who is Who of Violence 
a) Apartheid, the Time of Collective Identities 
As I have shown in chapter 3, one of the m
apartheid was that, despite its supporters’ claims to be staunch anti-communists, the basic 
social unit was not the individual but, just like in Marx’s views of society, the collective. 
Apartheid, or separateness, was not the separation of individuals but the separation of groups. 
White South Africans had a clear self-image as whites in general and Afrikaners or English 
speaking South Africans 799, supporters of the NP or its liberal opponents, members of certain 
religious groups, inhabitants of a certain provinces and so on in particular. Their individual 
identities frequently took the backbench to these grou
violence. People were not seen as individuals, but as members of a group – as governm
employees, ANC members, protecto
fighters, as black, coloured, Asia
                                                 
797 Cape Argus (1st February 2002: 1) 
798 Cape Argus (24th June 2002 c: 7) 
at the same time English and therefore rooted in Europe, reflects a split in 
ee themselves as Africans, however, in conversations with expatriate South 
 they felt foreign there and that South Africa would always be home to them. 
799 The ambiguity of the term, South African, but 
this group’s identity. Most of them do not s
Africans in Europe I was frequently told that
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 from any violent actions, while 
ed in the active voice with a clear 
                                                
committed by individuals against individuals, but as a kind of group action. Unrest, riots, 
uprisings, ‘black-on-black’ violence, the war on terror or public-order policing, none of the 
violence commonly reported in the newspapers could be performed by individuals.  
The focussing on group identities was encouraged by the authorities, for it clearly played into 
their hands. For one, it deprived the opposition movements of a way to create heroes who 
could give their struggle a public face, as Che Guevara had done in Latin America. On the 
other hand, the representatives of the apartheid state were absolved from individual 
responsibility for the acts of violence they had committed if they had acted in their function as 
upholders of law and order. 800  
Along with the binary opposition described in chapter 3.3, such collectivist thinking had a 
profound impact on how the violence was lexicalised. Obviously, violence perpetrated by 
members of the in-group was described entirely differently than that involving the out-group. 
The media tried, as far as possible, to absolve the in-group
blaming the out-group for as much violence as possible. In-group violence was thus 
downplayed in relation to out-group violence, which was frequently over-emphasised.  
A good case in point is the reporting of killings. If someone had died as a result of security 
force action, the events were generally described in the passive voice, which served to mask 
the link between the actors and the act (“Man killed as police break up boycott mob” 801). In 
some cases, the physical agents were deleted altogether and grammatical agency was placed 
on the victims (“Shock, grief at death of Biko” 802). Deaths brought about by opponents of 
apartheid on the other hand were frequently describ
emphasis on the agent (“Mobs take over” 803).  
Furthermore, while violence perpetrated by opponents of the government was always 
described in the most shocking terms possible, while the language used to describe actions by 
the proponents and supporters of apartheid was what Steytler has called “laundered” 804. The 
former were described using strongly emotional terms such as “assassins” 805 and “terrorists” 
806. The violence committed by agents of the state on the other hand was linguistically 
minimised. They “neutralised” 807 or “eliminated” 808 their enemies, they “opened fire in self 
defence” 809, or had, at worst, “killed” 810 someone.  
 
 22) and Simpson & Vogelman (1989 b: 1) 
ge unknown) 
) 
800 Butchart et al. (1998: 5), Tomaselli (1991 a:
801 The Natal Mercury (14th December 1985: 16) 
802 Cape Times (14th September 1977 b: 2) 
803 The Star (17th June 1976 c: 1) 
804 Steytler (1990: 118) 
805 Rand Daily Mail (12th September 1977: 1) 
806 The Natal Mercury (25th May 1983: 1), Daily Dispatch (22nd March 1985 b: 1) and The Argus (17th June 1988: 3) 
807 The Argus (23rd May 1983 a: 1) 
808 Cape Times (11th June 1986: pa
809 Daily Dispatch (22nd March 1985 a: 1) 
810 Rand Daily Mail (22nd March 1985 b: 2
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whites or 
papers. 814 
 the violence appear victimless. If victims were mentioned 
h as ‘were shot’ or ‘were murdered’ (see for example “Biko died after hunger 
strike 
           
Accordingly, if the reports talked of people having been murdered, it was safe to assume that 
the perpetrators had been opponents of the government and the victims were either 
blacks who had collaborated with the state. Black civilians and members of the liberation 
movements on the other hand were killed or, at worst, shot. For example, when Don Mattera, 
a journalist for The Star, wrote in the caption for the photograph of Hector Petersen that a 
child had been “murdered”, he was reprimanded by his superiors. “They insisted that I write, 
“killed”.” 811 On the other hand, when Melville Edelstein, a white official for the West Rand 
Administration board, was beaten to death by black children on the same day, no one at The 
Star questioned Peter Bunkell’s tribute stating that he had been “murdered”. 812  
Similarly, on 14th June 1986 the Bureau for Information stated in one of its daily ‘unrest 
reports’: “Unfortunately seven people were killed. One person was killed when a police patrol 
was attacked. In black-on-black violence, six people were murdered.” 813 This statement 
appeared unchanged in many South African news
The newspapers’ language was not the only thing affected by the general thinking in binary 
oppositions. The impact went further than that. The reliance on group-identities profoundly 
influenced the choice of incidents reported and created a specific schema for viewing 
violence. It was seen as a fight between two forces facing each other on a battlefield, which by 
no means reflected the true situation in the country. Every day, thousands of South Africans 
fell victim to violence that had nothing to do with group affiliations, such as rape, assault, and 
murder. However, such acts did not fit in the conceptual mould of ‘violence’ at the time, and 
therefore received little to no attention in the press. 815 
This pattern of reporting violence had one important consequence: The articles focussed 
largely on the perpetrators, making
at all, they were generally whites who had been injured or killed by opponents of apartheid, or 
white victims of crime. Blacks who had died at the hands of the police or the government’s 
black surrogates were generally not quoted or shown in pictures, and were largely absent from 
the texts. Journalists preferred formulations that did not imply victimisation such as ‘died’ to 
alternatives suc
– Kruger” 816 or “10 die in Eastern Cape weekend unrest” 817), and picture editors 
                                      
d in Hopkins & Grange (2001: 100) 
ns & Grange (2001: 1
d in The Guardia
811 Quote
812 Hopki 00) 
813 Quote n (14th June 1986: 1) and Martin (1997: 65) 
814 This choice of words was not unique to press reports. Official literature made use of the same terminology. Du Preez for 
example describes the Defiance Campaign as follows: “The campaign started on 26 June 1952, and serious rioting started in 
 Whites were murdered and nine Blacks killed. In Johannesburg the police shot and killed three 
ks killed.” (du Preez (1982: 211-212)) 
tember 1977 a: 1) 
Port Elizabeth where four
Blacks and wounded four. In Kimberly, (…) thirteen blacks were killed and seventy-eight injured. In East London two 
Whites were murdered and eight Blac
815 Manganyi & du Toit (1990: 6) 
816 Cape Times (14th Sep
817 Rand Daily Mail (25th March 1985: 1) 
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and depended on the skin colour of the people 
s heavy-handed reaction. In these cases, following the 
ping centres, brings the war to the 
Northern Suburbs. It also brings home to the people in our upper echelons the      
                                                
generally chose photographs of the perpetrators (in the case of crowds for example) or of the 
scene of the violence after the fact (in the case of burning buildings or vehicles). 818  
The reasons for doing so were diverse 
involved. If the victims were black their identity was generally of no importance to white 
readers, so they were omitted to make room for real news. Moreover, during the state of 
emergency, victims of state violence could not be named by law as the government wanted to 
take away the sympathy the English speaking population felt for them as underdogs in the 
political conflict. Also, there are indications that pro-government media tried to rob the black 
population of their right to see themselves as victims. 819 The reasons for not showing white 
victims were quite different. Apartheid had frequently been portrayed as the only defence 
against chaos and mayhem and showing white victims of violence too often would have 
undermined this image. As a result, readers might have got the impression that the NP was 
losing control or was not able to protect whites.  
There was, however, one exception to this rule. If the violence had been perpetrated by 
members of the liberation movement, or could otherwise be blamed on ‘terrorists’, showing 
their victims helped reinforce the old stereotypes of a ruthlessly violent out-group while at the 
same time eliciting support for the state’
same rationale that prompted the state to allow detailed reports about ghastly acts of township 
violence despite the emergency regulations, the victims of supposed ‘terrorist’ attacks or, to a 
lesser extent, ‘black-on black violence’, were not only given ample attention, but were 
frequently put at the centre of the reports. As Herman & Chomsky put it, it was “as if a 
commissar had instructed the media: “Concentrate on the victims of enemy powers and forget 
about the victims of friends.”” 820  
Besides discrediting the liberation movements and giving the in-group a feeling of cohesion, 
this also served to fuel the white population’s siege mentality, which was supposed to aid the 
NP’s consolidation of power. 821 As The Star commented on 14th August 1988, at the height 
of the state of emergency, about a bomb blast at Hyde Park Corner, a rich Johannesburg 
shopping area: 
“This blast, in one of the country’s richest shop
reality of South Africa, and makes us conscious that we live in a society which is 
terrorised.” 822 
 
818 Simpson (1996: 2-3)  
819 Dennis Pather (11th April 2002) and Babs Abba Omar (5th June 2002) in interviews with the author, ANC (1997 b: 13) and 
2) 
gust 1988) quoted in Cock (1990: 45) 
TRC Report, Vol 4, Chap 6, Para 50 
820 Herman & Chomsky (1988: 3
821 Haysom (1990: 75) 
822 The Star (14th Au
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ing them a feeling of having been there and experiencing the reported event. 
lity. They recognise the 
uth Africa, this meant that the newspapers maintained their old 
nature of story-telling in South Africa” , but it certainly introduced a few new concepts to 
This short quote leaves no doubt about the perceived divisions in South African society. “We” 
are under attack, “we” are “terrorised”, and the terror is not coming from within our own 
ranks. It is brought to us from the outside. 
During the apartheid years, another group stood out through its absence: The observers, that 
is, the newspapers themselves. The readers were meant to take the place of the real-world 
spectators giv
Besides making the reporting more interesting, and thereby increasing sales, this has the effect 
of rendering the newspapers’ involvement in shaping the symbolic acts invisible. By using the 
terminology of the official discourse, quoting in-group sources and describing the events with 
the help of commonly recognised themes, the reporter steps into the background and takes 
with him the report’s ideological slant. The readers are given the impression to not be looking 
at an expression of a certain worldview, but at a mirror image of rea
categories used in the reports and, because they were formed from within the same culture, 
their experiences in every-day life confirm their existence. Thus the things represented obtain 
independence from the media representing them and enter the realm of common sense. This 
helps naturalise the status quo, and propaganda is more readily accepted by its recipients 
because it is not recognised as such. 823 
The legal situation changed a lot at the end of the state of emergency and with it the range of 
things that could be published. However, this did not set in motion the kind of ideological 
revolution that the opponents of apartheid had hoped for. Many whites did not change their 
worldview even in the face of massive proof that it was inadequate to deal with everyday life 
in their country. This influenced the newspapers’ editorial choices. Naturally, the press 
publish those stories that promise high sales, a category that more often than not is made-up 
of what Galtung & Ruge have called “olds” 824, namely relatively predictable, easily 
understandable items. In So
descriptive patterns for years after the end of apartheid, thus extending the old ideas’ lifespan 
into the new era. Only slowly did any new ideas on violence emerge, and those that have, still 
draw heavily on the old imagery. 825  
b) The TRC and After: The Time of the Individual  
The change in the newspapers’ approach to violence was really set in motion by the TRC. I 
would not go as far as Commissioner Hugh Lewin and say that the TRC has “changed the 
826
                                                 
823 Lynch (1999: 9), Lewis (1994: 24), Kress (1985: 72-73), Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 193) and Fairclough (1992 a: 87) 
824 Galtung & Ruge (1965: 67) 
825 Ferreira da Rosa Ribeiro (1995: Summary, p. 2) and Tomaselli et al. (1987: 24) 
826 Lewin (1998: 1) 
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s a voice and the 
now finally portrayed as 
re are three possible reasons for this. One option is that it 
                                                
public discourse. For example, as John van Zyl, former editor of SABC TV news rightly 
pointed out, the term ‘gross violation of human rights’ did not exist in the media before the 
TRC took up its work. 827 Also, in their reporting of the TRC, the newspapers were more 
prepared than at any other time to abandon their drive to be totally objective, to be an invisible 
messenger so to speak. They were, as Garman put it, “saying “I” more freely and without 
censure” 828.  
Moreover, the specific aim of the commission was to give the victim
newspapers went along with this approach in their reports. 829 Thus, for the first time, they 
were given a platform to publicly express their feelings, thoughts and worries. During the 
TRC’s sessions, they could face their tormentors on neutral ground, meet them as equals, and 
try to understand, to forgive or to condemn. Their dignity, which was taken away by the 
anonymity of their suffering, could now be restored by the media. 830 
This led to an apparent change in editorial policy towards all people involved in violence. No 
longer were they hidden behind group identities, but were now generally portrayed as 
individuals committing acts of violence against other individuals (see chapter 4.6.4 a for more 
details). This seemingly positive development should not be viewed without suspicion, 
though. While it is commendable that the victims were finally brought out of the obscurity of 
apartheid-style reporting, and while it is true that blacks were 
individuals in the white press, neither step should be seen purely as a victory for humane 
journalism, but also as a continuation of courting the old prejudices among the old target 
readership. Behind the individual cases with their individual faces, the old binary opposition 
of identity and alterity remained intact. And while the two groups were no longer blacks and 
whites facing each other on the political battlefield, but rather the forces of good against evil, 
the groups themselves had not changed. They were merely re-labelled to fit the new language 
of political correctness. 831  
This can be proven by looking at the choice of incidents reported. During the transition period 
the newspapers focussed mainly on violence among blacks. Whites were rarely shown to be 
target of violent attacks. The
reflected the situation in the real world. While this is certainly true, I do not believe this to be 
the cause for the new approach to the reporting, as nothing had changed compared to the years 
before. Blacks had been victimised disproportionately for decades and the newspapers had 
never paid any attention to the fact. The second possibility is that it was a way of reaching out 
 
827 TRC (15th September 1997: John van Zyl, 7) and Chubb & van Dijk (1999: 49-50) 
828 Garman (1998: 2) 
: 2), Tutu (1999: 33), Lewin (1998: 2) and Simpson & van Zyl (1995: 7) 
829 Lewin (1998: 2) 
830 Hugon (Unknown
831 Rauch (1993: 2) 
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nships, which in turn boosted the 
ine of thought, namely: ‘You are not among 
he period before the elections, the out-group were not, as they 
e evil out-group. They, 
however, were still only portrayed as deviants, as strays from the in-group who, with the right 
 
oung black males. 834 
to the previously ignored section of the population. I find this scenario a little more likely, for 
more black faces in a newspaper meant more sales in the tow
newspapers’ circulation figures. However, even this factor should not be overestimated. 
Blacks were still economically weak and thus of no real interest to advertisers. To risk losing 
white readers for gaining black ones was not a good business strategy even in the years after 
the end of apartheid. This only became a factor after 1994 when the newspaper houses 
realised that it would be important for them to adjust to the new order. 832 
In my opinion the stories were chosen as part of an attempt to maintain white hegemony in 
South Africa. They gave the suffering a human face that readers could, at least remotely, 
relate to without actually making them feel threatened. It was like saying ‘there are many 
people who fall prey to violence in our country, but don’t worry too much, you are not among 
them’. This, however, already included the next l
them yet. Vote for the party you have successfully entrusted your security with for the past 
decades and you will be fine. However, if you switch to the other side, you will give power to 
the perpetrators of violence and god only knows what will happen then.’ And surely enough, 
after the image of the new in-group of good sufferers besieged by the forces of violent evil 
was solidly established in the white readers’ mind, more and more articles described black 
violence against whites, thus symbolising the advancing threat. 833  
Another clear indication for a continuation of the old stereotypes is the evil out-group, that of 
the perpetrators of violence. While no longer at the centre of attention, they are still very 
much talked about. During t
should have been in a completely free and fair press, the politicians who had erected the 
violent structure of apartheid, the soldiers and policemen who continued their futile fight 
against ordinary people in the townships well into the 1990s, the homeland leaders, the 
community councils or the vigilantes and street gangs who, under protection from Pretoria, 
had built-up powerful fiefdoms where violence was the norm and they alone were the law. 
These groups seemed to be absolved from any responsibility by the newspapers’ continued 
silence about their misdeeds.  
Only the white right wing whose attempt to stop the election wreaked havoc on South Africa 
seemed to have fallen from grace and was now demonised as part of th
response from the authorities, could be brought back into the mainstream. They were not the
was reserved for ynorm among violent criminals. This stereotype 
                                                 
832 Daily Mail & Guardian (2nd December 1998: 3) 
833 Shaw (2002: 51) 
834 ANC (1996 b: 25), Retief (2002: 198), Posel (1989: 272) and Segal (1991: 20) 
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lacks in general and young black men in particular continued to be seen as intrinsically 
violent and violence was portrayed as a mainly black phenomenon. 835  
The newspapers’ attitude towards violence only really began to change in the new 
millennium. However, the transformation was moving slowly. In order to get a better idea of 
the situation, I counted the number of reports about violence in a randomly chosen cross-
section of newspapers from 2002 836 and coded them according to the skin colour of the 
perpetrator(s) and victim(s) 837. Of a total of 44 articles on violence, 17 gave no indication of 
the skin colour of either the perpetrator or the victim. The remaining 27 were weighed heavily 
towards blacks. 16 had black perpetrators (b-b: 5; b-w: 4; b-?: 7) and 11 had black victims (b-
b: 5; w-b: 2; ?-b: 4). Whites by comparison were the perpetrators in only six cases (w-w: 4; w-
b: 2; w-?: 0) but the victims in nine (b-w: 4; w-w: 4; ?-w: 1), that is, 20.5% of the total and 
40.1% of the cases where skin colour is known.  
A few things should be said to explain these results. Firstly, the Cape Times did not carry a 
single story about violence on the day I picked, which partly reflects their editorial policy, but 
is also a factor that reduced the total number of reports. Secondly, whites are shown to be the 
perpetrators of violence in 13.6% of all reported cases (27.3 of those where skin colour is 
known), but only made-up around 10% of the population. This should not be interpreted as 
anti-white bias in the press, though. On the contrary. In my opinion it has more to do with 
ion. The Citizen for 
example did not carry a single report about violence that involved blacks, neither as 
perpetrators nor as victims.  
Of the two cases where whites had committed violence against blacks one was a short article 
in the Cape Argus about the search for the suspects of the right-wing bombings in Soweto in 
November 2002 838, which did not actually mention the identities of the victims. Only one, an 
article in the Daily Dispatch about a group of white rugby players who had been found guilty 
of beating to death a black teenager 839, actually showed white violence against blacks (see 
fig. 18). Moreover, the impact of the two articles was reduced by their size and location. Both 
were relatively small, tucked away relatively far inside the paper and had no images to 
accompany them. 840 This stood in stark contrast to, for example, The Sowetan’s coverage of 
the rugby players’ trial and sentencing (see fig. 19). 
                                                
B
their continuing focus on all matters pertaining to the white populat
 
835 Tomaselli & Louw (1991: 161), Frederikse (1987: 220-221), Segal (1991: 20), and Rauch (1993: 4) 
836 The Star of 23rd April and 21st May, the Cape Argus of 24th June and 12th November, The Citizen of 11th April, the Natal 
Witness of 12th April, the Daily Dispatch of 18th April and the Cape Times of 11th November 
837 B = black (in the non-apartheid sense), w = white, ? = unknown 
838 Cape Argus (12th November 2002: 6) 
839 Daily Dispatch (18th April 2002: 5) 
840 three in The 
rents and a lot 
more attentive to the victim and his family’s reaction to the verdict as well as to the reaction of the South African public in 
general. (The Herald (20th April 2002: 3)) 
 I should, however, point out that a fairly large story about the men’s sentencing was published on page 
Herald on 20th April 2002. It was illustrated with images of the victim’s and the one of the perpetrator’s pa
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Figure 18: Racist violence in white… (Source: Daily Dispatch (18  April 2002: 5)) th
 
Figure 19: …and black – not quite the same thing! (Source: Sowetan (19th April 2002: 1)) 
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mber of reports go, column 
ost 
them” . Thus, frames should be understood as ways of talking, and therefore thinking, of 
y 
                 
Of the articles that made the front page, three had black perpetrators (b-b: 1; b-w: 1; b-?: 1), 
one had a white perpetrator (w-w), and in two cases the perpetrator was unknown (?-?: 1; ?-b: 
1). I think it is therefore still safe to say that as far as the total nu
inches and overall attention (expressed for example through images, the time-span an event is 
covered and the position of a report within the paper or on a page) dedicated to the subject, 
violence against whites is overplayed while violence perpetrated by whites, especially against 
blacks, remains severely underreported. 841 
Furthermore, there is a clear difference in the reporting on different individuals, which can be 
traced back to the groups they belong to. With the exception of reports about the TRC, the 
articles generally do not allow the perpetrators of violence to speak for themselves. They are 
denied the power to define themselves, and are instead constructed by the outside force of the 
writer or so-called ‘expert’ sources, such as the police, government officials and academics. 
This reduced the complexity of the acts and made it easy to push them into the easily 
understandable one-size-fits-all mould of the crime story. However, it tends to rob them of 
their context and therefore their meaning, and clearly signals a lack of interest in the causes 
and possible ways of tackling violence other than the formulaic mantra of more police and 
tougher sentences. 842  
4.5 A Few Words About Framing 
Now that we know exactly what the newspapers defined as violence at any given time in 
South African history and we are also familiar with all those involved in the violence, it is 
time to move on to the actual discourse analysis of the newspaper reports. However, before 
we can find the code used to report violence, we need to answer a slightly broader question: In 
terms of what concepts was violence lexicalised? Let me explain. 
People do not simply perceive the world as it is. This would be physically impossible for they 
would be overwhelmed by a multitude of incomprehensible impressions devoid of meaning. 
In order to make any sense of our experience, we have to lend structure to it. This is m
easily achieved through the use of what has variously been called ‘frames’ or ‘narratives’. In 
his influential work Frame Analysis, Erving Goffman defined frames as “principles of 
organization which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in 
843
certain subjects. Frames are extremely important for any form of news reporting because the
                                
ount of articles in the City Press of 7th April, the Daily Sun of 16th July and the Sowetan of 5th 
ing ratio: b-b: 1; b-w: 0; b-?: 1; w-w: 0; w-b: 1; w-?: 1; ?-w: 0; ?-b: 3; ?-?: 5; total: 12. Thus, as 
es each make-up 16.7% of the total and 57.1% of those whose skin colour is known. 
d while blacks make-up 41.7% of the total and 100% of those 
841 By comparison, the same c
November revealed the follow
far as the perpetrators go, blacks and whit
When it comes to victims, though, whites are not mentione
cases where the skin colour is known. 
842 Frederikse (1987: 223) 
843 Goffman (1974: 10-11) 
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ral “schemata” 846, and van 
ll media output, they are particularly important in news 
attention before and presenting them in 
d to organise the world into stereotypical categories, which can be 
easily recognised by the audience and readily drawn on by writers of future stories. This is not 
lay down the parameters for writing about a particular event. In doing so they remove most of 
the contradictions, mismatches and discontinuities that exist in all complex accounts of 
reality. An unknown enemy thus becomes a known challenge. 844 
The way these challenges are lexicalised in terms of a broader discourse is an important 
indicator of the culture that produced them, for those frames are not randomly chosen 
semantic fields. Each is meant to activate in the mind of the reader certain scripts (Graber 
called them “schemas” 845, Rumelhart uses the more common plu
Dijk has termed them “mental models” 847), defined by Fairclough as “stereotypical scenarios 
and sequences of events associated with them, which are part of the deeply embedded 
common sense of a culture” 848. The scripts provide the background information about the 
world stored in people’s memories and the frames used by the press serve as signals telling 
the audience which set of information is needed in a given situation. The ideological function 
of frames and scripts thus lies in their structuring reality. They aid in the formation of what 
van Dijk calls “situational models” 849, that is, mental representations of the type of situation 
described. For example, let us suppose that every one has certain mental scripts about the 
pattern and possible course of a demonstration. By choosing to describe one specific 
demonstration as a ‘riot’ as opposed to a ‘peaceful march’ the newspapers activate the 
corresponding script in their readers’ minds, which helps them to better understand that one 
specific event described. 850  
While frames are present in a
reporting. The way the news is produced leads journalists to resort to the use of known 
formulae, choosing stories that have drawn public 
known ways. The media ten
only true for the definitions of a topic – that is, the question of what is covered by, for 
example, the term ‘violence’ – but also for the views and evaluations – that is, the question of 
how, for example, the term ‘violence’ is to be understood – of a topic. 851 
Both the definitions of a topic and its frames of reference are therefore very likely to be 
applied consistently through time. This has the effect that these categories eventually become 
naturalised, accepted as real by those who encounter them; and once they have entered the 
                                                 
844 Kress (1985: 70-71), Altheide (1997: 651), Goffman (1974: 10-12), Fairclough (1992 a: 197), van Dijk (1988 b: 13 and 
21), Snyder (1981: 183) and Trew (1979 a: 97) 
845 Graber (1984: 22-25) 
846 Rumelhart (1980: 33-40) 
847 van Dijk (1998 b: 26-27) 
47) and van Dijk (1988 b: 22) 
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848 Fairclough (1992 a: 196-197) 
849 van Dijk (1988 a: 146-1
850 Gumpertz (1982: 21-22), Pan & Kosicki (1993: 60), Rummelhart (1980: 37), Früh (1983: 330), Kress (1983: 120), 
Harman & Husband (1974: 61) and van Dijk (1989 a: 104-105
851 Murdock (1973: 168) and Hall et al. (1978: 58-59) 
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eliefs make the 
irst 
sage largely remained the same. True, the end of 
me of the old concepts managed 
 of changing, this stereotype has actually been strengthened 
 
e in 
their comfortable lifestyle. This is not to say that the English press actively conspired with the 
                     
realm of common sense, it seems that the subjects described cannot be seen any other way. 
All else becomes quite literally unthinkable. 852 And as we give little conscious thought to our 
beliefs in everyday life, we will generally act according to these linguistically built systems in 
most situations, which frequently leads people around us reacting in such a way as to confirm 
and validate our stereotypes. Thus, via the use of language, values and b
transition into the realm of the real, without the language users’ conscious attempt at creating 
reality, and from there in turn influence future representations. 853 
Applied to my subject, this theory should mean that a number of key themes can be found in 
all South African press reports on violence. At first it seemed that no such universals existed. 
The reporting during the apartheid years appeared strikingly different from that after the f
democratic elections in 1994. A thorough analysis, however, revealed a few items that were 
used across the board. These concepts were changing as far as their outward appearance was 
concerned, but their character and their mes
apartheid slightly ruptured this continuity. Such drastic changes of the political situation could 
not take place without being noticed in the media. And yet, so
to slip into the new era. For example people’s idea of what constitutes chaos and order has 
remained relatively unchanged. Also, as early as the 1970s, violence was presented as a 
largely black phenomenon. Instead
by the recent reporting and has since become an important aspect of white South Africans’ 
fears of the black population. 854 
But I am getting ahead of myself. Let me instead now turn my attention to the frames used in 
the reporting of violence in the South African press. 
4.5.1 Racial Difference 
The concept of racial difference was, not surprisingly, of central importance for the news 
reporting before 1994. The whole ideological structure of apartheid was built on the premise 
that the deep-seated differences between people of different racial origins make a multi-racial 
society impossible to sustain. Peace among people, so the architects of apartheid claimed, 
could only be achieved through a strict separation of the races. However, besides reflecting
this general worldview and supporting its rationale, the use of the ‘racial differences’ fram
the reporting of violence served a more specific and less lofty purpose. It was meant to keep 
the white population in power and the rest of South Africa available as cheap labour to sustain 
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used to
how to pers (even the 
.” 856  
anager of the Argus Group 
rticles, blacks stayed anonymous. For example on 
                                                
government to maintain apartheid. What I mean is that they were trapped in the official 
discourse of the day and did not notice the negative connotations of their reporting. So, 
despite their repeated claims to oppose the division of everyday life along racial lines, through 
their reporting on violence the press actually naturalised the view that humanity was divided 
into distinct racial groups that were intrinsically different from each oth
 the most obvious indicators of this frame was the racial designations that newspapers 
 describe people. They served as a quick indicator of how to categorise people and thus 
 interpret the situation described. Numerous examples from all newspa
most progressive ones used racial designations in their reports) and all time periods (they were 
in use until 1990) can be found. I will give just a few examples to make my point:  
- “A White man was dragged from a West Rand Board vehicle, beaten with stones, 
clubbed with sticks and left dead. (…) The students ordered the Black drivers out of 
the vans without injuring them
- “A White man was seriously injured when his car ploughed into a telephone pole after 
being stoned by a mob in a township near Parys.” 857  
- “A young Black woman who tried to smuggle an arms cache into South Africa from 
Swaziland at the weekend was arrested by the South African Police at the Golela 
border post in Natal.” 858  
- “Five commuters died instantly when two Black men opened fire on a crowd at Jeppe 
railway station. Fourteen were injured, eight critically.” 859  
A number of things should be said about racial designations. For one, note that the words 
‘Black’ and ‘White’ are capitalised. This was not uncommon during apartheid and should be 
viewed as more than just a matter of style. Capitalisation is rare in the English language and is 
generally reserved for proper names. Thus for a writer to capitalise the adjectives black and 
white must have a reason. In my opinion it was done to express the absoluteness of these 
properties. I find myself vindicated by a statement of a former m
made to emphasise his papers’ neutrality and objectivity: “We used nationality – Afrikaner, 
English, black and so on – rather than terms such as ‘terrorist’ or ‘freedom fighter’, we gave 
no social information that might have polarised the readers.” 860 Clearly, to him these so-
called “nationalities” were absolute and as such free from ideological connotations. 
However, there was more to it. Racial designations were not applied equally across the board. 
While whites were generally named in the a
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16th Ju
rioting 
policem ople were taken to hospitals.” 861 Then the article briefly sketches 
the eve
profession and age. The injured on the other hand are listed by name:  
g; Mrs J Thompson (concussion); Mrs P Kemp (fractured hand); Mrs S 
But wh
“When r accident 
g, burning, looting, pillaging, rape, and many more. As 
es a huge semantic field 
compar  
throwing and shootin  is described in non violent terms, such as 
ifference 
betwee
One would expect the ‘racial differences’ frame to be slowly phased out of use during the 
early 1
contrar ly 1990s racial difference received a boost in the shape of a concept 
’. Consider for example the 
followi
in the C
                                                
ne 1976 The Star informed readers that “The death toll in today’s bloody Soweto 
had risen to at least six this afternoon, including two Black pupils and two White 
en. Another 40 pe
nts and elaborates on the victims. The dead are not identified beyond their skin colour, 
“Mr P J Smart, a township manager, who suffered multiple injuries in the stone-
throwin
Carruthers (minor abrasions); and Mrs J Beatlie (minor abrasions).” 862  
at about the remaining 35?  Something Johann de Villiers said to me might explain: 
 I started here we would say: “Mr. and Mrs. Joe Bloggs were killed in a moto
and ten other people.” And the ten other people happened to be black, because you didn’t 
bother to…”” 863 And he would be right in this case, too. The other wounded happened to be 
black so The Star just didn’t bother.  
This brings me to my second point. Race was not only a matter of difference, but was 
frequently associated with value judgements as well. In connection with violence this meant 
that, in general, whites were shown as being attacked, being protected by the police, being 
ready for dialogue (for example in the case of the PFP), or wanting peace. What stood in their 
way was the political conflict between the government, who from the point of view of the 
English language press occupied a strange position almost outside the in-group but not really 
inside the out-group, and the representatives of the out-group. That out-group was associated 
with such acts as rioting, unrest, stonin
we can see, the violence perpetrated by the out-group occupi
ed to that of the in-group, which basically consists of the odd sjambokking, teargas
g, most other violent action
‘crowd control’ or ‘dispersing a gathering’. This again serves to emphasise the d
n the violent out-group and the largely peaceful in-group. 
990s and to disappear completely after 1994. This, however, did not happen. On the 
y, during the ear
that had been created during the late 1980s: that of ‘tribalism
ng article that appeared under the headline “‘The fighting makes us feel like men’” 864 
ape Times on 13th September 1990: 
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t and 
ged seer Joseph Dhladhla scoops his fingers through 
980s and 1990s that portrayed the conflict 
or comrades were 
                                                
“The eight middle-aged Zulu hostel-dwellers share one pot of steamed corn for dinner. 
Afterwards they plan to get drunk in a beer hall. And perhaps later they’ll go ou
kill a few Xhosas. 
Dormitory senior and acknowled
the stiff, bland porridge. 
“It used to be that we would just eat here and then drink in the hall. But now our blood 
is up.” 
Dhladhla, 58, did not come to his hostel in Soweto to fight. Neither did an estimated 
150 000 other residents of the migrant-worker hostels dotting Johannesburg’s 
townships, which have become the centres of savage factional violence.” 865 
This is just one in a series of reports during the 1
between hostel dwellers and township residents as basically one between different ethnic 
groups, mainly between Zulus and Xhosas.  
One important instrument in this pseudo-anthropological drive was the term ‘faction fighting’. 
Somehow, the expression must have struck a cord with white South Africans – journalists and 
readers alike – because after its emergence in the early 1980s, it was increasingly used to 
describe any kind of tension among the black population, regardless of the individual context. 
Soon such diverse phenomena as political tensions among the black population, the violence 
perpetrated by government-sponsored vigilantes, and the taxi wars that emerged as part of the 
‘third force’ became labelled as ‘faction fighting’. If we consider, for example, the following 
passages from four different articles:  
- The Star’s headline of an article on violence in rural Natal: 
“THOUSANDS OF ZULUS AND PONDOS CLASH IN CHRISTMAS OF BLOOD 
53 die in faction fight” 866 
- The Cape Times on the government’s reaction to the slaughter in Crossroads: 
“Mr Le Grange said the police would act strongly whether witdoeke 
involved. 
He said he was not prepared to allow one faction to think it could take the law into its 
own hands.” 867 
- The Sunday Times on the murder of two people in Natal: 
“Two people were killed and a number of others wounded in various incidents of 
unrest throughout the country this week. 
 
865 Cape Times (13th September 1990 a: 5) 
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 taxi drivers on the Cape Flats: 
he land they had previously inhabited, because it was 
cept the information as complete. 
conceal their involvement in the violence from the white population. And despite what they 
may say about fairness and non-racialism, unlike the alternative press, the mainstream papers 
Mr Vivian Mamba of KwaMashu near Durban was killed by a group of Black youths 
on Monday. On Thursday Mr S Dube was killed in Claremont, also near Durban. 
The deaths were believed to be related to the ongoing violence between political 
factions in Natal townships.” 868 
- The Cape Times on a shootout among
“Gun battles between feuding taxi factions erupted at the Nyanga bus terminus 
yesterday for the second time in 48 hours.” 869 
When considered independently, none of these cases is particularly remarkable. In fact, the 
use of the term ‘faction’ seems to make sense. In each case we have two factions of some 
larger group – Africans, inhabitants of Crossroads, Natal township dwellers and taxi drivers – 
involved in a violent fight over land or resources.  
This, however, does not tell the whole story. If we look at all four together, and take into 
account the historical context and the context of their production (the first three were written 
during the state of emergency), an entirely different picture emerges. First of all, all four 
incidents described were politically motivated. The “clash” in the first article was motivated 
by the apartheid government’s drawing of homeland boundaries which entailed the expulsion 
of a large number of people from t
assigned to the other group. The attack on Crossroads was motivated by the witdoeke’s aim of 
helping the police rid the area of anti-apartheid fighters. The third incident is an example of 
deaths resulting from Inkatha’s government-sponsored onslaught against supporters of the 
ANC and finally, the fourth is an example of ‘third force’ violence. However, the way the 
incidents are described makes them seem virtually non-political. I say ‘virtually’, because one 
is described as violence between “political factions”. Still, the term ‘faction’ places each of 
them firmly into the realm of Volkekunde’s culture-nature-complex in an attempt to explain 
the fighting. It is as if to say where there are factions, they will necessarily fight. No further 
explanation is required for the reader to ac
This leads me to my next point. This de-politisation of the incidents was not done by accident 
or out of a lack of interest for black politics. What we have here is not even a case of black 
politics. With the exception of the first item, we are in fact looking at perfect examples of the 
apartheid state’s campaign of terror against the black population. The witdoeke, Inkatha, and a 
number of taxi companies received financial support and weapons from the Pretoria regime to 
fight their dirty war for them. The NP used these surrogate forces precisely with the aim to 
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the oppressed into one among the oppressed. 
Violen
wanted
insinua
was an integral part of their black compatriots’ identity, just as 
ter fall of political apartheid they could not simply 
shed th ought that 
verything they had accepted as real was suddenly considered an illusion, an errant belief, a 
wrong 
withou took some time before the new 
situatio
This pr
racial d article about 
the mu rial of five (white) rugby players who had murdered a (black) teenager (see 
chapter
outside
case w udge would be important 
inform e other hand, a truly colour-blind country should 
have e
express
Similarly, when an unnamed woman was robbed in Knysna 11th April 2002, the regional 
Knysna-Plett Herald of 18th April told readers: “Two black men, who were later identified on 
the ban
her.” 87 in colour of the robbers be of any interest to the readers? It is not 
becaus
fact tha the two thieves were arrested in Plettenberg 
                                                
colluded with the government in hiding the truth. By using the term ‘faction fight’, they 
turned a conflict between the oppressor and 
ce was thus made into a black phenomenon, which played into the hands of those who 
 to maintain the status quo in the face of a changing world. ‘Keep whites in power,’ it 
ted, ‘lest they come for you next’. 870 
None of what I have just said explains the continued use of the term after 1990 though. Why 
would the media continue to work within the apartheid discourse? I think that it was partly 
because it served the interest of their target audience, but the main factor was surely their 
belief in the existence of such things as tribes and races in extra-linguistic reality. The media 
consumers and producers who had been socialised into the world of apartheid South Africa 
believed that ethnicity 
whiteness was an integral part of theirs. Af
eir point of view from one day to the next. They had to get used to the th
e
interpretation, and that they had been so easily fooled by the creators of this mirage 
t harbouring even the slightest suspicion. It therefore 
n was accepted as reality. 871  
ocess is still not complete today. I must admit that I was shocked and amazed to find 
esignations in some newspaper articles as late as 2002. For example in an 
rder t
 4.4.3 b for more details), The Herald wrote: “The large, peaceful crowd that gathered 
 the court mostly welcomed the black judge’s decision.” 872 One could argue that in a 
here racism was the subject of the trial, the skin colour of the j
ation for assessing his decision. On th
nough trust in its judiciary to see judges as colour-less and their decisions as 
ions of the law, not of their race.  
k’s security surveillance cameras, followed her from the bank and then approached 
3 Why would the sk
e the police are seeking the suspects. “Thanks to superb police follow-up work and the 
t their registration number was known, 
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Bay at
aparthe
 highly relevant to the story,  … in most cases 
Such e
English they continued to 
portray racial differences. Other information, such as the names of the perpetrators (as well as 
 15:00 on the same day.” 874 In my opinion, the reason is the same as during the 
id years. As Tony Heard’s explained:  
“Our guideline about race was if it isn’t
we would just take it out. And it just enraged sort of suburban whites who just wanted 
to know if it was a black guy. Then they could forget about it.” 875 
xtreme examples of racialism in the press are rare these days. Yet, even after the 
 language press by and large abolished the use of racial designations, 
the victims) or the location where the violence had occurred, were a clear indication to the 
skin colour of those involved. 876 Consider for example the following lead article from The 
Star of 17th May 2002:  
 “ ‘You deserve the death sentence’ 
They terrorised the suburbs, now the courts are expected to show no mercy 
 
The day of reckoning has arrived for a pair of serial killers whose murder and robbery 
rampage had people living in terror for nearly a year. 
Sentencing was expected today in the Johannesburg High Court trial of Simon Majola 
and Themba Isaac Nkosi, who were convicted yesterday of 37 crimes between them, 
including the murder of eight people by throwing them into Bruma Lake. 
(…) 
Majola (34), of Mofolo, Soweto, and Nkosi (23), of Vosloorus on the East Rand, were 
found to have robbed people of cash, jewellery and cellphones in Rhodes and 
Bezuidenhout parks and Bruma, all in Eastern Johannesburg. 
(…) 
“Five to six years ago, the state would not have hesitated to ask for the death 
sentence,” said the prosecutor, advocate Herman Broosryk, in argument for 
sentencing. 
(…) 
At the peak of the pair’s activities, the lake was drained after a number of bodies were 
found floating in it. 
The adjacent shopping centre suffered a decline in patronage and talks of closure 
started doing the rounds. 
                                                 
874 Knysna-Plett Herald (18th April 2002: 5) 
875 Interview with the author, 17th May 2002 
e that this is not an accident, but the result of more or less conscious editorial decisions. “The 
erview, 16th July 2002) 
876 Mike Tissong explained to m
violent crime is still associated with blacks,” he told me. (Int
  172
ple should not live in society again. 
brazen attitude of both accused showed complete contempt for the laws of the 
land and they cannot be allowed to roam freely in society,” said Broodryk. 
oving” inhabitants are attacked by outsiders. They are coming 
mbolise 
the in-group. Yet, there are indi
Bruma or visitors to the nearby parks and s
being white, m he out-group by contrast is very clearly defined: Young 
black m
knowing that I was in fact inves he papers are not allowed to 
                                                
“They attacked people in the safety of their cars. They preyed on defenceless people in 
early evenings or late at night. The court has to protect society and ensure that these 
peo
“The 
“Rhodes Park is now inhabited by career criminals. Peace-loving people cannot visit 
the park unless they want to be attacked by the likes of the accused.” 
(…)” 877 
At first sight, this seems like a simple account of a day in court. However, if we scratch the 
surface a little, an image emerges that is dominated by the concept of race and in which value 
judgements are made about the different races. Thus, what we have above is a clear example 
of South Africa’s new kind of subtle racism. So let’s get scratching. 
When looked at critically, the article reveals a binary opposition, which without too much 
digging and interpreting can be described as ‘the suburbs’ versus ‘those who terrorise the 
suburbs’. Let us first have a closer look at the suburbs. The article describes an idyllic 
scenario of parks, lakes, shopping centres and relative wealth (cars, jewellery, cash and 
cellphones). This is the world of the in-group, The Star’s addressees, their home turf, 
everything they know. Now, through the events described in the article, this world is being 
“terrorised” and its “peace-l
from the townships – Soweto and Vosloorus – the world of the out-group, foreign, unknown 
and feared. The victims, who in this article remain unnamed, in my opinion to make it as easy 
as possible for a wide variety of real-life readers to identify with them, are used to sy
cations of who they are. They are residents of the area around 
hopping mall, both factors which point at them 
iddle class people. T
ales from the townships. This point was not lost on the readers, either. One lady (not 
tigating the press) told me: “T
report skin colour anymore so now they report in what area this is all happening.” 878 
Now to the value judgements: The in-group is described in positive terms as “peace-loving”, 
“defenceless” and in need of protection from the courts. The out-group is not even made-up of 
people. There is talk of “the pair” and “serial killers”, but not ‘men’ or ‘people’. They are 
encroaching on the world of the in-group, annihilating its “safety”, threatening “society” as a 
whole. And their actions are described more in terms reserved for wild animals. They were on 
the “rampage”, “attacked” people, “preyed” on them and must not “roam” free. To me the 
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 into politics and the rhetoric of 
estic sphere. While during the 
Soweto Uprisings the dom
was increasing talk of wars, battles, and defence. 
The ‘war’ f
it was used in the reporting on the governm ovements and 
the popular uprising in the township other it surfaced in articles on the violence 
among diffe
‘war’ fram
by the latter was a prereq of the former. If there are no races or factions, 
there can be no war. 
Let us look at a few examples of the ‘war’ fram  in use. On 22  March 1985, the day after the 
shooting in Uitenhage, the front page of the 
page above this m
en – identified by the Commissioner, General Johan 
 
Although the protagonists of the story are th
impression is one of a war going on. There are hand grenades, gun battles, mines and arms 
caches, hardly the stuff of everyday law enforcem
proxim shooting, which three times talks about how police opened fire 
in self defence, again a term
reinforce its m tack by a hostile force (the ANC) which is 
dangerous, heavily arm
Uitenhage the crowd) to help their cause. Howeve
           
message of the whole article is no different than that of any one during the apartheid years. 
The perfect world of white South Africans is under threat of being destroyed by black 
savages.  
4.5.2 War 
P.W. Botha’s ascent to power in 1978 brought the military
‘total onslaught’ into public discourse. The media could not escape the all-encompassing draw 
of the new war frenzy. Soon a new way of speaking and writing about violence emerged that I 
will call the ‘war’ frame. This was applied not only in the reporting on South Africa’s attacks 
against its neighbours, but also slowly took over the dom
inant theme was one of chaos and mayhem, during the 1980s there 
rame was mainly used to describe two entirely different conflicts: On the one hand 
ent’s fight against the liberation m
s, and on the 
rent ‘factions’ –  be they political, ethnic or occupational – in the townships. The 
e was thus intimately linked with the ‘racial differences’ frame: The reality created 
uisite for the existence 
e nd
Daily Dispatch carried a small article on the front 
ain story titled “2 ANC men killed, arms cache found”:  
“Police have shot dead two m
Coetzee, as “trained ANC terrorists” – after hand grenade and gun battles in the 
Eastern Transvaal. 
Five “terrorist collaborators” were also arrested and a cache of hand grenades, limpet 
mines and AKM rifles and ammunition was discovered.” 879
e police rather than the SADF, the overall 
ent. The position of the article in close 
ity to the one about the 
 that is closely related to the ‘war’ frame, serves to further 
essage: South Africa is under at
ed and uses surrogates (terrorist collaborators, or, in the case of 
r, as the article also shows, there is nothing 
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to fear
determ
““terro ct outcome of a ‘total war’. 
When u the 
‘war’ f violent in-group and the violent 
out-gro
The ‘w
among article in the Stop Press Edition on 20th 
June 1986 about the witdoeke’s destruction of Crossroads is a good example of the 
e traffic into the camp and most wore 
e a bizarre addition to the drama. A convoy of about 10 military 
police motorcyclists, sirens wailing, escorted an SADF car carrying several officers 
zone. 
 from this ‘total onslaught’ because the country was protected by a strong and 
ined police force. The “ANC men [were] killed”, the “arms cache [was] found” and the 
rist collaborators” were also arrested” – the perfe
sed in this context, besides giving people a familiar way to conceptualise violence, 
rame helped emphasise the distance between the non-
up that was cast in the role of an external enemy. 
ar’ frame had an entirely different function when it came to describing the violence 
 the black population. The Argus’ front-page 
application of the ‘war’ frame to this scenario:   
“The ominous pall of smoke blotting out the sun stained the sky to the Gordon’s Bay 
coast. 
Flames leapt as new fires broke out in huts deep in the camp. Jets landing at nearby D 
F Malan airport were barely visible through the smoke. 
A war was raging in Crossroads. 
There were all the grim features of a conventional battle zone – teargas, gunfire, 
military and police vehicles, a Red Cross flag and helpless refugees clinging to 
salvaged possessions. 
Entering from one of the entrances off Lansdowne Road, we were beckoned by about 
70 men wielding long sticks and kerries. 
They appeared to be controlling the flow of th
white rags around one arm – the sign of the “witdoeke”, conservative township elders. 
(…) 
Several Casspirs and Buffels about 400 metres away, opposite New Crossroads, made 
occasional forays along the rubble-strewn road. 
A few minutes later about 300 youths wielding sticks burst out of the squatter camp 
into Lansdowne Road. Some were no older than nine or 10. 
They headed towards an advancing group of township elders. We watched the first 
exchanges of volleys of stones. 
Then … terror. From the elders’ ranks several shots were fired and the youths sprinted 
frantically away. 
Screaming women abandoned their possessions. Red Cross staff jumped into their van 
and raced off as the youths hurtled by. 
Amid the chaos cam
through the battle 
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with shotguns jumped 
The us
admits that he/she is describing a war. Battles, gunfire, Casspirs and Buffels, among other 
things, different than in the articles above. We 
e day they blotted out the sun”), 
only ve
fighting
closer l ts. We have four clearly 
identifiable parties: The security forces and the Red Cross who are portrayed as outside 
”, “chaos”).  
nt because the answers have become clear within the presented logic. 
Blacks are fighting, because it is in their nature and no one will win for an end to the fighting 
ress avoided saying that the apartheid regime’s black lackeys 
is active in the struggle against apartheid because success 
 at the moment, the state may be winning individual battles, 
Meanwhile several youths had stopped their retreat and stood their ground, ducking 
and weaving as half-bricks whizzed about their heads from both sides – some thrown 
by elders at a range of no more than 20 metres. 
In a series of brief, vicious Kerrie confrontations the “witdoeke” were forced back. 
As they retreated Casspirs and police vans moved up. 
A yellow van stopped near the hastily regrouping youths and a senior officer ran 
towards us. Youths started throwing rocks at the van. Policemen 
out and the youths fled into the shantytown.” 
(…)” 880 
e of the ‘war’ frame in this article is, I think, undisputable. Even the author him/herself 
leave no doubt about that. Still, something is 
will find no in-group for the reader to identify with other than the “we” of the author 
(although the out-group is quite visible in the headline “Th
ry little information who is fighting whom, and no clear explanation why they are 
 or who is winning. There is a distinct impression of chaos. On the other hand, after a 
ook, a sort of order emerges among those involved in the even
forces, neutral in the war and with a mandate to aid and protect. The two warring groups are 
described as “township elders” and “youths”, both of whom are associated with more or less 
negative terms (“wielding sticks”, “terror
Moreover, the article combines the ‘war’ frame with that of ‘racial differences’. There is, for 
example the pseudo-anthropological term “township elders”, an attempt to link the township 
population with some imagined African tradition, for no one speaks of ‘suburb elders’. We 
also once again find that whites are shown to be the bringers of peace to a world wrecked by 
the primitive blacks’ natural tendency to fight. So, together these two frames once again serve 
to obscure the political dimension of the fight as well as the government’s direct involvement 
in it. The questions I asked above – who is fighting, why are they fighting and who is winning 
– become unimporta
is against their nature. Thus the p
are fighting a community that 
would mean power to them. And
but they are losing the war. 
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The ma
which a
ame page titled “Speaking Zulu cost man’s 
life”. The next day, the paper carried an article on taxi violence on page two which donned the 
           
The war-frame continued to be used frequently during the period of transition, mainly in the 
descriptions of violence among the black population. For example the violence between hostel 
dwellers and township residents became increasingly lethal during the early 1990s, the 
newspapers frequently portrayed the events as a war between Zulus and Xhosas. The Cape 
Times of 13th September 1990 is a good case in point. The first edition carried an article titled 
“‘The fighting makes us feel like men’” 881, in which eight hostel residents in Soweto 
explained why or how they got involved in violence. One passage read: 
“So when for reasons still unclear the vicious battles flared up on August 13 between 
the migrant Zulus and Soweto’s predominantly Xhosa residents, Dhladhla explains: 
“We decided to fight like men because the fighting makes us feel like men … if we 
want to fight again later, we will. 
The violence has killed some 600 people.” 882 
in story in the second edition was an article titled “Horrific attacks erupt on Reef” 883 
gain deals with the subject of inter-ethnic violence. 
“In one of the most horrific attacks since the upsurge of violence on the reef this year, 
25 Zulu migrant workers were reportedly hacked to death at the Vusumuzi hostel in 
Tembisa yesterday by a group of men believed to be Xhosas. 
One man was decapitated.” 884 
This is supplemented with a smaller article on the s
sub-header “Factions in gun battle” 885.  
Similarly, when photographer Ken Oosterbroek was killed by a stray bullet in violence-torn 
Thokoza, most newspapers portrayed him as a casualty of war. “Top newsman dies during 
gun battle” 886 The Natal Mercury wrote. “Photographer killed in Rand hostel battle” 887 the 
Cape Times had to say. And The Star even made Oosterbroek’s death the main story the next 
day. “Oosterbroek among slain” 888 they wrote in one edition with a sub-headline “Running 
gun battles as National Peacekeeping Force troops and hostel dwellers clash in Thokoza” 889. 
Another edition 890 put it slightly differently, but stayed true to the war frame: “Photographer 
slain in action” 891.  
                                      
imes (13th September 1990 a: 5) 
imes (13th September 1990 a: 5) 
imes (13th September 1990 b: 1) 
imes (13th September 1990 b: 1) 
881 Cape T
882 Cape T
883 Cape T
884 Cape T
885 Cape Times (13th September 1990 c: 1) 
886 The Natal Mercury (19th April 1994: 1) 
887 Cape Times (19th April 1994: 1) 
4 a: 1) 
888 The Star (19th April 1994 k: 1) 
889 The Star (19th April 1994 k: 1) 
890 Unfortunately the editions that day were not named so that I have been unable to establish which came first. 
891 The Star (19th April 199
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“The English press did not classify everything as acts of terrorism. They, they 
described the bombing, for instance, of Amanzimtoti, they described that as an act of 
scribed anything where violence was used against civilians 
. (…) The other ones, we tended not to use the term guerrilla, but 
ar-frame survived even after the 1994 elections when those politically motivated 
’ died down. The opposing enemies were – as far as socio-economic and ethnic 
ound goes – surprisingly similar to those that had fought the township battles of the 
and 90s. War was still being waged on two fronts in South Africa. On the one hand 
ere the conflicts among the black population, such as gang fights and vigilantism, and 
other hand there was the (granted, no longer white) establishmen
order and against crime and violence. Both kinds of battle are for example present in the Cape 
Argus’ front-page sub headline in the City Late Edition on 17th May 2002: “Blitz begins after 
37 die in battles” 892. This theme is repeatedly taken-up and leads the reader through the 
article towards the preferred reading like a red thread. Here are just a few examples (note the 
similarities to the reporting from the apartheid years):  
“By 5am, army trucks had rolled into Lotus River, Grassy Park and Parkwood Estate. 
(…) released gangsters were trying to link up with former girlfriends, some of whom 
lived in areas controlled by rival gangs. (…) In Mitchell’s Plain 11 people died in 
gang warfare (…) [page break, continued on page 5] a police patrol came under fire. 
(…) the Six Bobs gang (…) entered the Jester Kids’ territory several times this 
week opening fire from passing vehicles. (…) houses were being shot at and furniture 
damaged by gang war.” 893 (My emphasis.) 
4.5.3 Counter-Terrorism / Anti-Communism 
This frame, in its totality as a fight against terrorism and communism, is clearly an apartheid 
phenomenon. In the eyes of the government, the ANC was a terrorist organisation that, aided 
by South African communists as well as the Soviet Union, had unleashed a ruthless campaign 
of violence on South Africa. This opinion was shared by the country’s press – English and 
Afrikaans. As I have already elaborated in detail in chapter 4.3.1 a, ANC fighters were 
frequently referred to as ‘terrorists’, even when alternative terms would have been equally or 
even more appropriate. 894 Some editors tried to
eant to help them distinguish terrorists from non-terrorists. Raymond 
ple explained his paper’s policy to me in an interview: 
terrorism, because they de
as acts of terrorism
                                                 
892 Cape Argus (27th May 2002: 1) 
 1 and 5) 
 with the author, 31st July 2002, Brewer (1986: 138) and TRC (17th September 1997: Thami 
893 Cape Argus (17th May 2002 a:
894 Jeremy Gordin in an interview
Mazwai; Jon Qwelane, 6) 
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 were placed in a different category. (…) The 
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 1983), to illegal 
eid government is easy to 
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SACP’
are used in language as if they were in fact a person. Consider for example the use of the 
words 
ANC” ; “Revolutionary forces 
much s
Sunday
t Botha said the demonstrators were communist-inspired. He claimed that a 
                                                
we talk about attacks, and we didn’t describe them as terrorist attacks on police 
stations, and that sort of thing. Those
Magoo’s bomb, McBride’s bomb in Durban in Magoo’s bar, we described that as an 
act of terrorism. I still believe it is. And the, the blowing up of the police headquarters, 
the air force headquarters in Pretoria mainly because it wasn’t only directed to the 
headquarters, but also people in the street who were killed.” 895 
However, such explanations do not stand up to scrutiny. If we look at the de facto use of the 
term ‘terrorism’, we will find that no distinctions were made between acts that were aimed at 
military targets and those that hit civilians. In fact, the English press used ‘terrorism’ a
cover term for anything from sabotage (“A planned onslaught” The Argus wrote regarding the 
1980 bombing of SASOL, and above that carried a kicker: “Sasol chief blames terrorists” 896) 
to ANC attacks on military targets in South Africa (“Attack latest in tapestry of terror” 897 the 
Cape Times said of the bombing of the air force headquarters in Pretoria in
border crossings (“Mr Vlok also said a group of “trained terrorists” was hiding in 
Mozambique waiting to infiltrate South Africa,” 898 The Argus told readers in 1988) and the 
township uprising (“Urban terror increases dramatically in SA” 899 The Star warned in 1985). 
Even the children of Soweto were at times described as being involved in acts of terror 
(“Survivors tell of terror ordeal” 900 The Natal Mercury titled a story about two white men 
who had been attacked in the township on 16th June 1976). 
The role of this frame in the communication strategy of the aparth
. The terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘communism’, just like their stand-ins, ‘the ANC’ and ‘the 
 are what Lakoff & Johnson have termed “personification” 901 metaphors, that is, they 
‘ANC’ and ‘SACP’ in the following newspaper headlines: “We sabotaged plants – 
(sub-headline) 902; “SADF units blast ANC in Gaborone” 903
tronger, says SACP” 904. Similarly, in an article titled “‘No one will stop me’”, the 
 Star published the following sentence: 
“Presiden
Moscow-backed Communist Party based in London had the African National 
 
895 Interview with the author, 19th July 2002 
5) 
896 The Argus (2nd June 1980 d: 1) 
897 Cape Times (23rd May 1983: 2) 
898 The Argus (17th June 1988: 3) 
899 The Star (23rd December 1985: 3) 
900 The Natal Mercury (17th June 1976 d: 
901 Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 33) 
902 The Star (2nd June 1980 c: 1) 
903 The Star (14th June 1985: 1) 
904 Pretoria News (13th June 1986 b: 5) 
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e will see that while they are 
closely
ANC in
meet co
they w
‘SADF rone’. So why did they choose not to? 
egory. 906 
en when actual persons were written about. As none of the leading 
members of the liberation movements could legally be quoted, ‘the ANC’ and its brothers-in-
 
support of the majority of 
           
Congress under its control. Now they had started infiltrating the new movement, the 
UDF (United Democratic Front).” 905 
To many readers it might seem absurd to refer to these examples as personifications of a 
conceptual entity, but if we look at the terms grammatically, w
 linked to people, they do not in fact denote persons themselves. We cannot meet the 
 a restaurant, nor can we have a conversation with the Communist Party. We can only 
mmunists or talk to ANC members. Thus, if the newspapers had wanted to be precise, 
ould have written things along the lines of ‘We sabotaged plants – ANC leadership’ or 
 units blast homes of ANC members in Gabo
The use of these terms in official discourse in South Africa served two purposes. Firstly, it 
helped to rob the struggle against apartheid of its human face, for how can we ask, ‘Who is 
terrorism?’ and secondly it gave the state (another example of personification) a visible enemy 
which was easily demonised by reference to a culturally salient cat
The above-said is true ev
arms remained nameless and faceless “Red threat” 907, “diabolical (Marxist) forces” 908, 
“communists” 909, “ANC terrorists” 910, “ANC insurgents” 911, “ANC members” 912 and the 
like, who were generally associated with negative character traits or actions. The Pretoria 
News for example explained why a state of emergency had to be declared as follows: 
“Mr. Botha said violence had also increased in white areas. 
The largest increase, however had occurred in black communities where violence had 
been imposed on “decent members of the black community by faceless so-called 
‘comrades’.” 
This action, encouraged by the ANC and its followers, had made the burning of 
innocent people who disagree with them a daily occurrence. 
It was clear that black revolutionaries did not enjoy the 
blacks. The revolutionaries therefore resorted to methods of intimidation to gain 
control. 
The government had, after thorough consideration and with due regard for the 
economic, political and security implications, taken certain security actions.” 913 
                                      
905 Sunday Star (24th March 1985: 20) 
906 Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 33-34) 
907 Weekend Argus (21st May 1983 b: 3) 
908 The Natal Mercury (16th June 1986: 1) 
909 Weekend Argus (21st May 1983 c: 3) 
 1988: 3) 
910 The Natal Mercury (25th May 1983: 1) 
911 The Argus (17th June 1988: 3) 
912 The Argus (17th June
913 Pretoria News (13th June 1986 a: 5) 
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 the cowardly mad-dog 
apartheid years. At first that 
 as well as crime, is eliminated.”  
This input is very valuable to the present di  ‘order’ was in fact very 
narrowly defined in South Afri
‘disorder’, but rather of violence. As 
ent is adamant to maintain order. People who perpetrate violence 
And The Natal Mercury was even more straightforward about its attitude towards the 
liberation movements. After a car bomb exploded outside Durban’s Magoo’s and Why Not 
bars on 14th June 1986, the newspaper exclaimed in an opinion piece on the front page: “No 
time for despondency” 914. The last section of the article reads: 
“We reject Mr. Pik Botha’s despondent talk of having to accept ‘poverty’ and a 
‘lowering of standards’ as the price of resisting ‘the diabolical (Marxist) forces’. 
They must be put down, hounded and brought to justice like
bombers whose gutlessness has them prey on unsuspecting innocents and whole latest 
iniquity brands them for what they are.” 915 
Government supporters hoped that such reporting would get people to see the ANC, the 
SACP, Soviet communism, and terrorism as synonymous and learned to fear them/it as a 
dangerous adversary, whose defeat justified certain political and military actions on the part of 
the government, and demanded support and sacrifices from them. 
4.5.4 Law and Order 
Law and order played a major role in public discourse during the 
seems understandable. In the face of what they saw as a violent onslaught it must have been 
natural for the authorities to take order as the one way to restore their control over the 
population. At second sight it is not quite so straightforward. As Gans pointed out:  
“Order is a meaningless term unless one specifies what order and whose order is being 
valued. For one thing, there are different types of order; a society can have violence in 
the streets and a stable family life at home, or public peace and a high rate of family 
instability. Also, what order is will be judged differently by different people. To the 
affluent, the slums will appear orderly as long as there are no disturbances and crime 
does not spill over into wealthy districts; but for slum dwellers, order cannot exist until 
exploitation, 916
scussion, for the term
ca. In NP-speak ‘order’ was not primarily the opposite of 
President Botha declared in May 1986:  
“[T]he Governm
must take note that if they do not renounce violence, they will inevitably face the full 
power at the disposal of the state, which has not nearly been applied to the full.” 917 
                                                 
914 The Natal Mercury (16th June 1986: 1) 
) 
 Bureau for Information (1986: 27) 
915 The Natal Mercury (16th June 1986: 1
916 Gans (1979: 56-57) 
917 P.W. Botha, 15th May 1986, quoted in
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 violence in 
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picture o headlines (“Bo-Kaap violence: Police shoot pupil” 920 and 
“Police ammatical agent position of 
sentenc
one exc
If we v is more than easy to find the meaning 
rying to get 
Such language was at that time generally reserved for the actions of the black population, so, 
while the page seems (and is) far from revolutionary in its portrayal of the police, it did stand 
Obviously, the “people who perpetrate violence” that Botha was referring to were neither the 
security forces, who were not using ‘
or abusive employers. No, his warning was aimed at political activists who used violence to 
achieve black liberation. Order and disorder/violence were judged not by what was happening 
in the private sphere of the individual, but by the events in the streets. The newspapers 
generally accepted this view and, in their reporting, placed the emphasis on public forms of 
violence such as ‘disturbances’, ‘public violence’, ‘riots’ or ‘unrest’.  
The opposite of these – ‘order’, ‘force’, and ‘power’ – all fell into the realm of the state, and 
violence therefore soon became associated exclusively with the opponents of the state. 
Representatives of public institutions, such as policemen, soldiers, or prison officials, are by 
definition seen as non-violent. What they are shown to be doing with their sjamboks, teargas 
and guns is the exact opposite of violence: the restoration and maintenance of order. Even in 
the most critical newspapers, there are no specific expressions that describe police
terms of the ‘unrest’ – ‘order’ scale. Some newspapers, such as the Rand Daily Mail and the 
Cape Times, did at time point out the security forces’ violent behaviour 918, but even they 
generally did not portray it as irrational or chaotic.  
The closest thing to a ‘cop unrest’ I found was the front page of the Cape Times of 25th 
October 1985 (see fig. 15 in chapter 4.3.1 b). The main headline “Chaos in City centre” 919 on 
its own would not strike me as extraordinary, but if we look at the whole page, a diffe
 emerges. In the other tw
 beat, arrest press” 921) the policemen are in the gr
es that describe negative action, a rarity during the apartheid years. Moreover, with 
eption, all images show the police in action, again underlining their real-world agency. 
iew the main headline against this background it 
‘Police cause chaos in City centre’. Moreover, the article cites witness to the police violence 
as saying:  
“They went up and down the street behaving like children. 
Nobody seemed to be in charge. I saw them whipping people who were t
out their way. How can they be allowed to act like that, their behaviour was 
appalling.” 922 
                                                 
918 See for example the Rand Daily Mail (18th June 1976 b: 39) and Cape Times (25th October 1985 a: 1)  
 a: 1) 
 
919 Cape Times (25th October 1985
920 Cape Times (25th October 1985 b: 1) 
921 Cape Times (25th October 1985 c: 1) 
922 Cape Times (25th October 1985 a: 1)
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ces such as “Police used tearsmoke and rubber bullets 
to disp
closed. used tear-gas to 
dispers
descrip cemen are 
hat implies clearly planned, goal oriented behaviour. And there is 
enerally offered just the explanation for the 
events 
 Grange, is quoted as saying:  
out against the majority of newspaper reports, which generally attempted not to antagonise the 
authorities for fear of repercussions. 
When describing police violence, the newspapers normally did not make any reference to the 
randomness of the security forces’ actions or their attacks on non-violent protesters or 
uninvolved bystanders. We read senten
erse the crowd estimated at between 150 and 200 youths and the road was temporarily 
” 923, “Rubber bullets, tear-gas used as unrest continues” 924 or “Police 
e the stone-throwers. No injuries were reported.” 925. This is in stark contrast to the 
tions of violent township dwellers. Even in behaving violently, the poli
portrayed as acting calmly, thoughtfully and purposefully. They do not ‘fire rubber bullets’, 
‘throw teargas’ or ‘whip’ people; they “use” teargas and rubber bullets “to” achieve 
something, a construction t
always a justification for their actions: “the crowd”, “unrest” or “stone-throwers”. 
The same image emerges when we look at the coverage of the shooting in Uitenhage in March 
1985. While most newspapers I surveyed were critical of the police and their actions – The 
Star talked of “police brutality” 926 and quoted “witnesses” 927 who deny that the police had 
warned the marchers before shooting and the Rand Daily Mail called the events a “bloodbath” 
928 – when it came to reporting the ‘facts’ they g
that the government wanted people to see. The Daily Dispatch for example wrote: 
“17 dead in Uitenhage 
Le Grange: police fired in self-defence 
Seventeen people died and 19 were wounded when police opened fire in self defence 
on a crowd of between 3 000 and 4 000 near Uitenhage yesterday, the Minister of Law 
and Order, Louis le Grange, said yesterday.” 929 
By the next day, many papers did start questioning this official version of the events. But at 
the same time they continued to provide the government with a platform with voicing its 
views. For example, in an article in the Cape Times titled “‘Not a peaceful crowd of 
mourners’” the Minister of Law and Order, Louis le
 “The fact that many people were armed with stones, sticks, bricks and even petrol 
bombs makes it clear that they were not a peaceful crowd of mourners on their way to 
a funeral.” 930 
                                                 
923 Daily Dispatch (1st October 1984: 1) 
924 The Argus (22nd March 1985 d: 1) 
925 The Natal Mercury (2nd March 1990: 3) 
926 The Star (23rd March 1985: 1) 
arch 1985 a: 1) 
927 The Star (22nd March 1985: 1) 
928 Rand Daily Mail (22nd M
929 Daily Dispatch (22nd March 1985 a: 1) 
930 Cape Times (23rd March 1985 b: 4) 
  183
Britain and America (but also from the English language press) on 
d category – the eye of the beholder – is considered, white South 
ck ghettos 
he centre of a new 
frame, that of ‘law enforcement’. 
As pressure mounted from 
the South African government to address the discrepancy between accounts from residents 
and the police, and to clarify what had happened in Uitenhage, the following reaction from 
Botha was published (admittedly tucked away on the inside pages) by the Sunday Star under 
the headline “‘No one will stop me’”: 
“President Botha told Americans at the weekend that he was determined to maintain 
order in South Africa and nobody in the world was going to stop him. 
He was answering a question during an interview on the ABC television programme 
“Nightline” about the killing of 18 black people in Langa on Thursday.” 931 
Thus, the shooting of 18 (or more) unarmed people was actually a case of maintaining order. 
Police violence committed in the act of duty remains unseen from the point of view of the 
‘law and order’ frame. 932  
As far as Gans’ secon
Africans certainly fit the description of the wealthy. During the 1960s and to a lesser extent 
also during the 1970s, the townships used to be seen as good places for Africans to live. The 
Soweto Uprisings made the first dent in that theory when it became clear to whites that the 
township population was in fact terrorised – not by the government, though, but by the 
liberation movements. One young man told me:  
“You know, the army had to go in. The people there were terrorised by their own 
people. The comrades, you know what they did? When people tried to go to work they 
would be nacklaced, because, you know, there was a strike. And they set-up 
checkpoints at the taxi ranks and search your bags. And when you went to white shops 
like Pick’n Pay, they would make you eat the stuff right there. Drink oil and dish soap! 
So people were just terrorised and afraid all the time. They needed us.” 933 
This view became widespread during the 1980s and 1990s as South Africa’s bla
became identified with chaos and mayhem, or to quote the Pretoria News (who in turn 
directly quoted P.W. Botha), “violence had been imposed on “decent members of the black 
community by faceless so-called ‘comrades’.”” 934 
The ‘law and order’ frame was slowly phased out after the 1994 elections. The term ‘order’ 
had become too strongly associated with, and defined as, the opposite of political strife to be 
of any use after the transition to democracy. ‘Law’, however, was still both untainted and very 
much useful. It was thus repackaged as the opposite of crime to form t
                                                 
931 Sunday Star (24th March 1985: 20) 
932 Trew (1979 a: 114-115) 
933 Conversation with the author in Prague, 8th April 2004 
934 Pretoria News (13th June 1986 a: 5) 
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the field who supplemented their own material with 
omes unannounced, happens relatively quickly and the perpetrators do not tend to 
stick around to give interviews later. Criminal violence is therefore generally covered after it 
has already happened. 
This calls for a different approach. Journalists can no longer just walk the streets in the hope 
of witnessing a crime or finding a new crime scene. They have to go to where they are sure to 
obtain information about it – the courts and police stations throughout the country. Thus, what 
I said about the reporting of criminal violence during the apartheid years now became true for 
most violence: It was filtered through the eyes of the criminal justice system, whose point of 
view the journalists make their own. Law enforcement and court officials are quoted more 
often than the people who were directly involved in the violence, and their views and 
decisions as well as the evidence presented to them are often reported as fact. And while the 
testimony of victims and expert sources (such as scientists or NGO workers) is at times used 
to supplement the court report, the perpetrators are generally not given the right to explain 
their side of the story. The readers’ perspective onto violence is therefore exclusively that of 
the socio-cultural in-group of the newspaper, ordinary citizens and their protectors. 
The newspapers’ view of the police also changed substantially. They morphed from soldiers 
in a war against terror or enemies of the people into a community-oriented organisation with a 
with the new attitude 
4.5.5 Law enforcement 
The most noticeable development in the reporting about violence in South Africa since the 
1994 elections has been a shift in attention away from politics and towards crime. This change 
of focus has had a big impact not only on the kinds of events covered, but also on the way 
they were presented. One important change was that in news sources. Before 1994, violence 
had mainly been covered by reporters in 
police reports, press conferences, court proceedings and the public relations output of various 
government departments, especially during the state of emergency. Due to the nature of the 
incidents covered, journalists could go and see the action for themselves, visit the townships, 
witness the violence and talk to those involved. Crime is generally not available for coverage 
like that. It c
mission to serve and protect all citizens of South Africa. In accordance 
newspapers portrayed the policemen as being part of the community, being among the people 
and working with and for them. Where previously the press had spoken of “police action” 935, 
“control” 936 and police who had “opened fire” 937, they now talked of “police work” 938, and 
detectives who are “investigating” 939 crimes and “arresting” 940 suspects.  
                                                 
935 The Star (17th June 1976 a: 3) and Cape Times (17th June 1986: 2) 
cember 1985: 3) and Daily Dispatch (22  March 1985 a: 1) 
: 1) and Knysna-Plett Herald (18th April 2002: 5) 
936 The Argus (21st June 1976 b: 1) and Natal Mercury (16th December 1985 a: 2) 
nd937 The Star (24th De
938 The Star (12th July 2002
939 Daily News (12th April 2002 a: 2) and The Citizen (9th April 2002: 3) 
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In doin
after th
perceiv t it, “from a police force to a 
g so they are now in agreement with the government and the police themselves who, 
e end of apartheid, have undergone a substantial change in self-perception and 
ed mission. They have metamorphosed, as Malan pu
police service” 941. This included a complete demilitarisation of ranks and symbols and a new 
philosophy of “community policing” 942 and a renaming of the Ministry of Law and Order 
into the Ministry of Safety and Security. 
Photographs underwent a similar change. Policemen were no longer pictured in camouflage or 
riot gear, standing around military vehicles. They were shown wearing ordinary police 
uniforms or even civilian clothing (see for example fig. 62 in chapter 4.6.4 b) and were either 
among the community, comforting victims, or at work on a crime scene (see for example figs. 
20 and 30). 
 
Figure 20: The new police service at work (Source: The Citizen (2nd July 2002: 6)) 
This new approach to violence has had serious consequences for crime reporting in general. 
As several journalists told me during our interviews, after 1994 the media “religiously 
reported everything we could get our hands on.” 943. After a while a kind of fatigue with the 
subject set in, though. Nowadays only the most gruesome crimes are made into big stories. In 
1999 the Sunday Times even admitted in an article on rape in South Africa:  
                                                                                                                                                         
940 Mail & Guardian (28th June 2002: 5) and Cape Argus (6th December 2001 a: 3) 
n an interview with the author, 25th May 2002 
941 Malan (1999: 2) 
942 SAPS (Unknown b: 1) 
943 Johann de Villiers i
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olent, so the argument 
problem 
“News organisations have an economic imperative report only that which is likely to 
sell their product. And, in the face of media saturation with normal, standard rape 
cases, only the very extraordinary make the news.” 944 
As a consequence non-violent crime rarely made the headlines, which led to the phenomena 
of crime and violence largely converging in people’s heads. This blurring of the 
terminological boundary in turn brought two further problems. On the one hand, it has made 
the ongoing violence appear much worse than it is. If all crimes are vi
goes, then a high crime rate must mean that there is also a large risk of falling victim to 
violence. This, however, is misconceived, for non-violent crimes such as theft, pick pocketing 
and fraud constitute a big portion of crime in South Africa. On the other hand, it has led 
people to underestimate the rate of violence that occurs in the private sphere and is not 
reported either to the authorities or in the newspapers, namely domestic violence, child abuse 
and the corporal punishment of domestic staff and other workers. Violence has come to be 
equated with unknown outsiders. 945 
4.6 Images of Violence 
Now that we have fought our way through all necessary background information needed for 
understanding South African news reports, it is finally time to turn to the analysis of the code 
used by the country’s English language press to describe violence. First, however, I should 
utter a note of caution. What I am about to describe are merely the intended readings, that is, 
the meaning intended by the text’s producers. While reading the following sub-chapters, one 
should always keep in mind that opposing decodings of any text are not only possible, but 
happen quite frequently. Still, as far as I could tell during my own research, the majority of 
white South African newspaper readers tended to find the intended meaning in the texts, 
especially during the apartheid years. The general public rarely left the path of mainstream 
thought and thus remained untouched by ideological revolutions. 946 
Accordingly, it is safe to assume that at any given point in time the majority of South African 
English speakers would have understood violence to be exactly as I have described it in the 
past sub-chapters. During the apartheid years and the early 1990s, it was seen as composed of 
individual events, motivated by politics and perpetrated by groups, while since the 1994 
elections it has been perceived as a symptom of the country’s omnipresent crime 
where individual perpetrators commit violence against individual victims. This way of 
portraying the world has had an impact on the imagery used to describe violence. 
                                                 
944 Sunday Times (4th July 1999: 2) 
945 Hamber & Lewis (1998: 2) and Tutu (1999: 176) 
946 Wodak (2002: 15) 
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d savages they were trying to keep in check.  
that they were still 
onised black 
external danger. To reinforce this image the apartheid government’s involvement in the 
During the apartheid years in particular the reliance on presenting society as split naturally 
between a good in-group and a bad out-group, while focussing exclusively on the perpetrators 
of violence, created a dilemma for the newspapers. How do you talk about violence? Or 
rather, who is committing it? The in-group, namely the white population, was considered to 
be civilised and peaceful. If the press had admitted that whites used violence to reach their 
political goals, they would have presented their readers as politically intolerant and no more 
civilised than the suppose
Also, the apartheid government saw itself as a protector of law and order and could therefore 
under no circumstance be shown to be violent. This would have put the state at the same level 
as the supposed terrorists in the liberation movements. The NP would then surely have lost the 
white voters’ support. 947 Naturally, this was not supposed to happen. As the chief of the 
SADF stated in a memo titled Guidelines on Statements in Respect of Responsible Reporting, 
which stated quite clearly: “[T]he least said, the better” 948. However, keeping all information 
about its engagement in the townships under wraps was not in the interest of the government. 
Officials knew that the public would find out about the uprisings one way or another, so they 
might as well release the information in a way that would reassure people 
very much in control. 949 This also prevented a head-on collision with the English press 
because, even though they accepted a certain degree of government interference, they would 
not have accepted a blanket ban on reporting from the townships.  
The way out of this bind was easier than it seems at first sight. The key lay in phrases like 
‘black-on-black violence’ and ‘law and order policing’ which condensed complicated and 
emotionally laden concepts into simple terms that provided an easy way of referring to things 
from a certain perspective. They were generally drawn from popular myths and as such fit in 
perfectly the public’s view of the world. Such seemingly common-sense designations link the 
depicted event with the historical knowledge of a culture, thereby helping the reader to 
understand and interpret the given situation in terms of culturally universal values. For 
example, while violence was decried as an expression of instinct-driven behaviour that should 
have been left behind on a lower level of cultural development, it was also seen as a sign of 
power and control. Thus, depending on whether the reports portrayed the dem
resistance or the widely demanded show of government force, different myths were drawn 
upon to explain the violence as either instinct-driven madness or protective force. 950  
Violence perpetrated by whites was generally portrayed as a form of self-defence against an 
                                                 
947 TRC Report, Vol 4, Chap 6, Para 50 and Tomaselli & Louw (1991: 161) 
e (1987: 211) 
 (1990: 158-159) 
948 Quoted in Frederiks
949 Jackson (1993: 145) 
950 Butchart, Hamber, Terre Blanche & Seedat (1998: 2), Rauch (1993: 3) and Posel
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he 
 the norm. For the 
same reason criminal violence among whites and white abuse of black domestic staff and 
 played down or de-politicised with the help of such terms 
e problem of violence, 
e 
violence in their own country and in the rest of Africa was continuously denied. Similarly, 
white violence outside the realms of the state, such as the attacks by right-wing movements or 
white anti-apartheid fighters, as well as extra-legal violence perpetrated by the agents of t
apartheid government, was either ignored or portrayed as an aberration from
farm hands was not given much attention either. A white skin and violence were supposed to 
appear incompatible. 951  
Instead, violence was presented almost exclusively as a black phenomenon. However, as I 
have already mentioned, not just any black person committing violence was seen as a violent 
black. 952 This image was reserved for those who had been constructed as the ‘other’, the 
enemies of the state. In line with this idea, violence committed by black people who stood on 
the side of the apartheid state was
as ‘black-on-black violence’. True black violence was associated with something completely 
different: anarchy and chaos as embodied by the fight of the liberation movements. In the 
government’s eyes they were uncivilised terrorists who tried to overthrow law and order in a 
most brutal way, and hand the country over to the forces of destruction. 953 
One would expect the content of the articles to have changed substantially after 1990 and it 
certainly did in parts. Suddenly many previously white newspapers began showing black 
faces and reporting from the townships. However, angle of the reports remained largely the 
same. Many newspapers did not even try to get closer to the roots of th
either analytically or physically. As they had done for the past hundred years, the decision-
makers remained in their mostly white offices in the white areas and viewed the outside world 
through the filter of their own worldview. This was the perspective from which they judged 
and modified the articles brought in by reporters in the field. Accordingly, the symbols used 
in the reports remained largely the same and the old images were merely adapted to fit a few 
new scenarios. 954 A few have actually been phased out, mainly because their referent in 
extra-medial reality has disappeared. And in order to cope with the new emphasis on crime, a 
number of new ones have been introduced. In all, though, the code used to describe violence 
has not changed any more than the structure of the message system as a whole. 
I have structured the following sub-chapters according to this structure. In sub-chapters 4.6.1 
and 4.6.2 respectively I will be dealing with the images of in-group and out-group violence 
that were constructed during the apartheid years, and trace their developments through to th
                                                 
951 Institute of Criminology, UCT (1991: 26), TRC Report, Vol 2, Chap, 3, Para 66, Louw & Tomaselli (1989: 33), Reeves 
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this meaning came about. 
The job of presenting the state vio
governm
subordinate role. Touting the gove
press. However, th iolence it committed 
were shown in a good light and the 
describ
representations of black violence also pushed the actual news to the background. The only 
960
                                                
present day. Sub-chapter 4.6.4 is dedicated to any new symbols that emerged after the 
transition to democracy 955. This should give the reader a comprehensive understanding of 
what violence means to South African journalists today and how 
4.6.1 State Violence: From ‘Our’ Strength to ‘Their’ Abuse of Power 
lence from a positive angle was given mainly to the pro-
ent media, especially the SABC. 956 The English language press played only a 
rnment’s victories was against their idea of an independent 
e NP could at least count on their silence about the v
against its own citizens. Even if the journalists occasionally wrote about the police and army’s 
violent behaviour in the townships, they were regularly censored by their managers before the 
newspaper was published. 957  
The only reports to reach readers were those that stayed within the government prescribed 
boundaries of thinking. Quite often state violence was not mentioned at all. Instead, the papers 
only portrayed the violent enemy in the hope that this would give the impression that they had 
included images of the state’s strength in the report as well. Due to people’s belief in the 
duality of all things, showing one side of the metaphorical medal automatically implied the 
existence of the opposite. 958 This way, government violence could be kept quiet without 
giving the impression of weakness and “the war being waged behind the myriad images of 
protest has gone unnoticed by vast numbers of South Africans” 959.  
The reports were, for example, frequently accompanied by conflicting visual signs, such as 
photographs of symbols of black violence. By showing a picture of a group of blacks, the 
newspapers implied potential violence and an accompanying text could then describe their 
(frequently violent) dispersal by the police as prevention of violence. This way, the police 
state’s strength could be portrayed without ever having to 
e the violence committed by its representatives. The much more powerful pictorial 
thing that remained in people’s heads in the end was the images of violent blacks.   
If the newspapers felt that a more direct approach was needed, but they still did not want to 
talk about ‘state violence’, they reminded their readers that the ongoing violence was confined 
solely to black South Africa and that their homes were worlds away from this chaos. Thus the 
 
955 I decided against giving a specific cut-off date because I believe that there really insn’t one. The changes happened over 
f the state of emergency in 1990. They dragged out at least until the TRC took up its work 
news reporting are still evolving today. 
p 6, Para 16-19 and 56 and TRC (15th September 1997: Johan Pretorius, 10) 
 6, Para 50 
, Cock (1990: 68), Tomaselli et al. (1987: 134), TRC Report, Vol 5, Chap 6, Para 98 and Posel (1990: 
rtheid’s Rebels. Inside South Africa’s Hidden War, quoted in Cock (1990: 68) 
 Vogelman (1989 a: 2) and Rauch & Storey (1998: 8) 
several years starting with the end o
in 1996, and some aspects of the 
956 TRC Report, Vol 4, Cha
957 Akhalwaya (1990: 52) and TRC Report, Vol 4, Chap
958 Lynch (1999: 9-10)
154-155) 
959 S. Davis, 1987, Apa
960 Cock (1990: 65), Simpson & Vogelman (1989 b: 1), Simpson &
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g to keep order in 
concept of ‘law and order’ became a central feature of official discourse. 961 As President 
Botha declared in a television interview on 25th March 1985: “I am goin
South Africa and no one is going to stop me keeping order.” 962  
The meaning of this expression is explained in a commentary by the Canadian secret service:  
“Within South Africa until recently, the use of the term “law and order” has generally 
meant the maintenance of white-minority rule and those government policies 
supporting racial segregation or apartheid. Basically interchangeably with the term 
“internal security”, it referred in essence to insuring the security and prosperity of the 
white population in South Africa.” 963  
This concept always came into use when it was impossible to not at least mention the state 
violence. In such cases the state’s successes against ‘communists’ and ‘terrorists’ were 
glorified, and it was emphasised that the government’s strength had prevented them from 
Any violence the state used in such cases was described as not 
only permissible, but necessary to keep the danger in check. 964 The journalists remained as 
966 This quote was printed in full in 
y Mail on 21st June 1976. 967 And a few years later in a re-assessment of the 
vents around 16th June 1976, the Sunday Tribune gave ample space to Brigadier Visser, the 
minority who took control and the community was scared either to oppose them or 
stop them.” 968 
This shows that, in their attempt to present their own civilisation as peaceful, the media 
removed references to violence from the descriptions of government action. This strategy 
meant that at times incidents of state violence, which had previously been denied, suddenly 
 
committing acts of violence. 
vague as possible in their description of the events and their language was very sober, at times 
even scientific. The situation in the townships was portrayed as a problem to which a solution 
was being offered, or they talked of the violence in terms of duties and responsibilities, such 
as the state’s mandate to protect its citizens and the security forces’ call to restore order. 965  
For example, Lieutenant-General Venter, Chief Deputy Commissioner for the South African 
Police, stated after the Soweto uprisings: “If we don’t do anything, the rioters will run amok 
burning, looting, killing and injuring innocent people.” 
the Rand Dail
e
Divisional Commander of Police in Soweto, to voice similar opinions: 
“Naturally force had to be met with force. (…) Suddenly this erupted among a 
had to be confirmed. In most cases the newspapers did not seem to be troubled by admitting
                                                 
961 Tomaselli & Louw (1991: 185) 
962 Quoted in Posel (1990: 160) 
963 Henderson (1990 a: 2) 
964 Manganyi & du Toit (1990: 2) and Rauch (1993: 2) 
965 Posel (1989: 270) 
966 Quoted in Brewer (1986: 79) 
967 Brewer (1986: 79) 
968 Sunday Tribune, 2nd March 1980, quoted in Brewer (1986: 78) 
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that their own reporting had been misleading. All that counted was the here and now, the 
immediate propagandistic effect of the symbols of the state’s strength. 969  
In order to portray government violence in the right way the newspapers used a number of 
symbols which were based on popular ideas, constructed by repetition and condensation, and 
then came to symbolise state violence in the later reports. 970 The police and the military in 
particular moved to the centre of attention. The members of the SAP and the SADF were 
taken to be the pillars on which the civilisation rested, as protectors of order and as islands of 
calm and superiority. People (black and white) in uniform were therefore an important symbol 
for the violence of the state. An even more impressive sign of the state’s strength and 
invincibility were military vehicles, such as tanks, Casspirs, ‘buffels’ (both armoured 
personnel carriers designed for the bush war) and army transporters. They therefore became 
the second important symbol for state violence. 971 
a) Policemen / Soldiers 
In the eyes of the apartheid government, the security forces constituted the first line of 
defence against the black threat in the townships. Thus, while they served as a symbol of 
om a few exceptions, 
SADF 
is 
means, which I will elucidate further in the 
following sub-chapters. 
 
Photographs 
 
In photographs policemen and soldiers were rarely ever shown in motion. Most of the time 
police were standing and surveying an area (see fig. 21) or guarding a site (see fig. 22).  
violence what they really stood for was the concept of strength. Apart fr
such as the Cape Times article cited above, newspapers portrayed the members of the 
and the SAP in a way that implied order, control and a readiness to serve and protect. Th
was achieved using a number of different 
 
thFigure 21: It is all under control now (Source: Rand Daily Mail (18  June 1976: 6)) 
Very rarely, around the beginning of the period under investigation, we could also see them 
taking aim with their firearms (see figs. 23 and 25). 
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thFigure 22: Cool, calm and collected (Source: Rand Daily Mail (16  June 1977: 3)) 
The calm and orderliness of the police was frequently contrasted with images of blacks 
running around, seemingly headless, a combination that served to emphasise the difference 
between the two groups (see figs. 23 and 25). 
 
Figure 23: Chaos and order side by side (Source: The Star (17th June 1976: 25)) 
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If policemen were depicted as moving, they generally appeared orderly, such as a marching 
battalion, and/or purposeful, for example in pursuit of fleeing black people or arresting 
demonstrators (see fig. 24). 
 
thFigure 24: Police patrolling Alexandra (Source: The Star (18  June 1976: 17)) 
By stressing the orderliness, controlled behaviour, and goal-oriented behaviour of the 
policemen and soldiers, the media once again emphasised the difference between them and 
the barbaric, wild, and uncontrolled blacks. 
Another interesting point when it came to the security forces was that of groups versus 
individuals. On the one hand, policemen and soldiers were clearly identified as belonging to a 
certain group of people. Their uniforms obscured their individuality and marked them as 
agents of the state. Persons became symbols of a system, a system that continuously described 
itself as the protector of law and order. 972 
On the other hand, the police and army units were clearly a different kind of collective than 
the black crowds they were facing. As I indicated above, they were no uncontrolled mass of 
bodies. They were a well-organised, clearly structured assembly of individuals. They were 
orderly, they moved purposefully, and they rarely ever seemed threatening. This was achieved 
 smaller than
                                                
by a number of different means. Groups of policemen were generally depicted as  
 
972 Posel (1990: 163) 
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the cro
‘groups
the ‘sec
of thes
that we  black protesters. For example The Star of 19th June 
wds of black people they were facing. Also, in captions they were only seldom called 
 of policemen’. Normally they were referred to as ‘police’ or ‘soldiers’, the ‘army’, or 
urity forces’, and occasionally as a ‘unit’, a ‘convoy’, or a ‘force’. The positive effect 
e terms was further enhanced by their contrasting with such words as ‘crowd’ or ‘mob’ 
re generally used to refer to the
1976 carried a photograph on the front pages of its Stop Press and City Late Editions that 
showed two policemen facing a crowd of black students (see fig. 25).  
 
Figure 25: Authority and mob rule, but who is who? (Source: The Star (19th June 1976: 1)) 
I will investigate the picture in a short while. At the moment my focus is on the caption: 
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tones with R1 rifles is an appropriate 
ing of the police, 
ce and above one that talks 
f the victims of a fracas – but no guilt is ever assigned for their killing. 
s another strategy the newspapers employed to dampen the impact of 
 outside threat.  
“The bloody confrontations between mob rule and authority reached its peak in 
Alexandra township yesterday when police with R1 rifles came face to face with gangs 
armed with sticks and stones and using ineffectual dustbin lids as shields against 
bullets. Here, in a typical scene, Black teenagers jeer and taunt two policemen, who 
eventually chose to retreat.” 973 
The description of the policemen is uniformly positive (if we agree with the government 
interpretation that facing children holding sticks and s
response): They represent “authority”, are carrying modern weapons and choose to retreat 
even in the face of jeering and taunting. They are a model force. Now, if we compare that to 
the description of the kids – mobs and “gangs” who are “armed” and despite using 
“ineffectual shields” somehow managed to impose their rule and dare to “jeer and taunt” 
policemen – this impression is strengthened substantially. Unlike the cops they are “armed”, a 
fact that makes them seem a lot more aggressive. Luckily, they are equipped with 
“ineffectual” gear. Note also the use of the ‘racial differences frame’ by talk
who in the picture are clearly identifiable as whites, as coming “face to face” (an action you 
cannot generally do with members of your own group – we generally do not come ‘face to 
face’ with our mother in the kitchen) with “Black” (capitalised) teenagers.  
One question that the caption throws up is that of “bloody confrontations”. What is the 
newspaper referring to? Surely not the events depicted, because there is no violence (or blood) 
involved. And yet it is described as a “typical scene”. In my opinion what happened is that the 
editor felt that he needed to somehow make a reference to the numerous people who were 
killed in the Reef townships over the past few days, but did not want to openly accuse the 
police of having been the party responsible for those deaths. So they get mentioned – 
interestingly, under a headline that makes reference to black violen
o
Figure 25 illustrate
reporting about police violence. Photographs of policemen or soldiers were often taken from 
behind or from the side. The two angles differed slightly in effect, but both produced images 
favourable to the police. The first choice placed the cameraman, and by extension the reader, 
among the police. They were, as it has since the American invasion of Iraq become known, 
‘embedded’ in the security forces. This spatial proximity reinforced the feeling of belonging 
and made it difficult to not view the police as members of the in-group. It also increased the 
impression of the police being the last barrier that stood between the approaching black 
crowds and the (white) reader. They were protecting the audience against an
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e was reduced and the connection 
 the reader was left with a feeling of 
 The Natal Mercury’s lead story on 17th June 
                                                
Moreover, if the police were seen to be with ‘us’ and protecting ‘us’, they could not be 
perceived as a threat to ‘us’, which is what they would have appeared to be had the photos 
shown them from the front, weapons ready to fire, seemingly aimed at the reader. Thus, even 
if the newspapers did not actively pursue as sinister a plan as I have accused them of in the 
last few paragraphs, by staying behind the police line, they could at least make sure that their 
readers would not get too worried about the events and start finding opposing readings, such 
as ‘our government has a policy of killing its citizens’. 
The second option, that of showing security force personnel from the side or from further 
away, is not about closeness and in-group bonds, but rather the opposite; it is about distance. 
Unlike in photographs taken from behind, these shots give the reader the impression of 
looking out at the events, surveying them. This, however, bears the risk that they may see 
violent police behaviour. This danger was reduced by not showing cops from the front or by 
moving further away from them. Their physical presenc
between the violence and its perpetrator was obscured (see figs. 21 and 26).  
The reader was removed from the events, a distant observer who could not really make out 
any details of what was happening. As such the photographs actually provided merely the 
semblance of information, a sort of paint by numbers. A meaningful picture only emerged if 
readers used the accompanying text as a manual for assembling it. The effect of this strategy 
was quite striking as it combined the advantages of linguistic and visual communication while 
avoiding most of the pitfalls. The pictures provided the realism, the sense of having been there 
and seen for themselves what readers valued, but because of their not really depicting 
anything, they did not say what had just been witnessed. This task was left to the caption that 
supplied the unit with meaning. The result was that
having seen something that in reality they had merely read about.  
 
Textual Elements 
 
The textual elements of the reports generally worked in the same way as the photographs. 
They stressed the strength and determination of the policemen and soldiers while at the same 
time emphasising their restraint. For example
1976 told readers: “About 1 000 policemen with Sten guns, FN rifles and machine pistols 
were pinned down in Soweto last night as rioting mobs went of a burning and looting 
rampage.” 974 Similarly, The Argus of 16th June 1976 wrote: “About 2 km away at Orlando 
police station a platoon of men in army fatigue uniforms, carrying teargas canisters and 
stenguns marched off down the hill to reinforce those at the Lipspruit.” 975  
 
976 a: 1) 
) 
974 The Natal Mercury (17th June 1
975 The Argus (16th June 1976 b: 3
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a minimum. 
pear more likely, in which case the 
t to the student of white South 
African
very pr
opaque – it is a screen, not a window – and impenetrable, which should tell any critical reader 
r me is the emphasis on “automatic rifles (…) ready to shoot”. I am 
sure this sentence was not meant to elicit sympathy for the potential victims; otherwise it 
would be phrased differently. Consider for example the option of ‘After days of street battles 
lice, an uneasy peace has returned to the townships of the 
wer in their homes to avoid running-ins with the heavily armed 
And, on 16th June 1986, The Argus carried an article on the front page titled “At least 22 dead 
over past four days – official”. In the second part on page three the newspaper quotes Leon 
Mellet as saying: “The security forces are in charge of the situation today and will be in 
charge tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow.” 976 This statement makes absolutely no sense 
in the context of growing unrest that has killed 22 people in four days, unless we take it to 
mean one of two things. It is either meant to imply that, while blacks are killing each other, 
the security forces are in control of the situation in the country overall and will protect the 
white population and do everything to keep the level of violence among blacks at 
On the other hand, it could also be understood to mean that the 22 dead are a sign of the 
security forces’ control, their success in fighting communism by killing ‘opstokers’ (agitators) 
who cause trouble in the townships. Comments from other government officials, including 
President Botha himself, make the latter interpretation ap
term ‘control’ can be taken as a euphemism for violence. 
A similar idea is implied by the lead of an article that appeared in The Star on 19th June 1976: 
“A taut and uneasy calm has descended on the riot-battered Witwatersrand behind a powerful 
screen of security forces armed with automatic rifles and ready to shoot.” 977 The positions in 
this section are clear: On the one side there is a (generally peaceful) white world that is 
inhabited by the newspaper and its readers. On the other side is a (generally agitated) black 
world, the “riot-battered Witwatersrand”, which luckily is so far away from whites that they 
need to be told about the situation there. The two are separated by “a powerful screen of 
security forces”, whose presence helps to maintain the calm on both sides. The stage for the 
remainder of the text is therefore set – it is a case of ‘us’ against ‘them’ and we are OK 
because we are protected behind a wall of policemen. 
There are two key elements in this section that are of interes
 culture – the “powerful screen” metaphor and the weapons. I personally find both 
oblematic. The former indicates that the divider between ‘our’ world and ‘theirs’ is 
that there is a distinct risk of cover-ups and lies on the part of those who control the screen 
and those who are allowed to peep beyond it.  
The second sore point fo
between children and po
Witwatersrand, as residents co
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977 The Star (19th June 1976 a: 1) 
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 that it might me 
sufficie
biggest
Only v he police used violence as part of their 
strategy. If showing acts of violence committed by the custodians of the law was unavoidable, 
these w
order o
For exa il of 16th June 1977 published an article titled “‘Police fired to 
save th lice had shot at 
demon
up in th en involved: “If we had not opened 
fire pro
Septem tory in which “A young national 
service
entire a
deploy rb for the duration of 
a large (black) funeral procession.” 982 And in the Cape Times of 17th June 1988, under the 
headlin
Adriaa
as strict as ever and Tony Heard, who might have attempted to bend them, 
patrols.’ I believe that the real reason was to draw white readers’ attention to an imaginary 
danger while at the same time reassuring them that they had nothing to fear all the time the 
cops and their guns were out there. To me it says a lot about a culture if the thought of men 
with automatic weapons walking the streets ready to shoot children singing songs is 
reassuring! And even if this intended meaning is not the one found by the readers – which 
according to my interviews it was – just the fact that anyone would think
ntly positively valued by enough people to make the front page of what was then the 
 newspaper in Africa is indicative of South Africans’ attitudes at the time. 
ery rarely did the newspapers mention that t
ere generally portrayed as acts of self-defence, or as measures taken to protect public 
r the life and property of the white population. 978  
mple the Rand Daily Ma
eir lives’” 979, which was dedicated entirely to justifying why the po
strators during the commemorations of the Soweto Uprisings. The message is summed-
e final sentence, a quote from one of the policem
perty and cars would have been damaged and many people killed.” 980 Similarly, on 8th 
ber 1985, the Sunday Tribune published a s
man describes the anguish he faced serving on South Africa’s ‘home front’” 981. The 
rticle is written in the first person, as if told by the young man himself. “When we first 
ed for the unrest,” he tells readers, “it was to protect a white subu
e “Three women killed in shootouts with ‘ANC’” 983, Minister of Law and Order 
n Vlok is allowed to explain the casualties as follows:  
“The minister said the clashes occurred when police – “in the face of extreme danger 
and under difficult conditions” – confronted two heavily armed groups of “terrorists” 
near the Swaziland border.” 984  
Obviously, no conflicting account or statement from the ANC was published. The emergency 
regulations were 
had left the Cape Times. 
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ispatch on 22nd 
March 
“Le Gr ge was a large image of 
indistin
inform so I will quote only a few passages: 
een 3 000 and 4 000 near Uitenhage yesterday, the Minister of Law 
“Police later found traces of exploded petrol bombs as well as one unexploded petrol 
en found on the petrol bomb.”” 985  
r’ and ‘protection’ often dominated reports 
of government-sanctioned violence. By comparison, violence committed by blacks was 
   
Another element which frequently appeared side by side with the self-defence myth was the 
strength-restraint dualism. See for example the lead article in the Daily D
1985 titled “17 dead in Uitenhage”. The theme itself is introduced by the sub-header: 
ange: police fired in self-defence”. At the centre of the pa
guishable vehicles (police vehicles the reader is told) in a township (Langa, the caption 
s us). The article was fairly long 
“Seventeen people died and 19 were wounded when police opened fire in self defence 
on a crowd of betw
and Order, Louis le Grange, said yesterday.” 
(…) 
Police had been “forced to open fire” on a crowd armed with stones sticks, petrol 
bombs and bricks. The crowd was marching towards Uitenhage on the highway from 
Langa black township. 
They were led by a person dressed in black and carrying a brick. (…) 
“When the crowd was about five metres from the police the commanding officer fired 
a warning shot into the ground next to the leader. 
“It still had no effect and the police were suddenly surrounded and pelted with stones, 
sticks and other missiles including petrol bombs. 
“The police officer had no alternative but to order fire, in self defence. Three R1-rifles 
and some shotguns were used. The crowd retreated and firing immediately ceased. Six 
R1-bullets, 27 shotgun cartridges and 10 pistol shots were fired. 
(…) 
bomb. Fingerprints have be
We are here faced with a police force that, although greatly outnumbered, is hugely superior 
to the attackers (rifles as opposed to stones) while at the same time showing restraint in the 
use of force (“firing immediately ceased”). Moreover, they are not so much portrayed as an 
attacking power but rather as defenders of Uitenhage against the dangerous marchers from 
Langa township. 
These quotes illustrate another method used by the mainstream media in order to make police 
violence appear in a positive light, particularly in comparison to violence committed by the 
liberation movements. Their actions were always described in an unemotional, neutral 
language. Terms like ‘necessity’, ‘security’, ‘orde
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… terror. From the elders’ ranks several shots were fired and the youths sprinted 
frantically away. 
Screaming women abandoned their possessions. Red Cross staff jumped into their van 
and raced off as the youths hurtled by. 
Amid the chaos came a bizarre addition to the drama. A convoy of about 10 military 
police motorcyclists, sirens wailing, escorted an SADF car carrying several officers 
through the battle zone.” 986 
Towards the end of the 1980s, some newspapers that had previously been content to just 
report the official version of the events did begin to take a more critical stand towards police 
violence. The article from The Star’s City Late Edition of 7th September 1989 that I dissected 
in chapter 4.2.2 c (“At least 4 killed, 100 hurt in Cape violence” 987) is one example. 
However, it also shows that by the time the press woke up to the horrors of police violence, 
the laws restricting their reporting were so firmly in place that they did not manage to 
effectively change their symbolisms without changing their entire editorial policy and 
confronting the government head-on as the alternative newspapers were doing. And as this 
dissertation will show, few of them had the nerve to do it. 
 
Numbers, Tables and Drawings 
 
Another popular tool for playing-down police violence as well as for playing-up the violence 
committed by opponents of apartheid were statistics of all sorts. The weight of bombs, the 
numbers of mines used by so-called ‘terrorists’, the amount and types of weapons confiscated  
by the police or the number of ‘terrorists’ killed were often given. None of these were really 
of any importance to the reader or to the completeness of the story. Whether a building was 
destroyed by one or two limpet mines makes no difference to the result and in most cases the 
average reader would be in no position to judge the actual significance of the numbers. Is the 
killing of “Nine suspected ANC insurgents,” 988 as The Argus of 17th June 1988 put it, a huge 
success or small fry? A civilian would not know.  
described using words like ‘bloody’, ‘fighting’, ‘murder’ and ‘wild’. For example in an article 
on the Witdoeke’s attack on Crossroads, The Argus of 20th May 1986 wrote: 
“A few minutes later about 300 youths wielding sticks burst out of the squatter camp 
into Lansdowne Road. Some were no older than nine or 10. 
They headed towards an advancing group of township elders. We watched the first 
exchanges of volleys of stones. 
Then 
                                                 
986 The Argus (20th May 1986: 1) 
987 The Star (7th September 1989: 1) 
988 The Argus (17th June 1988: 3) 
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and suffering caused by the policemen. 
The main point of the numbers was not to inform. Their use lay in what they symbolised: 
exactness, thoroughness and seriousness. They communicated to the reader that this was a 
newspaper that took its job seriously and checked all details before passing them on. In 
articles on police action, however, statistics often had exactly the opposite effect. Rather than 
helping to add precision, they helped disguise the pain 
Let us look for example at the front page of The Argus (City Late Edition) on 14th June 1985 
(see fig. 26) 
 
Figure 26: We blew 11 people to bits, including a 6-year-old boy – let’s call that a military operation… 
 1985: 1)) (Source: The Argus (14th June
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cision and purposefulness. This cool, calm and collected 
ackage is topped by a kicker above the main headline that reads: “SADF raid on Botswana – 
ade attack” 989.  
We find a fairly sober display overall – an image of General Constant Viljoen, the Chief of 
the SADF, saluting, a map of Botswana, a relatively non-sensationalistic headline (“ANC 
targets hit”) which implies pre
p
11 reported killed in mortar, hand gren
There is no indication of the agony the victims (40 people were injured in the raid) and their 
friends and family had gone through. They are merely a blot on a map and a number. The 
media generally avoided giving any details that might have conveyed an image of suffering 
when reporting on police violence. In their reports about black violence on the other hand they 
virtually celebrated the symbols of pain, such as blood and wounds. 990  
 
Figure 27: …they killed 5 people – only mindless savages could commit such an atrocity! (Source: The 
Natal Mercury (24th December 1985: 5)) 
pl bing of a shopping centre in Amanzimtoti in December 1985, which 
us on a crude head-count level causing less damage than 
For exam e the bom
killed five people and injured 40 (th
                                                 
989 The Argus (14th June 1985: 1) 
990 Hall et al. (1978: 9-10), Bell (1991: 203) and Posel (1990: 163) 
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the SADF raid), was universally condemned as “Urban terror” 991 or “Bomb atrocity” 992, 
widely covered in the news and illustrated with scores of photographs of people who had been 
injured in the blast (see fig. 27). 
 
Policemen and Soldiers After 1990 
 
After 1990, everything that had previously been a sign of government strength slowly turned 
into a symbol of brutal oppression. Most newspapers today describe the policemen of the 
apartheid state in the same terms that were previously used for black freedom fighters. And 
although many reports on the TRC amnesty hearings or trials of former policemen were 
dotted with modality markers like ‘alleged’ and ‘supposed’ that serve to reduce the 
impression of guilt 993, the symbol of the apartheid policeman has by and large changed its 
meaning, now standing for the exact opposite of what it represented before. 994  
This, however, does not necessarily show a different attitude towards the police in general. 
Instead, it is meant to draw a line under the old system to enable the new South African police 
force, the SAPS, to be seen as completely separate from the savage oppressors of the people. 
 and order’ was 
This view can for example be found in the Cape Argus article about the day of the trial of the 
PAGAD members accused of murdering Rashaad Staggie. “Cool cop’s order to hold fire 
‘stopped bloodbath’,” 995 the headline reads and the article repeats several times the presiding 
judge’s praise for the officer in charge at the site of the killing for not ordering his colleagues 
to shoot. “He probably saved many lives that night.” 996 
The images of cops facing huge crowds of demonstrators were also still used occasionally. 
Figure 28 for example appeared on the front page of The Star on 16th July 2002 accompanying 
an article (which, incidentally, was smaller than the image) about a march by striking 
municipal workers in Johannesburg. 
This article about the police clearing an illegal gathering in Delft is an exception though. 
                                                
The general consensus was that the police represent the law, which unlike ‘law
still a positive term, and stability, and that they protect ordinary citizens.  
Policemen thus still represent the strength of the government, which is pitted against those 
who sabotage the new order. Strangely enough, the reporting on policemen therefore often 
resembled that of the apartheid years. Strength, controlled behaviour and restraint were still 
quite often central to the image of the police. 
 
991 The Star (23rd December 1985: 3) 
992 The Natal Mercury (24th December 1985: 1) 
: 6) 
995 Cape Argus (7th March 2002: 2) 
993 See for example Cape Argus (7th May 2002 b: 2) and The Citizen (11th April 2002 b
994 McCarthy (1998: The SAPS, p. 1) 
996 Cape Argus (7th March 2002: 2) 
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Figure 28: Wage negotiations South African style (Source: The Star (16th July 2002: 1)) 
Generally, these days the communities where the police do most of their work – the poorer 
areas of the cities, the townships, and the informal settlements – are no longer portrayed as the 
enemy. “The communities are supporting us, and 30 people recently signed up as police 
reservists,” 997 a Grassy Parks police spokesman states in an article on gang violence in the 
Cape Argus on 17th May 2002. And in the N w South Africae  this support is mutual.  
 
Figure 29: To serve and protect (Source: Cape Argus (24th June 2002: 1)) 
                                                 
997 Cape Argus (17th May 2002 a: 5) 
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For example, in The Argus report of the shooting of five petrol station attendants in Cape 
Town, the main photograph shows a policeman lending support to the brother of one of the 
deceased (see fig. 29). The other two images show policemen on the scene of the crime (see 
fig. 62 in chapter 4.6.4 b) – a signal that they are there any time they are needed. 
All this, however, was not so much a symbol for violence anymore because most police action 
described in this way was indeed as you would expect in any free country of the world. At 
times the officers had to resort to violence, or what Max Weber would call legitimate force, to 
prevent or contain crime, but most of the time their weapons stayed in their holsters. And this 
is where the catch lies. As we have seen in chapter 2, the police have not completely changed 
their way. Allegations of police violence against suspects or detainees still surface often 
enough to be a cause of public concern, as is the amount of crime committed by police 
officers. And with the restrictions on what the newspapers could report gone, they now fulfil 
the role of public watchdog and exposed malpractice in the force, as well as the wrongdoings 
olicemen and women whilst off-duty.  
eople and injuring nine, the Diamond 
 the subsequent court proceedings, prominent 
coverag
its fron  July. “‘I saw bodies falling and I thought my time had come to die’” 999 it 
ng others, an article about a victim titled 
“‘The g
of p
For example, when a former police officer in the Northern Cape town of Postmasburg went on 
a wild shooting spree on 1st July 2002, killing four p
Fields Advertiser gave the incident, and
e for several days. “Mayhem in NC as ex cop runs amok” 998 the paper exclaimed on 
t page on 3rd
says on page three. And on 5th July it carried, amo
unman looked right into my face’” 1000 (see fig. 30). 
   
                                                 
uly 2002 a: 1) 
 July 2002 b: 3) 
 July 2002: 8) 
998 Diamond Fields Advertiser (3rd J
999 Diamond Fields Advertiser (3rd
1000 Diamond Fields Advertiser (5th
  206
   
Figure 30: A cop who lost the plot (Source: Diamond Fields Advertiser (3rd July 2002: 1-3 & 5th July 2002: 
2)) 
And on 18th July The Star published a box on page two, which united four articles on police 
proprieties under the headline “Law and Disorder”:  
 “Cop held for tourist robbery”  
about a Johannesburg officer who was arrested in connection with the robbery of a 
group of Taiwanese tourists; 
•  “Dog unit head out for using ‘K’-word” 1004 
about a dog-unit commander in the Western Cape who had been found guilty by a 
disciplinary hearing of using the word ‘kaffir’ in a telephone call to colleagues. 
And while the police are only described as acting violently in one of these incidents, all four 
denounce improper or illegal conduct by policemen. However, I am not sure whether the 
robbery should really be placed alongside the others. In my opinion this is another classic case 
of The Star constructing a crime wave, where none exists in extra-linguistic reality.  
im
• “Learning to lie the SAPS way” 1001 
about corrupt officers in two Gauteng police stations inciting people to make false 
affidavits; 
• “Uniformed officers ‘caught drinking’” 1002 
about two Pretoria officers who were asked to make a statement with regards to a 
recent accusation that they had been drinking alcohol while on duty; 
• 1003
                                                 
1001 The Star (18th July 2002 a: 2) 
1002 The Star (18th July 2002 b: 2) 
c: 2) 1003 The Star (18th July 2002 
1004 The Star (18th July 2002 d: 2) 
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More importantly, though, such examples show that the policeman has finally lost his 
symbolic power once and for all. Stories of police violence or crimes committed by policemen 
are no longer used to convey a hidden message. Their meaning is now their immediate 
content, or at most, as is the case in The Star’s box, the failings of the police as a whole. 
b) Police Vehicles and Military Vehicles 
During apartheid, police vehicles were a normal feature on any township road. They served 
two purposes: On one hand they were part of the state’s attack on the revolting blacks. They 
were used for transporting troops into unrest areas, protecting them from attacks while they 
were there and clearing passages that were closed to policemen on foot. On the other hand, 
they served as a signal to the township population that they were facing a greatly superior 
lost on newspaper editors 
 to those of the security forces. 
opponent. This symbolic power of armoured vehicles was not  
either. Due to their size and seeming invincibility Casspirs, Hippos and Buffels were a perfect 
tool for conveying a message of government strength and control to the white population. 1005  
 
Photographs 
 
Pictorial representations of police vehicles were very similar
Just like soldiers, armoured vehicles were meant to denote strength, power and security as 
well as strategic military thinking, methodical planning and restraint. To this end they were 
mostly depicted standing, which was intended to denote self-control and order (see fig. 33). 
When they were moving, it was generally in clearly distinguishable formations (see fig. 31) or 
as individual vehicles (see fig. 32). They were rarely coming towards the reader and no close-
ups were used in order to prevent them from appearing as a threat. 1006 
 
Figure 31: The security forces on the job in Soweto ’76 (Source: Rand Daily Mail (19  June 1976: 2)
                                                
th ) 
 
1005 Posel (1990: 162) 
0) 1006 Meli (1990: 150) and Posel (1989: 269-27
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Figure 32: Patrolling Cr
Due to their im
articles could be quite problem
find opposing readings – or what ngs – of the symbolism. It 
really depends largely on the caption whethe
or ‘abuse of power’, ‘police brut
The governm
representation of arm
knew of the potential dual use of the Casspirs.
the front page of the  the lead article about 
Casspir and a “sneeze machine”, but the main 
headlin
somehow involved in the violence. 
ossroads ’86 (Source: The Star (11  June 1986: 1)) 
pressive size and threatening appearance, using pictures of military vehicles in 
atic. One only has to be slightly critical of the government to 
I assume to be opposing readi
th
r a picture communicates ‘government strength’ 
ality’, and ‘excessive force’.  
ent was well aware of this danger and therefore restricted the pictorial 
oured vehicles during the state of emergency. The newspapers, too, 
 In my view figure 33, which was published on 
Rand Daily Mail on 22nd March 1985 to illustrate
the shooting in Uitenhage, is an example of a newspaper knowingly using a strongly 
ambivalent symbol in the hope that readers will find the opposing meaning. The caption only 
informs readers that they are looking at a 
e “17 dead in East Cape bloodbath” 1007 works as an indicator that these vehicles were 
 
Figure 33: The strength that ended in a bloodbath (Source: Rand Daily Mail (22nd March 1985: 1)) 
                                                 
1007 Rand Daily Mail (22nd March 1985 a: 1) 
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e none of the risks associated with images. 
Therefo irst line of defence against the 
encroac
publish
in Cape it suburb was saved by a Casspir from 
swept on to the highway in the Kraafontein area, outside Cape Town, 
related function in the reporting of events in the townships 
emselves. In those circumstances they were meant to show the difference in strength and 
                                                
Textual Elements 
 
Textual representation of armoured vehicles bor
re, in articles they often took a prominent role as the f
hing ‘Swart Gevaar’. For example on 8th September 1985, the Sunday Tribune 
ed a report under the title “Target Kraaifontein as youths stone and bomb white homes 
 suburbs” 1008, in which it describes how a wh e 
an attack by a group of black protesters. 
“White suburbs have come under attack for the first time since the unrest flared up a 
year ago,” the article begins. 
“This week the surges of violence in the Cape peninsula spread out of the coloured 
and black areas and into the suburb of Windsor Park. 
Shouting youths 
blocked the road with burning tires and obstacles and then stoned and petrol-bombed 
neighbouring houses in the white suburb. 
Yvonne Hoareau was alone at home at about 8.45pm. She had just finished bathing 
when she heard the next-door neighbour’s dog barking. 
“I went out the front door and they were out in the road dancing among the flames. 
They pointed at me and were laughing and shouting,” she said. 
She came inside just as a brick smashed through the front window of the house. 
Seconds later another brick hit the front door.” 1009 
The newspaper then continues to describe, for several paragraphs, the plight of other residents 
who had been besieged by the mob. One lady by the name of Mrs. Emerich tells readers of 
how her son had fired shots to defend them. 
“Then the police arrived, parked a Casspir in the highway and they ran away,” said 
Mrs. Hoareau.” 1010 
With this the account of the trouble ends and the reader gets another look at the life of 
ordinary whites who live in fear in the Western Cape. But the overall message is clear: The 
out-group is slowly but surely trying to invade ‘our’ lives and if it weren’t for ‘our’ police and 
their strength they would overrun ‘us’. 
Military vehicles had a another, 
th
behaviour between the violent black population and the whites who had come to ‘pacify’ 
 
1008 Sunday Tribune (8th September 1985 c: 19) 
 1985 c: 19) 1009 Sunday Tribune (8th September
1010 Sunday Tribune (8th September 1985 c: 19) 
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r the hastily regrouping youths and a senior officer ran 
ytown.”  
f this strategy is the 
les appear, the informed reader can 
townships. 
the black population and government intervention in the townships was no longer 
them. For example in The Argus’ first report of the witdoeke’s attack on crossroads, we read 
of how armoured vehicles were used to this end. 
“As they retreated Casspirs and police vans moved up. 
A yellow van stopped nea
towards us. Youths started throwing rocks at the van. Policemen with shotguns jumped 
out and the youths fled into the shant 1011
Here, the Casspirs and police vans are not only a symbol for the government’s strength as a 
tool to emphasise the violence of the black youths. The newspaper does not, like above, say 
‘don’t worry, we’ll protect you from them’, but rather ‘support us because they need us to 
keep them from killing each other’. This was one way of arguing for a continuation of 
apartheid by pointing at the devastating effects that a lifting of all controls on the black 
population would have. 
Every once in a while journalists openly used the shorthand constructed to support the 
government’s position, to do precisely the opposite. An example o
following quote from a Soweto resident in the Sunday Star: “In our streets, one day it’s all 
right. The next day you can cross the street when a Casspir comes round the corner, and you’ll 
die. It’s like Beirut.” 1012 Policemen are not mentioned in the text. Their presence is merely 
hinted at by the reference to their vehicle. The temporal relationship between the appearance 
of the police and the mentioned death implies a causal relationship, and, as no logic could 
explain why people would drop dead when police vehic
easily decipher the quote’s real meaning, namely that police in Soweto kill residents. The text 
further implies that their choice of target is entirely arbitrary, as the narrator does not mention 
any provocation of the police before the residents’ death. On the contrary, the victim does 
something that anyone of us does several times a day; he crosses the road. Yet even such an 
ordinary action in a seemingly normal environment (symbolised by the introduction “One day 
it’s all right”) can end in death in Soweto. The sentence “It’s like Beirut” further implies that 
such a violent episode is no exception, but rather that South Africa’s townships were in a state 
of civil war that can lead to violence at any time. Thus, if read properly, the article describes 
how the omnipresent police violence prevents normal life in the 
 
Armoured Vehicles after 1990 
 
The Casspir as a symbol of violence perpetrated by the security forces was slowly phased out 
during the 1990s. The focus had shifted away from the security forces to the violence among 
                                                 
1011 The Argus (20th May 1986: 1) 
eptember 1985, quoted in Cock (1990: 51) 1012 Sunday Star, 8th S
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by e state. On the one hand, the concept of violent and uncivilised 
nt did not want to get the public worried about the 
ut Africa 
ive curtailment of human rights. 
Accordingly, the liberation movements had to be portrayed as violent in order to prevent 
chinery’s right to exist. Furthermore, the government 
newsworthy. The first democratic elections marked the end of armoured vehicles, ‘sneeze 
machines’ and police vans. While before 1994 they had been part of life in the townships, 
after the elections they disappeared in the military’s depots. Accordingly, they were no longer 
seen in the news reporting either.  
4.6.2 The Violence of the Liberation Movements and Black Violence – Different 
Phenomena but Still Synonymous 
The newspapers felt a similar ambivalence towards violence perpetrated by blacks as they did 
towards that committed  th
blacks was an integral part of the white population’s worldview and the press saw it as their 
duty to reflect this. On the other hand, for a number of reasons they were unable to cover the 
entire spectrum of violence perpetrated by blacks. One barrier were the readers themselves. 
Not many whites were interested in what the black population did. Criminal violence in the 
townships was therefore dismissed as not interesting. In the strictly segregated life under 
apartheid it had no implications for the life of the white population. 1013 
Another problem was that the governme
ongoing violence. They were supposed to believe that the world was as perfect as their 
everyday experiences suggested. The NP knew that they were only going to keep the support 
of the broad mass of whites if they were certain that life in South Africa was perfect and 
would forever stay that way. Reports of a violent black uprising against the current order did 
not fit in with the beautiful world of white suburbia. 1014  
Therefore, even in those cases when the newspapers wanted to report black violence, the laws 
were often in the way. There was another, equally important reason behind this targeted news 
blackout. The NP was quite aware that a considerable part of the violence in So h 
consisted of political acts and as such carried a message. By reporting them the media also 
conveyed their message. According to van Heerden “violence is the most effective way of 
bringing objectives to the notice of the broad public. It is not so much the act in itself that 
matters, but its publication.” 1015 This meant that by paying attention to the liberation 
movements’ violence the media would have given them a public platform for their struggle. 
And under no circumstances was this supposed to happen. 1016  
On the other hand, the violence perpetrated by opponents of the government provided the 
officials with an excuse for the repressive laws and the mass  
questions about the repressive ma
                                                 
1013 TRC (17th September 1997: Thami Mazwai; Jon Qwelane, 3)  
1014 TRC Report, Vol 4, Chap 6, Para 4 and 113 
1015 van Heerden (1982: 206) 
1016 Rauch (1993: 3) 
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nce perpetuated by people 
C members were 
 acts of violence only for the sake 
                                                
profited substantially if white South Africans were of the opinion that without apartheid their 
country would descend into chaos and anarchy, as so many other African states had done after 
the end of white colonial rule. 1017 For that reason, the newspapers had to be allowed to report 
on violence perpetrated by blacks in some way, just to keep the whites worried. Accordingly, 
if violence was talked about, it was used to further reinforce the philosophy of apartheid by 
presenting the government’s opponents’ fight as “senseless viole
who have no commitment to civilized standards” 1018, or, as Jeremy Gordin put it, “the 
savages are at it again” 1019.  
This premise made one thing particularly important for the reporting of black violence in 
general and the violence of the liberation movements in particular: The individual acts had to 
be stripped of their political motivation. This achieved two things. For one, the risk of 
communicating an unwanted political message and thus awakening sympathies for the 
opponents of apartheid was eliminated. Secondly, the violence became devoid of meaning and 
as such really seemed like the result of anarchistic acts perpetrated by crazy savages incapable 
of rational thought and careful planning. 1020  
The SABC and the newspapers close to the government solved this dilemma by rarely 
reporting the violence directly. Instead, for example, the arrests of AN
described as prevention of violence. This way, the violent nature of the arrested activists could 
be pointed out and the desired images could be created without actually having to portray any 
violence. The English language press tried to be more balanced in their reports, but their 
overall attitude towards the violence in the townships was not substantially different to that of 
the government-supporting media. This meant that, in general, violence perpetrated by blacks 
was of no interest to them, unless it had any implications for the white population. 1021  
Throughout its reporting of the political trouble in the townships, the liberal press maintained 
an entirely white point of view and mostly ignored the framework from which the black 
violence derived its meaning. Rather than a struggle by oppressed people, it was portrayed as 
the deeds of ruthless black terrorists who were committing
of being violent. 1022 Every once in a while journalists did succeed in publishing truly critical 
articles about government violence or explain the reasoning behind the armed struggle of the 
liberation movements. I certainly do not want to detract from their achievements. However, 
throughout the apartheid years, they remained the exception. 1023 
 
1017 Manning (1987: 153) and Posel (1989: 263) 
3: 3) 
9) and Frederikse (1987: 212) 
C (17th September 1997: Thami Mazwai; Jon Qwelane, 3) 
& Guardian (6  August 1997: 2-3) and Business Day (21  January 1997 b: 2) 
1018 SAP Yearbook 1991, quoted in Rauch (199
1019 Interview with the author, 31st July 2002 
1020 Merrett (1994: 11
1021 Shaw (2002: 15) and TR
1022 Business Day (21st January 1997 b: 3), ANC (1997 b: 7) and Independent Newspapers (Unknown: 24) 
1023 Hachten (1984: 18), Electronic Mail th st
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code, a bit like a 
itive, 
tanding of the world. 1025  
ars, these stereotypes were quickly picked-up by the newspapers. All 
they had to do was create a modern version of the old images. 1026 Some, like ‘black-on-black 
nstruct the codes needed for manipulating the 
audience. Certain images were embedded in the reporting of violence and used over and over 
again, which implied that they captured the essence of black violence. This produced a strong 
, 
a 
So how did the newspapers succeed in depicting violence in a way that would not frighten 
away their readers and advertisers, or led people to believe that apartheid had outlived its 
usefulness? Direct images of violence or graphic descriptions of individual acts were 
obviously out of the question. Accordingly, just as they had done in the case of government 
violence, the newspapers solved this problem by constructing an intricate 
kind of visual and verbal shorthand, to denote black violence. 1024  
It consisted predominantly of images and concepts that were based on the white population’s 
most common prejudices and ideas of black violence, which had emerged soon after their 
arrival in Africa. What the newcomers encountered here was entirely different from what they 
knew from home. The local population appeared frightening to them, and soon a clearly 
negative image, tied closely to violence, was created. They were seen as wild, prim
impulsive, uneducated, backwards, barbaric, and uncivilised. Through repeated use, these 
subjective impressions eventually turned into seemingly objective descriptions of the facts. 
All European fears and prejudices are summarised in the term ‘African Mind’, the indigenous 
psyche, which was defined as being violent and driven by instincts. The African as an 
irrational barbarian whose violence was a threat to white civilisation soon became an 
important factor in white South Africans’ unders
During the apartheid ye
violence’, were easily understandable and quickly accepted. Others were less obvious and 
their construction took some time. The government used a two-part strategy for meaning 
building. In the first step, reports about violence were not censored too heavily for a while. 
During this phase, the English language press was at times allowed to publish fairly explicit 
articles of certain events provided that they stayed within the common apartheid discourse. 
Events like the Soweto Uprisings, the shooting in Uitenhage in 1985, the fights between the 
followers of the UDF and Inkatha during the early 1980s, and particularly the spread of 
necklace murders were described in surprising detail. 1027  
This time of relative openness was used to co
‘second order message’ 1028 which, hidden in the narrative about individual acts of violence
communicated a message that went far beyond the primary subject of the report. It was 
                                                 
1024 Posel (1989: 272) and Pahad (1993: 123)  
1025 Butchart et al. (1998: 2-3), Posel (1989: 272) and Pahad (1993: 123) 
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ed by Roland Barthes in the 1972 book Mythologies and later picked-up again by Stuart Hall (1973: 
s photography. 
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 directly anymore, everyone knew exactly what was 
ach other, were all that was needed to describe any form 
of blac
over in
symbol
a) 
The use of crowds to denote negativity is no  Africa. Several British and 
ample documented in great detail that people will 
statement about the character of black violence in general, namely that it is wild, primitive, 
and uncontrollable except by superior force. By repeatedly mentioning these key elements, 
they were turned into symbols of the parallel content. After a while, readers associated these 
elements with certain kinds of violence, accepting them as depictions and explanations of the 
events. At this point, they were moved to the foreground of the reports. 1029 
Soon these signifiers were established so well that merely mentioning them created images of 
the acts of violence they had been tied to in the audience’s heads. 1030 This is when the 
government strategy entered its second stage and the explicit pictures and descriptions of 
violence disappeared. What remained were merely the superficially non-violent symbols. The 
violence did not have to be mentioned
being said. A new kind of non-violent depiction of violence was born. 1031 
The images were then further legitimised and reduced to ever-smaller units of meaning 
through a process of repetition and condensation. By the mid-1980s a mere three elements, 
used alone or in combination with e
k violence: crowds, stones, and fire. These images and concepts appeared over and 
dependent of the content of a particular report. Removed from any context they became 
s for violence perpetrated by blacks. 1032 
Crowd / Horde 
t unique to South
1033American studies  have shown that the portrayal of crowds in news reporting serves a 
distinct ideological function. Wilder for ex
tend to feel more negatively towards others if they are perceived as members of a group rather 
than individuals, and that such feelings can be and have been exploited by the media to 
manipulate audience members’ sympathies when portraying conflict between groups. 
“Deindividuation” 1034, as Wilder calls it, is an easy and effective way to create feelings of 
hostility towards out-group members while at the same time increasing feelings of sympathy 
towards members of the in-group. 1035  
                                                 
1029 Posel (1990: 155) 
1030 Posel rightly points out that the effect of the reporting was naturally not the same with all media consumers. They could 
have raised conservative South Africans’ fears of the uncontrolled fury of the black population and opponents of apartheid 
took them to confirm their accusations against the state. However, the mainstream media did not try to reach either of these 
groups with their message. Their target audience was the middle of the political spectrum among whites and these people 
took the reports exactly as intended. ((1990: 155)) 
1031 Sayer (1984: 52-53) and Posel (1990: 155 and 166) 
1032 Malan (1990: 110) 
1033 For example Glasgow Media Group (1976), Halloran et al. (1970), Fowler (1991: 134-145), Wilder (1981) and Hansen & 
Murdock (1985) 
1034 Wilder (1981: 234) 
1035 Wilder (1981: 234) 
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urnalists’ own prejudices or whether they 
ic 
pinion (and in the end possibly their own), one thing is certain: no black person, not even 
s who were courted by the apartheid government, were 
ction, namely, to 
e public is seen as 
ural choice of symbol for black violence, for it has been an 
                   
It is therefore not surprising that, during the apartheid years, the newspapers hardly ever 
described blacks as individuals. It is hard to say which was cause and which was effect, 
whether such reporting was the result of the white jo
merely reflected the authorities’ prescribed point of view which in turn influenced publ
o
outstanding personalities or black
granted the right to be seen as an individual. Articles about Mangosuthu Buthelezi for 
example generally talked about him as a homeland leader, a black leader or a Zulu chief, but 
never simply as a man, and were often illustrated with pictures that showed him among a 
group of Zulus in traditional dress. 1036 
Whether it was done consciously or not, this served a clear ideological fun
paint a negative image of the people described and to set them apart from the implied reader 
of the English language press. In their study of populist media discourse and the crowd in 
Britain Mosco & Wasko found that 
“conservative attitudes to working class political participation have long revolved 
around the opposition between the public and the crowd. Th
composed of individual citizens, each making rational political choices (…). In 
contrast, the crowd is defined as a degenerate and illegitimate form of expression 
based on collectivity (…), and characterized by irrationality, violence and extremism 
rather than rationality, orderliness and moderation.” 1037  
The same could be said of South Africa, especially if the word ‘conservative’ is replaced with 
‘white’ and ‘working class’ with ‘black’.  
The crowd was a seemingly nat
important element in white South African perceptions of blacks for decades. It has its origins 
in an idea propagated by Volkekunde that, as members of primitive cultures, black Africans 
need a tight social unit in order to survive. To many whites, individuality seemed to be 
incompatible with the blacks’ character. And ideologically linking crowds with violence was 
not a difficult feat, for it is a common assumption that people in a crowd, along with losing 
their individuality, are somehow removed from their civilised state and are therefore prone to 
unleash an un- or rather pre-civilised kind of violence. This attitude is made painfully clear by 
a statement made before a commission of inquiry by Lieutenant-Colonel Pienaar who, as the 
senior officer at the police station in Sharpeville on 21st March 1960, was responsible for the 
police action during the Sharpeville Massacre: “The native mentality does not allow them to 
                              
1036 Teer Tomaselli (1992: 225) 
1037 Hansen & Murdock (1985: 231) 
  216
Crowds are not Multi-Coloured 
 
For one, crowds were generally shown to belong to one race group only. White protesters who 
joined their black compatriots were generally cropped out of pictures and ignored in texts. 
One exception I found was the Sunday Times of 21st July 1985, which displayed a large 
picture of a white man among the mourners at the funeral of the ‘Cradock Four’, Matthew 
Goniwe, Sparrow Mkhonto, Fort Calata and Sicelo Mhlawuli (see fig. 34).  
However, this should not be taken as a sign of greater openness. On the contrary, when looked 
at in context, the photograph created exactly the opposite impression, because the meaning 
does not lay in the picture alone. Several other factors, from the layout of the page to the 
content of the caption, are also involved in constructing its meaning. Let me explain starting 
with the big picture and working my way down to the photograph itself. 
First of all, the image is located in the centre of the page, next to the lead article and directly 
under the main headline that stretches across the entire top of the page and reads 
“EMERGENCY!” 1040. This makes it seem as if the depicted event is somehow directly 
related to the declaration of the state of emergency, something that certainly does not work in 
its favour. That impression is further strengthened by the black box/arrow to the left of the 
picture, which is inserted into the lead article. Again this serves to underline the link between 
the funeral and the emergency.  
Now to the text inside the arrow: “Priests March Under Soviet Flag”. Why is it there? Anyone 
with eyes can see that for themselves in the picture! Yes, but some people might not actually 
take this to be the essential message of the photograph – although in the politically charged 
situation of South Africa during the 1980s this is not very likely. Thus, the function of the 
arrow was not to inform, but to guide the reader towards the preferred reading of the 
photograph. The caption serves a similar purpose when it states “BLACK AND RED 
POWER … churchmen walk under the Soviet flag at yesterday’s funeral”. I say ‘a similar’, 
not ‘the same’ purpose for a reason. In the arrow, two groups are mentioned – Soviets and 
priests. In the caption, too, we initially hear about two groups – blacks and reds. But if we 
viets in the shape of a flag, 
gather for a peaceful demonstration. For them to gather means violence.” 1038 Thus, all the 
state ideologues had to do to create a salient image of violence was to sufficiently play on the 
deeply entrenched white fear of the black mob. 1039  
This was achieved in several ways, all of which I will sketch in the following sub-chapters. 
 
read on and when we look at the picture, we find three groups – So
                                                 
1038 Reeves (1996: 95) 
1039 van der Spuy (1990: 94), Simpson & Vogelman (1989 b: 1), Hansen & Murdock (1985: 231-232) and Sharp (1980: 25) 
1040 Sunday Times (21st July 1985: 1) 
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blacks, and a white churchman. But the caption informs us of only two, so what happened? It 
is obvious that the priest cannot be part of the group of blacks, he therefore must be one of the 
reds. And this, in my opinion, is exactly what the arrow and the picture insinuate and the 
caption says in a very roundabout way: Those churchmen who are involved in the township 
struggle are in fact not men of god, but puppets of Moscow. 
 
Figure 34: Red, white and black (Source: Sunday Times (21st July 1985: 1)) 
This message is reinforced by the choice of angle and the way the image is cropped. The 
dominant feature is certainly the Soviet flag which takes up nearly half the picture. The focal 
nding black point, though, is the white priest’s face. It stands out markedly against the surrou
  218
. 
egating individuality, political purpose, and ideological differences 
mong the black population. Whether the armed struggle against apartheid or Inkatha’s state-
overnment redefined all ongoing conflicts as one and made it appear 
 without even noticing it. Most white South 
demonstrations, were an adequate channel for expressing political sentiment. 1042 They saw no 
ok demonstrations, especially violent ones, to be 
      
mourners and the angle and the way the image has been cut help to put him at the centre. This 
certainly did not correspond to reality, as is clear if we look at the section of the flag that is 
visible. This would probably be missed by the reader who only gives the image a passing 
glance. He/she would most likely get the impression that the priest was among the leaders of 
the procession. So, to sum up, far from uniting the in- and out-groups, the picture serves to 
define the out-group as all reds and blacks who are opposed to the current order
The state ideologues encouraged the use of such stereotypes, for it reaffirmed the division 
between the black demonstrators and the white newspaper readership and served to de-
politicise the reporting about township violence. Much like the concept of ‘black-on-black 
violence’ it painted a picture of blacks as an intrinsically violent amorphous mass without any 
sense or direction, thus n
a
sponsored terror, the g
rooted in African culture rather than the oppressive system of apartheid. 1041  
This, however, does not explain why the newspapers that claimed to oppose apartheid took on 
this symbolism quite so readily. Several explanations would be plausible, and the truth is 
probably a mixture of them all. One factor is the newsworthiness of the event in terms of 
Galtung & Ruge’s twelve factors. Crowd violence fulfilled at least six of them: It perfectly 
fitted the frequency of newspaper publication; it generally passed the threshold of what was 
deemed worthy to be reported; it was easily interpreted by the news codes as a political story 
and could be presented to the readers in a simple manner of ‘us’ against ‘them’; it was easily 
understandable to the readers and thus meaningful to them; it certainly was a negative event; 
and, most importantly, it was expected to happen. White readers had been conditioned to 
expect large groups of blacks to behave violently. 
But newsworthiness alone does not explain the approach. I believe that the real motivator can 
be found on a more unconscious level – that of ideology. As much as they claimed to want to 
change the status quo, English speaking journalists were still average members of white 
society – they belonged to the urban middle class, were generally well off, and mostly male – 
and as such expressed their opinions exclusively within the officially sanctioned discourse. 
They were trapped in the dominant ideology
Africans felt that political participation (which, in their eyes, was sufficiently possible for 
blacks in the homelands and in the shape of community councils in the townships), not mass 
reason for anyone taking to the streets, and to
                                           
00: 178), Franks (1987: 174-175) and Simpson & Vogelman (1989 b: 1) 1041 Foster (1990: 166), Sanders (20
1042 Pattern (1997: 18-19) 
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t to mean that whites were never shown in groups. 
ifference between the two kinds of group was by emphasising 
the cro
Zululan The Star ran a front-page story titled “Zulus on rampage” 1045. Unlike 
an artic its 
march 
were st eople, the newspaper paints an image of the black protesters 
g) 
 the crowd threw stones, I realised ‘here is 
ouble’, and immediately shouted ‘fire’.” 1048 
Especially during the 1980s, but as early as 1976, weapons that were believed to be 
o served as symbols of black 
     
an unprovoked attack on public order. Protesters were assigned the role of enemies, to be 
defined solely by their criminal acts of stone throwing, arson, and destruction, and containable 
only by a strong, orderly police force. Such a view obviously left no room for explanations or 
analyses of the context of a demonstration and meant that non-violent black crowds, such as 
the group of 300 school children who marched peacefully through central Cape Town on 1st 
September 1976 accompanied by one lone policeman, were often ignored. 1043  
And this leads us straight to the next characteristic of the crowd: Crowds were not just mono-
racial; crowds were always black. This is no
They were, but these groups were portrayed entirely differently than blacks in that they were 
orderly or following a leader. Rampaging white crowds were just as absent from the reports as 
peaceful black ones. 1044  
 
Crowds are African 
 
The easiest way to express the d
wd members’ African-ness. For example, when protests began at the University of 
d on 18th June, 
le about a demonstration at the University of the Witwatersrand the day before (“W
into city ‘out of control’” 1046), in which students were described unfavourably, but 
ill portrayed as ordinary p
as tribal savages (“Zulus” rather than ‘students’) whose actions constituted vandalism and 
blind rage, devoid of any political message. “Buildings were gutted, cars were burnt and 
Whites fled for their lives today when rioting broke out at the University of Zululand at 
Ngoye near Empangeni,” 1047 the report begins. This sets the tone for the entire account, 
which goes on to paint the image announced in the headline: Zulus on rampage.  
A similar effect was attained by showing crowd members in African (mostly Zulu) tribal dress 
like animal hides or even mentioning (however, due to religious censorship never showin
that they were not wearing any clothing at all. For example in an article about the shooting in 
Uitenhage The Argus quoted a policeman as saying: “A coloured woman with bare breasts 
threw a stone at the Casspir. Simultaneously
tr
traditionally African, such as spears, clubs and axes, als
                                            
ave Order to Open Fire – Officer, quoted in Thornton (1990: 136) 
1043 Shaw (1999: 275) 
1044 Posel (1989: 271) and Teer Tomaselli (1992: 257-258) 
1045 The Star (18th June 1976 b: 1) 
1046 The Star (17th June 1976 d: 1) 
1047 The Star (18th June 1976 b: 1) 
1048 The Argus, 30th March 1985, Why I G
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y people in a crowd. 1049 For example on 26th March 1985, the 
1050
t as 
follows: “Entering from one of the entrances off Lansdowne Road, we were beckoned by 
about 70 men wielding long sticks and kerries.” 1052 
One of the most striking examples of the use of weapons to denote wildness and wanton 
violence that I found was published in The Star on 26th December 1985. The newspaper’s 
main headline that day read, “53 die in faction fight” with a kicker that read “Thousands of 
Zulus and Pondos clash in Christmas of blood”. The article was fairly long, so I will limit 
myself to quoting one short section that struck me as an interesting juxtaposition of white 
strength and black savageness: 
“A strong force of policemen from the Riot Unit have been in the area since the start 
of the fighting. 
Unconfirmed reports said that several homes of Pondos and Zulus have been burnt. 
, 
 bo ing to someone who is not involved in the fight, and the 
weaponry used is of secondary importance compared to the losses inflicted. So why were 
these two paragraphs published? In my opinion it is purely to communicate images of black 
savageness in order to remind the white population that the “strong force” should remain in 
power lest the savages escape from their townships and go roaming white neighbourhoods. 
Other articles create the same impression by simply talking of violence between different 
“factions” 1054 or “bands” 1055, “tribal” 1056 hostilities and the like, which implied that the use 
of violence was a tradition among blacks. 1057  
 
                                                
savageness when carried b
Cape Times, under the headline “Panga attack brings unrest death toll to 31” , reported 
that: “The deaths of two Uitenhage residents who were attacked by a mob wielding pangas 
have pushed the unrest death toll since Thursday to 31 in the Eastern Cape where several 
incidents of arson were reported yesterday.” 1051 And in an article in The Argus about the 
attack on Crossroads in 1986, a journalist recounts his trip into the battle-torn settlemen
Witnesses said that both groups clashed with shotguns, knobkeries, assegais, sticks
knives and pangas.” 1053 
This section has no apparent information value to the reader. The policemen are not stopping 
the violence, so mentioning their presence is rather useless. Unconfirmed reports that property 
has been damaged are also rather r
 
1049 Manning (1987: 153), Tomaselli & Louw (1991: 161) and Posel (1990: 160) 
1050 Cape Times (26th March 1985: 2) 
1051 Cape Times (26th March 1985: 2) 
1052 The Argus (20th May 1986: 1) 
1053 The Star (26th December 1985: 1) 
1054 Sunday Times (29th March 1987: 2) and Cape Times (13th June 1986 b: 2) 
 The Star (26  January 1986 b: 1) 
1057 Tomaselli (1991 a: 22), Segal (1991: 20), Talking about “Tribe”. Moving from Stereotypes to Analysis (Unknown: 1-2), 
1055 The Star (24th December 1985: 3) 
1056 th
Posel (1989: 268) and Posel (1990: 160) 
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owed their placards in the accompanying images (see fig. 35).  
Crowds are Opinion-less 
 
Similarly, many white racists believed that blacks were incapable of purposeful thought, let 
alone political opinions, a view that was consistently supported by the government and, to a 
lesser extent by the press. During the Soweto Uprisings the newspapers, particularly the Rand 
Daily Mail, still explained the students’ motives and reasons for protesting (if not so much for 
protesting violently) and sh
 
thFigure 35: The people shall speak! (Source: The Argus (17  June 1976: 23)) 
With time, however, all explanations for the protesters’ gathering or declarations of intent 
disappeared from the reports. Views of posters and slogans were generally either removed 
from photographs or obscured in such a way that their message became illegible (see fig. 36). 
Texts made no mention of them. 1058 
 
Figure 36: Ten years on, the message is lost (Source: The Argus (20th July 1985: 1)) 
                                                 
1058 Merrett (1994: 119), Posel (1990: 159) and Posel (1989: 267) 
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ulations may explain some of the omissions, but I believe that this is not The emergency reg
the whole picture. For one, when it suited their views the newspapers did show political 
statements and symbols in their photographs. The entire message of the Sunday Times article 
described above would have been lost had it not displayed the Soviet flag on the front page. 
Secondly, the alternative newspapers managed to publish political statements without being 
closed down (see fig. 37).  
 
Figure 37: Our strength is in our message (Source: Grassroots (August 1985: 2)) 
In my opinion, the reason fur such selective reporting lay once again in the ideological 
background of the English press. Most editors were quite content not to dispute the 
government’s views about the legitimacy of black politics because, by and large, they too saw 
ovements as dangerous terrorists whose aims should not be furthered. the liberation m
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Crowds are Huge 
 
Instead, elements of chaos and anarchy were stressed. Such feelings were communicated in a 
number of different ways: For one, the crowds were generally made to appear humungous. 
The Star for example reported on its front page on 16th June 1976, that the there were “10 000 
in Soweto on the rampage” 1059. And the Daily Dispatch, in a story about the murder of 
community councillor Benjamin Kinikini and his sons, explains: “The incident reportedly 
occurred when more than 30 000 chanting people who attended yesterday’s funerals were 
returning from the cemetery.” 1060 Such stories were frequently accompanied by photographs 
of huge crowds (see fig. 38). 
 
Figure 38: The danger is approaching (Source: The Argus (16th June 1976 (City Late Edition): 1)) 
During the Soweto Uprisings, the size of the crowds must have come as a particular surprise 
to journalists and editors. Most newspapers dedicated several pages entirely to photographs of 
the events in the townships and crowds of protesting students always featured prominently 
among them (see fig. 39). 
                                                 
1059 The Star (16th June 1976 d: 1) 
1060 Daily Dispatch (25th March 1985: 1) 
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Figure 3
The siz
The wh s, dancing and singing or with raised fists. This 
way th
body p hapter 4.6.2 c).   
 
Crowd
 
The la . The 
sense o
toward
him. The viewer instantly felt that this impenetrable wall of blacks was coming for him, that 
they w
Also, a group of blacks was seldom called that. Instead it was described using terms such as 
Women 
dragged off by student mob” , and The Natal Mercury explained: “Soweto was in chaos 
last night as vandal bands gutted Government buildings, looted bottle stores and laid siege to 
  
9: The symbols of bloodshed (Source: The Star (16th June 1976 (Late Final Edition): 7)) 
e of the crowds was often further emphasised by showing them at very close range. 
ole image was filled with moving black
e people were robbed of any individuality and disappeared in a sea of black bodies and 
arts, a mass without any kind of structure (see fig. 53 in c 1061
s are Wild 
ck of individuals also made the group appear chaotic, uncontrollable and wild
f danger emanating from it was greatly increased by depictions of the people moving 
s the camera, rather than passing by the side of the photographer or even away from 
ere running towards him, attacking him, ready to invade his/her world. 
‘crowd’, ‘horde’ or ‘mob’. This verbal imagery was extensively used in the reports about the 
events in Soweto on 16th June 1976. In its City Late Edition on 17th June, The Star’s main 
headline warns readers “Mobs take over” 1062. The Rand Daily Mail wrote of “
1063
                                               
976 c: 1) 
76 e: 3) 
1061 Sanders (2000: 171) and Posel (1990: 157) 
1062 The Star (17th June 1
1063 Rand Daily Mail (17th June 19
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some police stations.” 1064 Similarly, during the 1980s the state of emergency was frequently 
portrayed as a necessary measure to contain the mobs. On 21st July 1985, the Sunday Times 
wrote: “In a bold – and controversial – move, the State has adopted almost totally unfettered 
power to crush defiant mobs that have brought mayhem and murder to black townships.” 1065 
Note the contrasting of the mobs and the State, which is – unusually – capitalised. 
Whether people were described as a tribal army, a force of nature, or simply as a mass of 
bodies, the primary message of the reports was always the same: A group of blacks by its very 
nature is disorderly and violent. And even if the old terms were no longer used in the 1980s, 
the picture drawn of blacks remained the same: that of ‘violent black hordes’. 1066  
 
The Crowd during the Period of Transition 
 
This imagery did not change with the unbanning of the liberation movements in 1990. On the 
ric crowds laying the country to waste and going on murderous 
ess brutal death” The Star 
ad. 
contrary, images of barba
rampages were fast becoming a normal feature of the reporting during the transition. 1067 On 
30th June 1992 for example, under the headline “Newsmen witn
carried the following story on the front page:  
“Two horrified news photographers saw a man being dragged out of a Boipatong 
house and beaten unconscious before being shot and necklaced during yesterday’s 
mass funeral for the June 17 massacre. 
Star photographer Joao Silva and Weekly Mail counterpart Guy Adams were chased 
from the scene at gunpoint after witnessing the murder. 
They described how a crowd pulled a man said to be an Inkatha Freedom Party 
member from a house. 
“They started to beat him senseless with sticks and then threw rocks at his he
“As the crowd got the man into the street, a minibus carrying a lot more people, some 
armed with AK-47s, drove up,” Silva said. “They shot him dead and put a tyre around 
his body.” 
Silva and Adams said that as the group was about to burn the body, they were chased 
away at gunpoint.” 1068 
The article is illustrated with an image of a black man swinging a homemade axe above his 
shoulders about to bring it down on another man lying on the ground. In the background we 
see the outline of a crowd, which covers the whole width of the picture (see fig. 40).  
                                                 
1064 The Natal Mercury (17th June 1976 a: 1) 
1065 Sunday Times (21st July 1985: 1) 
1066 Rauch (1993: 2) and Sanders (2000: 171)  
1067 Merrett (1994: 168) 
1068 The Star (30th June 1992: 1) 
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Figure 4
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stark c
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membe  from the crowd is further underlined by the 
minibus “carrying a lot more people”. This gives the impression of there being a seemingly 
endless
‘primit
and the red peril, now rolled into one: wild Africans armed with modern weapons.  
As the e ongoing violence at the 
e crowd: While 
they ar
fact, th
term is
sensele e two white photographers 
therefore react to the spectacle in a way the reader can identify with while the actions of the 
xplained and therefore beyond understanding. And then there is the 
0: The brutal death of a young man seen through the eyes of a frightened photographer (Source: 
 (30th June 1992: 1)) 
ption reads: “Unknown attacker … hacks the body of a man who had been b
shot in Boipatong yesterday. The victim was then necklaced.” 1069 
Both the article and the picture illustrate perfectly how the image of crowd violence was 
constructed. In both cases the assailants are nameless and faceless, a feature that stands in 
ontrast to the naming of the two photographers. The victim, although given the 
e of being a single person, is still not identified as an individual, but rather as a 
r of a political party. The threat emanating
 supply of potential attackers. The crowd’s tools, sticks, axes and rocks, typical 
ive’ weapons, along with the Soviet made AK-47s re-invoke images of the black peril 
news value of the story is very low given the context of th
time and the mass funeral which happened the same day, the article seems to do little else 
besides illustrating the black population’s primitiveness. Still it is something special. Unlike 
most news items, this article makes explicit mention of the readers’ in-group, namely the two 
photographers, contrasting their feelings and their behaviour with that of th
e “horrified” at such displays of violence, the crowd seems to show no such feelings. In 
ey seem to show no feelings at all while beating a man “senseless”. Although this latter 
 not used to describe the crowd its use still leaves an impression of the violence being 
ss and the crowd being beyond sensible thought. Th
crowd remain entirely une
                                                 
1069 The Star (30th June 1992: 1) 
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 to underline white fears of 
hat might happen if these people are allowed to do as they please in South Africa. 
on, the newspapers sometimes still presented violence as typically 
eople’s knowledge of whom and what Inkatha 
katha hostel dwellers at the nearby Kwamadala hostel 
were responsible for the attack. He also alleged that “white” uniformed men in 
armoured vehicles assisted Inkatha in the massacre.” 1072 
direct relationship between the two groups. The photographers are in the minority, threatened 
and finally chased away at gunpoint, while the crowd is in the overwhelming majority, 
threatening and chasing the two members of the readers’ in-group. Taken metaphorically, 
again, we have a strong reference to the black peril, which serves
w
Even during the transiti
‘African’. The Boipatong massacre for example was frequently described as an ethnic conflict 
between violent primitives. The Argus of 18th June 1992 for example told readers: 
“The mob attacked houses at random, hacking and stabbing people in their path. Eight 
people are reported to have been injured. 
Vaal Triangle police liaison officer Captain Piet van Deventer said township residents 
claimed Inkatha residents from a nearby hostel were responsible for the attacks. 
He said men armed with knives, pangas and guns entered the township at 11.30pm and 
attacked occupants of houses. Most victims were women and children.” 1070 
The Pretoria News was even clearer about its interpretation of the events. Instead of relying 
on the symbolic power of the weapons and p
represented, they said it right in the headline: “34 die in ‘impi’ raid”. And the article explains: 
“At least 34 people, many of them women and children, were killed in a mass 
slaughter when Zulu impis allegedly went on the rampage in the Boipatong squatter 
camp in the Vaal Triangle late last night. 
(…) 
A group of about 200 men armed with knives, pangas and guns had slipped into the 
township on foot and started attacking houses in Slovo Park and killing occupants at 
random. 
Most of the victims were stabbed and hacked to death.” 1071 
Neither article needs to be dissected very much to find the intended meaning. It is all right 
there – mobs of Zulus randomly hacking people to death. None of the mainstream papers 
seriously investigated residents’ claims that policemen, soldiers, or white people had been 
among the attackers. The Argus article did mention the allegation in passing: 
“An elderly Boipatong resident, who witnessed the massacre, told the Star, sister 
newspaper of the Argus, that In
                                                 
1070 The Argus (18th June 1992: 1) 
1071 Pretoria News (18th June 1992 b: 1) 
1072 The Argus (18th June 1992: 1) 
  228
pons to the 
IFP. Bu rt of as IFP savagery.” 1073 
 
The Cr
 
The bl
election
such as ‘black-on-black violence’ and ‘faction fights’ are rarely found in the press these days. 
They n
not me
comple tail than acts of 
violenc
strong. cliché of the uncivilised hordes of black murderers. The only 
differen
black p
For exa he Electronic Mail & 
Guardi
suppor as dragged from his 
bakkie,
changed, but the imagery is clear: a mob of chanting black people waiting for their prey. 
Further
been pr  scene, thus reflecting the official point of view and positioning the reader 
among . The officers are mostly 
individ
They a  acting calmly and purposefully, for example when one of them 
“addres nfight broke out in which several people, 
includi
sudden violence, neither are the perpetrators named, but the context implies that the shooters 
had bee
crowd-
But it took the press quite some time to find the deeper connections between the NP 
government and the Boipatong attackers. As Jeremy Gordin, Eugene de Kock’s biographer, 
told me: “I mean that was de Kock and his buddies stoking up fires and giving wea
t again the press played it … so
owd after 1994 
ack crowd has remained a potent symbol for violent unrest even after the 1994 
s, however the terms used to build and maintain the image have changed. Expressions 
o longer fit in with the official discourse of tolerance and equality. This, however, does 
an that the attitude that gave rise to these terms in the first place has changed 
tely. Violence among blacks is still frequently described in more de
e committed by whites, and the association of crowd action with a black skin is still 
 This perpetuates the 
ce is that, today, such violence is more often ascribed to the political intolerance of the 
opulation rather than their nature. 1074 
mple in a report on the inquest into Rashaad Staggie’s murder, t
an described the scene in front of the victim’s home as involving “5 000 Pagad 
ters chanting “kill the merchants, kill”, minutes before Staggie w
 shot in the head and set alight” 1075. The actors, particularly the victim, may have 
more, the story is told from the viewpoint of a police intelligence operative who had 
esent at the
 the officers who face what is later called “the crowd” 1076
ually named adding to their positive evaluation and contrasting with the faceless mob. 
re described as
sed the crowd” 1077. After this talk, “a gu
ng Parker [one of the policemen] were wounded” 1078. No cause is given for this 
n among the crowd and had attacked the policemen. This again reinforces the view of 
action as irrational and violent. 
                                                 
1073 Interview with the author, 31st July 2002 
1074 ANC (1996 b: 25) and Segal (1991: 20) 
1075 Electronic Mail & Guardian (20th August 1998: 1) 
1076 Electronic Mail & Guardian (20th August 1998: 1) 
1077 Electronic Mail & Guardian (20th August 1998: 1) 
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b school 
 and other staff desperately tried to put out the flames but were 
ob, members of 
which were trying to regain entry to the school. 
At the time of going to press, police and the mob of residents were in a stand-off.” 1079 
This article is a prime example of the crowd symbolism in use today. Not unlike its 
counterparts during apartheid, it gives hardly any information about why the residents of 
This imagery has survived all changes in reporting and is still used by the mainstream press 
today. Consider for example the following article that appeared on the front page (it was not 
the main story, but the headline was above the fold) of The Star of 18th July 2002: 
“Rioters petrol bom
Schoolchildren ran for their lives today as an angry mob went out of control, throwing 
petrol bombs and destroying property in Lenasia. 
The school was attacked by a mob of residents – protesting their removal from the 
Thembelihle informal settlement – after they had damaged three shops and ransacked 
a butchery. 
The school’s deputy principal, Gerald Pillay, said the mob gathered at the school at 
about 7.45am, broke down the fence and started throwing petrol bombs into some of 
the classrooms. Students trying to flee were sjambokked by the mob. 
Pillay told how he
accosted by the mob. 
“They took our cellphones, beat us up and held us to the ground. One of them pointed 
a firearm at our chief administrative clerk. They searched him and robbed him of 
cash,” Pillay said. They then smashed windows and classrooms. 
Pillay said the principal had been approached by residents yesterday, telling him that 
the students living in Thembelihle would not attend school today. 
Pillay said they had wanted to use the pupils as shields if police fired on them during 
the march. 
“I think the thugs that came to the school are undermining the genuine demands of the 
squatters.” 
The mob also broke into a butchery owned by Settar Karim. 
“These people just came at about 7.30am, broke my till and removed the money inside 
it,” Karim said. 
They also smashed the windows of his car. 
The till of another shop owner, Shiraz Khan, was carried off by squatters this morning 
who had also smashed his car. 
Police reinforcements were on the scene trying to negotiate with the m
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Thembelihle were protesting, except that they were “protesting their removal”. Neither does it 
explain why the protest had turned violent. It is as if the newspaper expects its readers to 
presuppose that a protesting crowd of black people is by its very nature violent and therefore 
not to ask such a question.  
The protesters are not allowed to explain their reasons for resisting relocation or for violently 
attacking school children. Instead, they are constructed as the evil out-group (“they”, “these 
people”), a “mob” of “squatters” and “thugs” (never ‘people’ or ‘residents’) with all attributes 
the good in-group is expected to hate and fear: They are “angry”, “out of control”, “destroying 
property”, “attacked” a school, “damaged three shops”, “ransacked a butchery” “sjambokked” 
children, “beat” people and took their cellphones, “robbed them” and “smashed” car windows. 
Their negative actions are mainly described in active clauses and using terminology that 
describe the demonstrators either in the old apartheid way as a degenerate mob of primitives 
or as common criminals.  
On the other side stand the residents of Lenasia, they are constructed as the good in-group 
(“our”, “us”) with attributes that the readership is expected to recognise as normal and identify 
with: They are mostly named and other information, such as job descriptions (“principal”, 
“clerk”, “butcher”, “shop owner”), is given, which makes it easier for the reader to identify 
with them. Also, the fact that they have jobs, money and status symbols (cellphones, a 
firearm) indicates that they occupy a rank on the social ladder which is much closer to that of 
the white newspaper readership than that of the black out-group. They are attacked by the evil 
out-group (the close proximity of the robbing and the demonstrating almost insinuates that the 
attacks were motivated by the chance of making a profit) and, like most whites who were 
attacked in their homes, “desperately tried to put out the flames”. The people of Thembelihle 
on the other hand remain an anonymous “mob” without names, faces, sense or reason. 
hat appeared on the same 
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Let us briefly compare this article with one about the same conflict t
day in the Daily Sun, a tabloid newspaper aimed at a wor g-class black readership 1080. The 
Thembelihle issue was front-page news, illustrated with a huge
barricading a road with rocks. The title makes it clear from the beginning whose side the
tands on: “We won’t go!” 1081 it declares making the protesters’ cause their own 
t even adding quotation ma
 
ly 1 Rand compared with 2.40 for the Sowetan and 2.80 for The Star. 1080 The cover price in 2002 was on
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Figure 41: A whole different in-group (Source: Daily Sun (18th July 2002: 1)) 
The article on page two titled “‘We refuse to move’” 1082, this time including the speech 
 between residents, motorists and the 
police are plans to move about 500 families from the area.” 1083 
After this brief introduction the newspaper goes on to explain that the protesters are waiting 
nesburg executive mayor Amos Masondo, which they “have been 
      
marks, begins by explaining the situation in Thembelihle as follows: 
 “Angry members of Thembelihle have vowed not to move, in spite of eviction orders. 
Trouble has been brewing in Thembelihle, an informal settlement in Lenasia, south of 
Johannesburg, for weeks. 
At the heart of the trouble, which has seen clashes
for a meeting with Johan
                                           
1082 Daily Sun (18th July 2002: 2) 
1083 Daily Sun (18th July 2002: 2) 
  232
told was coming” 1084. “But the office of the mayor said Masondo had never arranged any 
meeting,” 1085 the paper continues a little further down and no talks took place. 
“Squatters who spoke to Daily Sun,” the article continues, “said the decision to move 
them to Vlakfontein was a ploy to make the land available for businesses. 
“The council is trying to make money at our expense. We are not occupying this land 
for free, we are also paying service charges,” said the residents. 
Thembelihle crisis committee spokesperson, Mzwandile Mdingi, said the community 
was being moved to Vlakfontein, an area which they claim has no infrastructure. 
“There is no running water, electricity, schools or clinics and the land is far from the 
industrial area where most of our people work,” said Mdingi.” 1086 (Italics in original.) 
The newspaper then goes on to explain how even the “nearby rate-payers of upmarket houses” 
had called the decision to evict squatters as a ““crime against humanity”” 1087 (quotation 
marks in original), especially as the people are being moved in winter. The article finishes off 
by quoting Soweto police spokesperson Captain John Shiburi that the police would be 
deployed in the area “on a 24-hour basis to monitor the situation” 1088. 
From this article a whole new image of the crowd emerges. No longer are they depicted as 
dangerous and evil (“members” or “residents” instead of ‘mob’), although some of the 
negative descriptions remained, such as squatter, a term that indicates illegal behaviour and 
carries heavy historical connotations as it was used by the apartheid regime to indicate that the 
black population had no right to live in urban areas. Neither do they act impulsively, 
irrationally or without reason. They feel they are being cheated for a number of possible 
reasons that they are allowed to express themselves in direct quotes. Moreover, they are 
shown to be open for dialogue. And finally, they are not described as violent, let alone as the 
out-group. It is quite clear from this comparison that The Star had the option to report 
differently that day 1089 but editors made the more or less conscious choice to stick with the 
old imagery of good individuals being faced by a bad crowd. 
n describing groups of Not only the articles often maintained the old modes of reporting whe
black people. Pictures, too, tended to make use of the old symbols when portraying crowd 
action. The Star for example published a large picture of a crowd reminiscent of the apartheid 
days on the front page on 4th July 2002 to accompany an article about a strike among 
municipal workers that had turned violent (see fig. 42).  
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 issue see Mail & Guardian (28th June 2002: 5), which provides an intrinsically mainstream 1089 For yet another view on the
position, but balances this with background information and quotes from residents. 
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Figure 42: Welcome to the new millennium (Source: The Star (4th July 2002: 1)) 
The writing on the placards may have changed, but the image remained the same – a massive 
crowd of angry-looking blacks walking towards the reader seemingly trashing everything in 
their way. The headline, “‘Only talks will end chaos’” 1090, also brings back memories of 
a condemnation of the protesters the paper actually gives readers an account of their 
with a quote from one of the demonstrators, talks about their 
          
apartheid where crowds of blacks automatically meant unrest (or, in some headlines even 
“chaos” 1091). However, in this case the article does not deliver what it promised. Rather than 
grievances, complete 
                                       
e 1976: 1), The Star (21st July 1985: 2) and The Argus (1st February 1990 b: 5) 
1090 The Star (4th July 2002: 1) 
1091 The Natal Mercury (19th Jun
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as captured on video 
e CCTV cameras linked to the Business against Crime surveillance unit and that 
workers would face prosecution if the council decides to press criminal charges.” 
e shoppers to seek safety in 
estroyed rubbish bins, strewing garbage in the city’s 
streets.” 1096 
“leadership, determined to prevent the nationwide strike from degenerating into further 
mayhem” 1092 negotiating with the government. They also give a description of the violence, 
which is clearly blamed on renegade workers who “broke ranks and, despite pleas from union 
leaders to “clean up their city”, continued where strikers had left off the night before, and 
again trashed the streets” 1093 and an overzealous policeman who had “fired a rubber bullet 
into the crowd” 1094 in Johannesburg and two who had injured workers with birdshot in Paarl. 
Still, the violence is more closely associated with the marchers. The police appear in 
connection with violence in the following sentences: 
- “In Johannesburg, what started out as a peaceful march ended with one man wounded 
from rubber bullets allegedly fired by police as mayhem broke out for a second day in 
a row” 
- “In one incident, a policeman allegedly fired a rubber bullet into the crowd and injured 
a worker in a leg.” 
- In Paarl, two marchers were treated for birdshot at a hospital, apparently after police 
said they needed to defend themselves when attacked with sharp objects. 1095 
And this is how the workers are described when they act violently: 
- “Rampaging workers broke ranks and, despite pleas from union leaders to “clean up 
their city”, continued where strikers had left off the night before, and again trashed the 
streets.” 
- “The worker, Comfort Shosha, from Durban Deep Pikitup, who was trying to calm a 
rampaging group who had broken a taxi driver’s window, was left lying on a filthy 
President Street pavement as the police officer allegedly ran from the scene.” 
- “[Superintendent Chris] Wilken said Monday night’s rampage w
by th
- “Workers emptied dustbins and damaged property.” 
- “On their way to Cape Town station, rubbish bins were overturned.” 
- “The protesters forced many informal traders and lunchtim
barricaded shops as they d
I believe that it is obvious even from this short summary that the amount of coverage given to 
the workers’ violence is much greater than that of police violence. Moreover, the newspaper 
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ee policemen as vaguely as possible and only in one 
lice are in the grammatical subject position, 
 from the action, and sentence three does not explicitly link the 
nstead the relationship is implied through the description of 
police action and the workers being treated in 
ill fill in the blanks and reconstruct the 
n (rampage), thus making the actor completely irretrievable. There are no 
modali
describ
sober ed in connection with the workers 
Fire as a Form of Black Violence 
 
r to nature than civilised whites, and what better way to express this 
se of nature in its crudest form, namely that of fire? Flames 
ports of violence with people being described as setting fires, 
uch as petrol bombs, or dancing around a fire.  
d frequently during the reporting of the Soweto Uprisings in 1976: 
describes the violent actions of the thr
case in an active sentence. In sentence one the po
which serves to distance them
policemen to the violence at all. I
a temporal relationship (“after”) between the 
hospital. The newspaper presupposes that the reader w
events in his/her head. Once again this technique serves to obscure the policemen’s 
involvement in violence. The impression of vagueness about the police violence is further 
underlined as all three sentences contain modality markers that signal uncertainty (allegedly, 
apparently). And finally, both incidents are justified by pointing at the violence of those the 
police were facing – the crowd. 
Now if we compare this description to that of the crowd, we will find a whole different kind 
of violence. In four out of six sentences their actions are described in active sentences with 
them in the grammatical agent position. One uses a passive construction and only one makes 
use of nominalizatio
ty markers indicating uncertainty or vagueness in any of the sentences; the actions are 
ed as fact. Moreover, unlike the police whose actions are described using relatively 
language (“fired”, “defend”), the words us
(“Rampaging”, “despite pleas”, “trashed”, “rampage”, “forced”, “destroyed”) are highly 
emotive and evoke the old images of chaos and mayhem. And while the police were now a 
non-racial category, that of the crowd was still closely associated with blacks. As Tony Heard 
put it: “Blacks usually run amok and go on a rampage. How many whites go on a rampage? 
Very few. I don’t even know what a white on a rampage looks like.” 1097 
b) Fire 
During the apartheid years, an equally popular symbol of black violence was fire. It played 
into two stereotypes that whites had towards their fellow black countrymen and was therefore 
used in two ways, literally and metaphorically. Let me explain.  
 
Blacks were seen as close
than by showing them to make u
were extensively used in press re
handling burning objects s
The fire symbolism was use
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• “Flaming night” 1100,  
• “Death town burns” 1101,  
• “Riots, arson spread” 1102, and 
• “Children stone buildings, burn vehicles” 1103  
These were just some of the headlines on and after 16th June. The articles, too, were dotted 
with references to flames and fire. “As we flew over the next time,” The Star describes a 
helicopter flight over Soweto, “pupils were jumping back from one of the cars, which began 
to spew flame and smoke. Seconds later the car was a ball of flame with thick black smoke 
pouring towards the sky.” 1104 “The fires are burning furiously,” 1105 a different article in the 
same edition explains. And The Argus told readers: “Thick black smoke was blowing over 
Orlando from a van which was reportedly overturned and burnt by the angry crowd.” 1106 
Even the supposedly liberal Rand Daily Mail described the situation in Soweto in a decidedly 
conventional way:  
as roving bands of vandals burnt Government buildings, looted bottle stores and 
threatened to lay siege to police stations.” 1107  
In fact, this formulation looks very much like one that was published the same day in the 
rather conservative Natal Mercury: “Soweto was in chaos last night as vandal bands gutted 
Government buildings, looted bottle stores and laid siege to some police stations.” 1108 Such 
striking similarities are probably the result of both newspapers belonging to the South Africa 
Morning Newspaper Group, whose members shared stories on a common wire service. 1109 
The “Mercury Correspondents” that the Mercury article is bylined to are most likely reporters 
for the Rand Daily Mail. This is a significant little detail, because in my opinion, the fact that 
the Mail published a story which was taken over without great changes by the Mercury, shows 
that the idea that black protesters are nothing but “vandals” on a rampage laying everything in 
their path to waste is widely shared among white South Africans. 
                                                
• “Children set cars ablaze” 1098,  
• “Looting, burning as riots continue” 1099,  
“The giant Black city – housing more than one million people – was last night in chaos 
 
1098 The Star (16th June 1976 f: 1) 
1099 Cape Times (17th June 1976: 1) 
1109 Raymond Louw in an interview with the author, 19th July 2002 
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Similarly, every newspaper I surveyed illustrated its reports about the events with images of 
burning vehicles and buildings or billowing smoke rising at the horizon (see figs. 43 and 44). 
 
thFigure 43: Soweto through the eyes of The Star (17  June 1976: 1) (The same picture appeared on the 
front page of The Argus that day) 
 
Figure 44: Soweto as seen by the Rand Daily Mail (18th June 1976: 1) (The same picture appeared on the 
front page of the Cape Times that day) 
I agree that the burning of buildings is a newsworthy event, but to give a burning car 
preference over, for example, images of injured victims must be the result of a conscious 
great consistency across the entire spectrumdecision, especially if it is done with such . It 
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certain
Peter M ne, among others, did a tremendous job at capturing the human face of 
sufferin
immen ee.  
ly was not done for lack of photographs of victims. Rand Daily Mail staff photographer 
aguba
g, but only one of his pictures of victims made the paper (see fig. 45). And, despite its 
se visual power, it was only published fairly small on page thr
 
Figure 45: The pain and suffe aused by the guardians of law and order is pushed aside by an 
advertisement for cigarettes (Source: Rand Daily Mail (19th June 1976: 3)) 
ring c
The Soweto Uprisings were not the only event in my survey where fire played an important 
role in the reporting. It was frequently used in the reporting of the witdoeke’s attack on 
e lead article in The Argus on 20th May 1986 it was even the 
dline, the lead, and the main picture all made use of the fire 
lotted out the sun” 1110 the headline read. The article is illustrated 
 the page showing a township (Crossroads, we are told) with 
. And the lead states: 
       
Crossroads in 1986. In th
dominant feature. The hea
symbolism. “The day they b
with a big picture at the centre of
smoke billowing above the shacks
                                          
1) 1110 The Argus (20th May 1986: 
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“The ominous pall of smoke blotting out the sun stained the sky to the Gordon’s Bay 
coast. 
Flames leapt as new fires broke out in huts deep in the camp. Jets landing at nearby D 
F Malan airport were barely visible through the smoke.” 1111 
And although the article never says who actually laid these fires, it is quite clear in the South 
African context. The headline gives the first indication by referring to ‘them’, which in 
apartheid South Africa generally meant black people. This impression is further underlined by 
the fact that the fires break out “deep in the camp”, a place that white people would not 
generally be associated with. And finally there is the fact that no white people are explicitly 
mentioned, in which case it is safe to assume that none were present in a black township at the 
time the fires broke out. Thus, without having to give long explanations, the newspaper 
expresses that the fires are a purely black phenomenon. 
In a completely different context and for more obvious reasons, the fires that broke out after 
the ANC’s attack on the fuel depot in Sasolburg were omnipresent in the newspapers’ 
reporting of the event the following days. “Six tanks still ablaze” 1112, “We fly through pillars 
of smoke” 1113, “Residents roused by midnight blast” 1114, “Blasts, then residents see ‘flaming 
hell’” 1115 were some of the headlines in The Argus on 2nd June 1980 (see fig. 46 for The 
Argus’ front page photograph that day). The Star painted a similar picture: “Sasol inferno” 
1116 and “Pyjama crowd watched the flames” 1117.  
However, not only the fire, that is the black violence, is portrayed. The fire fighters, the real-
life ones as well as those symbolic ones in government, and the police are shown to be on the 
ball right away. The Natal Mercury ran a kicker above the main headline on 2nd June that 
e read: “Plastic devices defused as Sasol fires brought under control” 1118 and underneath th
main headline, almost like a sub-headline, is the headline of an article announcing possible 
attacks on Mozambique: “Le Grange warns SA’s neighbours of reprisals” 1119. The Pretoria 
News on 3rd June announced a “Huge manhunt for saboteurs” 1120, while The Star reported in 
one of its later editions on 2nd June: “Firemen in battle to hold Sasol flames” 1121. And the 
next day it informed readers: “Sasol flames die as police hunt bombers” 1122. 
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Figure 46: The flames of terror at Sasolburg (Source: The Argus (2nd June 1980 (Late Final Edition): 1)) 
Combined with the symbol of the crowd, the flames acquired an almost mystical meaning. By 
showing people handling fire, or better yet dancing around a fire, the media invoked images of 
pagan rituals, again tapping into the white population’s fear of the primitives. This method 
obviously worked best on television as moving images combined with sound made the biggest 
impression on the audience. 1123 However, the English press, too, made use of this imagery. 
For examples, in a report about the burning to death of Kwanobuhle community councillor 
Benjamin Kinikini, the Daily Dispatch wrote: 
“Mr. Kinikini and his son, Silumko, 18, were burnt to death when his funeral parlour 
was set alight on Saturday. 
The chanting crowd reportedly danced on the charred remains of people they said were 
        
those of Mr. Kinikini and his son.” 1124 
                                         
) and Tomaselli & Louw (1991: 161) 1123 Hudson & Stanier (1998: 314), Posel (1989: 269
1124 Daily Dispatch (25th March 1985: 1) 
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This shows a completely different context in which fire was used to symbolise black violence. 
In the shape of necklacings it also came to represent the essence of township murder. Here it 
was not so much the nature of fire that was drawn on to create the desired images in peoples’ 
heads, but rather the ghastliness of the act of burning a person alive. Accordingly, the 
newspapers did not try to hide the violence behind a cloud of smoke, but openly described the 
brutal practice, at times in surprising detail and occasionally illustrating the articles with 
explicit images of the (dead) body. 1125  
For example on 20th May 1985, The Star described the dying moments of Maki Skosana under 
the headline “Funeral mob batters and burns ‘spy’ at Reef burial” 1126: 
“When they caught up with her they tore her clothes off and attacked her. 
Maki fell to the ground and combustibles were piled upon her and set alight. Even 
when it was apparent that she was dead, youngsters hurled stones at her and some spat 
on her semi-naked body.” 1127 
The article was illustrated with a photograph of a group of black men standing around and 
kicking at something that is burning on the ground. The body itself is not discernible in the 
photograph (see fig. 12 in chapter 4.2.3). Not so in the Sunday Times of 29th June 1986, which 
published a story titled “My ‘necklace’ hell” that was illustrated with a gruesome picture of 
the victim’s scarred back (see fig. 47). 1128 
The text makes use of similar language to that about Maki Skosana, invoking images of a 
frenzied mob descending on their helpless prey. The victim is portrayed as a tangible human 
”” to protect his safety) and being: he is named (even if his ‘name’ is the pseudonym “Mr. “X
described as a “father of four” who lives in Crossroads with his wife. We are told his age, his 
occupation and, most importantly to the white reader, the fact that he is non political (he was 
“sucked into the violence”) and does not partake in strikes. The perpetrators on the other hand 
are described as a “mob” and a “crowd comprising men and women of all ages”. As so often 
in descriptions of black crowds at the time, they are said to have attacked him with “sticks, an 
axe and pangas”; they “put a tyre around his neck and splashed petrol over him”; then “they 
set him alight”. The victim is finally saved when “Through a haze of pain he heard shots and 
the crowd scattered as the police arrive” 1129. 
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Figure 47: Savagery on display (Source: Sunday Times (29th June 1986)) 
Here we have the re sentatives of the in-group, the saviours, the protectors, and those who 
hunt (later in the article we read about a house-to-house search) for the perpetrators of 
violence. All others represent the out-group, the crowd quite clearly so with its primitive 
weapons and barbaric violence and the victim a lot less so, but still he is not one of ‘us’. At 
one point for example he is quoted as saying, “my kop was donk” 
pre
r translated that 
discharge from hospital.” 1131 
1130, a colloquialism that we 
would not hear in the papers coming from whites. Moreover the newspape
quote in brackets (“I was dizzy”). This to me clearly means to underline that he is different, 
for would one of ‘us’ need translating? But the most important feature of the article is not 
found among the reference to persons; it is the portrayal of the victim’s wounds, scars and 
suffering. Almost a quarter of the two-column article is devoted to descriptions such as: “His 
face and head had panga and knife wounds, and the interview was conducted shortly after his 
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discourse, where words such as ‘terror’ were preferred. As we will see in 
reater detail in chapter 4.6.4 b the portrayal of such aspects of the victim could serve several 
as of interest for the journalists because, besides fulfilling 
 the white public? 
fted on Friday when police escorted a Press group into Nyanga to observe a 
e other hand it was an easy way to show to the white 
popula
Throug
among ’ as the 
y different than whites, 
but actually stood on a lower step on the evolutionary ladder. Who else but underdeveloped 
Why did the newspapers choose to expose their readers to such a disconcerting subject? It was 
certainly not meant to emphasise the obvious, namely that burning people alive is incredibly 
cruel. Strangely, words like ‘cruel’ were rarely used in articles about necklacings. They did 
not fit in with what I have called the ‘racial differences’ frame, and were too neutral to be of 
use in apartheid 
g
functions in a report. In our case it w
eight criteria of newsworthiness (frequency, threshold, unambiguity, meaningfulness, 
consonance, unexpectedness (these last two might seem like a bit of a contradiction, but it was 
expected in that whites thought that necklacings happened frequently, but came unexpectedly 
as no on knew when the next case would become known), reference to persons and reference 
to something negative), it satisfies the readers’ fascination with the forbidden world of 
devilish violence (necklace “hell”) in the townships that they would otherwise not even get a 
glimpse of. It is the appeal of the forbidden.  
And why did the government allow the papers to be so open with these necklacings when it 
put so much effort into keeping other kinds of black violence hidden from
We must not forget that this last article was written just after the declaration of the second 
state of emergency and while, as even the article itself tells us, a “ban on reporting on events 
in Crossroads and the surrounding townships” 1132 was in place. Obviously the information 
was not obtained secretly. The government wanted this story to get out. So why was the ban 
“temporarily li
security operation” 1133 and Mr. “X” paraded in front of gazing white journalists at a “Press 
conference arranged by the police on Friday” 1134? In my view it served them in two ways. On 
the one hand it supplied the journalists with some information about the townships, which 
might have stopped them probing independently and uncovering things that the government 
wanted to keep under wraps. On th
tion what barbaric deeds the blacks in the townships were capable of.  
h such reporting, necklacings soon developed into a symbol for the political violence 
 South Africa’s blacks, or rather for ‘black-on-black-violence’ or ‘faction fights
conflicts were called in the press. 1135 And this is where the real reason for their publication 
lay. They reinforced the old prejudice that blacks were not just visibl
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saving lives. 1136 
 
Black Violence as a Form of Fire 
 
Fire was not only used in the literal sense described in the last sub-chapters. The newspapers 
also employed the symbolism in a different, metaphorical way. Fire was perfect for expressing 
notions of chaos, senseless destruction, and wildness. Raging flames encompassed everything 
whites took black violence to be about. Like a fire it can erupt at any time and in any place. It 
happens spontaneously and has no specific cause, which means that it is not the result of a 
rational, thought process. The spark which enflames them comes from an inner force. Blacks 
carry violence within them. The fire symbolism was also meant to show that black violence 
has no clear direction and does not attack any clear targets. It is like a wildfire. Once started, it 
develops its own momentum and can develop in any way imaginable. 1137  
Playing on the white population’s fear of the supposed irrationality of blacks and their wild 
passions, the newspapers thus described crowd violence using metaphors that drew on 
analogies with wildfires or volcanoes, which insinuated that the violence perpetrated by the 
crowd was forceful and uncontrollable. It was said to ‘break out’ or ‘erupt’, ‘flare-up’, ‘rage’ 
and ‘spread’.  
Again, the Soweto Uprisings were a prime example. On 17th June The Argus’ main headline 
was “Violence flares again in Soweto” 1138 and the Rand Daily Mail used metaphors of fire 
and flames throughout its reporting of the uprising. The sub-headline of its main story 
(“Flaming night” 1139) on 17th June 1976 read “Riots rage – Army on standby” 1140. And a few 
pages on we find an article saying:  
“Only a day or two before yesterday’s violence broke out in Soweto Mr Leonard 
Mosala, of the Soweto Urban Bantu Council, warned that unless the matter was dealt 
t peville shooting incident.”  
savages could commit such despicable acts? This in turn implied that the only way to protect 
whites from falling prey to this kind of violence was to keep them well away from blacks, and 
served to justify the preservation of apartheid. Besides, the reports had the added advantage of 
increasing white support for the government intervention in the townships in the name of 
with immediately it would precipita e another Shar
And a little ways further down the article continues: “Mr Alpheus Kumalo, of the Zulu School 
Board in Dube, warned that the strike could spread like wildfire” 1141. 
                                                 
1136 Simpson & Vogelman (1989 b: 1), Posel (1990: 161) and Frederikse (1987: 220) 
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1138 The Argus (17th June 1976: 1) 
1139 Rand Daily Mail (17th June 1
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This theme was maintained by all papers in their reports of violence during the following 
days. On 18th June the Cape Times told readers “54 dead as riots spread” 1142, on 21st June Th
ported “Fresh riots erupt” 1143, and on 19th June the Cape Times talked of “20 dead in 
dra flare-up” 1144, a headline placed above a picture of a smoking building (see fig. 48). 
 
Figure 48: Flaming riot (Source: Cape Times (19th June 1976: 1)) 
The 1980s also supplied the press with enough chances to use the fire symbolism. On 8th 
September 1985 the Sunday Tribune reported rioting in the Cape Town area as follows: “This 
week the surges of violence in the Cape peninsula spread out of the Coloured and Black areas 
and into the suburb of Windsor Park.” 1145 The Cape Times of 6th September 1985 chose a 
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ers fleeing the police near Moroka Police Station, on their 
ere is 
always the risk that it gets out of control. Let us remember why the newspapers were allowed 
to report on black violence in the first place. Among other reasons, the government wanted to 
reassure voters and opponents alike that it was in control, and the fire symbolism came in 
handy here for it carried a connotation of its own limitation. Experienced fire fighters – in 
government, the police, and the army – were always able to contain these violent forces in the 
townships and would even eventually restore order there. Thus, the flames as a symbol for the 
uncontrollable were also a sign of the government’s strength because their destructive force 
had obviously not advanced into the white areas. 1149 
In this context showing images of fire rather than, say, crowds served another purpose besides 
emphasising the violence. They helped cover-up those aspects of the protest that the 
authorities wanted to keep a secret. Leaders, goals, opinions, points of view, everything that 
could give the violence a face and a reason, or serve as an explanation, disappeared in the 
flames. A political will was the last thing that could be expressed in this way. 1150 
 
Fires after 1990 
 
Fire retained its symbolic power throughout the transition period, both in its literal and its 
metaphorical use. For example on 13th September 1990, the Pretoria News covered the 
violence in the Reef under the headline “Killing spree mayhem spreads”: “Townships on the 
Reef erupted into renewed violence last night with mobs shooting and hacking people to 
death, burning houses and looting.” 1151 Around the same time, the Cape Times also published 
a number of articles that lexicalised township violence in terms of fires: “Horr ic attacks 
similar metaphor to describe the same situation: “Violence flared in Athlone again yesterday 
(…).” 1146. In December 1985, The Star told readers about violence at a funeral in Moroka:  
“Chaos erupted when mourn
way to the Avalon Cemetery, were attacked by enraged taxi-drivers, causing fears of a 
clash between youths and the motorists.” 1147 
And on 12th June 1986 the Pretoria News pointed out that 
“The spreading rioting rocking black townships and squatter camps near Cape Town is 
taking place close to D. F. Malan international airport only a few kilometres from 
coloured and white suburbs, as our map shows.” 1148 
The most important aspect of fires in the context of official apartheid discourse is that th
if
                                                 
1146 Cape Times (6th September 1985: 1) 
1147 The Star (24th December 1985: 3) 
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 more in this latter article, where both “drama” 
and “gu
Howev
newspa indsaye 
, 
and th
includi
as the W
erupt on Reef” 1152 we are told on 13th September. “Taxi violence erupts” 1153 a headline reads 
the next day. The word ‘erupt’ pops-up twice
n battles” are said to erupt. 
er, more than any other kind of fire, it was necklacings that now inspired the 
pers’ imagination. The best-known incident is probably the necklacing of L
Tshabalala on 15th September 1990 by five ANC members, who accused him of being an IFP 
supporter. They attacked him at Inhlanzane station in Soweto, stoned, beat and stabbed him
en doused him with petrol and set him alight.1154 While a number of newspapers, 
ng the Sunday Times and the Cape Times, did not use the pictures, several others, such 
eekend Argus and the Sunday Star, published a whole sequence (see fig. 49).  
 
Figure 49: The last dying moments of Lindsaye Tshabalala (Source: The Argus (15th September 1990: 6)) 
When questioned about the story by O’Dowd, several editors admitted that the gruesomeness 
of the images would normally be a strong reason for not publishing them, but that in this case 
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1152 Cape Times (13th September 19
1153 Cape Times (14th September 1990 
1154 Marinovich & Silva (2000: 30-39 and
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y excited. Because we have never 
Howev
Chris K
 this what they are talking about when they are talking about 
violence?”” 1156 
Therefore, he wanted to write a story which would show his readers that “there is another sort 
of South Africa, and this is what is happening a couple of kilometres from you.” 1157 And the 
deputy editor of The Star, David Hazelhurst, described the picture of Tshabalala’s burning 
body as one of “three or four pictures that I remember that really highlighted the real horror of 
township warfare”. 1158 And apparently most editors felt that the images spoke for themselves, 
for they were generally not accompanied by an article.  
Since the 1994 elections the necklace seems to have largely disappeared from public view. 
This is not so much because people no longer get necklaced. Rather, I believe that the 
newspapers’ change in editorial policy – less violence and more hope-inspiring news – as well 
as the readers’ lack of interest are responsible. The only necklacing that I came across in my 
sample, apart from the murder of Rashaad Staggie, was a case of three suspected murderers 
who had been killed by a group of angry residents in Khayelitsha. The article – “‘Innocent 
men’ were necklaced” 1159 – appeared on the front page of the Cape Argus on 16th January 
2002. It was not the main story and only had a small headline, but it was placed above the 
fold. There was no picture with it and nothing else to draw readers’ attention to it.  
I believe that this story was not published because of the necklacing, but because it was a case 
of mistaken identity. The wrong people had been burned while the ‘real’ murder suspects 
were hiding from the community inside the local police station. Moreover, the Minister of 
Safety and Security had reacted to the incident by visiting the Cape Peninsula and talking to 
residents and policemen in an effort to improve policing in the area. If nothing else, those two 
factors surely helped to get the story published. 
                                                
they felt that they had to use them because they constituted something new. Robert Mgwasa, 
the Sowetan’s chief photographer, explained: 
“When I first saw these pictures I became ver
captured necklace like here. Mostly we find the body lying there, the flames already 
out. (…) Because of the way the scene was captured, we had to publish.” 1155 
er, several white journalists admitted that there was another, more profound reason. 
arstens, assistant editor at Rapport, said: 
“You can write the story of violence without using any of those pictures, and no one is 
going to read that story half way through. But when they see the pictures, they say: 
“Oh my God, is
 
1157 Quoted in O’Dowd (1996: 65) 
1155 Quoted in O’Dowd (1996: 59) 
1156 Quoted in O’Dowd (1996: 60) 
1158 Quoted in O’Dowd (1996: 60-61) 
1159 Cape Argus (16th January 2002 a: 1) 
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est flicker of yellow – meaning fire – in the picture, it will in my 
Despite this shift in media attention, fire is still a powerful symbol for black violence today. It 
is visually dramatic in colour photographs and is therefore of great appeal to editors. Dennis 
Pather, the editor of the Natal Mercury, explained to me: 
“It happens quite often that if you are looking for a dramatic effect in a picture, if there 
is even the slight
mind be decisive, you know, that is the picture that I want because it is, it is made to 
evoke something in the reader that is going to draw their attention.” 1160 
When I questioned him further, he said that he was not aware that there was a “black-white 
connotation” 1161, but admitted that he could not remember a time when whites were reported 
as setting fire to things.  
 
page – again (Source: The Citizen (11th April 2002: 1)) Figure 50: Black savages out on the ram
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ich 
nisers of the illegal gathering 
l public, they attempted to talk (during the apartheid 
sm for issuing orders that were disobeyed) and their concern is to 
“diffuse a volatile situation” and to end traffic congestion to ease life for motorists, a move 
                                                
Tony Heard on the other hand confirmed my findings right away. When I showed him a copy 
of The Citizen of 11th April 2002 (see fig. 50) and told him that I believed that in the South 
African context this had to mean that the persons referred to are black, he fully agreed. “Yes, 
that’s right,” he said. “Also, blacks always used to riot. There was never a rebellion or an 
uprising, but a riot.” 1162 
The texts, too, kept the fire symbolism alive. For example, on 30th April 2002 the Cape Argus 
published an article entitled “Delft residents burn tyres to protest cuts, evictions” 1163, wh
closely resembles the reporting during the apartheid years. “Hundreds of Delft residents burnt 
tyres on the N2 and R300 freeways in protest against water cuts and evictions from their 
Reconstruction and Development Programme houses,” 1164 the lead tells us. The remainder of 
the article is then built upon the old bipolar symbolism of a crowd of black protesters 
threatening order while a contingent of policemen keep them in check. The article continues:  
“Yesterday police, traffic and emergency personnel were called to defuse the volatile 
situation when angry residents used burning tyres to block traffic on the R300 off-
ramp from the N2. 
Ian Pretorius, of the Kuils River public order police unit, said they were forced to 
disperse the crowd after attempts to talk to the orga
failed. 
“The burning of tyres caused major traffic congestion and motorists hat to be 
diverted,” said Pretorius. 
About an hour later residents re-grouped and marched up and down Delft Main Road 
singing freedom songs.” 1165 
The article is clearly written from a position favourable to the police and opposed to the 
actions of residents. The police are only ever mentioned as agents in passive sentences, the 
“were called” and “were forced”, which, unlike for example ‘the police moved in’ or simply 
the active ‘the police dispersed a crowd’, implies that what happened was really beyond their 
immediate control and that all they could do is react and contain the situation. They are shown 
as restrained and helpful to the genera
years this was a euphemi
that most Argus readers would surely evaluate favourably as they are more likely to be a 
driver than a protester. Furthermore, the police are given a face, in the shape of Ian Pretorius, 
while the residents (until later in the article) remain an amorphous crowd.  
 
0  April 2002: 3) 
1162 Interview with the author, 17th May 2002 
1163 Cape Argus (30th April 2002: 3) 
1164 Cape Argus (30th April 2002: 3) 
1165 Cape Argus (3 th
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hroughout this section. They are “angry” and they 
antly, probably against everything they know, value, and 
are about. The actions would therefore probably not be valued favourably by white readers – 
or example, if they were called ‘a desperate bid by Cape Town’s poor to hold on to 
easons that drove township residents to not pay for their services. And 
st the white population and were mostly used in 
reports about clashes between blacks and the security forces. The imagery draws on memories 
                    
This confrontation is also represented in the photographs that accompany the article. In a 
bigger one at the top the only thing that is clearly discernible are policemen and police 
vehicles, all of which appear calm and non-aggressive, guarding the passing cars. In the 
smaller image below two policemen are actually confronted by a crowd of people. The picture 
is taken from behind their backs and from below which makes the protesters appear quite 
menacing. We see a lot of legs, a huge crowd about to swallow the two policemen who, once 
again, are standing there all calm, talking to an agitated man who is gesticulating at them. 
And this is how the residents are portrayed t
live their anger out actively as agents in active sentences: The “protest”, they “block traffic” 
and they are “marching”. All three actions were involved in the popular uprising which 
resulted in the fall of apartheid (a connection that is made more explicit by the later 
mentioning of “freedom songs”) and the terms would therefore activate in readers’ heads the 
old apartheid schemata of ‘protests’ or ‘demonstrations’ as being dangerous, reckless, 
opposed to order, and, more import
c
unlike, f
the basic services that have become a matter of course for us’. 
There is one important break with the past that I should not ignore. In the section following 
the one cited above The Argus actually quotes residents’ spokesman Jacob Gcobo who 
explains people’s reasons for protesting. This quote, however, would most likely not help to 
gain sympathy for his cause among Argus readers, most of whom are from the wealthier parts 
of Cape Town where not paying bills is just not an option. I personally found that most whites 
were opposed to the government policy of giving free water to the poor and had no 
understanding for the r
as the author falls short of asking in which way the residents’ behaviour is a result of 
apartheid or of widespread poverty and inadequate relations between the people in power and 
the voters on the ground, the quote will not enhance readers’ understanding of the broader 
socio-economic context of the report.  
c) Sticks and Stones 
While the crowd and fire denoted black violence in general, sticks and stones were reserved as 
symbols of the ‘black onslaught’ 1166 again
                             
 taken as the position of the white newspapers that I am analysing. In the eyes of most blacks and of 
 fight was an uprising, a war of liberation or a resistance. I personally share this 
minology of the people I am researching, in order to render their world more 
1166 This should only be
the opponents of apartheid in general, this
view, but have decided to use the ter
understandable.  
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of a time when Africans armed with traditional weapons were a serious threat to the newly 
arrived colonialists. As Posel points out: “As an action of the crowd, stone-throwing was 
conveyed as similarly threatening, wanton and wild, evoking a sense of brute force.” 1167 The 
fear of ‘the African’ is as deep-seated as it is old. It is therefore not surprising that sticks and 
stones are among the oldest symbols of black violence. They were already well established by 
the time of the Soweto Uprisings, even though the newspapers were still allowed to report 
violence quite openly. Later, as press restrictions were tightened, sticks and stones grew ever 
more important as carriers of meaning. 1168 
Sticks and stones continued to be used as symbols of black violence during the transition 
period in exactly the same way as before 1990. After the 1994 elections, both items largely 
 youths who had
 
lost their symbolic power, though, mainly because the stone-throwing  
previously fought the security forces in the townships had laid down their weapons. However, 
every once in a while, newspaper articles still make reference to stone-throwing, generally in 
relation with violent black crowds. 
 
Stones 
 
Stones in particular came to symbolise random acts of violence against anything or anyone a 
black person might disapprove of. They were used extensively in press reports about the 
demonstrations of the 1950s and 60s and would grow into a key theme in the reporting of the 
most striking black uprising against white domination – the Soweto Uprisings. Flames and 
crowds played an important role during this era in explaining the nature of the ongoing 
violence, but children holding or throwing stones were used specifically to show that the 
black population was bent on overthrowing the current order and would do so violently if they 
were given a chance.  
The Daily Dispatch for example published an eyewitness account saying, among other things: 
“I saw four white women in a small car escape a barrage of bricks and big stones” 1169. 
“People stoned, offices attacked … and vehicles burnt,” 1170 the caption under an aerial 
photograph in the Cape Times read. And The Star simply summed the events on 16th June
1976 up as follows: “Police opened fire as the rampaging students, who had taken up stones, 
advanced on them” 1171. 
A similar line of thinking is also discernible in a set of photographs published in the Rand 
Daily Mail on 19th June 1976 (see fig. 51). 
                                                 
1167 Posel (1989: 268) 
1168 Posel (1990: 157)  
1169 Daily Dispatch (17th June 1976 b: 1) 
1170 Cape Times (17th June 1976: 1) 
1171 The Star (16th June 1976 d: 1) 
  253
 
Figure 51: The who is who of violence (Source: Rand Daily Mail (19th June 1976: 4)) 
The combination of a picture of policemen facing away from the camera with one of youths 
holding stones facing towards the camera has clear implications for the reader. The feeling is 
that the students are attempting to attack the policemen (or even the reader himself) who 
therefo
With a 
intende en of going over the top with using 
Zu . There is no proof that they are together or that they are in Alexandra as the 
The Natal Mercury published an article titled “50 Cape buses 
stoned” 1173, where over 28 lines in two columns the journalist talked a lot about broken glass, 
re have to keep their guns ready to defend themselves (and the reader).  
critical newspaper like the Rand Daily Mail it would be quite possible, though, that the 
d meaning is in fact one of accusing the policem
firearms against children armed with stones. However, due to the perspective, I do not believe 
this to be the case. If the paper had wanted to communicate that message, it would have been 
a lot more convincing to show the kids from behind and the policemen advancing on them. 
And in case anyone doubts that a mainstream paper would have been able to get a hold of 
pictures from among the youngsters, I should point out that, at the time of the Soweto 
Uprisings, the Mail had several black photographers who took plenty of photos from the 
struggle side. 1172 It simply chose not to use them. 
In any case, there is one thing we should not forget. For all we know the policemen could be 
chasing a cattle thief in the Northern Cape and the children could be playing with their mates 
in Kwa lu
caption claims. But most readers will believe that they saw what they in fact had merely read. 
During the 1980s, stones became an important symbol for black violence and the newspapers 
frequently made reference to stone-throwing in their reports. At times they even dedicated 
entire articles to such incidents without really explaining the relevance of such accounts. For 
example on 3rd June 1980 
                                                 
1172 Peter Magubane, a Mail staff photographer, later published his photos in a book (see Magubane & Lee (1979)). 
 June 1980: 3) 1173 The Natal Mercury (3rd
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nhage. The story is 
titled “‘Not a peaceful crowd of mourners’” 1174 and quotes the minister as saying: “The fact 
that many people were armed with stones, sticks, bricks and even petrol bombs makes it clear 
that they were not a peaceful crowd of mourners on their way to a funeral.” 1175 The reasoning 
here is clear: The sticks and stones symbolise violent behaviour on the part of the crowd, 
which instantly explains and excuses the violence used by the security forces against the 
crowd. In fact their ‘violence’, without ever being mentioned, is turned into ‘defence’. The 
Daily Dispatch used a similar reasoning in its lead article about the events. Again le Grange is 
quoted, which serves to both, legitimate the statement as it comes from an authoritative source 
and leave the newspaper room to distance itself from it should it be criticised.  
“Police had been “forced to open fire” on a crowd armed with stones, sticks, petrol 
bombs and bricks,” the paper explains. “The crowd was marching towards Uitenhage 
on the highway from Langa black township.” 1176 
Again we have a reference to stones and sticks, which this time is more openly used as a 
reason for the police opening fire on the marchers. And, just in case critical readers might 
disapprove of the use of live ammunition against stick-wielding marchers, the newspaper adds 
a sentence that would have convinced most whites of the necessity to shoot: “The crowd was 
marching towards Uitenhage” 1177. Once again, the police turned to violence in order to 
defend themselves and protect the white population of Uitenhage. This view was later 
confirmed by the Cape Times in an article about the inquest into the shooting. On 17th June 
1986, the newspaper reported that “Mr. Knoesen found that Lt Fouche had done his duty in 
dispersing the crowd. He said that they were on the way to kill the white residents of the 
town.” 1178 
By the way, the Kannemeyer Commission later uncovered that this explanation was created 
only for the public. Lt. Fouche, one of the policemen involved, admitted in front of the judges 
that they had never been stoned. They had apparently invented the story shortly after the event 
in order to have a convincing explanation for their actions that would seem to make sense 
within the public discourse. 1179 
                                                
but gives no explanation as to why the destruction of property in Cape Town would be of any 
interest to the readers in Durban. 
Stones also made the headlines in March 1985 after the shooting in Uitenhage. For example, 
on 23rd March 1985 the Cape Times ran an article on page four in which the Minister of Law 
and Order, Louis le Grange, gives his interpretation of the shooting in Uite
 
 Thornton (1990: 137) 
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1175 rd Cape Times (23  March 1985 b: 4) 
1176 Daily Dispatch (22nd March 1985 a: 1) 
1177 Daily Dispatch (22nd March 1985 a: 1) 
1178 Cape Times (17th June 1986: 2) 
1179
  255
A little later this sentiment was reflected powerfully in a picture that would make newspaper 
history. On 6th September 1985 the Cape Times illustrated its front page article on the street 
battles in Athlone with an image of a young man hurling a rock at a Casspir (fig. 52). As far 
as I know this was the only time a photographer managed to capture stone throwing in action, 
providing white readers with visual proof of the ongoing black onslaught. 
 
isplay of strength (Source: Cape Times (6th September 1985: 1)) 
trangely twisted rationale which clearly exposes European 
ed to be less developed, for how can anyone rationally explain 
Figure 52: An impressive d
This line of thinking involves a s
bias against anyone consider
  256
the fac
live am
Surely,
howeve n in apartheid South 
 second-in-command of the Peninsula Riot Squad, made 
“there 
is noth
anyone
called for the imposition of martial law. Two sections are 
articularly striking: “In Guguletu, near Cape Town, 600 people attended an illegal gathering. 
ntervened and were stoned. They retaliated with sjamboks and teargas.” 1183 And: “In 
002 train commuters became violent after 
-page story under the title “Trains gutted as 
commuters riot” 1185, which explained the situation as follows: 
                                                
t that the throwing of a stone at an armoured vehicle is more threatening than shooting 
munition from the safety of said vehicle into a crowd of largely unarmed youths? 
 by any measure, it is the latter which constitutes an act of brute force! This reasoning, 
r does not take into account the emotionally charged situatio
Africa where, basically, any violent action taken by blacks was understood as an immense 
threat to law and order. This link between stones and threats is clearly exemplified in a 
suggestion that Major Dolf Odendaal,
at a trial in the Cape Supreme Court in 1988. “If black people decide to fight,” he said, 
ing I can do.” 1180 The best solution in such a case, he felt, was to allow police to shoot 
 holding a stone. 1181  
On 20th July 1985 the Pretoria News even used the theme of stone-throwing in an article that 
was clearly meant to prepare the way for the declaration of a state of emergency the next day. 
“Pressure builds to put stop to violence” 1182 the headline read. The lead introduces the reader 
to the idea that violence was rife across the country and that something had to be done about 
it: “Near-anarchy flared in streets around South Africa again yesterday as pressure mounted 
on the government to put a stop to the violence.” Then the newspaper set out to describe all 
these dangerous acts that 
p
Police i
Soweto, 10 private and five police vehicles were damaged by stones. In some instances the 
police used teargas and rubber bullets.” 1184 Surprisingly, not many readers seem to have 
questioned the judgement that a few kids throwing stones in two cities as far apart as Cape 
Town and Johannesburg were a danger to the security of an entire nation. Or if they did, they 
were not allowed to express their doubts in letters to the editor. 
Nowadays references to stones are rarely found in the press, but the imagery itself has not lost 
its symbolic power. Every once in a while, it is dug-up again and used in reports about violent 
black crowds. For example, when on 10th April 2
rail services from Pretoria had to be halted due to a methane leak, most newspapers focussed 
exclusively on their burning carriages and stoning emergency service vehicles rather than 
their concerns. The Citizen published a big front
 
1180 Quoted in Pauw (1993: 4) 
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“Rioting train commuters stormed Pretoria Station yesterday afternoon, setting alight 
three carriages one a locomotive, and then stoning firemen and attacking fire engines 
arriving to extinguish the blaze, after main-line traffic was halted because of a 
methane leak.” 1186 (Mistake in original.) 
The Cape Argus and the Pretoria News, also made ample reference to the stone-throwing 
while not letting a single commuter explain their actions. And on 12th April 2002 The Natal 
Witness gave the following account:  
 “Disgruntled commuters vented their anger by embarking on acts of vandalism. 
A man died in hospital after being shot at Saulsville in a stone-throwing incident and 
seven security guards were injured.” 1187  
Without any knowledge of South African history, politics and newspaper reporting this 
section would really not make much sense. How can a person be shot by a stone? However, if 
we know of the historical relevance of stone-throwing and shooting and the persons 
associated with these actions, we can easily reconstruct that the police were called out at 
Saulsville after a crowd of black commuters had become rowdy. The people (or at least some 
of them) had begun throwing stones at the police who had retaliated (or at least some of them) 
by shooting into the crowd. 
 
Sticks 
 
Stones did not lend themselves to being photographed. Occasionally, people holding stones 
were used to illustrate articles, as in the Rand Daily Mail article of 19th June 1976 described 
above (see fig. 51). Stone-throwing, however, happened quickly and capturing a stone in the 
air was a task that only Cape Times photographer Ivor Markman managed (see fig. 52 in the 
last sub-chapter). And stones that were lying about were not exactly visually stimulating, so 
for the commercial press, where interesting photographs often meant higher sales, publishing 
pictures of stones was not an option – unlike the SABC, which according to Posel repeatedly 
showed film footage of stones on the ground. 1188  
So while stones featured prominently in the textual elements of the articles, the newspapers’ 
preferred weapons for photographs were sticks. They were readily discernible and instantly 
gave the crowd an air of aggression (see fig. 53). 
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thFigure 53: Sticks and stones may break my bones… (Source: Rand Daily Mail (17  June 1976: 6)) 
On the other hand, if portrayed the right way, they could also underline just how inferior the 
black protesters’ weapons were against those of the policemen they were facing. A reader who 
looks at figure 54 below, which was published in the Rand Daily Mail on 18th June 1976 as 
part of a whole page of images about Soweto would most likely not feel intimidated by the 
crowd that was facing him/her.  
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thFigure 54: …but it’s not very likely! (Source: Rand Daily Mail (18  June 1976: 6)) 
In fact, the critical reader might even take the children’s side in the conflict. If we look at the 
entire page (see fig. 55), we will find students standing around the dead body of one of their 
peers next to a picture from a demonstration in London that shows a clearly legible sign “End 
Police Killings”. And at the very bottom of the page is an image of heavily armed policemen 
in camouflage patrolling the townships. It is therefore not difficult to make the connection 
between the body, the armed cops and the message of the sign and understand the page to 
mean: ‘You are faced with a few angry kids, find a better way of dealing with them!’ This, 
however, was not the usual message of the mainstream press. 
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Figure 55: The big picture (Source: Rand Daily Mail (18th June 1976: 6)) 
When sticks were referred to in the textual elements of an article, they were generally dealt 
No new symbols for white violence emerged during the time of transition even as the 
e to light and the white right wing stepped-up 
espite profound political changes, the South African newspapers 
 the very end of the period 
with in the same way as the stones described above or even mentioned alongside them. I will 
therefore skip a textual analysis, lest I repeat myself, and will instead move on to the new 
elements that emerged in the reporting about violence after the end of apartheid. 
4.6.3 Nothing New: Violence during the Transition 
apartheid government’s violent aberrations cam
its violent struggle. In fact, d
did not much change the principles that guided their reporting until
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 long maintained a predominantly 
white perspective in their choice of topics as well as in the way in which they approach them. 
Alternative discourses emerged only tentatively and a new way of thinking about the world 
was therefore slow to take hold. 1189 
The AWB’s invasion of Bophuthatswana in 1994 is a good case in point. It was widely 
covered in the press, but the focus was not on the murders that they had committed, but on the 
killing of three of their own members. The story’s news value lay not in their horrific attacks 
on black civilians, but in the fact that, for once, whites had been killed by blacks. 1190 Star 
picture editor Robin Comley explained: 
“I know at the time there seemed to be an inordinate amount of shock attached to the 
death of three white people. Which I found bizarre considering what had gone on 
before that, innumerable black people had been killed and there hadn’t been that 
shock. I think it comes down to the old mind-set that we tend to find ourselves in. 
There seems to be a slight division between blacks and whites, on this newspaper in 
terms of reportage and how horrific this deed was.” 1191  
The Citizen called the events “The horror slaying of 3 AWB men” 1192 and began its front-
page article with a touching plea from one of the men who were about to be executed:  
““Please God help get us some medical help”, pleaded the bearded member of the 
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). 
They were his last words before a Bophuthatswana soldier calmly stepped up and 
pumped six bullets into the bearded, khaki-clad man and two colleagues in Mmabatho 
dogs”, Natal on Saturday told its readers on the front page of the Final 
f the wounded men and a huge image of them after the 
ed 
on the front page above a picture of
lying on the ground, hands in the air. Page three showed a picture of the men lying on the 
ground with a caption that read
                                                
under investigation here. Most English language newspapers, even those that are now owned 
and/or edited by blacks and have a majority of black readers,
yesterday, reports an eyewitness, Reuters photographer Kevin Carter.” 1193  
 “Shot like 1194 the 
Edition on 12th March 1994. The story was drawn out over several pages with the cover page 
illustrated by a small photograph o
execution (see fig. 56) as well as a small text box detailing their plight. 
The Sunday Times had a similar approach. “Sheer bloody murder” 1195, the paper exclaim
 a uniformed black man pointing his gun at a white man 
s: “LAST INTERVIEW … minutes after answering questions 
 
1189 Fisher (Unknown: 1) and Dooms (2002: 7) 
1190 O’Dowd (1996: 126-132) 
1191 Quoted in O’Dowd (1996: 128) 
1192 The Citizen (12th March 1994: 1) 
1193 The Citizen (12th March 1994: 1) 
) 1194 Natal on Saturday (12th March 1994: 1
1195 Sunday Times (13th March 1994 a: 1) 
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from th
were e
is group of SA and international journalists, the three men lying on the dusty road 
xecuted by members of the Bop security forces”. 1196 
 
Figure 56: Three AWB men were brutally slain – Oh, and by the way 57 blacks also died (Source: Natal on 
Saturday (12th March 1994: 1)) 
And underneath we are shown a close-up of a man exiting his car, hands in the air, with the 
other two dead on the ground. 
The text equally positions the journalist and thus the reader on the side of the three dead men, 
expressing horror and compassion. In “The bullets that no one expected” 1197 we read: 
“The execution of the right wingers in Mafikeng was as unexpected as it was brutal. 
(…)  
A minute before I had interviewed both the victims. They were subdued and frightened
ugh agitated, were not 
 
but spoke readily. They were under arrest and the police, altho
mistreating them. 
                                                 
1196 Sunday Times (13th March 1994 b: 3) 
1197 Sunday Times (13th March 1994 b: 3) 
  263
. 
es read (from top left to bottom right): “Fighting”, “Pleading”, “Killing” 
Every journalist at the scene treated the three men with compassion. But for the 
execution, it was like any other hour in the middle of the week’s turmoil that produced 
hundreds of casualties. 
A short while before, colleague Ray Bradley who saw the right-wingers surrender 
asked Colonel Marx of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force to call for medics. He was 
told an ambulance was on the way
Then suddenly they were all shot dead. 
It was horrific and it was shocking, a sight I never want to see again. It was murder. 
Neither cold blooded nor premeditated, but a crime of passion.” 1198 
Besides unwittingly being made to feel compassion for the three men, the readers are once 
again presented with the old image of black murderers out of control. The black victims of the 
white murderers out of control are quietly ignored. 
The Weekend Argus of 12th/13th March 1994 even ran a four-picture series of the whole 
execution on page three under the title “Death in the dust” 1199 (see fig. 57). The captions 
under the four pictur
and “Aftermath” 1200. 
 
Figure 57: No help and no mercy (Source: Weekend Argus (12th March 1994: 3)) 
The Eastern Province Herald was even more striking in its identification with the three AWB 
men. In its edition of 12th March 1994 it showed a colour picture of them pleading for their 
                                                 
1198 Sunday Times (13th March 1994 b: 3) 
1199 Weekend Argus (12th March 1994: 3) 
1200 Weekend Argus (12th March 1994: 3) 
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the god-
experienced what whites had feared all along – violent attacks by other blacks. Thus, one 
e to the fore: the victim. Still, this does not mean that the 
1204 Good South 
                                                
lives on page one, taking up nearly half the page. Below was a black-and-white picture of the 
three after they had been executed. Their main headline read: “God help us” 1201. While it 
could be argued that those were the three victims’ words, there is a strong possibility that 
readers would identify with the ‘us’-group. In this case, the old fears of the black peril would 
once again be revived invoking images of black killers out of control threatening 
fearing members of the (good) in-group. 
I believe that these examples show quite clearly that even after the end of apartheid, violence 
was still judged in group terms. The opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’ had not gone away, 
and both were still perceived largely along racial lines. The only change was that most 
English speaking South Africans had now either understood that apartheid was a system of 
evil oppression or no longer wanted to voice their support for racial segregation for fear of 
being branded a saboteur of the new order. In any case, the representatives of the old system 
may have moved to the side of the violent ‘other’, but the in-group of white English speakers 
were still white English speakers, not all non-violent supporters of democracy or even all 
South Africans. 1202 
4.6.4 The new Individualism: Violence in the New South Africa 
The newspapers’ approach to violence only began to change after the gloomy predictions of a 
race war did not come true after the 1994 elections. Now, true to the old humanistic ideal of 
sympathy for the underdog, the in-group began to open itself to all those blacks who had 
important symbol of violence cam
English language press has suddenly become colour blind after 1994. The racial lines may 
have been blurred and the in- and out-group modified, but a difference in the reporting about 
people of different skin colours remains. For example, a white mob is still unheard of, as is an 
orderly group of black protesters. The term riot is also mainly used in connection with blacks; 
whites don’t seem to take part in such violent demonstrations. Calm and agitation are still 
bound to the appearance of the people described.  
Moreover the most important element in reports about violence is still the binary opposition 
between good and evil. 1203 And while the groups representing these two poles have changed, 
the general definition of the terms has not. A good person is still one who shares the 
worldview of the dominant group – the difference is that this group has changed as the former 
opponents of apartheid are now the ones who have the say in the country. 
 
(2000: 7), Steinberg (2001: 4) and Schlesinger (1991: 4) 
ger (1991: 4) 
1201 Eastern Province Herald (12th March 1994: 1) 
1202 Danso & McDonald 
1203 Rauch (1993: 2) and Schlesin
1204 Schlesinger (1991: 15) 
  265
of violence for example are not seen as 
e victims. These are the two aspects 
Africans are therefore seen as all those who support black empowerment and racial 
integration, and the new other, the new enemy, are racists and sceptics who show no trust in 
the new order, criminals who jeopardise the stability of the new state as well as ‘illegal’ 
immigrants from other African countries, a hatred of whom is for various reasons (among 
them because it is felt by South Africans of all skin colours) not seen as racism. 1205  
In connection with violence this means that a good person is one who keeps away from it. 
While during apartheid some ANC members still accepted violence as a legitimate means to 
reach their goal, today they consider any violence committed outside the state’s monopoly on 
power to be illegitimate. Right-wing perpetrators 
fighters for a good cause. And while the new rulers have a certain degree of understanding for 
the underprivileged blacks in the former townships who commit violence in order to bridge 
the material gap between themselves and the rest of the population, not many white media 
workers share this feeling. Violent criminals are therefore presented as the other that needs to 
be fought. As a result, their victims are among the group of good people, of the self, that 
needs to be protected. 1206 
This opposing pair stands at the centre of the new reporting about violence. The symbols used 
to describe them are mainly ones that had been completely ignored during apartheid: the 
individuals involved in the violence (however, groups, for example in the shape of gangs and 
vigilantes, are still important in the reporting today) and th
that I want to look at more closely in the following sub-chapters.  
a) Individuals 
With the change in political attitude towards the liberation movements and South Africa’s 
shift away from a political structure based on collectives, the newspapers, too, began to focus 
more on individuals. This is in line with international trends. The reference to individuals in 
news stories has been widely used in the Western media for decades. Galtung & Ruge listed 
reference to persons as one of their factors of newsworthiness arguing that “personification is 
the outcome of cultural idealism according to which man is the master of his own destiny and 
events can be seen as the outcome of an act of free will.” 1207 (Italics in original.) News that 
can be presented by referring to a single person or a small group rather than having to talk 
about abstract social forces or structures is more likely to be printed. But, as Galtung & Ruge 
have pointed out, these individuals are not merely newsworthy for who they are, but rather for 
whom or what they come to represent. 1208 
                                                 
1205 Harris (2002: 6-7), Gelber (2000: 2-3) and Danso & McDonald (2000: 7 and 16-19) 
1206 Steinberg (2001: 4) 
: 69) 
1207 Galtung & Ruge (1965: 68) 
1208 Galtung & Ruge (1965
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y conversations with Brenda Roodt and Jeannette 
eness of the situation or the 
example, of the places named by the writer only one, Wynberg, is in the more upmarket 
h and famous. All other 
Let us consider, for example, an article on child-rape and incest that was published in the 
Cape Argus on 24th June 2002: After a fairly emotional headline – “Please daddy, don’t rape 
me” – the article describes, in a surprisingly sober tone what is, in their words “a shocking 
trend of incest in the Cape”. First there is a “38-year old Parow man [who] has been arrested 
after fathering his own grandchildren”, then a “Mitchell’s Plain man [who] has been jailed 
after having a child with his 13-year-old daughter and then indecently assaulting the 
grandchild when she turned seven” and then a “Brackenfell man [who] is awaiting trial for 
rape and incest after living with his primary school daughter “like husband and wife”, raping 
her from when she was seven until she turned 13”.  
These episodic accounts are followed b
Kellerman the control prosecutors of the Bellville and Wynberg sex courts respectively, 
interspersed with statistics from the SAPS Child Protection Unit in the Western Cape, which 
confirm that there is indeed a problem. All paint a bleak picture. “Kellerman said it was 
shocking how abused children in areas of low socio-economic standing believed it was 
“almost normal” and an “accepted fate” to be raped by people they respected and looked up 
to.” The final paragraph is a short remark that social worker Milanda Smith, “who until 
recently served in the Cape Town sexual offences court” had said that “the profile in Cape 
Town’s magisterial court district reflected the tendency in the rest of the Peninsula and also 
included a “disturbingly high” occurrence of incest.” 1209 
While the article is describing a social problem, it does so using the examples of specific 
individuals each with their own biography. However, this personalisation of the problem of 
child-rape in South Africa is not meant to point out the uniqu
people involved. On the contrary, the individual is related to a category of persons, in this 
case we have the victims and the perpetrators of violence, which is endowed with a mythic 
meaning at the cultural level. As Hall pointed out: “A newspaper can account for an event, or 
deepen its account, by attaching an individual to it, or by bringing personal attributes, isolated 
from their social context, to beat on their account as an explanation.” 1210 Individuals are thus 
turned into symbols for larger news issues, organisations or population groups. Far from 
replacing collectivism they therefore come to express it. The names, ages, places of residence 
or job-descriptions of perpetrators, victims, and observers of violence along with images of 
individuals have become new symbols for the out- and in-groups respectively.  
The article quoted above contains a number of indications exactly who these groups are. For 
southern suburbs and even Wynberg is by no means the turf of the ric
                                                 
1209 All quotes from Cape Argus (24th June 2002 b: 5) 
1210 Hall (1973: 183-184) 
  267
t child-
on in “areas of low 
socio-e
Kellerm
fact. N
ment that leaves 
no room
are told
courts wn, Kellerman again 
is said 
areas are lower-income neighbourhoods to the north of Cape Town or, in the case of 
Mitchell’s Plain, on the Cape Flats. Cape Town proper is only mentioned in passing in the last 
paragraph and Ms. Smith’s remark rings of the same old stuff – it mirrors the rest of the 
Peninsula. No information is given about white, middle class suburbs like Fish Hoek and 
Claremont or about wealthy Constantia. Thus by omission the newspaper implies tha
rape and incest are problems of the poor. And just in case this subtle message is lost on some 
readers, it is made explicit in the statement that the problem was comm
conomic standing”. The validity of the claim is underlined by its being attributed to 
an, a perceived expert on the subject. Thus it gains the status of an unquestionable 
o further inquiry seems necessary. 
I admit this theory could be attacked on the point that the truly poor black (in the apartheid 
sense) townships like Langa and Khayelitsha are not taken into account either. However, in 
my opinion this is not because the newspaper does not feel that they have the same problems, 
but because these parts of town are of no interest to the intended Argus reader and therefore to 
the paper. In order to test this theory, I conducted a brief content analysis of a random sample 
of seven issues of the Cape Argus throughout 2002 1211 and found that only nine articles 
mentioned the black townships and informal settlements at all and that of those only three 
were about events in those areas as opposed to events that marginally touched upon them like 
a police raid across the Western Cape which included Philippi East 1212, an ANC bid to find 
more people eligible for welfare in, among others, Khayelitsha 1213 or the police receiving a 
letter from white right-wingers claiming responsibility for a bomb blast in Soweto 1214. In 
short, the township population just did not feature in the Argus. 
But let us return to the rape cases above. Now that we have established who the out-group is, 
can we find an in-group for the reader to identify with? In my opinion we can, in the shape of 
the experts quoted. In the second paragraph the author talks of a “shocking trend of incest in 
the Cape”. This establishes the position from which the rest of the article is to be understood 
and lays down the facts. The shocking trend is made real by this factual state
 for questions. Later on, presupposing that the entry statement has been accepted, we 
, “records kept by prosecutors in Cape Town, Wynberg and Bellville sexual offences 
paint a shocking picture of incest and child abuse”. And further do
to have found the state of affairs “shocking” while Smith finds the occurrence of incest 
“disturbingly high” 1215. By the end of the article, so many people in positions of authority 
                                                 
1211 16th January, 19th February, 14th March, 4th April, 17th May, 24th June and 12th November 
1212 Cape Argus (19th February 2002: 10) 
1213 Cape Argus (14th March 2002: 8) 
1214 Cape Argus (12th November 2002: 6) 
1215 All quotes from Cape Argus (24th June 2002 b: 5) 
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we should not agree with them. In my opinion everyone should in 
fact be
experts – both named and unnamed (‘the courts’, the ‘SAPS’) – that we are led to agree with, 
and for
A sim
Johann
ast Friday evening, a 24-year-old mother left her baby alone in her flat for a 
Therea
child, a
then finally, after having been begged by friends, called the police. ““She does not seem to 
AIDS and a collapse of the 
ed. 
                                                
have been shocked and disturbed that the reader is positioned to agree with them. I am not 
pointing this out to say that 
 shocked at those stories. No, the reason for my emphasising it is to show that the 
 lack of other positive characters identify with, all represent the establishment. 
ilar picture emerges from an article about the rape of a five-month-old baby in 
esburg that appeared in the Sunday Times on 9th December 2001.  
“Early l
night out at a nearby disco,” the article begins. “When she returned at around 1 am, the 
little girl was crying uncontrollably.” 1216  
fter, the newspaper explains how two of the mother’s “drinking mates” had raped the 
nd how, rather than caring for her daughter, the mother went out again to get beer and 
understand the implications,” says Child Protection Unit investigator Captain Peter Linda. 
“When we interviewed her, she did not show the slightest sign of remorse.”” The neighbours, 
however, did and their condemnations of the mother and the two rapists are given ample space 
throughout the following paragraphs. “Yet,” the paper’s authoritative voice cuts in again, “if 
the child’s mother cared only about herself, no one seemed to care about her circumstances, 
where she lived on the corner of Claim and Twist streets in Johannesburg’s inner city.” Then, 
we get a detailed description of the “run-down Action Cinema building” where rooms are 
rented as “venues for “quickie sex” sessions” for 20 Rand a day and “a stench of urine meets 
the visitor”. Now that the whole context seems to be established, the question of why the rape 
had to happen is addressed. “It is a case of innocence versus evil – and evil is seen to be 
winning,” we are told and are then presented with a number of speculations as to why there is 
such a “shocking increase in the number of babies raped in the past few weeks”: paedophilia 
(a minor contributor), the belief that sex with a virgin cures 
society’s moral fibre. Then it is back to the experts’ opinions who point out:  
“In almost all the incidents of infant rape that have hit the headlines recently, the 
profile of the mothers is the same: poor, largely uneducated and single. Their ages 
range from late teens to early 20s. They are usually unemploy
The perpetrators, too, fit a profile: unemployed, young and known to the mothers.” 1217 
Then the government is attacked – again with the help of expert testimony – for mainly 
reacting to cases after they have already happened, by arresting suspects and denying them 
bail, rather than acting preventatively by strengthening child welfare organisations and 
 
1216 Sunday Times (9th December 2001 b: 15) 
er 2001 b: 15) 1217 All quotes from Sunday Times (9th Decemb
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“and threatened to continue with the punishment for as long as she remained outside 
prison. 
Thembinkosi Magubane, a security guard at the building, had no sympathy for her. 
“We know that the laws are very strict on woman abuse. But if we had beaten her up 
the first time we saw she was neglecting her baby, we could have saved the poor 
baby.” 
Amid all this, a little girl sleeps quietly in a children’s ward in Johannesburg Hospital, 
oblivious to the ripple effect that her brutal defilement has had on society. 
As she sleeps, her future – beyond the recovery of the physical wounds – is uncertain. 
Her new guardians are the police and welfare organisations. They will decide on what 
shape her shattered life will take.” 1218 
Once again we have two groups pitted against each other. On the one side stand the 
perpetrators and, this time, also the mothers, both of whom are described as young and poor 
le. here are also 
d us to believe that they are black: the location of the cinema and the 
As the paper said, it is a case of good 
the spirit of reconciliation, they frequently emphasise the old differences. They for example 
enable the newspapers to denounce attacks by black assailants against whites without having 
support systems for mothers. Finally it is back to the scene of the crime where neighbours 
have beaten up the mother  
and the latter deviate from the socially approved norm in that they are sing T
some indications that lea
demographics of Johannesburg where the poorest of the poor are generally not white. On the 
other side we have well educated, articulate experts and policemen, who are named, which 
gives them an identity beyond the group and indicates that they belong to both racial groups. 
In this article the latter group is also joined by the neighbours, some of whom are named. Not 
surprisingly, all those names are African. The former group is associated with neglect and 
abuse while the latter stands for defence and protection. 
versus evil, but the Times has hope that the good side might be winning. They are the focus of 
the final sentences and they have made sure that the baby can finally sleep quietly. Now all 
they have to do is make the right decision for the rest of her life. 
Thus, in my opinion, we have now identified beyond doubt the new in-group as the supporters 
of the new order and the new out-group as all those who act against the in-groups norms. Such 
images help to subtly advertise to sceptical (white) readers the ‘New South Africa’, where all 
good people regardless of skin colour fight side by side against evil. 
The names and pictures of individuals are, however, also used to achieve the exact opposite 
aim. Rather than reinforcing the concepts of equality among all individual South Africans and 
                                                 
1218 Sunday Times (9th December 2001 b: 15) 
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to use racial terminology (see for example fig. 58). As Jeremy Gordin put it: “The ‘swart 
gevaar’ has become the ‘swart criminal gevaar’.” 1219 
 
Figure 58: The new face of violence (Source: Sunday Times (9th December 2001 a: 1)) 
b) Victims 
While not new as such, the symbol of the victim certainly acquired a new importance after the 
end of apartheid. Violence was now no longer seen as an abstract concept that could be hidden 
behind impersonal terms like ‘unrest’ or ‘public order policing’, but as actions that have 
perpetrators and therefore also victims. As, during the early and mid-1990s, the newspapers’ 
approach to violence was still very much determined by their old world view, the majority of 
victims portrayed during that time were still white. 1220  
The ab
become
Provin ub shed the death of news photographer Ken 
id
 period under investigation here, I could no 
ove-described AWB shootings in Bophuthatswana exemplify this attitude; and it 
s even more strikingly obvious when we listen to the reason given by Eastern 
ce Herald editor Ric Wilson for having p li
Oosterbroek as a front-page story. In his opinion it expressed “the senseless carnage and 
needless death that was happening in the townships” 1221. Surely, no one doubts that the death 
was tragic, but I find it quite shocking that the death of one white man is cons ered to be the 
perfect illustration of the violence that blacks are experiencing every day.  
As many other aspects of the reporting, the newspapers’ attitude towards victims changed 
slowly over the years. By the end of the time
                                                 
1219 Jeremy Gordin in an interview with the author, 31st July 2002 
al. (1970: 90) 1220 Scheper-Hughes (Unknown: 2) and Halloran et 
1221 Quoted in O’Dowd (1996: 161) 
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longer make out a difference between how the newspapers described black and white victims 
of violence. Together they had become the new symbol of the good in-group. 
 
A Brief Excursion Back to Apartheid 
 
During the apartheid years the papers faced a similar problem when portraying victims as they 
did when describing violence in general. On the one hand, the reports served the purpose of 
denouncing the liberation movements for their ruthlessness; on the other hand, the impression 
could easily emerge that the state was unable to protect its citizens or was even committing 
acts of violence itself, something that had to be avoided at all costs. Again the newspapers’ 
strategy, partly forced on them by legislation, was to divide victims of violence into groups 
and portray only those whose cases confirmed the official worldview, while ignoring all 
others. This is why we rarely read about the victims of crime – except in spectacular cases 
such as necklacings or murders within the (white) family – the victims of state violence, such 
1222
 did see were victims of political violence, which was, as we know, defined as 
asised 
 are.” 1223 
as torture and police brutality, and black victims of white violence.  
What we
violence against the state. However, in order to be worthy of coverage, the victims not only 
had to have been attacked by the liberation movements, but also had to be of some interest to 
the readers. This meant that, with very few exceptions, they were generally white. Thus, 
victims came to symbolise black violence against whites. Their victimhood was expressed in 
several ways. Linguistically they were victimised through the use of words that emph
their helplessness and innocence, such as ‘civilian’, ‘bystander’ or ‘non-combatant’. For 
example, after the bombing of two Durban bars by the ANC, The Natal Mercury published a 
highly emotional opinion piece demanding that 
“They must be put down, hounded and brought to justice like the cowardly mad-dog 
bombers whose gutlessness has them prey on unsuspecting innocents and whose latest 
iniquity brands them for what they
Women and children were given special attention in the reports, as they symbolised weakness 
and innocence. For example, when a bomb exploded at a shopping centre in Amanzimtoti in 
1985, The Natal Mercury exclaimed in a huge headline “Bomb atrocity” 1224 with a sub-
headline “Baby, youngsters cut down in Christmas crowds” 1225 and on page five the 
newspaper carried a number of pictures of children on stretchers under the headline “The 
faces of young terror victims” 1226 (see fig. 59). 
                                                 
1222 Scheper-Hughes (Unknown: 1-2), Institute of Criminology, UCT (1991: 26), Kaplan (1987: 12) and Potter (1975: 165) 
1223 The Natal Mercury (16th June 1986: 1) 
 5) 
1224 The Natal Mercury (24th December 1985: 1) 
1225 The Natal Mercury (24th December 1985: 1) 
1226 The Natal Mercury (24th December 1985:
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thFigure 59: The victims of a war that neither side could win (Source: The Natal Mercury (24  December 
1985: 5)) 
Another strategy of eliciting sympathy for the victims was that of naming, a practice that 
stood in stark contrast to the treatment of the perpetrators. If whites had been harmed in 
attacks by the liberation movements, their names and other personal details were generally 
given while the perpetrators of the violence remained nameless. They were called ‘terrorists’, 
‘killers’ and the like, but their humanity as expressed by names and faces was hidden.  
In contrast with the victims of violence perpetrated by the liberation movements stood those 
 perpetrators. Once again the victim 
became
In acco lence perpetrated by the security forces was generally 
portray
townsh y the security 
forces t given the privilege of being 
named,
‘rioters
it came
and drawings were often preferred over pictures. During the 1980s the Cape Times started 
                                                
of the so-called ‘black-on-black’ violence. While their plight was often described in graphic 
detail in the press, they were not generally named. They, like most ordinary blacks, remained 
anonymous ‘cases’. 1227 Their purpose was not to illicit sympathy, but to emphasise the 
wildness of blacks and the cold-bloodedness of the black
 a symbol for the ‘swart gevaar’. 
rdance with this logic, the vio
ed as victim-less. State violence constituted incidents and trends. 1228 The people in the 
ips, including women and children, who were harassed on a daily basis b
and the apartheid government’s black surrogates were no
 photographed and pitied. They were mere ‘youths’, ‘students’ or worse, ‘thugs’ and 
’. While the victims of ANC bombs were shown in gruesome detail in the news, when 
 to security force action and white violence, visually inoffensive imagery such as maps 
 
sien Williams (17th July 2002) and Dennis Pater (11th April 2002) in interviews with the author, Scheper-Hughes 1227 Moeg
(Unknow
1228 Malan
n: 1-2) and Independent Newspapers (Unknown: 36 and 42) 
 (1990: 86) and Posel (1989: 270) 
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printing
of ‘unr
 a map on page two titled “Unrest: Police Report” where they indicated the locations 
est incidents’ that happened on the previous day with numbered dots (see fig. 60).  
 
Figure 60: Climate control (Source: Cape Times (5th October 1985 a: 2)) 
It was a bit like a political weather chart, cross referenced with very brief descriptions of what 
the numbers stood for, a clean gloss-over for death and suffering in obscure places. For 
example, on 5th October 1985 (see fig. 60) the text read:  
“PRETORIA – The following situation report was received from the SAP for the 
period ending 7pm yesterday. 
A  In KwaZakele a man was killed when an SADF patrol dispersed a stone-throwing 
mob. In Gavendale a man was arrested after SAP vehicles were stoned. 
stoned a police patrol. In Mitchells Plain a crowd stoned cars and set them alight. A 
d stoned and extensively damaged a car. A youth was arrested. 
as arrested after SADF vehicles were stoned. 
B  In Tinus a man was arrested after a home was stoned 
C  In Guguletu a man killed when police dispersed stone-throwers with shotgun fire. 
In Athlone a crowd stoned cars. Three men were arrested. In Elsies River a crowd 
man was arrested. 
D  Near Paarl a crow
E  In De Aar a man w
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 private vehicles were dispersed by police who used 
One could argue that in this case the newspaper was forced to choose such representations by 
the emergency regulations, but even in cases where no such restraints applied the policy was 
not much different. When, for example, the ANC bombed the air force headquarters in 
Pretoria in 1983, the victims were named, shown in pictures and pitied at length in the press. 
On the other hand, when the South African air force retaliated by bombing Maputo, the 
newspapers said “41 ANC terrorists killed, says SADF” 1230 (The Natal Mercury), “Raid on 
ANC: ‘Scores’ died” 1231 (Cape Times) or “S.A. STRIKES BACK” 1232 (Pretoria News). No 
names were given and even during the coming days readers were not informed that the raid 
had in fact killed three workers at a jam factory, a soldier guarding a bridge, a child playing 
and an ANC man washing a car and injured at least 40 other people, mostly women and 
children. 1233 
 
Victimisation Today 
 
As I mentioned above, during the final years under investigation here a victim’s skin colour 
no longer determined the way he/she was described in news reports. That is not to say that 
blacks and whites were treated entirely equal. Proportionately, still more white victims made 
the papers than blacks. As the London Guardian pointed out in 1999 
d car hijacking in South 
But tho ifferently. Independent of race, 
creed, 
state o
                                                
F  In Soweto three men were arrested by an SADF patrol following attempted arson in 
a school. A crowd who stoned
rubber bullets and tearsmoke. A crowd used a front-end loader and caused damage to 
Emadwaleni School. 
G  In Mamelodi two men were arrested after a school was stoned. Two delivery 
vehicles were gutted and three youths were arrested. 
H  In Duncan Village a man was slightly injured when a delivery vehicle was  
stoned.” 1229 
“The overwhelming majority of victims of rape, murder an
Africa are black. You wouldn’t know it from reading Johannesburg’s two main dailies, 
the Star and the Citizen. Their daily diet of crime stories is heavily weighed in favour 
of coverage of whites.” 1234  
se victims who were spoken about were not presented d
social class or gender they were most often portrayed as helpless, defenceless and in a 
f shock and, more importantly, as ordinary folks who had been attacked either by 
 
1229 Cape Times (5  October 1985 a: 2) 
1230 The Natal Mercury (25th May 1983: 1) 
1231 Cape Times (24th May 1983: 1) 
: 2) 
th
1232 Pretoria News (23rd May 1983: 1) 
1233 Theissen (1997 a: 10) 
1234 The Guardian (24th May 1999
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anonym
persona
Let us 
Grassy
“Martin , eight, was leaning over to share his packet of chips with his two-year-old 
sister w me and ripped into his body.” 1236 
“Killed
ends tra
ous outsiders or savage brutes who had prayed on them for no reason other than 
l gain or joy of inflicting pain.  
look at a few examples: “Five petrol attendants were shot dead execution-style at a 
 Park petrol garage early today – and their attackers escaped with at most R1 000.” 1235 
ique Africa
hen a flying bullet pierced the front door of his ho
 for protecting his family” with the sub-headline “Simple act of taking out the rubbish 
gically for dad” 1237 (see fig. 61). 
 
Figure 61: The human face of suffering (Source: The Star (24th May 2002: 1)) 
This last example was an article that appeared on the front page of The Star on 24th May 2002. 
It starts with an emotional account of the events that led to “dad’s” killing: 
“When thugs pistol-whipped his wife and bit and punched his daughter, Derrick 
Booysen snapped and fought back. It cost him his life. 
At about 7am yesterday Booysen (42) opened his back door to take out the rubbish 
                                                
and was accosted by four men who forced him back into his three-bedroom house in 
Fleurhof, Florida 
 
1235 Cape Argus (24th June 2002 a: 1) 
: 1) 1236 Cape Argus (17th May 2002 b
1237 The Star (24th May 2002: 1) 
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They demanded hand over his car keys, then grabbed his wife Allison and hit her on 
the head with a handgun, causing a bleeding gash. 
One of the men also bit eldest daughter Maxine (19) in the face and slammed his fist 
into her mouth, as her younger sisters Shirley (17) and Roxanne (12) watched 
helplessly. 
Angry, Booysen began punching some of the men. 
“The robbers overpowered him, dragged him into his bedroom and apparently forced 
him to kneel down before shooting him in the head,” said West Rand police 
spokesperson Inspector Yolande Bouwer.” 1238 
The report is illustrated with a large close-up photograph of Maxine Booyden’s face with her 
wounds clearly visible. Her mother is seen crying in the background. Presented with the story 
of the victims in this way, many readers would identify with them and be more likely to buy 
the paper. Many white South Africans were afraid of falling victim to violent crime 
themselves and by presenting the victim as someone just like them, as a normal people trying 
to lead normal lives in such abnormal times, the newspapers gave them someone they could 
easily identify with. That would certainly not have worked if violence had been shown to 
victimise mostly gang members, criminals (in the case of police brutality), prisoners and 
people who live on the fringe of society, such as drug addicts or prostitutes. 
Like a classical morality play, the papers thus constructed a mythical good guy for the 
audience to identify with, who is pitted against a ghastly enemy. This way, they are reassuring 
themselves and, more importantly, their white readers that now they are really playing for the 
right team, and they do not even seem to see that this is the same belief they had held ten 
years earlier. It was all forgotten at this moment. The reporting transformed the pitiable victim 
into a symbol for the good in oneself. 
A number of methods were used to bring them to the fore: Victims now featured prominently 
in the textual parts of the articles, not only as actors, but also as directly or indirectly quoted 
n invoked in the foremost elements of an article, such as the 
headline and the accompanying imagery, for example when on 24th June 2002 the Cape Argus 
shouted “City Massacre” 1239 in a large front-page headline (see fig. 62).  
                                                
sources of information. The photographs often showed either the victims themselves or their 
next of kin and the headlines frequently made mention of the victims too. The reports 
generally took one of two forms (which could, incidentally, co-exist in one article): They were 
either sensationalistic or showed compassion. While the latter appealed to the readers’ fears 
and pains, the former served to feed their curiosity about all things negative. 
Sensationalism was therefore ofte
 
1238 The Star (24th May 2002: 1) 
1239 Cape Argus (24th June 2002 a: 1) 
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thFigure 62: The new kind of South African massacre (Source: Cape Argus (24  June 2002: 1)) 
And while the incident reported in the article – the shooting of five petrol station attendants in 
Grassy Park mentioned in chapter 4.6.1.a – was certainly tragic, this headline shows just how 
 normal a country South Africa has become for the word ‘massacre’ to be chosen to describe
the killing of five people over less dramatic formulations like ‘multiple murder’, ‘killing’, 
‘shooting’ or ‘homicide’. Only a few years earlier a massacre was normally the slaying of 
several dozen (see fig. 63). 
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Figure 63: South African massacres a few years earlier (Source: Cape Times (14th September 1990: 1)) 
Compassion became another important element in the accounts during the 1990s. The 
victims’ pain, their tears and their suffering were shown in ample detail in texts as well as in 
photographs. “Brave mom saves son” 1240 the Pretoria News reported on the front page on 
23rd May 2002. The article, which, incidentally, was cut out and given to me by a 
representative of the right-wing Freedom Front to show me just how bad the lives of white 
                                                 
1240 Pretoria News (23rd May 2002: 1) 
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South Africans had become, is illustrated with a large photograph of a woman with tears in 
her eyes (see fig. 64).  
 
rdFigure 64: A role model for all of us (Source: Pretoria News (23  May 2002: 1)) 
Additional information is not only provided by the sub-headline “Woman surprises three 
armed robbers in her home” and the caption “A visibly shocked Eileen Smith of Bultfontein, 
who still has tears in her eyes hours after the harrowing incident at her house”, but also by a 
short quote in larger type that is taken from the text and placed in a box surrounded by the 
article: “‘I pleaded with the man, begged him not to shoot us, but he got mad. I just grabbed 
Twisten and ran.’ Eileen Smith (mother)” 1241 Together these elements serve to elicit 
sympathy and admiration among readers, even if they do not read any further. 
And while tears, wounds and bruises were fairly uncontentious and therefore frequently used 
in the newspaper reports, two attributes of the victims most often created controversy: blood 
and the faces of dead bodies. Blood serves as a strong visual element in colour photographs, 
which helps to draw people’s attention, and is an indicator of injury or death even in black and 
white pictures, which feeds the audience’s desire for sensation. In short, a photograph of a 
bleeding person is a lot more dramatic than a mere portrait that needs a caption to inform the 
                                                 
1241 Pretoria News (23rd May 2002: 1) 
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reader what has happened to the person depicted. It expresses in an instant the difference 
between death and life. Blood therefore has some appeal to picture editors, especially for the 
front page. During the time of transition when violence was much sought-after and people’s 
tolerance for gore was high, many newspapers tried to outdo each other in finding the most 
gruesome pictures (see for example figs. 65). 
 
 
Figure 65: The little difference between injury and death (Sources: Cape Times (14th September 1990: 1) & 
1990: 1)) The Argus (14th September 
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f the 16 
violence and therefore continued to use the blood symbolism in the texts. “‘He suffocated in 
his own blood’” 1243 the headline of an article about the murder trial of five white racist 
suspected of killing a black teenager in what was then the Northern Province in The Star on 
1st February 2002 read. The Cape Times, too, chose that aspect of a witness’s testimony for its 
headline: “Poacher choked on blood while rugby pals hit him, court told” 1244. And the Cape 
Argus of 7th May 2002, in an article about the stabbing of a security guard, describes the 
man’s last moments as follows: “Residents tried to revive him, but by the time the paramedics 
arrived, he had died in a pool of blood.” 1245  
Editors feel a similar ambivalence towards the use of faces in pictures, albeit for another 
reason. On the one hand they are a good way to pay tribute to the victim by quite literally 
giving the violence a face. On the other hand, showing a face can insult the victim’s dignity as 
well as inflicting unnecessary pain on their family and friends. 1246 And, as in the case of 
Chris Hani, editors sometimes feel that showing a face is too horrifying. In O’Dowd’s survey 
only two out of a total of 21 pictures showed Hani’s full face with his mouth wide open, the 
tongue caught between his teeth and a bullet hole discernible in his jaw (see fig. 71). 1247 
At the same time, some editors felt that it was bad taste to show faces or large amounts of 
blood and often cropped pictures. For example, in her survey of the photographs that 
accompanied reports of the murder of SACP leader Chris Hani, O’Dowd found that “o
pictures of Hani’s body on the bricks, 10 pictures showed varying amounts of blood, some 
having been cropped to reduce the amount of blood visible.” 1242 As time passed, editors grew 
more sensitive to the effects of blood in photographs and the symbol was used less and less.  
However, editors did not want to lose such a powerful symbol for the suffering caused by 
 
thFigure 66: Raw violence (Source: Sowetan (17  May 2002: 3)) 
                                                 
1242 O’Dowd (1996: 103) 
1243 The Star (1st February 2002: 1) 
1246 O’Dowd (1996: 158) 
1244 Cape Times (1st February 2002: 4) 
1245 Cape Argus (7th May 2002 a: 1) 
1247 O’Dowd (1996: 96-97) 
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Of the newspapers that did not show the face, seven had no option as they had no pictures 
available. Three, namely the Sunday Times, the Cape Times and the Sowetan, did, but refused 
to run them at the time. All three editors felt that the images were too gruesome. 1248  
Nowadays, such gory depictions of victims have become very rare. Articles about murders are 
now generally illustrated with photographs of the crime scene (see for example figs. 62 and 
67), of the victims’ grieving relatives (see figs. 67 and 68) or older pictures of the victims 
from their family album (see figs. 67 and 68). 
 
7: A more humaneFigure 6  approach to violence… (Source: Cape Times (6th December 2001: 1)) 
 
Source: Cape Times (13th May 2002: 3)) Fi ities (gure 68: …not only for celebr
                                                 
1248 O’Dowd (1996: 96-97) 
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feeds th  news value 
of a sto
and the judge Joe Ikaneng told the Sunday 
Times: 
media 
interest  some way outrageous, shocking or disgusting, for example if the 
victim 
For exa rates South Africa’s 
fascina
“Woma ild 
rapes” 
farmer,
jailed f alls into this category. It was not only the crime that was strikingly 
ow any human being can act with such savagery towards a 
 this restraint in photographs, the newspapers’ victim-centred reporting still frequently 
e voyeurism of the audience. As violence has swamped the headlines, the
ry has often come to be measured by the brutality of the acts of violence committed 
 helplessness of the victims. As Johannesburg 
“Rape has achieved the status of a national sport (...) leading to compassion fatigue in 
blah blah.” 1249 Ordinary rape is no longer news. Today, violence is often only of 
 to the press if it is in
is very young or particularly old, or if the crime is especially bloody.  
mple page eleven of the Cape Argus of 6th December 2001 illust
tion with abnormal (for lack of a better term) kinds of rape. It combines an article titled 
n of 101 attacked by would-be rapist” 1250 with one about “the recent spate of ch
1251. And although it is not about rape, an article about the murder of a 75-year-old 
 published in Pretoria News on 24th May 2002 under the headline “Savage farm killer 
or life” 1252, also f
insensitive, though. The article is too: 
“Except for his respect for the dead man and his family, a Pietermaritzburg High Court 
judge said yesterday he might have ordered that photographs of murdered Richmond 
farm resident Raymond Lundy (75) “in his butchered state” be hung in the prison cell 
of his killer as a daily reminder to him of his brutal and savage behaviour. 
“The photographic exhibits of the deceased hacked with bushknives and his throat slit 
can only be described as nightmarish. This murder ranks amongst the most gruesome 
that I have seen,” Judge Pillay said when he sentenced 37-year-old Sibusiso Gatsha 
Ngubane to life imprisonment for the murder and to 20 years imprisonment for 
robbery with aggravating circumstances of the elderly man on October 27 last year. 
Ngubane was also sentenced to six months imprisonment for unlawful possession of 
ammunition. 
“I simply cannot imagine h
fellow human being. It sickens me and it fills me with revulsion,” Pillay told Ngubane. 
He described as an absolute disgrace the fact that Ngubane had made use of two 
“young lads” aged 15 and 17 (members of his family) to commit his ghastly crimes 
and said in the circumstance it seemed his (five) children would be better off without 
him. 
                                                 
1249 Sunday Times (4th July 1999: 2) 
1250 Cape Argus (6th December 2001 b: 11) 
1251 Cape Argus (6th December 2001 c: 11) 
1252 Pretoria News (24th May 2002: page unknown) 
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 two youths who gave evidence against the accused indemnity from 
 the common Western opposites of right and 
                                                
Lundy had been assaulted, bound with wire and left in a sugar cane field until the 
accused returned, hacked him to death with a bushknife and slit his throat. 
“Those moments in the sugar cane field before he met his death must have been the 
most agonising for the deceased,” the judge said. 
He said attacks on the farming community, the frail and the aged and people living in 
isolated areas or alone were far too frequent and deserving of “the severest 
punishment”. 
He said members of society had to be assured that the courts would always protect 
them from wanton thuggery “with all the might at their disposal”. 
In imposing the maximum sentence allowed by law on Ngubane he was “not at all 
troubled” by his conscience, sense of fairness and sense of justice the judge added. 
“In your case there is no room for mercy because you showed none,” he told Ngubane. 
The court granted
prosecution.” 1253 
I have decided to cite the entire text above because this article illustrates a number of aspects 
about the reporting of the English language press in South Africa. It clearly separates in-group 
from out-group and both are represented by individuals: the (white) victim and the (black) 
perpetrator respectively. The reader is made to identify with and feel pity for the victim 
(“Those moments (…) must have been the most agonising”) while strong words condemn the 
perpetrator (“I simply cannot imagine”, “no room for mercy”) and portraying him as 
inhumane and savage (“savagery”, “hacked with bushknives”, “showed no [mercy]”). In 
between these two groups stands the court (in this case symbolised by the black judge), 
charged with protecting the good in-group from the savage attacks of the out-group. The 
court’s views are the newspaper’s (indicating that it, too, stands above the conflict and is fit to 
pass moral judgement on society) and the angle from which the events are presented leaves no 
room for judging them along any other lines than
wrong and crime and punishment. 
It could have been different. The history behind the attack could have been given, the 
relationship between victim and perpetrator made known. We are not told how the perpetrator 
was apprehended and why the judge can be sure that he, not one of the teenagers, has 
committed the murder. Imagine for example a scenario where the newspaper tells the story of 
a poor man rather than a black man in a small community in KwaZulu Natal who is trying 
hard to make ends meet, feed his wife and five children and put his sister’s teenage sons 
through school. But his employer, a wealthy old farmer, does nothing to ease his situation. He 
 
page unknown) 1253 Pretoria News (24th May 2002: 
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makes him work long hours for little money and do hazardous jobs without protective gear. 
When our man is tired or slow he is physically and verbally abused by the farmer and his 
sons. One day he witnesses the farmer hide some money in the house and out of desperation, 
anger and frustration decides to rob him. His nephews volunteer to help him 
evening they go to the farm, confront the farmer, rob him and kill him. When they realise 
what they have done, panic sets in and they flee the scene of the crime. A while later, though, 
our man feels remorse and decides to turn himself in to the police in return for his nephews to 
be let off. He is sentenced by a strongly biased judge who is more interested in pleasing the 
wealthy farming community than in understanding the roots of the problem, and during the 
trial is tormented with verbal abuse. The article than finishes with a short quote from the man 
‘I know what I have done was wrong, but I could take no more abuse and felt I had to do 
something lest my children all end 
follow in my footsteps’. 
I am not saying that this is what occurred in the reported case. I do not know what happened, 
because I could not find any reference to the case anywhere else. Not even the farmers’ rights 
groups on the internet mentioned it. But it could easily have happened this way and if the 
newspapers had described it like that, we might come away feeling differently towards the 
people involved. But the p
the judge. He is quoted at length, at times without quotation marks, which lends the quote an 
air of absoluteness, as in the case of “attacks on the farming community, the frail and aged 
and people living in isolated areas were far too frequent”. And this, I believe, is a good 
indicator as to why the paper reported from this particular perspective. It expressed the views 
of the Pretoria News target readership, “the upper end of the market” 1254. Incidentally, like 
the article depicted in and described around figure 64, this story was given to me by Colonel 
Uys of the Freedom Front who thought that it served as a good example of what
South Africa was like. 
ensationalised accounts of violence are not only objectionable because they paint an 
ate picture of a county in chaos and mayhem. The Pretoria News article above is a 
se of ‘trial by media’, a virtual sentencing of the culprits without giving them a
nd themselves. This is seldom done, as it has here, by direct accusations and finger 
g. Rather, the media are much more subtle, using the power of the old binary 
ion of identity and
implicitly become a symbol of the o
              
1254 Independent Online (2002: 1) 
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fear. R
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intende
fact res
This ki cally reflect upon their own 
involvement in making South African society what it is today and the possible recognition of 
their own guilt. As members of a different group, they cannot possibly be responsible for the 
perpetrator’s behaviour. The mistake has been made outside their own sphere of influence. 
However, as the perpetrators’ behaviour is the result of the same cultural and social 
circumstances as that of the victims, the newspapers are creating a boundary that is not 
verifiable in the extra-medial world. This way, by explicitly pointing at the facts, the media 
are actually covering them up. 1256 
This, however, is not the only problem associated with this symbolism. It also bears the risk 
that, by emphasising the human drama, the papers deny the victims self-determination and the 
right to forgiving, reconciliation and healing. 1257 They are robbed of the positive status they 
have achieved by society’s recognition of their being victims. They are often embarrassed 
before the public and even the last fig leaf that had previously protected them from the hungry 
looks is taken from them.  
For example, several journalists and photographers and even a cameraman from the SABC 
were present when the self-proclaimed citizens’ militia PAGAD lynched the gang leader 
Rashaad Staggie in broad daylight. 1258 Staggie died an agonising death, brought about by 
gunshots and a petrol bomb that had been thrown at him while he lay on the ground wounded. 
The media shared every cruel detail of the incident with their audience. Nothing remained 
hidden. The Cape Times for example delivered the images of Staggie’s death to readers’ 
breakfast tables (see fig. 69) under the headline “Night of bloody execution” 1259.  
The article did not leave Staggie any dignity either:  
“One of the most notorious figures in the Western Cape underworld, Rashaad Staggie, 
was shot in the head, set alight, and then had scores of bullets pumped into him las
River gutter. 
eaders of such descriptions have no way of approaching the violence in a neutral, 
tional way and to analyse it in its complex totality. Unless they actively read against the 
d meaning of the text, they will unconsciously be persuaded that the accused party in 
ponsible for the violence portrayed and will take sides against them. 1255 
nd of reporting also spares the readers from having to criti
t 
night by militant anti-drugs Muslims as he lay twitching in a Salt 
He lay in the street – critically wounded – for more than an hour before being driven 
away in a mortuary van, his blood flowing out of him, mingling with the fire-
extinguisher foam. 
                                                 
1255 Corner (1980: 79-80) and Simpson (1997: 2) 
1256 Simpson (1997: 1-2) 
1257 Simpson et al. (1997: 2) 
1258 The Economist (12th October 1996: 21) and McCarthy (1998: A Study of the Causes of Violence in the Post-Apartheid 
1) 
Era: 1-2) 
1259 Cape Times (5th August 1996: 
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Flats and Boland – took about 25 minutes to die. 
Staggie – who with his brother Rashied was a co-leader of the Hard Livings gang that 
has branches across the Cape 
Handgun after handgun was emptied in his direction from across the street as members 
of the crowd bayed for his blood. He appeared to be wearing a bullet-proof vest. 
Members of the police stood by, apparently helpless.” 1260 
 
thFigure 69: Shocking images of violence (Source: Cape Times (5  August 1996: 1)) 
The other newspapers I surveyed followed a similar pattern in their reports. The Star’s lead 
article on 5th August 1996 was very close to the one cited above, but the headline – “Police 
look on as a crowd of Muslim vigilantes shoot and burn gangster” 1261 – was a lot more sober 
and the article was not accompanied by any photographs. They made-up for this the next day
mes, minutes before his 
                                                
 
with a large photograph of Staggie on the front page, a man in fla
 
1260 Cape Times (5th August 1996: 1) 
1261 The Star (5th August 1996: 1) 
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death. Inside, the paper presented its readers with a kind of slide show of the execution, image 
after image of violence and suffering.  
An exception was The Argus, which was surprisingly restrained in its reporting. They showed 
only a photograph of Staggie’s wrapped body being carried away on the front page and a 
picture of policemen walking past his charred body on page three (see figs. 70 and 71). The 
paper also gave some attention to Staggie’s grieving relatives. 
 
Figure 70: Rashaad Staggie’s body (Source: The Argus (5th August 1996: 1)) 
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Figure 71: A mere heap of ashes (Source: The Argus (5th August 1996: 3)) 
The media justified their explicit representation with their duty to show reality the way it is. 
The time of cover-ups, said an editorial of The Star, had ended in 1994. 1262  
5. The Imagery Rediscovered: South African English-Speakers 
Talk About 
 
Violence 
Now that I am familiar with the violence in South Africa and have scrutinised the way the 
newspapers have covered it in their reports, it is time to look at white English speakers’ views 
                                                 
1262 FXI (1996: 1) 
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ere is a relationship between the 
s is what I will try to achieve in the 
results of the past chapters and any relevant literature as well as my 
er, I believe that there is a clear pattern with the 
Uncovering them is the second task 
of this 
think a
how th ves of ordinary people. 
us, for example when people had been victims of violence themselves. In other 
ases, though, it remained unclear where the imagery originated, for example if my interviews 
ir sources of information or when experience and idea were 
of the situation in their country and to investigate whether th
three, whereby one influences any of the others. Thi
present chapter. Using the 
field notes and interview transcripts from South Africa, I will attempt to show that clear 
parallels exist between the white population’s perception of reality and the media’s reporting 
of violence ant that these are not merely coincidental. Of course, one could say that the reason 
for this is that the newspaper producers and their readers share a cultural background and 
should thus have similar worldviews. Howev
reports influencing the worldview much more significantly than the other way around.  
I will try to prove this by once again focussing on recurring themes and images used to 
describe the ongoing violence in South Africa. On the one hand, I will investigate white South 
Africans’ direct experience with violence. Is there a lot of violence in their lives? If so, what 
kind? And do they experience it as perpetrators, victims or witnesses? These parts are based 
largely on my interviews, my own impressions of the situation I found and on scientific 
studies that originated in South Africa.  
The results of this preliminary work are meant to provide me with a backdrop against which I 
can compare white South Africans’ views about violence. 
chapter. I will search for the code(s) that ordinary white South Africans use to talk and 
bout violence. I will try to explain, for example, what acts are classified as violence, 
ese are talked of, and what significance violence has in the li
Another important question will be how these ideas came into being. Sometimes this was 
quite obvio
c
partners did not specify the
mutually exclusive. It was this latter group that was of particular interest to me because in my 
opinion they had the greatest potential of uncovering hidden processes of meaning making. 
Finally, I will compare these beliefs and opinions with the imagery found in the newspaper 
reports as well as with reality as I experienced it during my time in South Africa and as other 
people from outside my target group described it. This should bring to light the shared ideas 
that form the foundation of English speaking South Africans’ thinking about their country. 
But before I get back into the theory of it all, let us first look at the world of experience of my 
target group.  
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5.1 Pride and Prejudice: The Apartheid Years 
5.1.1 White South Africans’ World of Experie
Violence in White Areas 
During the apartheid years, white South Africans remained largely untouched by the violence 
that was tearing their country apart. Due to the relative wealth of the white population, the 
policy of ‘separate development’ that kept them away from poor people and the SAP’s heavy-
handed way of policing the pass laws, criminal violence was rare and political violence 
virtually non-existent in the white areas. 1263  
This is not to say that there was no violence at all in the lives of white South Africans. 
However, it was generally committed by whites themselves an
did not consider to be violence. Instead, if someone was meting out corporal punishment to 
workers, they were ‘teaching them a lesson’; if a man slapped his wife, he was ‘putting her in 
her place’; if guys got into punch-ups, they were ‘just being men’; and acts like throwing 
domestic staff in the pool despite their not being able to swim – a thing that I was told about 
by a number of different people – were considered as just another way of ‘having fun’. 
Accordingly, whites saw their world as being largely free of violence. 1264 I believe that 
Gerald Shaw summed it all up perfectly when he told me: 
“You see, the white community was protected from,  … I’m talking about the white 
community. Everything was just fine as far as they were concerned, as long as they 
were not concerned about what was happening to blacks.” 1265 
And most whites were indeed n
inhabited. 
 
Violence in the Townships 
 
The violence in the townships went largely unnoticed by the white population. As we have 
seen in the past chapters, the media did not accurately portray the violent reality there and the 
majority of whites never visited black residential areas, be they townships or homelands, and 
not many of them spent any time with blacks. In fact, it never occurred to most people to even 
try. When I asked my interview partners what would have happened if they had contravened 
apartheid regulations and had, for example, gone to a black beach, the standard answer I 
received was somewhere along the lines of ‘Why would I go there? They were awful!’. I did 
not find a single person who had ever got curious about either the repercussions of breaking 
                                      
 (2002: 1 and 9) 
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iew with the author, 22nd May 2002 
1263 Shaw
1264 du To
1265 Interv
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The tru day, but I must say that my experience in South Africa has 
een that, after years of segregation, it is the normal thing for everyone to drift apart. I was 
with several hundred guests from a number of different countries and 
ne was hostile to me. On the contrary, every single black person I met in 
even talk – I met a few white 
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 or the way the other three quarters of South Africa lived. No one had ever gone to a 
each or a blacks-only facility of any kind.  
In places where people were forced to mix, for example at work or during the later years in 
some restaurants, they still tended to stay apart. Like oil and water they managed be together 
without actually blending. Even the English press’ newsrooms and facilities, like canteens and 
lavatories, were segregated. Strangely enough, in my interviews the two sides often blamed 
each other for this situation. Some white journalists claimed that they had tried to integrate 
their black colleagues into the gene
lves. Black journalists on the other hand unanimously complained about racism among 
hite colleagues and a tendency to keep them separate.  
th is hard to reconstruct to
b
once invited to a party 
despite intense efforts on the part of a few people to get everyone celebrating together, little 
unicoloured groups soon formed that seemed impossible to penetrate for members of the other 
group. I tried my luck with some students my age and even managed to exchange a few words 
with a young man, but then an uncomfortable silence set in and I decided to leave. This is not 
to say that anyo
South Africa was friendly, helpful and more than open towards me – something that I cannot 
say about the white people of Bloemfontein – but as soon as I encountered groups (of any 
kind) the mixing became difficult. 
But I am straying away from my original line of thought. There were a few situations where 
interaction with blacks was unavoidable for whites, such as with their workers and domestic 
staff. These relationships were frequently very complex, so I will not go into too much detail. 
Often the children used to play together while the adults did not 
South Africans who, as kids had spoken at least one African language but as soon as they 
grew older, they stopped talking to their former friends and forgot all they had known. Whites 
used to entrust their homes, their farms and their children to black workers but still viewed 
them as if they were children themselves. Staff would often feel unhappy and humiliated in 
this situation, but at the same time love their employers, especially the children, like their own 
family. The dependency was mutual and so were the love, hate and misunderstanding. But 
most importantly, whites used to think of their staff as a part of their lives and never wondered 
if they had a life of their own or what that might look like. One young man for example told 
“When I was still living at home we 
do all the housework. She was there wh
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 about their views, dreams and aspirations. 
particular struck me in this regard. I was doing research in 
                                                
lunch. But we never talked. In those eighteen years I never knew how she lived, if she 
had kids and stuff. It was her world … just different.” 1266 
So whites, as a group, had no direct access to the lives, minds and feelings of the black 
population. They were not in the townships during the demonstrations of 1976/77, they did 
not attend any meetings organised by the Civics during the 1980s and most of them did not 
speak to the black people they had contact with
And they most certainly did not talk about the violence they experienced on a day-to-day 
basis. As Johann de Villiers told me:  
“Now, you can say, this is what every, ah, period of history does when it turns out it 
was bad, it says “I didn’t know”. I’m not trying to say that, but I don’t think generally 
a lotta people knew.” 1267 
 
The Ones who Knew 
 
Certain individuals, like journalists, policemen or civil servants, had the chance to witness the 
events in the townships through black eyes, but most of them turned it down, preferring 
instead to view the black world from the safety of their white perspectives. They formed an 
island inside the townships and rarely reflected critically on the events they witnessed on a 
daily basis. 1268 
One young man’s story in 
Johannesburg and living at a backpacker’s hostel in a safe white neighbourhood, when one 
day I decided to visit Soweto. A man I had made friends with was not happy with my decision 
and repeatedly tried to stop me from venturing into what he considered to be a very dangerous 
area. When I did not listen, he decided that the least he could do was to come along to protect 
me. Obviously, nothing happened to us, which came as a surprise to him just as much as the 
fact that there were such things as roads and traffic lights there.  
On the way home we stopped at the apartheid museum for a visit. Reluctant to go at first, he 
grew more and more interested as we walked through the exhibit, but also turned more and 
more surprised at all the atrocities that had been committed in the name of his protection. The 
final wake-up call happened when we reached a re-enacted scene from the township uprisings 
of the 1980s: A Casspir sitting in the middle of a room, surrounded by live-size photographs 
of demonstrating kids. The visitor was allowed, even encouraged to join both sides, to share 
their experience. So we did. At first we stood with the kids and felt the fear of being faced by 
this armoured beast. Then we climbed into the Casspir and looked out the small windows at 
 
1266 Conversation with the author in Prague, 8th April 2004  
 July 2002 1267 Interview with the author, 25th
1268 Chubb & van Dijk (1999: 133-136) and Tutu (1999: 48-51) 
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ust admit, was rather frightening to me. It was not 
s he in denial? 
but certainly not exclusively – from their real-life experiences. 
against whomever they can lay their hands on in order to bring down a democratically elected 
government and replace it with the rule of communist mobs was not only viable, but 
to that of 
act, the subject of the next sub-chapter. 
the shouting and running crowd, which, I m
as bad as it was for him, though. He went pale and quietly said: “I have to go. I can’t stand 
this. It’s the smell. It brings back bad memories.” We walked through the rest of the museum 
in silence. At the end of it all, he went back to the cashier and, close to tears, thanked her for 
having shown him what had gone on. He was so taken by the experience, he later organised 
tours to the museum from the backpacker’s. 1269 
What had happened? Obviously he had known what had been going on, he had been put on 
township duty during his military service in the 1980s. Had he forgotten? Wa
Was he lying? Was he trying to be absolved of guilt? No, I believe, he had not registered the 
whole experience as an act of violence in the first place. In the official discourse of the time it 
was not classified as such. It had been a matter of defending his country against an outside 
attack. Like many other whites in the early to mid-1980s, my friend accepted this ‘total 
onslaught’ view of reality. Only when the whole situation was redefined and presented to him 
within the framework of post-apartheid discourse did he see that the real onslaught had 
emanated from the state against a permanently besieged black population. Only when they 
were presented to him as victims of violence did he identify with the black masses he had 
previously considered to be a dangerous threat. He had to be given a new repertoire of 
thoughts and a new framework within which they made sense before he was able to see the 
world in any other way. 1270  
And this is where the media come into play. They provide people with just that repertoire. The 
framework comes mainly – 
Apartheid was not so much an ideology as a way of life. And whites liked and therefore 
supported this way of life. Their experiences told them that apartheid meant that people could 
live in relative wealth, relatively free from the ills that haunted many liberal democracies, 
such as crime, drug abuse and joblessness, and still enjoy all the benefits of a democracy. This 
framework was then filled with ideas that seemed to fit, from sources such as conversations 
with friends and family, specific experiences such as being searched for bombs at their local 
shopping centre, and, most certainly the media. All these, in neat cycles, constantly drew upon 
each other and reinforced each other. Thus, the world view that South Africa was a perfect 
place were it not for outside agitators inciting hordes of primitive blacks to commit atrocities 
empirically verifiable. But now I am straying from the realm of white knowledge in
white opinion, which is, in f
                                                 
1269 Johannesburg, 20th July 2002 
th1270 Jackson (1993: 26) and TRC (17  September 1997: Arri de Beer, 5) 
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ostly fear that got them to cling to grand apartheid and it was mostly fear that kept them 
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5.1.2 White South Africans’ Views 
Throughout apartheid, but especially during the 1980s, fear of violence, or, more precisely, of 
what Steve Biko called “the illusionary swart gevaar that only e
stricken whites”  was a major factor influencing
m
from demanding true democracy. As Ken Owen, the editor of Business Day, once wrote in an 
editorial: “Pressure from the black masses (…) pushed them into psychological bunkers … In 
the face of threats of revolution, the voters brushed aside all other issues.” 1272 
According to a survey by the Human Science Research Council (HSRC), in 1985 a mere 29% 
of English speakers supported complete desegregation of residential areas, barely more than 
wanted to maintain complete segregation (25%). 1273 Another survey conducted in 1986 
revealed that only 5% of English speakers favoured what the authors called “black majority 
government” 1274 – an ideologically laden term that whites often used to express their fear of 
democracy, which was not unlike the “transfer of power from whites to blacks” 1275 that 
Independent Newspapers spoke about in their submission to the TRC when describing why 
they were opposed to ending apartheid. All these expressions show the clear misperce
the reality on the ground, for what the ANC was fighting for was not apartheid in reverse, but 
universal franchise. However, in the minds of many white South Africans, who could not 
imagine that anything but skin colour could ever influence voting patterns, in a country like 
theirs this would automatically mean that power would always be at the hands of blacks as 
they were the majority. 1276  
Such considerations certainly played an important role in the white population’s choice of 
government. During the 1980s more and more English speakers began to support proponents 
of apartheid. A pre-election survey in May 1987 showed that 49.3% intended to vote for the 
NP (43% did), with a further 7.7% planning to opt for far-right parties s
Conservative Party (CP) or the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP). 1277 In fact, in the late 
eighties the NP drew over a quarter of its support from the ranks of English speaking South 
Africans. 1278 This shift in allegiance from the liberal Progressive Federal Party (PFP) to the 
NP surely had something to do with people’s ars and anxieties over what would happen if 
their country ever came to be a non-racial democracy. One of the government’s election 
                                                 
1271 B. Steven Biko, 1972, Introduction. In: B. Steven Biko, Black Viewpoint, p. 8, quoted in Franks (1987: 176) 
1272 Quoted in Rhoodie & Cooper (1987: 230) 
1273 Rhoodie & Cooper (1987: 203) 
1274 Rhoodie & Cooper (1987: 226) 
nown: 28) 
1987: 189) and Rule (2000: 219) 
14) 
1275 Independent Newspapers (Unk
1276 Friedman (2001: 3) 
1277 Rhoodie & Cooper (
1278 Magubane (1989: 1
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opinion ason why the newspapers did not adequately inform white South Africans 
about the violence they did not experience directly was the same as why they did not find out 
on their own: Their lack of interest in all matters pertaining to blacks.   
          
slogans had been: “Over my dead body will I vote for the ANC.” 1279 And due to their 
ignorance of what was really going on in the townships they did not know that this could quite 
literally be the statement of thousands of South African blacks. 
 
The Role of the Press as a Shaper of Ideas 
 
White people’s ignorance of the ongoing violence was, as we have seen in the last sub-
chapter, partly the result of their lack of direct experience with it. But it was also due to the 
media’s inadequate reporting of the bloody reality in the townships. There were other sources 
of information, but they need to be looked at with caution
 source that was closest to the events that needed explaining – the black population. In 
vey of attitudes to political violence in South Africa Burton found that 33% of white 
 cited “contacts with fellow human beings” 1280 as their main
about political violence. But again, as we have seen, these contacts mainly took place within 
their in-group, so that, ultimately, their knowledge of the situation in the townships would not 
have increased much in the process. The education system, the churches, friends, family, and 
co-workers should be seen as shapers of attitudes rather than sources of information.  
The press therefore had an immense infl
respondents cited the media as their main source of information (10% cited both, contacts and 
the media and 13% declined to specify) with the newspapers being mentioned twice as often 
as television. 1281 These figures differed slightly from my findings. Of the people I spoke 
with, 67% cited the media as their main source of information (44% newspapers, 39% 
television, 17% radio), 13% cited both the media and contacts with other people and 20% 
either did not answer or we did not get to the question. No one cited only personal contacts. In 
any case, it seems to be safe to assume that during the past years the media, and particularly 
the newspapers, have been the main source of information for white South Africans.  
And this source wa
ed them of certain things if they had wanted to. In the eyes of Allister Sparks, the 
 editor of the Rand Daily Mail, “it is difficult to exaggerate the impact of this 
atic brainwashing on white attitudes” 1282. This is not the whole story though. In my 
, the main re
                                       
1279 Quoted in Franks (1987: 182) 
1280 Burton (1994: 249) 
1281 Burton (1994: 249) 
1282 Sparks (1999: 80) 
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from white papers if they covered too much news from the townships. 1284 This led a great 
rom what I understand, most 
as information out there for whites to be found had they wanted to. But many did not. 
r to find out what was happening in the townships and prisons of the apartheid state, 
people would have had to overcome their mental barrier and pick up an alternative 
per, a newspaper aimed at the black population or a township 
nd very few of them ever did. 1283 On the contrary, as the failure of the Rand Daily 
ompared with the success of The Citizen has shown, they tended to turn away even 
number of South Africans to believe that what they saw around them every day was the real 
extent of violence in the country. As Kane-Berman noted: 
“The segregation of news and opinion, coupled with social and residential segregation, 
thus helps to limit white perceptions (including the perceptions of businessmen) of 
black living conditions, views, grievances, and demands.” 1285 
In an opinion survey in 1982 for example, 71% of white respondents indicated their belief that 
blacks were basically content with the status quo and had no reason to want political change. 
Such a staggering lack of understanding of the real feelings and wishes of the black 
population a mere three years before the country descended into a veritable civil war shows 
just how little whites knew about blacks. 1286 
Or rather how many of them mistook beliefs for knowledge. F
white South Africans were quite convinced that they knew exactly what was going on in their 
country, where the causes for these events lay and how to solve the problems in the 
townships. Few ever questioned this ‘knowledge’, so few ever realised that it was not based 
on information, but on impressions and hearsay and as such constituted no more than a belief. 
Some people were so convinced of the superiority of their own insights that they came to 
disbelieve even eyewitness accounts or newspaper reports that did not conform to their ideas. 
Bob Steyn, the conciliator and registrar of the Media Council, for example told Jackson in 
1989 that one day  
“I was on the phone with a woman complaining about a headline in that morning’s 
Cape Times. The headline dealt with an incident of police beating schoolchildren in 
Cape Town’s streets, a story she saw as yet another fabrication by a troublemaking 
newspaper. 
                                                 
1283 Manning (1987: 30-31and 135), Tutu (1999: 171), Frederikse (1987: 224), Massing (1987: 36-37), Brewer (1986: 320) 
and Kane-Berman (1979: 159) 
1284 Babs Abba Omar in an interview with the author, 5th June 2002 
1285 Kane-Berman (1979: 159) 
1286 Sparks (1999: 80), Pakendorf (1987: 265), Manning (1987: 135) and Malan (1990: 189) 
wed how little they know to this day. A man told me: “Under apartheid we benefited from…, but 
rmy.” (Interview with the author in Cape Town 24th 
One of my interviews sho
the blacks benefited too, from good roads, a good legal system, a good a
May 2002) And my impression was that he was not alone with this belief. 
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he help of anti-apartheid forces among liberal whites who greatly 
s efforts to defend its law-abiding 
proceedings of the National Conference on English-Speaking South Africa Today in July 
ect, it would seem that such rejections of media messages were 
As they spoke, Steyn noticed out of his window a group of uniformed black 
schoolchildren walking in single file in Darling Street below. Then out of nowhere and 
for no apparent reason came a group of policemen, batons flailing as they dispersed the 
children. Steyn described to the woman what he was witnessing. 
“I don’t believe it,” she said. Then, referring to what she assumed must be his political 
bias, she added: What’s more, you must be Prog [a progressive] and shouldn’t have the 
job you have.” 1287 
Such a story should, in theory, disprove my hypothesis of the media influencing people’s 
opinions right here. In my view it is quite compatible with it though. An account of policemen 
wielding batons, running after a fe
contradicts the image of South Africa that was common in public discourse until then. As I 
have shown in the last chapter, policemen were generally viewed as calm and controlled, not 
running and violent, while the group of blacks was supposed to be big, uncontrollable and 
threatening, not consisting of a few children on their way home from school. Therefore, what 
is at question here is w
ation that does not fit in with their worldview. In such a case, they have a choice: They 
dify their worldview, they can ignore or re-interpret the new information to fit in with 
ew of reality or they can reject the message outright. 1288 
This is exactly what happened in our case here. The author of the article in the Cape Times 
tried to write against the grain of what had by then become common wisdom, namely that a 
disciplined police force was fighting a small but annoying township uprising instigated by 
outside terrorists with t
exaggerated its extent and tried to vilify the Republic’
citizens. Many readers, in my opinion, rejected such an interpretation not because the 
newspapers could not reach them, but rather because the readers actively chose not to believe 
them. Once they had acquired a certain view of the world, they were no longer willing or able 
to simply discard it and replace it with something new. We must not forget that, while 
newspapers are integral to constructing public discourse, the individual article is always an 
addition to the existing world of knowledge of a society and will be judged by its readers in 
terms of its compliance with the principles of this world. 1289 
In South Africa, there was an additional paradox at work. If the numbers presented at the 
1974 are even remotely corr
                                                 
1287 Jackson (1993: 159) 
1288 Hartley (1982: 140), Fairclough (1995: 46) and Retief (2002: 216) 
1289 Hartmann & Husband (1971: 268-269), Goffman (1974: 28-29) and MacKuen & Coombs (1981: 122-123) 
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 papers largely 
failed to take advantage of their new freedoms. While the Weekly Mail uncovered the 
Inkathagate scandal and Vrye Weekblad exposed police death squads, the big newspaper 
talked of ‘black-on-black’ violence and ‘mob justice’. The alternatives’ stories were only 
taken up hesitantly, if at all. 1295 And in my view, Ken Owen’s admission of not having 
not rare. According to de Villiers, only 31% of English speakers thought that the English 
language press gave the “the most reliable and unbiased news on South African politics” 1290. 
More respondents found the press “too critical” of the government (24%
was “not critical enough” (14%). 1291 And yet, they did not stop reading. This leads me to 
believe that, while they rejected the obvious content, the subliminal message the newspapers 
sent was fully consistent with their views. This is also what had influenced them in exactly the 
opposite direction for too long. Or rather, to take a less deterministic view of the press, new 
ideas were rejected because newspapers had made it too easy for readers to find the 
information that confirmed their preferred version of reality while igno
forgetting all uncomfortable news.  
Furthermore, due to the relaxing of influx control and other reform measures taken by the 
government, whites saw more and more blacks an a day-to-day basis. They saw t
nt, but they also saw that, as long as they abided by the rules, they were not hassled by 
. So why would they believe that such things were going on in other places? Manning 
d in an interview: 
“I know there are riots in some places (…). But I thi
happening. Most blacks want to live in peace. I see them on the bus and in the streets 
and where I work, and they seem satisfied with life.” 1292 
Obviously, the people who were running into trouble with the police must have done 
something wrong in the first place. 1293 After all, although distant and generally easy to 
ignore, all blacks were a potential threat and the ones who overstepped the line deserved to be 
put back in their place. 1294  
5.2 Slow Changes: The Period of Transition 
The general framework began to change in 1990, but neither the reality on the ground nor the 
ideas conveyed through the news did. The townships were still in turmoil and the white areas 
were still islands of calm. And this was still explained in the old terms of cultural differences. 
The alternative press came into its own during this time, but the mainstream
                                                 
1290 Quoted in de Villiers (1976: 354) 
1291 Giffard (1976: 657-658) 
1292 Quoted in Manning (1987: 35) 
1293 Malan (1990: 154) and Manning (1987: 135-136) 
1294 Malan (1990: 158) and Mike Tissong thin an interview with the author, 16  July 2002 
 (17th September 1997: Vrye Weekblad, 2-4) and TRC (17th 1295 Burnett (Unknown: 7), Claassen (2000: 430-431), TRC
September 1997: Arri de Beer, 4) 
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view and their general integration in the socio-political mainstream. 1296  
uth Africa’s population) were described 
d the accusations of top-level involvement in the ‘third force’ violence shows that this 
t an accident but the result of their journalists’ specifically white, middle class point of 
As most whites used the mainstream press rather than the alternative newspapers as their 
source of information, they stayed in the dark about what was really going on in their country. 
The group mindset and the siege mentality were accepted as facts to build on, rather than 
flaws that needed to be corrected if the country was to have a future. For example, before the 
referendum on whether to continue the reform course, the NP ran a massive advertising 
campaign telling voters to “vote yes, if you’re scared of majority rule” 1297. 
The shroud of silence was only officially lifted on 15th April 1996 when the TRC began its 
investigations. 1298 This was not only achieved through the hearings, but also through the 
TRC’s policies. The members of the commission remarked in their final report:  
“A distinctive feature of the Commission was its openness to public participation and 
scrutiny. This enabled it to reach out on a daily basis to large numbers of people inside 
and outside South Africa, and to confront them with vivid images on their television 
screen or on the front pages of their newspapers.” 1299  
The newspapers gave the TRC their full attention. Some of the large dailies (such as The Cape 
Times, Daily News and The Star) had correspondents assigned purely the TRC. The papers 
dealt with the commission’s work and with apartheid’s atrocities in their news sections, in 
commentaries, on their letters pages and in special reports. 1300 There were some smaller 
provincial newspapers that, at the request of their advertising customers, remained true to 
apartheid policies and refused to report on TRC’s activities. 1301 But by and large the newly 
uncovered atrocities (committed by all sections of So
in the media on a daily basis. For the first time the victims were given a chance to leave the 
cave of anonymity and fear they had been forced into by a public that did not want to hear nor 
believe and, independent of their skin colour and origin, the perpetrators were put on public 
display. Their actions were described in detail to illustrate the extent of their guilt. 1302 As 
Antje Krog, who headed SABC Radio’s reporting of the TRC, explained:  
                                                 
1296 Interview with the author, 30th May 2002 
1297 Quoted in Waldmeir (1997: 199) 
1298 TRC Report, Vol 1, Chap 5, Para 5 
ara 5  
 Chap 11, Management and Operational Reports, Media and Communication Department, Para 14-15, 
1) 
1299 TRC Report, Vol 1, Chap 5, P
1300 TRC Report, Vol 1,
Tutu (1999: 84) and Garman (1997 a: 
1301 Electronic Mail & Guardian (19th September 1997: 2) 
1302 Garman (1997 a: 2), du Plessis (1998: 4-5) and Sparks (1999: 86) 
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“Week after week; voice after voice; account after account. It is like travelling on a 
rainy night behind a huge truck -- images of devastation breaking in sheets on the 
windscreen.” 1303  
The TRC was not perfect, but it was certainly a good solution. Because of the possibility of 
receiving amnesty, many perpetrators confessed their d
that the victims did, in many people’s eyes, not get justice (or revenge, as some observers put 
it). But they at least found out the truth. Without the TRC they would most likely have had 
neither. The circumstances surrounding Steve Biko’s death could, for example, only be 
cleared up when his murderers testified voluntarily to the TRC. Three earlier investigations 
had not produced any results. 1304 Donald Woods, the former editor of the Daily Dispatch and 
a friend of Steve Biko, remarked: “[The TRC will] at least supply the vital ingredients for 
finding out what happened, which, in the final analysis is the most important thing.” 1305 
As a result of the commission’s work, South Africa’s white population was for the first time 
confronted with the full extent of political violence perpetrated under apartheid. A telephone 
survey car
(CSVR) showed that particularly white South Africans had long believed that what they had 
seen in the media during the apartheid years had been a realistic reproduction of every day life 
in their country. Of 124 respondents, 23% said that they had heard about the atrocities 
committed by the apartheid regime f
id that they had known that some violations of human rights were happening, but were 
e that they were an everyday occurrence. This means that, before 1997, merely 22% of 
outh Africans were, as they themselves judged it in retrospect, adequately informed 
hat was happening in their own country. 1306 
 TRC change that? In many ways it did, for now no one can believably claim anymore 
y are ignorant of the atrocities that were committed in the name of apartheid, black 
on, and, in many cases, power. Still, I do not believe that the TRC fundamentally 
d white South Africans’ views of their country, for they deeply misunderstood the 
of the Commission. Despite the negotiated transition as well as the TRC’s 
dence from the ANC government and its mandate to investigate all sides invo
the conflict, many white South Africans saw it as a kind of victors’ justice, not as a service 
provided to them by neutral outsiders. Former President P.W. Botha decried the Commission 
as a “circus” 1307 and an ANC witch-hunt against Afrikaners and refused to appear before the 
                                                 
1303 Quoted in Sparks (1999: 87) 
1304 Gevisser (1997: 1) 
1305 Quoted in Hugon (Unkown: 2-3) 
1306 Hamber (1997 b: 1), Theissen (1998: 6) and TRC (17th September 1997: Independent New
th th
spapers, 5) 
 May 1998: 1) and CNN Interactive (7  January 1998: 1) 1307 Time Magazine (4
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aper houses, declined to make official 
 did not accept the 
ited its report. They have made no 
frikaners, were in 
 
  
panel. Many institutions, such as the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk, the South African 
Agricultural Union and the Afrikaans newsp
submissions. They did not understand that the TRC’s objective was not to put them on trial 
for supporting apartheid, but to reconstruct, as far as possible, a lost part of South Africa’s 
history and to break with the old culture of secrecy. 1308  
This message was lost on many ordinary white South Africans, too. They
Commission as the builder of a new ideological framework of non-racialism and 
reconciliation, but instead approached it with their old mental framework of group-based 
divisionism and suspicion. 1309 Their worst expectations often turned into self-fulfilling 
prophecies. Very few attended hearings directly, instead relying on the media’s reporting, 
which they used selectively. They witnessed their leaders being “grilled” 1310, but they often 
did not see members of the ANC being questioned or hear victims tell their stories. Thus, no 
new discourse about violence emerged among the white public, because, by and large, they 
refused to leave the old one behind. The TRC made them see, but it could not get them to 
think. 1311 
The same is true, to a lesser extent of the newspapers. Many journalists, too, felt that the TRC 
was set-up to point fingers and dig-up past misdeeds, not to help the country move into the 
future. In February 1998, Desmond Tutu, the chairman of the TRC, expressed his sadness at 
this attitude in a speech in Pretoria: 
“Rapport and Die Burger (…) have sought from day one to vilify and to discredit the 
TRC so that they would pre-emptively have discred
bones at all about their nostalgia for a past which we ought all corporately and 
individually to lament. They want to recall a past when they, the A
charge, even though they now claim never to have supported apartheid. They have
been unashamed, quite brazen in their support of a defiant Mr P W Botha and they 
actually said after his first court appearance that it was a pity he was not so young any 
longer, for this was the leader their beleaguered community needed so desperately and 
they pointed with pride to some of his quite outrageous comments; that he had nothing 
to apologise for and that apartheid was really only good neighbourliness.” 1312 
Even years later, when it should have been amply clear that the TRC was an independent body 
that investigated the crimes committed by the liberation movements with the same vigour as 
those of the former rulers, The Citizen was not ashamed to state in an opinion piece about 
                                               
 for example van Staden (Unknown: 2) and Chubb & van Dijk (1999: 130-135) 
), Burnett (Unknown: 4-5), Garman 
RC (17  September 1997: Arri de Beer, 2) 
1308 Tutu (1999: 171) and Theissen (1997 c: 16-17) 
1309 For such opinion see
1310 van Staden (Unknown: 2) 
1311 Tutu (1999: 84 and 184-185), Berger (1997: 1), Chubb & van Dijk (1999: 135-137
th(1997 a: 3), TRC (27th November 1996: 10) and T
1312 Tutu (1997: 11) 
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r reluctance to take part in the TRC and have their own businesses 
at through their 
reporting, not just of the TRC but of any event, they were actually constructing the history of 
the future. Instead they saw their role as merely relaying the commission’s message. Hence, 
they did not go beyond simply describing what was happening before the TRC and did not 
question the entire ideological framework that had allowed such human rights abuses to be 
committed in the first place.1315  
Therefore, the old views prevailed and white South Africans were largely allowed to keep 
their impression that during the 1970s, and to a lesser degree also during the 1980s, their 
 mandate to patrol the entire country, rather 
re
presidential pardons: “In fact, all of these crimes were too much even for the openly pro-ANC 
TRC to stomach, and that took some doing.” 1313  
This attitude explains thei
scrutinised. Unlike many black journalists and their more courageous white colleagues who 
felt that they too had been victims of apartheid, those journalists closer to the political 
mainstream felt that they would be unjustly accused of collaboration. 1314  
More importantly, though, it helps to explain why they reported the violence uncovered by the 
TRC in terms of the old frames and using the old imagery. The newspapers generally 
acknowledged that the TRC was a tool for showing apartheid’s misdeeds and for South 
Africans to find their history, but somehow they did not understand th
country would have been peaceful and calm had it not been for a number of isolated incidents 
of political violence for which the black population was largely to blame. The real culprits, the 
violent structure of apartheid and the lack of respect for human rights among large sections of 
the population (black and white), were not identified. 1316  
5.3 Between Knowledge and Fear: The New South Africa 
5.3.1 The White Populations Experience with Violence Today 
Since the end of apartheid white South Africans have certainly experienced more violence in 
their daily lives. For one, the end of influx control gave the poor township residents a chance 
to finally take crime out of their own areas and into white South Africa. Secondly, as the 
repressive apartheid machinery that had kept a lid on black anger for so long was lifted, the 
path was indeed opened for revenge attacks against the former oppressors. And finally, the 
police was restructured and presented with a new
than just the wealthy white neighbourhoods. This often stretched resources beyond their 
capacity and reduced their ability to combat criminal violence. Accordingly, while befo  
                                                 
1313 The Citizen (23rd May 2002: 18) 
1314 This was lamented by many observers in literature, but was also brought up by Pallo Jordan in an interview with the 
dal (1997: 6-8) for editors arguing against special media 
02, Hamber (1997 b: 2) and Garman (1998: 3) 
author, 22nd May 2002 
See for example Business Day (21st January 1997 b: 1-2) and Skjer
hearings and Business Day (21st January 1997 b: 2-3) for arguments for participation. 
1315 Garman (1998: 2) and du Plessis (1998: 2-3) 
1316 Pallo Jordan in an interview with the author, 22nd May 20
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1990, white South Africans rarely fell victims to crime and knew almost no one who had, 
these days, most people know at least one person in their direct vicinity who has been the 
victim of a violent crime. 
However, the impact of such incidents far exceeded their frequency. Even in the new South 
Africa, white South Africans are not very likely to fall victim to violence. Numerous surveys 
as well as the official crime statistics show that whites experience least amount of violent 
crime of all population groups. A victim survey in Durban, for example, found that while 
black and coloured residents reported high levels of both, property and violent crime, Asian 
and white Durbanites had mainly been the victims of property crime with only a 
comparatively small percentage experiencing violent crime (see fig. 72). 1317 
 
Figure 72: Crimes experienced by blacks, Asians, coloureds and whites in Durban (Source: Shaw & Louw 
(1998 a: 3)) 
Comparable surveys in Cape Town and Johannesburg showed similar results. Black and 
coloured residents of Cape Town were found to be disproportionately affected by violent 
crime, while whites were largely the victims of property crime. Similarly, black residents of 
                                                
Johannesburg were disproportionately victimised by violent crime, while Asians and whites 
encountered mostly property crime. 1318 Furthermore, while between one quarter and one third 
of respondents in the Johannesburg survey who had experienced property crime in the 
traditionally black areas – informal settlements, townships and the inner city – reported the 
use of violence, only 14% of victims living in the suburbs did. And one quarter of black 
victims had been subjected to violence during burglaries, compared with only 9% of whites. 
Similarly, in Durban 46% of black victims reported the use of violence during burglaries 
compared to 14% of Asians and 10% of whites.  
My interviews, too, showed that most whites had not witnessed or experienced violence 
themselves. Time and again I heard things like “Our life has not been touched by it.” 1319 
“We’ve had no violence in the immediate family.” 1320 “No, we’ve been the lucky ones.” 1321 
 
1-2 and 5) 
 
or in Cape Town, 20th May 2002 
thor in Cape Town, 24  May 2002 
1317 Shaw & Louw (1998 a: 3) and Robertshaw et al. (2001 a: 
1318 Camerer et al. (1998 a: 1) and Louw et al. (1998 a: 1)
1319 Woman in her early 30s in an interview with the auth
th1320 Interview with the au
1321 Answer in a street survey in Bloemfontein, 1st July 2002 
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heft and violence see this chapter below). Three 
th the highest proportion of car hijackings in the country, 
Interestingly enough, my own personal experiences in South Africa confirm these findings. 
ey said looking at my boyfriend, “do you own a 
white Ford Laser with the following registration?” and read off our license plate number. 
                      
Of the fifteen people I spoke with during my street surveys, four said that they had personally 
been the victims of violence: a homeless man who had been physically assaulted several times 
while sleeping outdoors, a woman who was “currently going through physical and mental 
abuse from my ex-husband” 1322 and a married couple who had escaped an attempted 
hijacking of their car (for more detail on car t
told me about people in their close vicinity who had experienced violence: An 83-year-old 
pensioner who said that some people in her retirement home were “pushed around by the 
staff” 1323, a (white) stall owner on the Durban beachfront who told me about one of his 
neighbours having been shot and another having been hijacked, and finally one man, who 
said: “My brother, yes, me personally, no,” but would not qualify his answer any further. The 
remaining eight were straight no’s. Only one of them, a Durban attorney in his 30s, qualified 
his answer a little further: “No, people generally haven’t” 1324  
These findings have been confirmed by other research. For example, a study in Pretoria 
showed that only 5% of the white population had fallen victim to violent crime between 1993 
and April 1998, compared with 22% of blacks. And in a survey of victims of crime in Durban 
in 1998, only 14% of respondents who lived in the suburbs reported having been subjected to 
violence during the criminal incident. 1325 
Also, despite what the media and common sense might tell us, the majority of victims of car 
hijackings are not wealthy whites, but in fact ordinary blacks. According to the ISS victim 
survey in Johannesburg, the city wi
82.3% of all victims of car hijackings were black. 1326  
While I was living in Cape Town my car was stolen. It was, from what I can gather, a typical 
car theft: One Friday afternoon after coming home from an interview, I had parked my little 
Ford Laser (the South African equivalent of the European Escort) where I always parked it: 
right outside my building in Sea Point, a neighbourhood with an OK safety record but a bad 
name among whites as being the home of gays, prostitutes and dodgy characters (all of whom 
you could find if you looked, I should add, but none of whom generally bothered anyone 
else). My boyfriend and I spent Saturday at home not doing much, so we did not use or check 
on our car. On Sunday morning, we were awoken by a knock on the door. Two uniformed 
policemen greeted us with a smile. “Sir,” th
                           
 survey in Durban 14  April 2002 
a: 4) and Robertshaw et al. (2001 b: 2-3) 
1322 Answer in a street survey in Bloemfontein, 1st July 2002 
1323 Answer in a street survey in Durban 14th April 2002 
th1324 Answer in a street
1325 Shaw (2002: 51-52) 
1326 Louw et al. (1998 
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en continued with a proud smile on his face, “it is actually 
in Guguletu. We recovered it this morning.”  
And so it was that we spent Sunday morning at the police station filing a report and Sunday 
afternoon at a police pound inspecting our ‘stolen’ car. We had not lost much. The distributor 
was missing as were the spare tyre (which was fairly bald anyway) and our parasol from the 
trunk (not a big loss as it was winter and the thieves were kind enough to leave their 
umbrella). The locks on both sides had been destroyed as had the immobiliser and the radio. I 
personally do not believe that the car thieves were the same people who stole these things, but 
this is pure speculation. In the glove compartment I found an invitation to the funeral service 
of Mongameli “Torr” Pelem, a 21-year-old man. He was to be buried in Guguletu on 25th May 
2002 – the Saturday my car was stolen. In my opinion whoever took the car needed a lift to 
the service and could not get there any other way. The parts were probably stolen later; an 
k to later. What I really wanted to tell is that while we were at the pound, two young black 
 As one of my interview partners said: “Anyone can be a 
                                                
When he confirmed, the next question was: “Where exactly is your car at the moment?” (In 
retrospect a strange question considering that they knew full well where it was.) “Right…,” 
my boyfriend answered pointing at an empty parking spot where our car had been, “there it 
was.” “No, Sir,” one of the policem
abandoned car in Guguletu is a prime target. But I am losing myself in emotions that I will get 
bac
men approached the car next to ours. We exchanged greetings and hoping to get someone 
else’s views of car theft in South Africa, I asked: “So, your car was stolen too?” “No,” one of 
them replied. “We were hijacked.” 
5.3.2 White South Africans’ Views about Violence Today 
As I have already hinted in the previous sub-chapter, the feeling of personal safety among the 
white population in South Africa has steadily declined since 1994. 1327 According to a survey 
by the Human Science Research Council (HSRC), in February 1992 a striking 44% of white 
South African respondents reported feeling unsafe every-day life. By February 1998 this 
number had shot up to 82%. 1328
victim of violence. It’s getting worse and will get worse. It will get dramatically worse in the 
next 20 years.” 1329 Strikingly, according to the HSRC, over the same period as the white 
population’s fear grew, the proportion of blacks (in the old apartheid sense) who reported 
feeling unsafe fell from 56% to 49%. 1330 
 
t that the official police statistics surely do not reflect people’s reality. Still, it is fairly 
ewis (1998: 1).  
1327 Ehlers (1998: 2) 
However, Hamber & Lewis point ou
safe to say that crime in South Africa is no longer rising (Hamber & L
1328 Alence (1999: 3) 
1329 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 22nd May 2002 
1330 Alence (1999: 3) 
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Violence was certainly a key reason for such discomfort. When asked what they feared most 
about crime, white respondents in a victim survey in Durban showed disproportionate concern 
about violence. More than half feared loss of life during crime, and nearly a quarter feared 
sexual violence (see fig. 73). 1331  
 
Figure 73: What people in Durban fear most about crime (percentages) (Source: Shaw & Louw (1998 a: 
4)) 
Fear of violence was even more marked in 2001. According to a survey conducted by 
er man confirmed: “Could be the victim of violence at any time. I 
Robertshaw et al., 55% of respondents feared loss of life, 26% sexual violence and 16% 
physical injury. By comparison, only 3% were afraid of loss of property. 1332 
Not surprisingly, fears of violence were also frequently expressed in my interviews. One 
young woman in her early 20s for example warned me shortly after my arrival: “South Africa 
is hectically violent and you always have to fear being robbed, raped, killed or otherwise 
assaulted.” 1333 And an old
used to travel with a firearm, but no longer. You can’t win.” 1334 And another told me: “The 
violence part is getting worse by the day. There are so many illegal immigrants who don’t 
work. How do they live?” 1335  
My street surveys confirmed that this was the overall view. 11 out of 15 people whom I asked 
“Is violence a problem in South Africa today?” answered affirmatively. Three people saw the 
situation gloomily, but more nuanced. One girl in her late teens said: “Sometimes yes, other 
times no.” 1336 And a couple I spoke with in Durban stated: “[Him] In certain areas, but large 
                                                 
1331 Shaw & Louw (1998 a: 3) and Schönteich (2000: 1) 
1332 Robertshaw et al. (2001 c: 5-6) 
n, 31st December 2001 
 May 2002 
1333 Conversation with the author in Cape Tow
1334 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 24th
1335 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 24th May 2002 
1336 Street survey in Bloemfontein, 1st July 2002 
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y” (Durban) and the like. 
 unknown to the interviewees seemed to be identified as dangerous. White 
strange
what m
or the 
attenda
and yet
The ed ig Issue agreed. They told me of numerous occasions of vendors 
wn, I simply do not look like a very 
talling nearly 50 Rand .The security guard of the mall I stood 
to sit down even though the guard must have known him. And throughout the day barely 
would not be surprised if he 
parts are violence-free. [Her] I believe that South Africa is naturally non-violent.” 1337 Only 
one man, a retired bank-manager in his 70s, gave a clear “Not actually.” 1338 But the majority 
of answers were along the lines of “Yes, yes, very much so” (Bloemfontein); “yes, I really 
think we should bring back the death penalty, that would bring crime right down”; 
“absolutely”; “extremel
 
The Who is Who of Violence Revisited 
 
Despite their lack of direct experience, most people had a very clear idea of what they 
considered the violence to be. At the most basic level, the concept could be summed up as 
‘stranger danger’. It was felt to come from the outside, to be encroaching on people’s lives. As 
one lady told me: “I’m afraid at night of people coming in.” 1339 And she was no exception. 
My interviews showed that overall there is a distinct feeling among whites of being besieged. 
But not everyone
rs were only rarely viewed with suspicion, except when they did not fit the image of 
ost white South Africans take their own group to be, such as drug addicts, prostitutes 
homeless. One lady expressed this sentiment in one short sentence: “Taxis, parking 
nts, beggars and street vendors are a form of racism. Whites feel threatened by them 
 they are allowed to be there.” 1340  
itorial staff of The B
being verbally abused, spat at, or worse, because they were perceived to bring danger to the 
suburbs. I must admit I encountered no violence during my day as a street vendor, nor did 
anyone seem too afraid of me. I was met with arrogance from quite a few people, but, as the 
editor pointed out to me, even though I dressed do
threatening street person.  
Still, my day of embarrassment and sore legs was not in vein, because I learned one important 
thing. Next to me stood a (coloured) fruit seller and the difference in treatment the two of us 
received from the general public was enormous. I received a job offer, an invitation for coffee, 
free cigarettes and donations to
in front of periodically allowed me to sit down on a box if I got too tired. The incredibly sweet 
young man next to me, on the other hand, was met with fear and scorn. People would not look 
at him and some even jumped out of the way when he approached them. He was not allowed 
earned enough money to feed his wife and daughter. In fact, I 
                                                 
1337 Street survey in Durban, 14th April 2002 
1338 Street survey in Bloemfontein, 1st July 2002 
th1339 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 20  May 2002 
1340 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 22nd May 2002 
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 South Africans, but by far the 
bigger 
Africa,
people 
John Pi uphemism for 
ack of respect and a lack of education,” 1343 one lady told 
ks 
Even more plain in her wording was a woman in Cape Town who complained to me about a 
black tenant who had rented the former maid’s quarters behind her little suburban house. He 
had dared to have friends visit him whenever he pleased, something that seemed to really 
trouble her. “You know, these groups of black people come to my house at every time of day 
and night, it’s just scary.” 1346  
The white population’s fear of unknown blacks first emerged during the Soweto Uprisings. 
Before 1976, whites had never truly been scared in their own country, but on 16th June “the 
tide of history had turned” 1347; white South Africans would never feel safe again. 1348 Leon 
                                                
made less by selling fruit than I received in donations. This experience is a clear indicator of 
an overall trend. Deviants are perceived as a danger by white
threat seem to be black people. As one man told me: “If you think of violence in South 
 you automatically think of interracial violence.” 1341 And he was not talking of white 
abusing blacks. 
lger put it quite bluntly: “To many white South Africans, “crime” is the e
the migration of impoverished, workless blacks across the old racial dividing lines.” 1342 My 
interviews confirmed this view. “The threat comes mainly from disadvantaged communities. 
They have low self esteem (…), l
me. Another agreed: “It’s poverty. The reason for violence is poverty, everywhere in the 
world.” 1344 And while these two did not say it openly, the terms ‘disadvantaged’ and ‘poor’ 
to me seemed to be stand-ins for ‘black’. A man in Durban was slightly more direct in making 
this connection:  
“You know the Afrikaans farmers like my father, he was in the war and when he came 
back from the war he had to bring us up, he had to feed us. So he had to work the land 
and build everything we have. And now they are trying to reverse all that and give it to 
the black people. I think if the Turkish people in Germany were to say: “Well, I’m a 
naturalised German now, I want what you have”. Your dad would have something to 
say about this.” 1345 
I do not think that he realised that, being the descendent of European immigrants, his father 
would in fact be the equivalent of the naturalised Turkish person in Germany while the blac
he hinted at being the “have-nots” would really be the equivalent of my father. To him, 
somehow, the black population represented outsiders. 
 
1341 Man in his mid-60s in an interview with the author in Cape Town, 24th May 2002 
1342 Electronic Mail & Guardian (24th April 1998: 5) 
1343 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 22nd May 2002 
1344 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 1st June 2002 
1345 Answer in a street survey in Durban, 14th April 2002 
n, 30th December 2001 
alan (1990: 78) and Leatt et al. (1986: 83)  
1346 Conversation with the author in Cape Tow
1347 Malan (1990: 78) 
1348 Tutu (1982: 92), M
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Mellet hinted at this in our interview. “Look,” he told me when I asked whether white South 
Africans had actually realised how sheltered their lives were,  
“I think that a lot of the white people realised that they lived a shel…, but a lot of the 
people were very scared. Because the message was “We’re gonna, transfer that 
violence to the white areas.” And perceptions were that we are now going to be under 
attack and people like that, they were frightened, they were scared.” 1349 
This view was echoed by people during my interviews. One woman told me: “In ’76 I was in 
school and I remember the fear, you know, now the thing that has been sweeping through 
Africa is now coming to us.” 1350  
This sentiment was exploited by P.W. Botha’s ideologues, who made the ‘total onslaught’, an 
external threat emanating from an external aggressor, one of South Africa’s intellectual 
priorities. 1351 They could, however not have succeeded without the media, for in this case 
without the messenger there is no message. 
icate. 
acist or that 
they on
are freq ct a sort 
of logic
This w
“Austra ” (see fig. 74).  
  
Most newspapers readily took-up the popular myth of young black males as violent, 
dangerous, and bent on taking what white people have built for themselves, because it served 
as an easy template for a number of different crime stories. Moreover, the journalists could be 
sure that readers would by and large recognise the message they were trying to commun
Now, I am not saying that the English language press in South Africa was openly r
ly showed black violence. This would simply be untrue. What I am saying is that they 
uently using their own stereotypes, and those of their white readers, to constru
 in their reports, which, if decoded as intended, is biased against young black men.  
hole logic starts with little things, such as the omnipresent advertisements for 
lia/New Zealand Canada Emigration” or “EuroMigrate
                                               
e 2002 
author in Cape Town, 20th May 2002 
1349 Interview with the author, 26th Jun
1350 Interview with the 
1351 Shaw (2002: 43) 
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Figure 74: What a wonderful place to leave 
 like the symbolisms I have documented above and
he thousands of senseless, brutal white murders and rapes on farms 
                          
But it mainly includes hidden elements  
goes all the way to terribly biased opinion pieces, such as the one that appeared in The Citizen 
on 23rd May 2002 after President Mbeki had pardoned a number of criminals. The story was 
titled “Prepare for the total onslaught” 1352 and the author states his views quite plainly:  
 “It is obvious that the ANC wants to drive whites out of this country. (…) 
For every one of t
and in the towns, an average of six other whites leave the country. 
Many whites are of the opinion that the government silently condones these crimes. 
Can you blame them when the President of the county condones heinous crimes 
against whites with pardons for the perpetrators?” 1353 
Such messages were not lost on the majority of white readers, who react to the perceived 
threat and either leave – Sparks estimates that 75,000 have left South Africa between 1994 
and 1999 1354 – or seek to insulate themselves in the suburbs by what the London Economist 
once termed “siege architecture” 1355: ever-growing walls, electric fencing and razor wire. 
Others are moving to gated communities or have existing roads closed to public use in order 
to prevent non-residents from entering (see fig. 75).  
                       
) 1352 The Citizen (23rd May 2002: 18
1353 The Citizen (23rd May 2002: 18) 
1354 Sparks (1999: 76) 
1355 The Economist (15th July 1995: 1) 
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Figure 75: Law Road – A suburban paradise 
By 2000, the city of Johannesburg had closed off 360 roads for suburban security compounds. 
Many people keep guard dogs and an even larger number owns guns. 1356 A growing number 
of South Africans also place their faith in firearms. According to the police’s Central Firearms 
Registry, for example, in 2000 a total of 3.2 million South Africans legally possessed some 
4.2 million firearms. 1357 
s, often promising ‘armed response’ (see fig. 76), has 
ce the 1980s as more and more whites sought to buy safety in the face of 
                                                
The number of private security firm
grown rapidly sin
radical change. This trend was accelerated by the transition as policing resources were spread 
thinner and crime increasingly moved out of the townships. Nowadays, a lot of houses are 
wired-up by private security services and outfitted with alarm systems and panic buttons. 1358 
In a survey that the Institute for Security Studies conducted in Cape Town, just under 70% of 
white respondents reported to have access to some form of protection of their household 
against crime. 1359 According to Schönteich, the number of active security officers registered 
with the Security Officers’ Interim Board increased by 44% between September 1997 and 
March 2000 to 166,000. This number does not include approximately 50,000 ‘in-house 
security officers’ employed throughout the country. By comparison, in 2002 South Africa had 
 
1356 Ehlers (1998: 1), Louw et al. (1998 c: 2), van Niekerk & Ludman (1999: 42-43), Marks & Andersson (1990: 58) and 
Shaw (2002: 94) 
1357 Schönteich & Louw (2001: 6) 
ouw et al. (1998 b: 10-11), Electronic Mail & Guardian (28th April 
-170) 
d Camerer et al. (1998 c: 2) 
1358 Cock (1989: 11), The Economist (15th July 1995: 1), L
1997: 5) and Shaw (1996 c: 168
1359 Camerer & Louw (1998: 1) an
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102,349 sworn police officers, which means that there are now more than twice as many 
people working for the private security industry than the SAPS. 1360  
 
Figure 76: All is safe and sound 
 
Localising Fear 
 
As the past few paragraphs may have indicated, in the eyes of many white South Africans, 
reas. In its victim 
survey of Johannesburg the ISS broke the figures relating to feelings of safety down by race, 
gender, age and place of residence and found that less than 40% of whites and residents of the 
suburbs felt safe in their own neighbourhood at night. The figures for women and the elderly 
were even lower, with more than 70% admitting to feeling very unsafe. 1361  
What is even more striking is that, when asked where they felt most unsafe, white respondent 
in the ISS’s Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town victim surveys all regarded the suburbs 
they live in more dangerous than either the townships or informal settlements (see figs.77, 78 
and 79). 1362  
                                                
violence is not only a matter of population groups, but also of geographic a
 
1362 Shaw & Louw (1998 b: 2-3) 
1360 Schönteich (2000: 1) and Legett et al. (Unknown: 6) 
1361 Louw et al. (1998 b: 9-10) 
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Figure 77: Parts of Johannesburg regarded most unsafe (Source: Shaw & Louw (1998 b: 2)) 
 
Figure 78: Parts of Durban regarded most unsafe (Source: Shaw & Louw (1998 b: 2)) 
 
Figure 79: Parts of Cape Town regarded most unsafe (Source: Shaw & Louw (1998 b: 3)) 
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s are more likely to 
g for a bus stop. 
 fact, let me tell you his story to illustrate the contrast between the South Africa I 
ive in: As I mentioned before, during my 
                                                
I was also surprised that people in Durban and Johannesburg considered the inner city areas to 
be more unsafe than any other part of town – despite ample evidence that in terms of crime 
the townships are the most dangerous. Shaw & Louw explain: 
“The fact that more than two-thirds of whites and Asians thought the inner city was 
the most unsafe part of Durban and Johannesburg, could reflect actual experiences of 
crime in the inner city relative to the suburbs. However, these fear
be based on impressions of the inner city formed through the media, as well as through 
environmental factors which characterises many of these areas, such as overcrowding, 
litter and street hawking.” 1363 
Personally, I have to agree with their (speculative) findings. I have walked the streets and 
back alleys of both cities alone and with a friend and, despite the fact that at 1.61 metres I am 
neither the tallest nor strongest of all women, I never felt unsafe or threatened in any way. I 
did encounter street vendors, litter and the occasional homeless, drunk or drugged person, but 
no more so than in any major city I have been to in other countries. And they certainly did not 
interfere with me. On the contrary, some of these seeming threats provided invaluable services 
to me by giving me a source of good fruit, cheap clothes and directions every time I was lost. 
A sangoma in Johannesburg was of great help when I walked into her shop after an interview 
at The Star with a bad cold and a young man in Hillbrow saved me from a long walk through 
Johannesburg lookin
In
experienced and the world white South Africans l
time in Johannesburg, I was staying at a backpackers’ hostel in Observatory. One day, I had 
an appointment with a journalist in his office downtown. My boyfriend was not feeling too 
well so, unusually, I went on the minibus taxi on my own. The ride there went smooth – well, 
except for the roadblock where we were all searched by police armed with automatic weapons 
– as did the interview. When I was done, I went for a little walk around downtown and, as it 
was a sunny winter’s day, I decided not to board the minibus at the main station, but instead to 
walk along the road home for a while and catch a passing taxi there.  
After a while, the area started to look just a little dodgy so I decided that it was time to catch a 
ride out of there. I had heard on the radio that, unlike in Cape Town, in Johannesburg taxis 
only take passengers at designated stops, none of which was anywhere to be seen. So, what 
could I do except walk on? I was alert, but not scared until my cell phone rang. “Now this is 
just what I need,” I thought to myself, “a young white woman walking around a black [yes, I 
had such racist thoughts and I hated myself for them] area talking on the phone.” It was my 
 
1363 Shaw & Louw (1998 b: 2-3) 
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d. How did you get into that 
situatio
Unfortu
young 
me, wh
told him  taxi stops a while ago ’cause 
ou’re 
here.” 
me fro
chat, m ent 
iolence, but 
comple
were o
bombin
white S isk of falling victim to a terrorist attack was quietly 
nored; the non-existence of something is not generally considered to be news. Moreover the 
a ‘crime wave’ and ‘explosion of crime’ a ‘culture of violence’, 
low respect of state authority on the part of the black population and the poor training of the 
investigated. Instead, the perceived increase in 
sent government to keep order. 
boyfriend, worried, asking where I was. I walked on to the next intersection, read off the street 
names and asked him to come fetch me by car. He agreed and we hung up. Then the phone 
rang again. It was him again. “I have asked around where exactly you are and have been told 
that this is the middle of Hillbrow. The locals have told me that I cannot come pick you up 
because that would mean losing the car and probably getting kille
n?” We discussed it no further. I just promised to get the next taxi. 
nately none seemed inclined to stop for me, so I kept on walking, when suddenly a 
man came towards me. He was about 25 and black, but not exactly menacing. “ ’Scuse 
at is a white girl doing walking around here like this?” He seemed nice enough so I 
 my story. He started laughing. “They’ve taken down the
the drivers refused to stop anymore.” Great. How would I get home? He directed me towards 
a little wall in front of a block of flats and said: “Let’s sit down here. Look, this is where I 
live,” he said pointing at a balcony somewhere, I don’t know where. “You can call your 
boyfriend and tell him that he can come get you. I will protect you and him while y
And this is exactly what happened. To this day I do not know if he actually protected 
m a danger I was too blue eyed to see or if there really was none, but we had a nice 
y boyfriend came, they shook hands and then we drove off – much to the amazem
of our South African friends, to whom Hillbrow seemed to be about the most frightening 
place on the planet. 
 
The Role of the Press in Creating such Feelings 
 
These feelings were certainly reinforced by the way the newspapers reported violence. Time 
and again they focussed on the, admittedly very high, levels of some kinds of v
tely ignored the stark reduction of other forms. Rape, robbery, hijackings and murder 
mnipresent in media discourse, but who no one ever wrote about the decline of 
gs, police shootings or politically motivated executions. The fact that the average 
outh African was no longer at r
ig
situation was described as 
when in fact a territorial expansion or a democratisation of public violence or a gradual 
deracialisation of victimisation would have been more accurate terms. The historical context 
of the present situation – such as the disregard for human rights among the security forces, the 
police in crime solving techniques – was not 
violence was decried as the failure of the pre
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but also confirmed by people who have direct experience with the subject. 
The media’s new openness about violence, or rather about crime, has thus fed public hysteria 
and encouraged feelings of helplessness in the face of an ever-growing threat. 1366 The 
newspapers’ portrayal of the situation fit perfectly with white South Africans’ existing views 
on crimes and violence and were therefore readily taken up. One lady explained to me:  
“Just look at the number of incidents reported in the media. Rape for example. It’s just 
soared. People say we were shut off from it. We never used to have the news, CNN 
and that. They say it was always there, but I don’t buy it. It has just escalated.” 1367 
And, of course by the emphasis placed on crimes as they happened as opposed to the previous 
approach of portraying crime only after it had already been solved, his created the impression 
that the authorities were no longer in control of the situation, which led many people to the 
conclusion that if criminals were not at risk of being punished they would not have an 
                                                
This sudden rise in reports about violence led white South Africans to believe that the number 
of perpetrated acts of violence had also exploded after the end of apartheid. 1364 That this is 
really not the case has not only been shown by numerous studies on the subject (see chapter 
2.4 for details), 
John Jansen, the head of Pollsmoor Prison, for example told me: 
“Another thing is that, yes, the media is now writing about this high crime rate and I 
can understand. But sometimes I’m asking myself a question: How high is this crime 
rate, really, in comparison to the apartheid years? That is the question that I’m asking. 
Is it really out of hand? Or is it being portrayed through the media as being out of 
hand? And I tend to see it is more in the latter way.” 1365 
incentive to stop their activities. 1368 The press thus helped create the common impression that 
the end of apartheid was the beginning of anarchy. As Hamber & Lewis explain:  
“The media’s extensive coverage has created a skewed picture of it (the violence). 
Based on the reporting, most South Africans subscribe to the view that crime 
continues to spiral out of control. According to recent police statistics, however, the 
crime rate has been falling.” 1369 
 
Longing for the Iron Fist 
 
As we have seen, the views of violence among the white population have not changed much 
since the end of apartheid. The same is true of the definition of the concept in public 
discourse. While it is no longer seen as a matter of ‘law and order’ or counter-terrorism, it has 
 
1364 Simpson & Rauch (1993: 6) and Shaw (2002: 15 and 84) 
1365 Interview with the author, 19th June 2002 
or in Cape Town, 1st June 2002 
1366 CSVR (1999: 19) 
1367 Interview with the auth
1368 Simpson & Rauch (1993: 6), Camerer & Louw (1998: 2 and 5-6) and Shaw (2002: 83-84) 
1369 Hamber & Lewis (1998: 1) and CNN Interactive (1998: 1) 
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der context that 
all 
not been redefined in terms of, for example, social pathology or human nature, but in terms of 
law enforcement. Violence is still seen as a problem of the criminal justice system and people 
are still predominantly occupied with individual acts, not with the broa
produced them. 
This view is reflected in South Africans’ perceptions on how best to combat crime. In a 
survey conducted by the ISS among victims of crime in Johannesburg, only 11% of 
respondents called for social development, compared with 84% who suggested changes to the 
criminal justice system such as more police (39%), better policing (22%) tougher legislation 
(10%) or a reintroduction of the death penalty (12%). Only 1% suggested the slightly more 
socially oriented option of community policing (see fig. 80). 1370  
 
Figure 80: Measures suggested by victims of crime in Johannesburg to make the city safer (unprompted) 
(Source: Louw et al. (1998 b: 13)) 
These results highlight another problem that concerns not just violence and crime. South 
Africa has by and large not built a culture of respect for human rights. On the contrary, the 
majority of South Africans support capital punishment and many see nothing wrong with 
torturing suspected criminals in order to extract a confession. In a survey of 122 white South 
Africans in 1996, the CSVR found that 21% of respondents ‘strongly agreed’ and 27% 
‘agreed’ with the statement “The police should be allowed to use their guns more frequently
1371
 
                                                
to maintain public order” . A striking 80% called for the reintroduction of the death 
penalty which was outlawed by a Constitutional Court Judgement in June 1995. According to 
the authors, their findings are a close reproduction of those obtained in a nation-wide public 
opinion survey in October 1995 1372 among 2163 South Africans belonging to all different 
 
6 Constitution: Elite and Public Attitudes to the “options”. 
1370 Louw et al. (1998 b: 13) 
1371 Theissen (1997 b: 11) 
1372 Kotzé, Hennie, 1996, The Working Draft of South Africa's 199
Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Occasional Papers, February 1996. 
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ve away from repression for the rise of crime and violence. 1374 
ate the links between the three factors. I 
will do so b
race all the tim
studies and as I found on the ground. Then, I will 
the news reports I analysed. Bu
same as a causal relationship. Finding that w
hopefully help m e the origins of the white population’s views to either experience, the 
ortunately I was to 
discover that bigotry, prejudices,
Afrikaners who never got past 
even though it only occasionally reared its ugly 
like a quiet ring at you were not really aware of because the noise of 
ust admit, I was shocked just how racist people were and how little others 
objected to their opinions. Some views were so incredible to me that I have decided to let 
myself get sidetracked in the present chapter and spend some time portraying the views that 
otherwise nice, normal, and friendly people were not ashamed to share with a complete 
population groups. 1373 It is therefore safe to say that, rather than considering a reduction in 
state violence as a contribution to a reduction in violence overall, the majority of people 
blame the mo
How can that be? In my opinion it is due to their not seeing capital punishment and police 
violence as forms of violence, but rather as forms of the legitimate use of force. Violence to 
them is still what it has always been, illegal acts perpetrated by members of the out-group.  
5.4 Final Triangulation: Comparing Reality, Opinion and News Reports 
Now that I have laid out all information needed to understand the violence in South Africa 
since 1976, the newspapers’ reporting of the subject and white South Africans’ experiences 
and views, it is time to take the final step and investig
eginning with the white population’s views of violence and, equally importantly, 
e measuring them up to the historical reality as documented in a number of 
move on to a comparison of the results with 
t as I said in the introduction, a mere resemblance is not the 
ill be the task of my final step. This will 
e trac
news reports or both. 
 
Fearsome Negroes 
 
The first aspect I need to investigate in order to make a meaningful statement about the world 
white South Africans live in is that of race. I had expected mild racism in post-apartheid 
South Africa, especially in conservative places like Bloemfontein. Unf
 and racism are not confined to small towns or rugby playing 
primary education. It was an omnipresent phenomenon which, 
head, could somehow always be felt. It was 
ing in your ear th
everyday life drowned it out. But if you were in a quiet room or if you listened carefully, it 
could be heard clearly. And every once in a while it would get loud and impossible to ignore. 
In some cases, I m
                                                 
1373 Theissen (1997 b: 11-12) these figures were confirmed again in 1999 in Reality Check, 1999, Reality Check Survey of the 
ury, Pretoria News, Diamond Fields Advertiser and Sunday 
 (Quoted in Hamber (1999: 6 and 8)) 
nd Chibnall (1977: 79) 
Attitudes of South Africans. Cape Times, The Star, The Merc
Independet. 28th April 1999.
1374 van Niekerk & Ludman (1999: 43), Hamber (1997 b: 2) a
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strange
on viol
the form
 to teach him to do patterns and he’s good after we show him, but the next 
 whites still consider 
blacks 
quite plainly:  
r. I believe that they form an important background, if not even a part, of their views 
ence and that the latter can therefore not be understood properly without having heard 
er.  
By and large most of white South Africans felt that black people were somehow different than 
them. One of my neighbours let me in on an interesting bit of insight one day when she said: 
“Black people’s eyes are different. They are physiologically different. They are long sighted: 
They see things further away than they are.” 1375 I never did get out of her how she imagined 
this to work and what she thought long sightedness in Europeans was all about. And a man I 
interviewed told me: “I believe that there is an inherent genetic difference between the races. I 
don’t understand this Western European blindness to this.” 1376 But the most striking were 
another woman’s opinions on black physiology: 
“They’re genetically different than people. They’re more like monkeys. Their brains 
work differently, a bit like a jug. You know, they can only learn so much. We’ve got 
one working for us. We’ve trained him to paint walls, but you can only teach them so 
far. We tried
time, he’s forgotten. We have to show him every time. The jug is full. It won’t take in 
anymore.” 1377 
So here we have it. Blacks are not even people. They are genetically different and it is 
therefore not surprising that they are physiologically different, too.  
However, South Africans did not just perceive a difference between them and their black 
compatriots. As this last statement shows, their perceptions of blacks often involved a value 
judgement. My interviews confirmed Friedman’s 1378 findings that many
to be incapable of rational thought. One man for example told me: 
“Scientific research has shown that there are differences in intellectual capacity 
between the races. You know, on maths, the Japanese do best and the Blacks will be at 
the bottom. Studies have shown that, with every percent of Caucasian blood, your IQ 
will go up.” 1379 
This pseudo-information is applied uncritically not only to black people in the person’s own 
vicinity, but to all blacks, including the people in government. One lady in Cape Town said it 
                                                 
1375 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 1st June 2002 
1376 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 24th May 2002 
1377 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 19th May 2002 
1378 Friedman (2001: 9-10) 
1379 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 24th May 2002 
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lition. They need to be told. They need to be told often. They 
untry. They cannot 
re still pretty savage in a way.” 1382 And a lady in Cintsa 
ssure all of us that not only was the area beautifully redone, very clean 
“I don’t think African men should run a country. They cannot do that. They cannot do 
anything of their own vo
need to be instructed step by step … They can’t do it on their own.” 1380 
She had obviously not read any of the hundreds of books, scientific studies or NGO reports 
(including the TRC report) that have documented the failures of the all-white apartheid 
government. She somehow knew that the current government “could not do it”, but never 
considered the fact that the numerous raids on wrong targets in neighbouring countries, the 
failure to pacify the townships or the high number of people killed by agents of the state were 
an even bigger sign of ‘not being able to do it’ than beggars, squatters and street vendors in 
the city centre. A little while into our conversation she explained (after admitting to not 
knowing any blacks inside South Africa or elsewhere):  
“This is what we are dealing with. These people are running the co
shake their tribal ancestry. There is cannibalism, trade in body parts, ancestral 
worship, they let goats bleed to death. There are people in government who throw 
bones.” 1381 
Now we are getting somewhere. The difference between blacks and whites is not only 
perceived to be genetic, but also cultural. And at this point we rediscover the theories and 
findings of Volkekunde that live on in South Africa in the form of a popular myth of the 
‘African other’ as intrinsically backwards, primitive and dangerous. As one of my neighbours 
explained to me: “Black people a
East, a small town in the Eastern Cape, told me that she never left her village anymore 
because the bigger cities were just too unsafe since the end of apartheid.  
“When I last went to Durban, I wanted to enjoy the beachfront, but we were told that it 
is too dangerous to walk there. You know, it’s been redone for lots of money, but you 
can’t go there. The kaffirs 1383 shit in the pool. They do their laundry in the pools.” 1384  
Two things struck me about this statement. Firstly, like so many of her white compatriots she 
miraculously acquired this knowledge about the black population without ever having had any 
contact with them. As she said herself, she had not visited the beachfront. I have done so, I 
might add, and I can a
                                                 
1380 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 1st June 2002 
1381 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 1st June 2002 
1382 Conversation with the author in Cape Town, 29th May 2002 
1383 Kaffir is the Arabic word for non-believer. It made its way into the Afrikaans language during the early years of the Cape 
Colony when Arab slave traders used it to describe African slaves. Today it is a derogatory term, used by both Afrikaans and 
English speakers, roughly equal in meaning to the English ‘nigger’. It is a highly objectionable, racist word and should in my 
opinion not be used. I have avoided it throughout this paper, but for reasons of scientific preciseness find myself compelled 
not to censor this lady’s quote. 
1384 Conversation with the author in Cintsa East, 18th April 2002 
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ers.  
of 
white South Africans, English and Afrikaans speaking, had internalised the ‘total onslaught’ 
mentality and accepted apartheid as natural. Thus, when it finally collapsed in 1990, they were 
orld and with their own self-preservation. 
 the 19th century through the struggle of a small 
and quite safe to walk around, I also did not encounter any dirty laundry or faeces (human or 
otherwise) in any of the pools.  
The second thing that I noticed was that this woman viewed black people washing clothing as 
a threat. Now, from my point of view, this would seem nonsensical at best. But if it is looked 
at in context, it becomes more understandable. To a middle-aged white South African the 
Durban beachfront and its pools would feel like home territory – ‘our’ world. Many times in 
my interviews was I told that blacks cannot swim and that, for that very reason, throwing 
them in a pool was fun; and that even at the beach they do not go in the water. Beaches and 
pools, or at least the ones that were worth visiting, had previously been reserved for whites 
and the exclusive privilege of using them was certainly among the things they lost after the 
end of apartheid. This loss is what the lady laments here, the invasion of blacks into a 
formerly white space, their encroaching on what she considers to be h
Her pain is exacerbated by the fact that the pools had only recently been redone, something 
she feels was done for her as she can appreciate it, not for the people who are there now and 
who cannot. They put the pools to another use, which to her is an excuse for why they should 
not be there. The rationale is that if they cannot do it properly, they should not be allowed to 
do it at all. Moreover she chose to believe that they use it in a way that she strongly 
disapproves of, for the lowest (in her eyes) of human activities – ridding themselves of dirt. If 
looked at this way, the statement begins to make sense in that blacks are perceived to bring 
decay into a perfect white world. 
This, however, still does not explain why they are dangerous. Despicable maybe, but 
dangerous? To understand this feeling, we have to take a historical perspective. Since their 
arrival in South Africa, the European settlers (as opposed to the British colonialists) had 
perceived the Africans around them as a threat. The Afrikaners were convinced that unless a 
way was found to contain the black population, their numerical superiority would ultimately 
mean the end of white civilisation at the tip of the African continent. In an attempt to insulate 
themselves and protect their world from this danger, a number of political, social and 
psychological mechanisms were created over the years – the culmination of which was the 
system of apartheid.  
Apartheid encompassed everything from politics to the minds of individuals and, like a 
disease, spread through the population until it seemed to be the only viable way of life for 
everyone. After over 40 years of racist rule and anti-communist indoctrination, the majority 
more obsessed than ever with the fragility of their w
The ‘swart gevaar’, a societal myth created in
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th African nation. 
e primitive, the native was by his/her very nature a threat. No 
ause they are who they are. And to many of 
d dangerous way. “South African blacks are not like other blacks, in the US and 
phasis.) 
 continent or having had 
education. You 
cal step on 
a strange 
packag
white o
Maybe
I must 
criticis
particu
know t
danced
he pools, the low 
white group in the midst of blacks in competition for land, became the embodiment of the 
ultimate evil threatening the modern Sou
Thus ‘the African’, th
explanation was needed. They are a menace bec
my white interview partners there was no doubt that blacks were ‘different’, ‘African’ in a 
very dark an
the UK,” one Capetonian told me. “Believe me, they’re African. They perform witchcraft and 
the like. And, you know, not just a few of them, but 90 percent!” 1385 (Original em
And she seemed to know all this despite never having left the African
black friends, as she later admitted. And she was not the exception, either. Another woman in 
Cape Town explained: “They’ve all just come out of the bush. They have no 
speak to a bunch of imbeciles. They don’t even speak English.” 1386  
The bush popped-up several times in conversations as a symbol for the metaphori
the evolutionary ladder, beyond which blacks – at least in South Africa – had not climbed yet 
and beyond which they might not be able to ever climb at all. Putting an interesting twist on 
an American saying about girls and trailer parks, a (quite well educated) gentleman told me: 
“You can take the African out of the bush, but you can’t take to bush out of the African.” 1387 
Well, that just about says it all. The black person has come to be imagined as 
e of inferior genes and cultural backwardness which, if let loose in the world of its 
pposite, will wreak havoc and destroy everything in its path. 
 I am overemphasising the importance of such views for everyday life in South Africa. 
admit that, coming from Germany, where to this day few people even dare to openly 
e Israel, let alone express racist views in public, hearing such stories was probably 
larly difficult for me. I had never been directly confronted with these ideas and did not 
hat people actually believed such things, unless they liked to wear hooded gowns and 
 around burning crosses in their spare time or shaved their heads and celebrated 
Hitler’s birthday. Still, I think that my coming across these images of primitive savages is not 
just a case of my sensitivities leading me to thoroughly lop-sided impressions. The majority of 
white South Africans were to some degree afraid of blacks. 
And their fear was largely one of violence. The bone throwing, the faeces in t
IQ, all these were mere metaphors for the perceived primitiveness of the black population. 
And primitive, to most whites, was synonymous with violent. As one man explained to me: 
                                                 
1385 Conversation with the author in Cape Town, 30th December 2001 
1386 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 19th May 2002 
1387 Conversation with the author in Prague, 8th April 2004 
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itional.” 1388  
And a w
• 
Life is t I came across again in another 
y, mugging… Big black men.” 1390  
istic drawing 
 their meaning to the completion of the whole: savages 
ho besiege the locals from outside the city’s gates and who, if they manage to get in, take all 
scious level, because it’s quite young men doing 
t  do with the past. I think it’s about revenge.” 1393 
ist  interviewed. 
Still, if we look at whom violence is most commonly associated with, we will find that the 
majority of white South Africans perceive groups of young black strangers as the biggest 
• “We have always had tribal violence, faction fighting and the like. (…) It’s always 
been there. It’s trad
oman agreed:  
“Life is cheap to the black person.” 1389  
 cheap. An interesting formulation, and one tha
interview:  
• “The Nigerians, it’s its own factor. They take all the jobs of the locals. Life is cheap 
for them. They are greedy. Murder, robber
Let me quickly add another couple of links in this chain of thoughts:  
• “They just let any black man into the country, but they won’t let any whites in. That’s 
where all the problems start. You know, the Nigerians and them.” 1391  
• “The illegal immigrants are a problem. Cape Town is so far away from everything – 
why has it got to have a shack city full of Nigerians outside its gates?” 1392  
Wow, here it is, a perfect image of the ‘swart gevaar’ sketched as an impression
of individual dots, each contributing
w
they can and in return bring crime and violence. And who exactly are they? Big black men. I 
think one man I spoke to in Johannesburg summed it up perfectly when he told me: 
“With regard to the violence of some of the crime, I have my own opinion, which I 
don’t think is very popular and it’s not based on anything, but I think there is, I mean, 
there is, almost largely on a sub-con
it. But I think there is a lot of revenge, there is some kind of revenge factor at work. I 
mean when you’ve actually got, for example, as you have had a few times …, young 
black robbers in their early twenties who could take what they want and go, and they 
actually torture people. Or rape very old white women. I think there’s something quite 
strange at work. It’s go to
This little collection of racist thoughts and apartheid fears should be viewed with caution. 
Obviously, I have chosen particularly striking quotes. This is not to mean that South Africa is 
plagued by racial bigotry and intolerance with no light at the end of the tunnel. I did hear 
some very enlightened voices, not least among the journal s I
                                                 
1388 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 13th March 2002 
1389 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 1st June 2002 
1390 Woman in her late 30s in an interview with the author in Cape Town, 19th M
st
ay 2002 
e Town, 1  June 2002 
ape Town, 24th May 2002 
sburg, 31st July 2002 
1391 Woman in her 50s in an interview with the author in Cap
1392 Man in his mid-60s in an interview with the author in C
1393 Man in his 40s in an interview with the author in Johanne
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 No, actually, I would look them 
) Semen is holy among them.” 1400  
threat. “Seeing two black men in the street makes you tense, it’s inborn,” 1394 one lady told 
me. And another agreed:  
“If I go into Cape Town and get surrounded by three black men, my first reaction is 
fear. I get frightened. The next thing is aggression. I just want to hit them over the 
head with a blunt object and get rid of them.” 1395  
And when I questioned her about her feelings if she were to experience the same with three 
white guys, she told me: “Yes, I would react the same. …
straight in the eyes and I would tell them…” 1396  
These last two statements are indicative of a trend that I noticed fairly soon after my arrival in 
South Africa. Men were generally more open towards, and less afraid of, their black 
compatriots, despite numerous studies showing that men are more likely to become victims of 
crime than women. The same was true for younger people despite their increased risk of 
falling victim to violence compared with older South Africans. 1397 This intrigued me. Why 
would there be a difference between the ages and the sexes?  
 
Sexual Predators 
 
My interviews soon provided an answer to this question. A number of middle-aged white 
women mentioned black sexual desires during our interviews in order to illustrate to me either 
that blacks were truly different than ‘us’ or that blacks posed a threat to them. One lady for 
example warned me in a very motherly way: “Don’t ever smile at a black man, he’ll take that 
as an invitation.” 1398 And another insisted:  
“If an African male can’t have successful sex three to four times a day, he’s not strong, 
he’s not a man. (…)The witch doctors play an important role in this. That is where the 
body parts come in. You know, they are consumed for strength. A man will eat a 
woman’s vagina, but it must be removed while she is still alive. And it’s ground up 
and made into muti.” 1399 
This link between black sexual desires and pagan religions seems to be a common one in 
white women’s imagination. The first lady I quoted, the one who had warned me not to 
underestimate a black man’s sexual desires, also told me: “Incest is common among 
Coloureds and Blacks. (…
                                                 
1394 Woman in her early 30s in an interview with the author in Cape Town, 20th May 2002 
1395 Woman in her early 30s in an interview with the author in Cape Town, 22nd May 2002 
1396 Woman in her early 30s in an interview with the author in Cape Town, 22nd May 2002 
1397 For victimisation studies see for example Prinsloo (2002: 7-8), Shaw (1996 a: 2), Robertshaw (2001 c: 2-4), Louw et al. 
(1998 a: 1-3), Camerer et al. (1998 a: 1-2) and Schönteich & Louw (2001: 8-9) 
e Town, 19  May 2002 
1398 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 19th May 2002 
1399 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 1st June 2002 
th1400 Interview with the author in Cap
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mericans not 
rly similar, as was the general 
against white women, with black 
And while this rate is the highest I could find for any area in South Africa (the Cape Town 
equivalent was just over 10% 1403), the general profile is the same nationwide. A study done 
 most women (49% of respondents from all 
             
Such sexual stereotypes are not uncommon. Numerous studies dealing with group-based 
discrimination, such as racism or homophobia, have shown that people generally describe 
their in-group in positive terms, while forbidden and negative attributes, such as brutality or 
sexual abnormality, are projected onto the out-group. Abbott & Calonico for example showed 
in their analysis of rape and race in the press in New Orleans that many white A
only see blacks as being driven by uncontrollable sexual desires, but also envisage these 
desires as directed specifically towards white women. 1401 
This study is of great interest to me, for, despite its age – or rather because of it – its findings 
are still valid in the South African context. South Africa in 2002 in many respects resembled 
the American Deep South of the early 1970s. Both societies had recently repealed racist and 
segregationist legislation and neither had overcome racism yet. The education levels and 
relative wealth of the white populations as well as their experiences with black people were 
similar (although by no means the same), and, although the demographics of the two regions 
differed markedly, all other factors specific to the problem of rape and press reports thereof 
were almost identical: The demographics of rape were fai
pattern of the individual incidents. Moreover, in both countries the police were dominated by 
white men and had a long history of conflict with the black population. Accordingly, blacks 
and whites in both areas were fairly similar in their attitudes towards reporting crime, with 
blacks generally showing much lower rates of reporting. Women from the two population 
groups also had similar experiences with the police in both countries, with some officers 
ridiculing or even abusing them when they reported rapes.  
The white population’s views of rape in both countries were also near identical. Both tended 
to view rape as a crime perpetrated mainly by black men 
men raping black women a close second. The only difference seemed to be the intensity of 
fear of being raped. Many white South African women think that they are very likely to be 
raped at some point in their lives. If we look again at figure 73 in chapter 5.3.2, we will see 
that white Durbanites mentioned sexual violence as their second biggest concern in relation to 
crime, even before physical injury. 26% of white respondents said that sexual violence was 
their biggest fear, the highest percentage of any race group and a striking figure in a sample 
that was 48% male. 1402 
by the ISS in 1998 confirmed that the one thing
                                    
onico (1974: 141-142) 1401 See for example Quasthoff (1989: 187) and Abbott & Cal
1402 Abbott & Calonico (1974: 149), Shaw & Louw (1998 a: 3) and Robertshaw et al. (2001 c: 5-6) 
1403 Camerer et al. (1998 c: 7) 
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population groups) feared was sexual assault, followed closely by loss of life (47%). The 
types of crime feared the most were housebreakings (28%) and rape (26%). Thus, the threat is 
perceived to be coming from the outside. Not surprisingly, 79% of women questioned felt 
most unsafe in public areas. Only 14.7% felt most unsafe in their own home. However, when 
asked directly how they felt at home, only 59% answered that they felt safe. 1404  
For white women, the imagined perpetrator of rape is generally a young black man, or even a 
group of black youths, who, driven by wild sexual desire, waylay strangers in unfamiliar 
places. However, according to researchers, trauma clinics, and the police, this scenario is far 
from the prototypical rape. Only a minority of perpetrators are in any way mentally or 
sexually unstable. Most rapes are committed by men who are accepted by society as entirely 
normal, average citizens. In their victim survey Bollen et al. found that 67.5% of perpetrators 
of the worst incidents of abuse were employed and 63% earned over 2000 Rand a month. 1405 
And they rarely ever attack complete strangers, either. On the contrary, most victims know 
their assailants. 1406 In fact, date rape, rape by neighbours, friends, male partners, fathers, and 
he is certain to not be caught. His home or that of the victim are therefore the preferred 
cene. 81% of rapes reported to Bollen et al. happened either in the victim’s home (52.4%), 
es of friends or family of the victim (5.2%) or 
y 819, or 4.22%, were reported by white 
victims
conside p almost 15% of the population.1409 In 1997, the 
                                                
other relatives are by far the most common types of rape. 1407 
Also, rape rarely happens in the dark alleyways and parking garages that it is commonly 
associated with. According to Vogelman, rape is generally committed in places where the 
perpetrator is alone with his victim, out of sight and sound of others, and, most importantly, 
where 
s
the perpetrator’s home (19.2%) or in the hom
the perpetrator (4.2%). Only 19% of rapes were committed in public places. Camerer et al.’s 
survey of crime in Cape Town showed similar patterns. 1408 
Like most violent crime, rape also seems to be largely a problem of the black population. Of 
the 19,368 rapes recorded by the police in 1988, onl
. The remaining 18,549 were black. The results become even more striking when we 
r that the white population made-u
numbers came closer to reflecting demographics with 78.8% black (in the old apartheid sense) 
victims and 9.2% white victims, but black women were still clearly at greater risk of being 
victimised than whites (see fig. 81). 1410  
 
1404 Bollen et al. (1999 e: 1-2 and 5) and Simpson et al. (1997: 1) 
1405 Bollen et al. (1997 d : 1) and Simpson et al. (1997: 1) 
1406 Simpson et al. (1997: 1) and Vogelman (1990 b: 96) 
1407 Simpson et al. (1997: 1) 
amerer et al. (1998 b: 4-5) 
96), Simpson et al. (1997: 1) and The Government of the Republic of South Africa (1996: 1) 
1408 Bollen et al. (1999 c: 3) and C
1409 Vogelman (1990 b: 
1410 Gilchrist & Butchart (1998: 4), Prinsloo (2002: 7-8) Friedman (2001: 1) and Louw et al. (1998 a: 8) 
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Figure 81: Race of rape victims in South Africa in 1997 (Source: Gilchrist & Butchart (1998: 2)) 
These numbers throw up two questions: Firstly, what, if not rape in dark alleyways, should 
white women be afraid of? And secondly, being as I have so far not provided any proof that 
know the offender. The ISS documented similar ratios in respect of murder (see fig. 82).   
    
young black men are of no danger to them, who, statistically speaking, should white women 
fear?  
 
Fear Thy Neighbour 
 
Both questions can be answered simultaneously by focussing on question number two. One 
look at the numbers provided by victim surveys and crime statistics will reveal the real 
danger: The majority of violent crimes are committed by people known to the victim. 1411 In 
2001, a CIAC national docket analysis showed that  
“in most cases (more than 70%) the victims and offenders were known to one 
another”. 1412 (Original emphasis.)  
The national Victims of Crime Surveys have persistently come up with similar ratios. In 1998 
for example, 60% of assault victims and 63% of victims of sexual offences knew the offender 
by name and a further 17% of assault victims and 12% of victims of sexual offences knew the 
offender by sight. Only 20% of assault victims and 24% of victims of sexual offences did not 
1413
                                             
 et al. (1998 b: 8-9), Bollen et al. (1999 e: 3) and Schönteich & Louw (2001: 10-11) 
1411 Shaw (2002: 43 and 59) 
1412 CIAC (2001 a: 17) 
1413 Louw (1999: 4), Camerer
  329
 
Figure 82: Proportion of assault, sexual offence and murder victims who knew the offender in some way 
(Source: Schönteich & Louw (2001: 11)) 
Moreover, several surveys 1414 found that the incidence of violent crime reveals clear cyclical 
trends with levels at their highest during the Easter and Christmas holidays as well as Fridays 
and Saturdays, a fact which according to Schönteich & Louw points towards violence being 
committed when “acquaintances, friends and family members come together over holiday 
periods and on weekends in the context of increased alcohol consumption” 1415.  
If we focus solely on sexual assault, the violent crime discussed above, the fi regu s are even 
my interviews. A frightening number of women told me 
                                              
more striking. Of the women who reported abuse to Bollen et al., 86% said that the 
perpetrators of the worst incidents were known to them. In 59% of cases abusers were their 
partners, lovers or spouses. 1416 This highlights one of the most remarkable aspects of 
violence against women in South Africa: A large proportion of women in South Africa will at 
one point in their lives have an abusive partner. Bollen et al. have found that at present “as 
many as one in four to one in six women are in an abusive relationship and that one women is 
killed by her partner every six days.” 1417 90% of all women interviewed in the study had been 
physically abused. The two most common forms of physical abuse reported were being 
pushed or shoved and being slapped or hit. 1418  
These findings were confirmed in 
that they had experienced what I personally would call domestic violence in at least one of 
their previous relationships. Some only hinted at it or gave rather vague answers, like a lady in 
her late 50s that I spoke with during my street survey in Bloemfontein. When I asked her if 
   
14 Camerer et al. (1998 b: 1-2) and Schönteich & Louw (2001: 11) 
1415 Schönteich & Louw (2001: 11) 
1416 Bollen et al. (1999 d: 1) 
14
1417 Bollen et al. (1999 a: 5) 
1418 Bollen et al. (1999 b: 5) 
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violence, she told me: “I’m currently going through physical 
1419
riences except that they had happened. Their mother, who is now in 
n was a 
ng process for him. The couple are now divorced and for the sake of his daughter, he is 
hange his ways. The child lives with him and his new girlfriend – 
sections of this chapter. 
she had ever been the victim of 
and mental abuse from my ex-husband.”   
Other women were surprisingly open and detailed in their accounts. A woman in her early 30s 
for example told me that she had grown up with a father who had regularly beaten her mother. 
She then saw two of her three older sisters marry abusive men and the third get into a long-
term relationship with a drug addict who would occasionally hit her. And despite all these 
negative examples she married an abusive alcoholic herself. She stayed with him, despite 
repeated beatings, for more than five years before she finally had the courage to leave. Her 
two sisters took a few years longer to get themselves to divorce their husbands and, although I 
had several conversations about the subject of violence with both of them, neither ever told 
me more about their expe
her 60s, is still living with their father and never said a word about her experiences during my 
entire time in Cape Town. The third sister who now lives in Johannesburg was the quickest at 
ridding herself of her abusive partner and was quite open about the pain and fear she had gone 
through. The same goes for my friend in Cape Town. Both confirmed that they had gotten 
involved with very charming men and only once they were in a serious relationship found out 
that there was another side to their partners, one that came out under the influence of drugs 
and alcohol and that knew no respect for anyone else’s needs and weaknesses. 1420  
Interestingly enough, even one of the men confirmed this assertion. He has since sobered-up 
and receives treatment. He can now openly talk about what he did, although he has still not 
understood why he did it. One thing he knows for sure, though. His father used to beat his 
mother and him all the time and it was the normal way of dealing with conflict when he grew 
up. Learning that hurting the one you love can eventually be an act of self-destructio
lo
making every effort to c
incidentally a young woman who had two abusive relationships before him, and who he has 
hit before he gave-up drinking – and, as far as I could see, the chain of domestic violence 
seems to be broken in this family.  
All this leads to my next and final question: Why, if their own partners are the greatest 
danger, women tend to be most scared of black strangers? I believe the answer to be twofold, 
and think that both arguments can basically be traced back to the newspapers’ reporting about 
the phenomenon of violence in general and rape in particular. I will specify this in the final 
 
                                                 
1419 Interview with the author in Bloemfontein, 1st July 2002 
1420 Several conversations with the author, December 2001 to July 2002 (Cape Town and Johannesburg) 
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necessa
suppor
country
from al
were v
the Un
majorit ra y property crimes, such as theft, 
rm
ce by either 
1422 is is why it plays no role in defining women’s violence 
chema and does not register as violence done to them in their memory. Several women who 
equently associated with black people. 
ct experienced theft or break-
                                                
The Non-Violent Wife-Beater 
 
My interviews have shown that many people do not distinguish between the concepts of 
violence and crime; they equate the first with the second. However, not all violence 
rily criminal. As I have shown in the chapters on violence perpetrated by the 
ters of the apartheid state, one can act violently and still stay within the limits of a 
’s legal system. Legitimacy and legality are not to be equated. On the other hand, far 
l crimes are violent. For example in 1999, only 32.6% of crimes recorded by the SAPS 
iolent in nature. This is still a much higher proportion than in many other countries – in 
ited States the figure came to 15% and in Great Britain it reached a mere 6% – but the 
y of crimes committed in South Africa are gene ll
fraud, or vandalism. 1421 
The mixing of these two concepts, or rather the subsuming of both under the cover-te  
‘crime’ has had a lasting effect on the way white South Africans define violence. Legal 
violence is not perceived as such and neither are violent acts that South Africans consider to 
be just a normal part of every normal person’s life, rather than a police matter. My first line of 
reasoning is therefore that domestic violence is frequently not perceived as violen
its perpetrators or its victims.  Th
s
had answered my question of whether they had ever experienced violence with a firm ‘no’, 
later hinted at having been physically abused at home. For example, one girl in her early 20s 
who had previously denied ever having experienced violence told me calmly about her 
boyfriend having thrown a butterfly knife at her head. Luckily he missed, so that was not 
violence in her eyes. Besides, he was drunk, so that really did not count anyway. 1423  
 
The Violent Car Thief 
 
The second argument runs in exactly the opposite direction, namely that crimes committed by 
young black men are often perceived as violence even if they are de facto non-violent. Car 
theft and house break-ins, for example, were both mentioned as forms of violence by several 
people (not only women) I spoke with and both were fr
One man for example told me: “When I grew up, we never locked a car. There was no risk of 
violence.” 1424 Similarly, my question whether people had ever been the victims of violence 
were answered affirmatively several times when people had in fa
 
1421 Schönteich (1999: 2) and Schönteich & Louw (2001: 4) 
xperienced sexual or physical abuse did not think that what had 
ch 2002 
in Cape Town, 24  May 2002 
1422 Bollen et al. found that a striking 34.5% of women who e
happened to them was a crime. (Bollen et al. (1999 c: 5) 
1423 Conversation with the author in Cape Town, 14th Mar
th1424 Interview with the author 
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ins. A m
said: “C
and our
t [traffic light] 
This po
oneself
certain
classify st, the determining factor for many of my white South 
 Pretoria, hinted at this when he told me: 
                                                
an in Cape Town (who incidentally described himself as “a bit of a news junkie” 1425) 
ompared to the newspapers we’ve been very fortunate. (…) We’ve had cars broken in 
 house burgled.” 1426 And a man in Durban (I spoke with him and his wife) told me: 
“Yes, we were hijacked. Well, they tried… We were stopped at a robo
when two black men walked up to the car. My wife was driving. They put a gun to the 
side of my stomach and told me to get out of the car and told her to stay. So I told 
them that they could have the car and the keys, but not her! But they refused, so I just 
got out of the car and pulled her with me right across the passenger seat. We ran into a 
shop and called the police, but the thieves were not good enough to deal with the 
immobiliser, so the car was not actually stolen.” 1427 
The latter quote is in my opinion a good illustration of Thornton’s point that what exactly 
violence is very much dependent on factors outside the control of those people involved. 1428 
Is the hijacking that went wrong an act of violence? The gun that was not fired? In the opinion 
of my interview partner it is. I must admit in this case I agree. But the first quote is in my 
opinion only understandable in the South African context. From a German point of view, 
locking cars does not seem like a very effective method for preventing violence.  
 
Defining Violence by Skin Colour  
 
ints to a difference between the average white South African and me in defining for 
 the contested concept of violence. I make the definition dependent on the effect of a 
 act. If a person (or animal for that matter) is harmed in the process, I personally 
 an act as violence. By contra
African friends and interview partners seemed to be not the action itself, but the actor. A 
crime committed by a black man is a lot more likely to be classified as an act of violence than 
one committed by a white person. And a non-criminal act that does physical or psychological 
harm to another person is a lot less likely to be seen as violence if it is committed by a white 
person than if the perpetrator is black. These are preliminary findings only, that could 
certainly be refuted by further research, but all factors that I tested point towards this 
definition being applied more or less across the board. 
In my opinion this is the result of a particular social stereotype among white South Africans, 
which led to them conceptualising violence along racial lines. Martin Schönteich, a senior 
researcher at the ISS in
 
8th May 2002 
rvey in Durban, 14  April 2002 
1425 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 1
1426 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 18th May 2002 
th1427 Answer in a street su
1428 Thornton (2002: 50) 
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ereotypes. According to Snyder the basic function of 
treme, or if negative 
alues are attached to a category, stereotypes can easily have the opposite effect of making the 
t. Let me explain. Social stereotypes work 
y not via our thoughts, but through our actions. When dealing with 
o, thus eliciting a 
friendly response. 1432 
                                                
“Until ’97 there was a belief that hijackings were committed purely by blacks against 
whites, until the ISS Victims of Crime Survey in ’97 proved that you’re just as likely 
if not more to be hijacked in Soweto as in Sandton. Hijackings symbolise white 
middle class fear – recently replaced by rape during burglary.” 1429 
In order to explain my theory I must go on a brief excursion detailing some previous research 
on the nature and functioning of st
stereotypes is to render the flow of cognitive input predictable and manageable thus enabling 
the individual to live in a social world. Stereotypes are important in our interaction with 
others, because it is they, rather than specific situational cues, that tend to guide our 
behaviour. Life would be unmanageable if we had to go looking for new input in every 
individual situation. However, if such simplification is taken to the ex
v
coexistence of different groups increasingly difficul
by categorising people on the basis of highly visible characteristics, such as gender or race, 
and assigning each of these groups a number of attributes. Once established, these mental 
models take on a dynamic of their own and individual members of the target group will 
generally no longer be able to change them, because the way stereotypes work in people’s 
minds perpetuates their unaltered existence. 1430 As Snyder explained 
“[T]here exists considerable evidence that stereotypes can and do influence 
information processing such that new evidence that confirms these stereotypes is more 
easily noticed, more easily stored in memory, and more easily brought to mind than is 
disconfirming evidence.” 1431 
Thus, stereotypes do not merely influence our perception of other people, but actually guide 
the individual’s experiences and memories in such a way as to emphasise facts that confirm 
them while filtering out those that refute them. Dissimilar behaviour among members of a 
group is less readily noticed and more easily forgotten, and so are similarities among people 
who are not seen as belonging to a common group. However, stereotypes might even make 
the transition to realit
people of a group other than our own, there is a risk that we influence their behaviour in such 
a way that confirms our stereotypes. For example, if we expect a person to be friendly due to 
group membership, we will frequently be more friendly towards them to
 
ler (1991: 92), Retief (2002: 193 and 198), Hamilton (1976: 83) and Snyder (1981: 183) 
 206-297), Wilder (1981: 218-220) and Snyder (1981: 191-193) 
1429 Interview with the author, 23rd July 2002 
1430 Altheide (1976: 11), Fow
1431 Snyder (1981: 192) 
1432 Hamilton (1976: 89), Chibnall (1977:
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Howev
behavio
expect, types, 
entrated 
e fact that white violence and ‘legal police killings’ had 
Some p
to und
attitude , told me:  
er, in relation to stereotypes causality is generally not attributed to individuals’ 
ur, but to group properties. If people act in a way that our stereotypes lead us to 
 such behaviour is generally used as a confirmation of the validity of the stereo
and the group membership is frequently identified as the cause for the individual’s actions. 
The question whether their membership in the perceived group is in fact the reason for their 
behaviour is normally not asked. 1433 
When dealing with negative stereotypes, there is the added problem that they generally 
heighten emotional arousal (fear, anger, embarrassment and the like) when we are confronted 
with them in real-life situations. And, as Wilder has found, aroused people tend to 
oversimplify their social environment by relying increasingly on groups-based stereotypes 
while ignoring individual variations among the people around them. 1434 
 
The Role of the Media in Constructing Violence 
 
If we apply this theory to the case of South Africa, my white interview partners’ statements no 
longer seem paradoxical. Throughout the past three decades, the media, which, as we have 
established, served as their main source of information about violence, have slowly built a 
powerful stereotypical image of violence as an illegal act and as more or less a black 
phenomenon. Although during the crucial years of 1976 to 1994, the newspapers conc
mostly on political violence, and often pointed out the security forces’ involvement, the 
underlying imagery showed violence as something that is criminal in motivation and is mostly 
perpetrated by young black men. Moreover, the extensive use of the mob as a symbol of 
violence soon made any larger group of blacks seem like a potential threat. 1435 
Their fear was further enhanced by th
been continuously de-emphasised by the press and were largely lexicalised in non-violent 
terms such as ‘strength’, ‘force’ or ‘maintaining order’. Violence was thus always portrayed 
as a black phenomenon and all violent blacks as criminals. The impression soon emerged that 
all violence was in fact criminal and that violent crime was exclusively the domain of the 
black population. 1436 
eople I spoke with approached the media messages with the necessary critical attitude 
erstand that many of them were merely visibly symptoms of an underlying racist 
. A couple that I interviewed in Cape Town, for example
                                                 
1433 Retief (2002: 194), Hamilton (1976: 85-86) and Wilder (1981: 219-221) 
 2, Chap 3, Para 66 
1434 Wilder (1981: 238-239) 
1435 Simpson & Vogelman (1989 b: 2) and TRC Report, Vol
1436 TRC Report, Vol 2, Chap 3, Para 66 
  335
 white
“[Him] You know, there’s still a lot of racism. For example the other day the post 
office here was robbed. “And it was a  guy,” people would say. As if it matters. 
really pisses me off.” 1438 When I questioned if she was really sure that 
ips during the 1950s to 80s and from there spread to 
A woman in Cape Town for example complained 
But in the media all criminals are black … [Her] and all victims are white.” 1437  
However, such balanced views and rare, especially when it came to talking about violence. 
Most people I spoke with conceptualised violence purely in terms of racial difference and 
‘law and order’, and showed no great interest in broadening their horizons. They share the 
outdated and inaccurate view of crime and violence expressed in The Citizen story quoted 
above and readily take-up the ideas provided by the press. A lady in Cape Town told me: 
“When you read all this [pointing at an article in that day’s Cape Argus about gang violence 
on the Cape Flats], it 
the newspaper reports could be taken at face value her very enlightening answer was: “The 
media report truthfully. The reporters are mainly black.” 1439 
Such views were further reinforced by the newspapers’ choice of stories. The cases that 
received most attention during the first few years were incidents of public violence in the 
townships. After the end of apartheid, attention shifted to crimes where the perpetrator could 
be shown to have maliciously intruded a white victim’s home or car. Violence was something 
that originated in the streets of the townsh
the white suburbs during the 1990s because it was no longer contained by the police.  
As Jeremy Gordin put it: “It is a ‘See, they took over and now it’s a mess’-type thing.” 1440 
And a man in Bloemfontein agreed: “Since our friends, the Grunewalds have taken over 
everything has gone bad.” 1441 So did a lady in Cape Town. While we were talking about the 
government, she told me: “The reason South Africa is getting worse is because there are no 
whites telling them what to do.” 1442  
And ‘bad’ and ‘worse’ to them did not just mean disorderly; it meant dangerous. Indeed, the 
majority of white South Africans I spoke with saw groups of young black strangers as a 
menace. And while they were only rarely associated with sticks and stones, the old imagery 
still re-appeared every once in a while. 
fairly early in our conversation that street violence was a big problem in her city:  
“Taxi drivers take big part. It’s been going on for five to seven years. Some are 
controlled by Blacks, some by Coloureds, some by Muslims. They stone and burn 
busses. They terrorise people on busses and trains.” 1443 
                                                 
1437 Married couple in their late 40s in an interview with the author in Cape Town, 18th May 2002 
1438 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 19th May 2002 
1439 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 19th May 2002 
1440 Interview with the author, 31st July 2002 
1441 Conversation with the author in Bloemfontein, 2nd July 2002 
1442 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 1st June 2002 
1443 Woman in her 40s in an interview with the author in Cape Town, 19th May 2002 
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e crowds are getting less.” 1444 
 this view of violence to the point where 
e to understand the real nature of the violence in South 
Africa 
with w
being c
the onl
With th
the ster
chose p
of youn
what it
toward
evidenc t raped. At the same time, if she signals her fear to 
e 
And another told me: “We are a violent society.” Then she paused for a while before she 
added: “But th
And this points towards the last important factor in defining violence: Even though so-called 
‘black-on-black’ incidents and, more recently, domestic violence and rape among blacks 
received ample coverage, they did so with a focus on the perpetrators. Victim-centred 
reporting was generally reserved for black violence against whites. Therefore, once again, 
white readers were presented with a scenario where they could identify with the victim and 
clearly saw the perpetrator as their enemy. Such messages fit with white South Africans’ 
general worldview and were therefore readily accepted as the way things are. They became 
real in people’s eyes. 
Indeed, most white South Africans have internalised
they are unable to see violent acts that do not fit this template. Just as they did not see the 
cruelty of apartheid, they are unabl
because no one has provided them with a repertoire of mental and linguistic concepts 
hich to grasp it. Their primary source of information consistently defined violence as 
riminal acts perpetrated by black strangers and most people soon accepted this view as 
y possible definition of violence.  
is in mind, we can now understand why a white South African woman who accepted 
eotype of young black males as sexual predators that are generally active in groups and 
ublic places for their crimes, will react with fear when she is confronted with a group 
g black men, instead of going into the new situation with an open mind and seeing 
 will bring. Furthermore, her stereotypes will lead her to interpret a greeting or a move 
s her as a stereotype-confirming threat, while filtering out stereotype-disconfirming 
e, such as the fact that she was no
the men, they might for various reasons, such as opportunism or humour, actually make a pass 
at her. In any case, what she will remember a day later will generally be the fact that she felt 
threatened in the presence of black men.  
If, on the other hand, the same woman is beaten by her husband, there are two forces working 
against her remembering the experience in terms of violence. The first is the fact that from th
perspective of white women, white men are not a distinctively defined social group. On the 
contrary, they are perceived as members of the in-group and are as such judged to be non-
violent. The second is that violence is predefined in their heads as public acts committed by 
blacks. Accordingly, what is happening to them at home does not fit the stereotype of 
                                                 
1444 Married couple in their late 40s in an interview with the author in Cape Town, 18th May 2002 
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rstanding of 
nted all that 
saw the theft of their cars as acts of violence 
gainst them. It fitted the pattern of violence as understood using the rationale of the ‘total 
of the townships, intruding the world of middle class 
                                                
violence and is most likely to be explained in other terms, such as authority, anger or 
desperation.  
The same rationale works to explain a number of white views about violence. One man I 
spoke with for example recalled an incident at the University of the Witwatersrand during the 
1980s where a group of black students had supposedly burnt the library. He was convinced 
that they had done this purely because they were black and therefore had no unde
the value of education, but a lot of desire for destruction. And he readily admitted that the fact 
that it had happened also led him to expect nothing else from blacks in the future. What he did 
not notice, however, was that by no means all black students engaged in acts of sabotage 
against white universities. Neither did he question what might have motivated this particular 
incident, other than the race of the perpetrators. 1445  
The incident, if it took place as he reported, could just as readily be explained in terms of ‘the 
struggle’. Dennis Pather explained: 
“If you, if you burnt what was symbolically, sort of in your eyes, things that 
represented wealth and that was white wealth, that was a sort of victory for you as a 
black person. And so you thought to burn buildings and burn cars. It’s, it’s just 
something that I remember from that era. That not being able to match the military 
might of apartheid, any destruction of what white privilege protected, you, you wished 
to destroy. And I mean kids burnt down, they destroyed their own schools. And some 
people say: “How can children destroy what was important to their own lives?” But 
when you look at it from their point of view, that was, I mean, it was certainly nothing 
compared to what white education represented. So it, it meant, it represe
was evil in education. It represented Bantu Education, so-called Bantu Education and 
so it needed to be destroyed.” 1446 
Suddenly, what the white man, using his conceptual system, had interpreted as an act of 
violence, in Mr. Pather’s words turned into an intellectual struggle. It was still an act of 
destruction, but one that had a positive value attached to it. A bit like a young bird has to 
break the eggshell when it hatches because it limits its freedom to see the world with its own 
eyes, the kids felt they had to destroy the education system that was designed to blind them. 
Similarly, we can now explain why whites 
a
onslaught’. Blacks were coming out 
whites, destroying things that were dear to them, and in one violent instant taking away what 
they had earned through hard work. My own interpretation of car theft is different as I come 
 
1445 Conversation with the author in Prague, 8th April 2004 
02 1446 Interview with the author, 11th April 20
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ney for the bus, gone to the funeral with them,” I sobbed, “anything to prevent them 
xperienced differently by people of different 
about violence and what they did not bring up, we can see clear parallels between the image 
                                                
from a different background and conceptualise things differently. Accordingly, when my car 
was stolen I went through a whole range of different emotions. I did not feel violated and I did 
not think that anyone had invaded my private sphere. I was insured so I had not lost anything 
but time and I had no qualms about using public transport while my car was fixed. So what 
did I feel? At first not a lot I must admit. It was a kind of ‘oops’ when the police told us about 
it, but being as the car had been recovered already, there was no anger or despair. 
I became a little more emotional later on when it came to inspecting the car. As I mentioned 
above, I found the invitation to Mr. Pelem’s funeral in my glove box. His young face looking 
at me silently from the crinkled bit of paper, the poem on the back titled “Goodbye”, the 
writing in a language I could not understand, all that aroused a deep sadness in me. I cried, I 
cried in the police pound – not for my car or my loss, but for the people who had to break the 
law in order to pay their last respect to a friend. “I would have driven them myself, given 
them mo
from becoming criminals.” Evidently, I did not take the thieves to be members of an out-
group who had attacked me. I did not experience violence against me. I interpreted the 
incident as history having failed all of us. We were in the same boat, we had all been 
prevented by the reality in South Africa from working together, jointly solving a problem and 
in the process making the country a better place for everyone. And out of this feeling of 
closeness and imagined solidarity, I did something that would probably be condemned by any 
white South African who feels that crime is a matter of law enforcement rather than social 
psychology; I did not report my find to the police in order to protect whomever had been kind 
enough to provide me with such powerful insight into my own conceptual world. 
In my opinion, these examples show that experience is determined by culture, that is, that 
cultural assumptions and values are not something we can place upon experience. They are 
part and parcel of it and as such cannot be filtered out by those who make the experience. This 
is why one and the same situation can be e
cultural backgrounds. 1447 In our case, things that are classified as violence in South African 
culture are perceived as such by members of the South African public, even if I or other 
outsiders would classify them differently, while things that I might perceive as violence are 
not experienced as such by a South African.  
 
The Link Between News and Views 
 
If we now look back again at what things South Africans mentioned when I talked to them 
 
son (1980: 57 and 146) 1447 Lakoff & John
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n who are active in groups and who seek whites as 
iews and conversations, both in answer to my 
es. The tail end went to 
, 5% assault and 4% car hijacking. 1448 The 
main difference is the positioning of burglaries. I personally feel that this is not a matter of 
different priorities, though, but should be explained with the difference in the questioning. 
The ISS asked about ‘crime’ while I was specifically concerned with ‘violence’. Some of my 
of violence that has been cumulatively constructed in the press over the years: Violence was 
generally associated with young black me
their primary targets. Moreover, most people seemed to believe that violence most commonly 
occurs among strangers. Car hijackings and robbery were listed disproportionately more often 
as ‘acts of violence’ than, for example, domestic violence, which was at times not even seen 
as a form of violence. Violence was seen as criminal, and a large number of people were 
convinced it had a racial component. For example, while they believed that blacks hijacked 
cars out of a general criminal inclination, they also thought that the hijackers made a 
conscious choice to target white drivers. Thus, violence was not only closely associated with 
the black out-group, but also seen as something that was intruding into the white in-group’s 
world, an invasion that was only possible because South Africa now had a government that 
was incapable of ruling properly and secretly supported blacks who took revenge against 
whites.  
Even more striking than this overall image is my list of the individual acts that were brought-
up in connection with violence during interv
questions and unprompted. It reads almost like page two of The Star on an ordinary day: By 
far the most common were robberies and murder with six references each. Second place on 
the attention scale went to assault and car hijackings with each being mentioned four times. A 
close third were rapes and farm attacks (black against white) with three hits each. Then came 
a number of acts and concepts that were all referred to twice: police violence, street children, 
domestic violence, burglary, car break-ins, muti murders, and burglari
a number of more specific concepts that were only mentioned once and could be subsumed 
under some of the terms above, but I chose to keep them separate to maintain as precise an 
image as possible: informal courts in the townships sentencing people to death, white farmers 
assaulting black workers, stoning and burning busses, mugging, gang violence, crowd 
violence, stabbing, bombings, and shootings.  
This list closely reflects the findings of the ISS 2003 National Victim Survey. In fact, of the 
survey’s top six crimes that South Africans are most afraid of, five are the same as my top 
five: 25% of respondents (of all population groups) said they worry most about murder, 23% 
cited burglary, 18% sexual assault, 13% robbery
                                                 
1448 ISS (2004: 2) 
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terview partners might therefore have refrained from mentioning non-violent house break-
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In order to find out if they more closely resemble the newspapers’ reporting, I randomly chose 
three issues of The Star (23rd April 2002, 18th July 2002 and 4th November 2002) and counted 
all reported incidents of violence and crime that had been listed as violence by South 
Africans. The newspapers’ priorities are slightly different than both the crime statistics and 
people’s views. The most commonly reported crime was by far murder, with eleven cases 
mentioned. Number two was rape with four references (six if we include two rep
sexual assault against boys, which the newspaper did not classify as ‘rapes’). Car hijackings, 
robbery and burglaries were each brought-up twice and bombings, right wing hit squads, 
rioting, car theft and assault were reported once. 
                                                 
1449 All figures except farm attacks from SAPS (2003 b), the figure for farm attacks is my own calculation using the nu
of attacks given in the Report of the Committee of Inqui
mber 
ry into Farm Attacks (2003: 418) and the population count in The 
Government of South Africa (2002: 1) 
1450 ISS (2004: 2) 
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Crime in order of 
frequency 
Cases per 
100,000 
No. of references in 
interviews (+ 
ranking) 
No. of references in 
newspapers (+ 
ranking) 
    
Burglary at residential 
premises 
680.5 2 (4) 1 (3) 
Assault with intent to inflict 
grievous bodily harm 
597.7 - 2 if stabbing & 
shooting included (5) 
- 
Common assault 575.8 4 (2) 1 (4) 
Theft out of or from motor 
vehicle 
454.0 2 (4) - 
Robbery with aggravating 
circumstances 
268.1 Not applicable 1451 1 (4) 
Common robbery 222.0 6 (1)  1 (4) 
Theft of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
221.0 - 1 (4) 
Burglary at non-residential 
premises 
203.3 - 1 (4) 
Rape 122.3 3 (3) 4 (6 including ‘sexual 
assault’) (2) 
Murder 47.5 6 (1) 11 (1) 
Carjacking 34.3 4 (2) 2 (3) 
Farm attacks 2.3 3 (3) - 
Riot 1.8 (public 
violence) 
2 if crowd violence & 
stoning busses 
included (5) 
1 (4) 
Bombings n/a (0.2 1452) 1 (5) 1 (4) 
Figure 83: Crimes of violence in South Africa: the police’s view, the public’s view and the newspaper’s 
view (Colour coding: Green: Public opinion close to media opinion; Yellow: Public opinion close to police 
statistics; Red: Public opinion seemingly independent; blue: all three similar) 
The table in figure 83, which is the result of this final triangulation, shows that the case for an 
agenda-setting function of the media is anything but clear-cut. On some issues, such as 
murder and rape, there is a remarkable agreement between the press and the public and little 
resemblance between those two and the police statistics. In other cases, though, public opinion 
is much closer to the statistics than to the news (for example with regards to assault) and in 
yet another group of cases, such as farm attacks, it seems to have its own dynamic.  
However, in my opinion these findings do not refute my theory of some form of media 
influence on thought. Instead, I believe they point towards a version of the theory advanced by 
MacKuen & Coombs. In areas where people have little personal experiences (murder or rape) 
the media exert a stronger influence over their opinions than in those cases where people have 
witnessed violence directly or have themselves been victimised (such as assault). 1453  
                                                 
1451 Generally no specifics of the circumstances of the robberies were given, either in personal accounts or in examples, so I 
cannot judge which category my answers fall in. However, if we combine the statistics into one big meta-category of 
‘robbery’ they come close to reflecting public opinion. 
1452 Figure for the Period January to September 2001 from SAPS (2001 b: 1) 
1453 MacKuen & Coombs (1981: 59-101) 
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ones that are marked red 
committed by the apartheid regime from the 
persona
‘ungov
levels o stem of apartheid. It 
was as 
 runs into a convenience store and shoots three clerks. Somehow his murders 
. I am sure the results of my study would have been slightly 
different if I had interviewed people directly after the bombings in Soweto in November 2002, 
but I do not think that they would in fact have changed their long-term view of right-wing 
violence. The newspapers fared a lot better than public opinion in this respect.  
They did cover a number of smaller attacks and closely followed the trial of five rugby 
players accused of murdering a black teenager in early 2002. And, of course, they gave a lot 
vember that year. However, overall they certainly did not 
I believe that my study has also exposed a phenomenon that MacKuen & Coombs have not 
addressed in their work: that of ideology. If we look at the incidents that are marked red, that 
is, those where public opinion seems to be independent of the newspapers and the statistics, 
we will find that the ones that were mentioned (as opposed to the 
because no reference was made to them) – car break-ins, carjackings and ‘farm attacks’ – are 
all highly ideologically charged categories. At one point or another in the history of South 
African news reporting all three of these received ample attention in relation to black 
violence. In my opinion they, along with others such as rape and robbery, form a meta-
category of ‘swart gevaar’ in people’s heads, which more closely resembles the newspaper 
reporting over the past decades than the reality during that time. 
This becomes particularly clear when we consider what is missing from the newspaper articles 
and my conversations and interviews with South Africans. The most striking is probably the 
complete absence of all forms of state violence 
l accounts of my interview partners. A few people made reference to the ANC’s 
ernability’ campaign, the comrades, or the people’s courts as reasons for today’s high 
f violence, but not a single person mentioned the oppressive sy
if to them the torture, the deaths in detention, the hit squads, and the many massacres 
of protesters by heavily armed policemen had just not happened.  
The newspapers did mention them every once in a while, for example when Wouter Basson, 
the former head of South Africa’s chemical and biological warfare programme, was acquitted 
of 64 charges, including murder. However, many of them focussed more on the trial and 
modern reactions to the verdict than on the gruesome crimes he had been accused of. 
Moreover, with a few exceptions (such as the Mail & Guardian and the Sowetan) the 
mainstream papers did not lexicalise his actions in quite the same terms as those of a black 
youngster who
were different, less murderous. 
Another big blank spot was right-wing violence. Several people again talked of racially 
motivated attacks by blacks, a term that often included the infamous ‘farm attacks’, but not a 
single one raised racist violence against black people, such as the beating of black farm 
workers by their employers
of attention to the bombings in No
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 problem, nor did they analyse it critically. Neither the perpetrators 
ly given a voice. Rather, the papers relied on expert sources, such as 
lmost all the incidents of infant rape that have hit the headlines recently, the 
ts poor social policies. What the paper does not do 
is go in
explore
educati
alcoho
obviously plays a role though, otherwise there would not be any young women with children 
or encountered and at times offered present-day 
                                                
reflect the gravity of the
not the victims were real
politicians and scientists, to comment from the outside or just took it upon themselves to 
explain reality to their readers, which often led to a one-sided view. 
The perspective taken by the people in our conversations also closely resembled that of the 
newspapers. Violence was regarded in largely an a-historical manner. It happened. It had 
causes and backgrounds and it had perpetrators and victims, who were, at times, even 
portrayed as real people with real stories, but it was not in any way related to society as a 
whole. Let us take for example the article from the Sunday Times of 9th December 2001 1454 
about the rape of a five-month-old baby that I analysed in chapter 4.6.4 b. The newspaper 
gives a detailed account not only of the event, but also of the surrounding circumstances and 
the socio-economic background of the child’s mother. It even puts thing into perspective by 
explaining the wider phenomenon of child rape: 
“In a
profile of the mothers is the same: poor, largely uneducated and single. Their ages 
range from late teens to early 20s. They are usually unemployed. 
The perpetrators, too, fit a profile: unemployed, young and known to the mothers.” 1455 
And finally the government is attacked for i
to the question of why these young people are poor, uneducated and single. It does not 
 how a mixture of apartheid policies, the anti-apartheid struggle’s disregard for 
on as well as the lack of opportunities today and the ease of access to drugs and 
l have had an impact on these people’s lives. Neither is the role of sex discussed. It 
and young men waiting to rape those children. The role of sex in culture could be addressed in 
both contexts. 
Similarly, white South Africans talked as if crime was a problem of the here and now. They 
mentioned individual acts they had heard of 
explanations, such as poverty causes violence. The historical perspective of how violence was 
cultivated throughout all sectors of the population, independent of skin colour, social class or 
gender, is generally absent. 
 
1454 Sunday Times (9th December 2001 b: 15) 
) 1455 Sunday Times (9th December 2001 b: 15
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 even the world of 
ve in a world of ideas. 
them to; and if their parents are believing Christians they will generally accept that God is 
6. Conclusion 
 
Have I in fact managed to prove that the newspapers have influenced South Africans’ ideas 
through their reporting on violence? It is true that I found little evidence that South Africans’ 
views about the violence in their country are directly shaped by the newspapers. Neither have 
any other scholars before me been able to prove such a simple, stimulus-response-type link. 
However, I think I have shown that the press do structure and limit people’s interpretive 
frameworks. In my opinion, I have provided ample proof that the English language press not 
only helped to define what was seen as violence and what was not, but also provided the 
language to describe the individual incidents and thus constructed the point(s) of view from 
which the public interpreted them. At times the newspapers’ reporting may even have 
influenced some people’s behaviour towards their fellow South Africans. In short, mediated 
meanings are important for structuring the way they see the world –
experience. 
There are sure to be people who will never be convinced of such direct media influence, partly 
because proving its existence always involves a certain number of presuppositions. I want to 
remind these doubters that this alone does not mean that they cannot be scientifically 
investigated. As van Dijk has pointed out:  
“No ‘facts’ in the social sciences are being proven beyond any reasonable doubt, and 
we always work with more or less plausible assumptions, consensus, and (for 
quantitative studies) statistically more or less significant outcomes. So, by selecting a 
problem for study, we do so on the basis of incontrovertible ‘facts’ as the consensus of 
people or scholars define them.” 1456  
As I said in the introduction, my work is based on the ‘fact’, established by anthropologists 
and linguists like Franz Boas, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, that people do not live 
in an objective world independent of perception, but lead their lives according to the pictures 
in their heads. They li
The next important ‘fact’ that guided my work was that ideas are not innate. People are not 
born with a worldview; it is acquired during the process of socialisation. Adults in any culture 
teach their children what is real and what is not, what is right and what is wrong, how to make 
sense of the world around them and how to evaluate their experiences. The outcome will be 
different from culture to culture and from language group to language group. English children, 
for example, can and will learn about the concept of ‘God’ because their language permits 
                                                 
1456 Private correspondence with the author 
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d often change their ideas accordingly. The next question therefore is 
m, so that they are not likely to have experienced violence 
either. 
What I
media.  the media is not ‘pure’ information either, but rather constructs a world in 
ow can they be so sure that 
someth
that wh
Due to readers of the 
es are divided on 
could not have agreed more. I should point out that, among journalists, a fairly clear pattern of 
subscribed to the British-style libertarian view of the media 
osed 
real. Similarly, if a South African English speaker is provided with a concept like ‘black-on-
black violence’ by his/her language/culture, they will seem real to them. 1457 
The process of learning does not stop at the end of childhood. People acquire new knowledge 
throughout their lives an
where this new input comes from. Experience certainly plays an important part in this learning 
process. However, as we have seen, very few white South Africans have actually experienced 
violence, let alone been the victims of black assailants. The education system, organised 
religion, and everyday interaction with friends, family members and co-workers are all 
important sources of information and shapers of ideas for the majority of South African 
English speakers. 1458 However, we should not forget that, due to the continued racial and 
class-based segregation of everyday life, the people they come in contact with are generally 
from the same background as the
They do not create information, they merely relay it.  
 wanted to discover was the primary source and I believe that I have found it in the 
It is true that
language, much like anyone else telling a story. However, its importance to the creation of 
social reality goes beyond that of a town crier. For one, media discourse is not only all-
pervasive in modern society, but has in fact become one of the pillars that our way of life rests 
on. And secondly, despite many people expressing minor reservations towards the 
information they receive from the media (along the lines of ‘H
ing happened, I’ve never seen it?’), they generally place a great deal of trust in the fact 
at the overall picture of the world that they are presented with is as realistic as it gets. 
 these two factors, and because of the fact that the majority of white 
English language press either lack access to alternative definitions of the situation in their 
country or reject the alternatives they do know of because they seem inconsistent with their 
worldview or their own best interest, they will generally accept the definitions presented in the 
press as self-evident. 
Interestingly enough, South African journalists and media experts themselv
this issue. A number of editors and former editors clearly disagreed with my assertion that 
their newspapers did or do influence the way white South Africans see their country. Others 
opinion soon emerged. Those who 
as having a duty to report objectively (incidentally, all older white men) tended to be opp
                                                 
1457 Rauch (1993: 2), Grace (1987: 1-2 and 120-121) and Searle (1995: 1-2) 
lsmoor Prison, in an interview with the author, 19th June 2002, Robertshaw et al. 
 (1997:160-161) and Altheide (1997: 654) 
1458 John Jansen, Deputy Director of Pol
(2001 c: 1), de Gruchy
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to notions of media influence. Johann de Villiers and Gerald Shaw for example voiced a 
certain degree of scepticism towards my ideas. Mr. Shaw told me: “We always found over 
many years that leading articles, that the opinion or the comment of the newspaper has very 
little … influence.” 1459 
Proponents of advocacy journalism (especially black journalists who had worked in 
mainstream press during the apartheid years) and more cynical observers of the media, on the 
other hand, were convinced that the media have an important influence on how the public 
views the world around them. Among others, Dennis Pather, Mike Tissong, Pallo Jordan, and 
Jeremy Gordin all told me that they believed that the media could and did influence the way 
white people think of their country. When I asked him if he thought that the media had an 
influence on white South Africans’ views of their country, Tony Ehrenreich, the Provincial 
Secretary of COSATU, told me:  
“Absolutely, white a
powerful medium the radio, the TV, the newspapers. People don’t get any other 
views.” 1460 
l South African social scientists and media scholars also share this view. 1461 Martin 
eich of the ISS told me: “[W]hite middle class fear (…) is certainly reinforced by the 
 1462 Even the TRC in its final report stated that “the South African media pla
crucial role in helping reflect and mould public opinion during the years under review” 1463 
And Shaw, in his study of violence in South Africa, pointed out: 
“It is far more likely that the public impressions of high levels of crime and poor 
policing are not only a result of personal experiences but also of press coverage of 
particular sensational cases of crime and poor police performance.” 1464 
My own research has, as we have seen, confirmed Shaw’s assertion that the papers’ choice of 
subjects has influenced 
e has tended to grow with their portrayal in the media as a problem that is of relevance 
ers’ lives. During the 1970s and early 1980s, when violence was shown to be a remote 
 disorder in the townships, people did not worry too much about it.  
on to, and fear of, violence increased during the 1980s as President Botha’s 
anda machinery painted an ever-clearer picture of the ‘rooi gevaar’, even while the 
 
1459 Interview with the author, 22nd May 2002 
1460 Interview with the author, 10th June 2002 
98: 1), Shaw & Louw (1998 b: 1), Friedman (2001: 2) and Shaw (2002: 85) 
backgrounds who see the media as an important source of beliefs and opinions see 
8), Chomsky (1989: 148-149), Glasgow Media Group (1976: 344-345), McCombs 
n Dijk (1998: 31), van Dijk (1994: 17-18) and Altheide (1991: 1) 
5) 
1461 See for example Camerer & Louw (19
For non-South African scholars of diverse 
Hall et al. (1978: 29-30), Wodak (2002: 7-
& Gilbert (1986: 3), va
1462 Interview with the author, 23rd July 2002 
1463 TRC Report, Vol 4, Chap 6, Para 1 
1464 Shaw (2002: 8
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an public’s worldview. In a 1982 opinion survey a frightening 80% of 
e past years. According to the ISS 2003 National 
                                                
total amounts of newspaper reports on unrest declined. After the bombing of the air force 
headquarters in Pretoria on 20th May 1983, the Weekend Argus for example dedicated an 
entire page to the ‘red peril’. At the top stood a box titled “A dossier of terror in SA” 1465 
which listed all bombings since April 1982. Underneath was a fairly long article about “Red 
threat stepped up” 1466, and beneath that we could read: “Communists behind attack” 1467.  
Such reporting, along with the general anti-communist campaign in the broadcast media, 
political speeches, the schools, the military and the police, seems to have had a visible effect 
on the South Afric
whites said that communism, not black discontent, was the greatest threat to South Africa’s 
future. 1468 One of the people I spoke to confirmed: “You don’t understand. The police, they 
were having a tough time in the townships. They could not let communism take over or else 
everything would have gone down the drain.” 1469 Even Tony Heard admitted that when he 
met Oliver Tambo in 1985 
“I was honestly surprised. Because I thought he might be a bit more bloodthirsty 
sounding. ’Cause he’d been demonised in South Africa as a bloodthirsty communist 
and all that. You know, we were all influenced by propaganda. And I was actually 
surprised at this rather gentlemanly guy with black shoes, dark suit and saying the 
most wondrous things about calling for a climate of peace in South Africa.” 1470 
The sudden freeing of the press and the subsequent explosion of violence onto the front pages 
of every newspaper went hand in hand with an ever-growing fear among the white population. 
This, however, is where the predictability ends. According to MacKuen & Coombs’ model, 
one would have expected concern for violence to fall in the new millennium as the media 
grew tired of violence and shifted their interest to other topics. This was not the case, though. 
Fear of violence grew significantly in th
Victim Survey results  
“significantly less South Africans feel safe in 2003 than they did in 1998. In 1998, 
60% said they felt very safe walking in the areas where they live during the day; this 
figure dropped to only 25% in 2003. At night, only 25% said they feel very unsafe in 
1998 compared to 58% in 2003. These views differ markedly by race, with a minority 
of Indians (11%) and whites (35%) feeling very safe during the day, compared to a 
majority of coloureds (62%) and blacks (64%).” 1471 
 
1465 Weekend Argus (21st May 1983 a: 3) 
1466 Weekend Argus (21st May 1983 b: 3) 
thor, 17  May 2002 
1467 Weekend Argus (21st May 1983 c: 3) 
1468 Sparks (1999: 80) 
1469 Conversation with the author in Prague, 8th April 2004  
th1470 Interview with the au
1471 ISS (2004: 2) 
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 by disconnecting them from 
n, which had 
This suggests that the newspapers do more than inform readers about the world. They create 
reality; make history so to speak. By defining certain aspects of reality as distinct events, they 
bring them to people’s attention. If the readers trust a newspaper to portray the world 
truthfully, then the events described will be real to them, regardless of what others around 
them might see as facts. Furthermore, newspapers also have the power to change the meaning 
and the significance of events, for example by highlighting certain aspects or by 
retrospectively connecting them with other events (or, in fact,
their context). 1472  
However, as Fairclough has pointed out, “the discursive constitution of society does not 
emanate from a free play of ideas in people’s heads but from a social practice which is firmly 
rooted in and oriented to real, material, social structures” 1473. The new knowledge people 
derive from the newspapers is tested against a stock of pre-existing ideas and interpreted, 
changed, or rejected in accordance with them. 1474 
Thus, if we take the example of what happened in South Africa after 16th June 1976, and look 
at how the media contributed to the creation of the event, we will find that its influence was 
substantial, but it was always in line with their readers’ worldview. The newspapers defined 
the violence as a distinct event, namely as a riot. This way, it acquired an air of completeness, 
a beginning and an end, and equally importantly, it was characterised as an incident of a 
certain type of violence, which made it perceivable as one in a series. This, however, is not the 
only way that things could be seen. They could, for example, have been defined either as an 
ongoing conflict between an oppressive regime and the subjugated populatio
started decades earlier, or as a shooting followed by a number of acts of sabotage. This would 
have given the events an entirely different character, a change, which most likely would have 
influenced people’s perception of them.  
The media owe this power to define reality partly to their use of language. It contributes to the 
construction, transformation and reproduction of knowledge and belief. Language does not 
merely refer to the world, but creates it by giving meaning to it. Things are given shape and 
assigned meaning by language. It creates identities, relations and concepts in individual 
language users’ minds. Our experiences and the meanings we assign to them are thus 
constructed out of the repertoire offered by our individual language. Our subjective world is 
what Hartley has called “language-potential realized in use” 1475. 1476  
                                                 
1472 Tuchman (1978: 4 and 184), Altheide (1979: 243), Lang & Lang (1981: 671) and Schulz (1976: 28) 
1473 Fairclough (1992 a: 66) 
1474 Bignell (1997: 105), Hartley (1982: 139), Altheide (1997: 650) and Fairclough (1992 a: 66) 
1475 Hartley (1982: 140) 
-213), Altheide (1985: 158), Fairclough (1992 a: 64) and Grace (1987: 120) 1476 Whorf (1956 (1940): 212
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 as different social subjects. And while the labels were not 
searcher, and are based on empirical findings and verifiable facts. A 
speech in 1985 became known as the ‘Rubicon’ 
ost people had no 
alternative but to believe what they were told because they were not there when the president 
spoke. Instead they heard his words on television or the radio and read about it in the press. 
                                                
For example, while the extra-linguistic reality that the ANC had taken-up arms against the 
apartheid state is undisputed in the South African media, the value given to this struggle is 
not. The labelling of opponents of apartheid variously as ‘terrorists’, ‘guerrillas’ or ‘fighters 
for democracy’ constituted them
created by the newspapers, they were readily taken up in the media discourse of the day, and 
through their repeated use were given an air of absolute reality. Thus by presenting something 
as a historic reality, the media were in fact writing history. 1477  
This becomes particularly obvious when we closely scrutinise publications about violence in 
South Africa, such as the ones quoted in the present dissertation. At first sight they seem to be 
quite ordinary scientific works that adhere to the principle of objectivity as far as this is 
possible to any human re
look at their literature lists, however, soon reveals clear indications of the media influencing 
even science. When facts are stated they often come from newspaper reports, especially when 
crime statistics and other numerical information is involved. 1478 Quotes by government 
representatives and other authoritative persons are also often taken directly from newspaper 
articles. 1479 This was especially true during the apartheid years, because, due to the limited 
reliability of official accounts, monitoring groups such as the Human Rights Commission and 
the South African Institute for Race Relations frequently had to make use of newspaper 
reports in their efforts to estimate the extent of the ongoing violence in South Africa. Their 
publications then in turn became the source of much scientific work and subsequent media 
output, a fact that highlights the intertextuality of every newspaper article. 1480  
By pointing this out I neither intend to criticise the practice nor do I doubt the quality of such 
work. I myself have made use of media sources for the factual parts of this dissertation. What 
I want to do is expose the pervasiveness of media messages in our modern world. In this 
respect it is not so much what the media say that is of importance, but how they say it. The 
way they structure the facts reported is frequently accepted as ‘the way things really are’ by 
society. For example, President Botha’s 
speech after the media had given it this name. In fact the whole speech is largely a media 
creation. Beforehand, the media hailed it as the beginning of a new era and afterwards, they 
redefined it as a turning point at which the country did not turn. M
 
d Chibnall (1977: 12) 
eridge & Spence (1996: 102-103), Haysom (1989 b: 193), Marks & Andersson in 
en (1992: 38-40) and Jackson (1993: 27) 
& Nathan (1989: 68), Cock in Hoffmann & McKendrick (1990: 45-46) and Hachten 
1477 Hall et al. (1978: 58-59), Altheide (1979: 243) an
1478 See for example Johnston in Gutt
Manganyi & du Toit (1990: 29), Theiss
1479 See for example Nathan in Cock 
(1984: 77) 
1480 Johnston (1996: 82-83) 
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And th
South 
it. Tha  missed opportunity in the history 
the 
relation
order to
“the sta cing and people’s courts) understood as 
ung man I spoke with for example used “the comrades with their 
levision. 
ey seem to have accepted the media’s definition of the event. No one questioned if 
Africa had really reached the proverbial Rubicon and Botha had ever intended to cross 
nks to the international media, 1985 still represents a
of South Africa. 1481 
In my opinion it would be naïve to think that the press does not influence people’s attitudes 
and behaviour towards the world in any way. People react to new information, and in many 
cases they have no other way of obtaining it than through the media. This does not mean that I 
support the old ‘hypodermic needle’ view, nor that media influence is simply a matter of 
cause and effect. However, as many scholars before me have pointed out, if the new 
information presented fits with people’s existing ideas, it is very likely to be given a place in 
their view of the world.  
This has been shown time and again to be true in South Africa. In their analysis of 
ship between ‘People’s Courts’ and necklacings, Schärf & Ngcokoto state that, in 
 discredit the alternative structures of government in the townships during the 1980s, 
te has attempted to have the two terms (neckla
virtual synonyms” 1482 – an assertion that echoes the findings of Simpson & Vogelman 1483 – 
and conclude that “considering the official monopoly over legal news and analyses on the 
subject it has probably succeeded in persuading a considerate proportion of the gullible public 
of this connection.” 1484 I found evidence in literature 1485 and during my interviews that 
confirms this view. One yo
kangaroo courts that terrorise the township population” 1486 by instilling fear through setting 
examples (he mentioned the forced feeding of dish washing liquid and soap powder as well as 
necklacings as instances of commonly used punishment) as an illustration of black barbarism 
and the ANC’s complete lack of human emotions. When questioned, he admitted that he 
never spoken to a comrade, nor witnessed a ‘People’s Court’ session or a necklacing. As he 
said at a different point in the conversation though, him and his family had seen enough of all 
three in the newspapers and on te
And his was neither the only, nor the most striking case of media reports being used as 
evidence to support a point of view in conversation. Some people admitted openly that they 
had derived their views from the media. One lady, for example told me:  
                                                 
1481 Daran et al. (1986: 1-5) and Joyce (1990: 124) 
1482 Schärf & Ngcokoto (1990: 361) 
1483 Simpson & Vogelman (1989 b: 1) 
1484 Schärf & Ngcokoto (1990: 361) 
1485 See for example Chubb & van Dijk (1999: 133) 
1486 Conversation with the author in Prague, 8th April 2004 
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rs to get a good image of the 
ongoin
interest
newspa  
 admitted to placing more trust in the newspaper reports than in her 
 of this ‘evidence’. Not only do the newspaper images 
as the p
of long
good white state and the bad black opponents of the government. And, as all the big 
publishing houses, including its most critical members, were part of the system, as well as due 
“There was a series of bombs last year and the Christians gathering at Newlands 
prayed against it. And since then, there have been no bombings. I hadn’t realised this 
before, but I heard it on the radio and it’s true.” 1487 
And not just general feelings of being influenced by the media were voiced. In conversations 
about violence I was repeatedly told to look at the newspape
g violence, even though my interview partners did not know that I was even remotely 
ed in the media. One man, for example, told me: “Violence is a problem. Just open a 
per.” 1488 Another man I spoke with on the Durban beachfront who had recently
emigrated from South Africa and was back visiting his family explained: “Just look in the 
paper, violence is hereditary in South Africa.” 1489 And a woman I spoke with in a small town 
in the Eastern Cape even
own experiences. We were talking about her last visit to Johannesburg when she told me:  
“It’s the papers. You read so much doom and gloom about murders and robberies and 
rapes, you don’t really want to go out anymore. (…) I really didn’t find it unpleasant, 
but now I appreciate what we have here.” 1490 
To me, the fact that a number of people used newspaper reports to prove to me that their 
interpretation of reality was in fact the real one offers ample proof that they construct their 
opinions towards violence on the basis
reappear in people’s ideas about violence, they are openly and consciously used as sources of 
information about reality.  
One question remains, though. Throughout this paper I have repeatedly emphasised that the 
newspaper producers came largely from the same cultural background as my target group and 
would as such hold similar ideas about the world. Obviously, this poses the problem of 
finding cause and effect. Did the newspaper reports influence the people or was it in fact the 
other way around that popular ideas made their way into the newspapers via the minds of the 
journalists and editors? I believe that both are the case, that there is mutual influence between 
the newspapers and the public.  
The long-term influence, however, is clearly from the report to the reader. The imagery used 
to describe violence in South Africa today has been build-up over decades. The black stranger 
rototypical perpetrator of violence that I have drawn up in the last chapter is the result 
-term ideological work. Official discourse portrayed the world as split between the 
                                                 
st1487 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 1  June 2002 
r in Cape Town, 24th May 2002 
 Durban, 14th April 2002 
thor in Cintsa East, 18th April 2002 
1488 Interview with the autho
1489 Conversation with the author in
1490 Conversation with the au
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ndency to become too 
re led to believe that their country was calm 
gery of wild black mobs sitting in the townships simply waiting to 
ace among journalists. As van Dijk put it:  
“Once established, the ideological framework serves such fundamental functions in all 
cognitive and social information processing, that changes in such a framework are 
usually slow, difficult and only partial.” 1495  
                                                
to the strict censorship laws during apartheid, the English language press generally stayed 
within the mental framework proscribed by the government. The newspapers’ description of 
the violence along government-set lines greatly contributed to them soon becoming the limit 
of the thinkable for much of the population. 1491 As an editorial that was published in The Star 
on December 19th 1986 admitted: 
“One of the most insidious features of censorship is people’s te
easily habituated to it. Let alone the information-starved man in the street; even the 
media can start to believe that what may not be reported is no longer happening.” 1492 
Thus, by choosing to report from one point of view only and by continually using the same 
imagery to portray the world, the newspapers provided the intellectual foundation that the 
status quo was built on.  
This effect was further reinforced by their behaviour after the lifting of the media restrictions 
at the end of the state of emergency in 1990. Despite being free to report what they took to be 
true, the newspapers mostly stuck with the old concepts and ideas and simply increased the 
frequency of their use. While before, people we
and peaceful, they now witnessed an explosion of violence, which they believed to be take 
place in reality as well as in the papers. They thought that the ‘total onslaught’ was now 
happening right in front of their eyes.  
In the opinion of many white South Africans their country was going from a peaceful paradise 
to hell on earth and all because the black peril was no longer under control. During the period 
of political change, the ima
spread mayhem in the orderly white world was burned into the white psyche purely by their 
extensive use. 1493 And again there were indications that the journalists who created those 
images were among the first to believe them. Only eight years after the above-quoted editorial 
was published in The Star, the newspaper’s then deputy editor, David Hazelhurst, explained to 
Catherine O’Dowd why he had published a story about a necklacing: “We were saying this is 
just another and another death and this is the society we have become.” 1494 (My emphasis.)  
Now that such ideas are widely accepted, they cannot be struck from public consciousness 
purely through the change of heart that has taken pl
 
1491 Business Day (19th September 1997: 1) Ferreira da Rosa Ribeiro (1995: Summary, p. 2) and Tomaselli et al. (1987: 24) 
1492 Quoted in Teer Tomaselli (1992: 128) 
1493 Tomaselli (1991 a: 26) 
1494 Quoted in O’Dowd (1996: 65) 
1495 van Dijk (1988 a: 147) 
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 people’s minds. Nowadays, many white South Africans would rather 
 they see as experiences, than the new media reports. One 
dy for example told me: “The media report only the violence they hear about. There is a lot 
 that they don’t tell. I think they seriously underreport.” 1496  
 this entire thesis has attempted to prove: The 
 reality and are important tools for 
ocesses should, however, not be understood in the 
ia ‘effects’ have done. The impact of the media 
goes b onse models. It is a complicated, social process, not unlike 
t can have an impact on an 
s 
ence lies in it being part of the 
amework for people’s everyday thoughts. 1497  
g-term process. This, 
search that has measured people’s opinions before and after 
 of 
me, the 
’s 
in a certain way.  
reporting of violence in the English 
The newspapers constructed violence to mean crime 
en, a meaning that was readily 
und and internalised by the majority of white English speaking South Africans. After a 
ore no longer be any doubt that the South 
luenced, or even shaped, the knowledge, beliefs, values, 
 English speaking South Africans; it has been an 
portant factor in the construction of their world. 
                                                
The recent reduction in the number of reports about violence and the change in emphasis have 
not helped to counter the growing fear. The images have become common sense and as such 
re firmly anchored ina
trust their decade-old beliefs, which
la
happening
This quote, I believe, shows quite nicely what
newspapers play a part in creating certain perceptions of
maintaining and modifying them. These pr
behavi uristic way that some students of medo
eyond simple stimulus-resp
that of acculturation. Rather than being a separate entity tha
otherwise stable system from the outside, the media is part of the total cultural fact and it
 within. Thus, its influmessages help to create this culture from
fr
As s cu h, media power / media effects is not an individual event, but a lon
in my opinion, is why previous re
the consumption of certain media contents was bound to fail. The individual act
communication may well seem ineffectual if looked at in isolation. Yet over ti
nderlying message, rather than the overt content, can have the power to shape peopleu
opinions 
I believe this has in fact been the case with regards to the 
language press in South Africa. 
perpetrated by groups of nameless, faceless young black m
fo
thor ugo h review of my material there can theref
African press has, over time, inf
social identities, and social relations of white
im
 
1496 Interview with the author in Cape Town, 22nd May 2002 
1497 Gerbner (1985: 14-15) 
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th ordinary 
outh Africans 
 in South Africa? 
ears? 
perienced violence? 
 
 of violence? 
ce influence you in your life (for example when going 
oving home)? 
 
Race: 
- What role does skin colour play in every day South African life? 
- Is it an issue in your life? 
- Do you have friends from other race groups? Or is this not a factor that influences 
your choice? 
- Do you believe that there is a difference – biological or cultural – between the 
different racial groups in SA? (Warning, I do not mean between language groups!!) 
 
Racism: 
- Is racism a problem in South Africa? 
- Has it been getting better during the last 10 years? 
- Is it a problem in your life? 
- Have you ever witnessed open racism? 
- Have you ever experienced racism towards yourself? 
 
Media: 
- What source do you get your news from? 
- Do you read newspapers? 
If so, which ones?  
- What factors influence your choice? 
 
Media and violence: 
- What do you think of the media’s reporting of violence? (too much, not enough, 
factual, sensationalistic etc.) 
 
Appendix A: Questionnaire used in my interviews wi
S
 
- Tell me a bit about yourself 
 
Violence 
 
- Is violence a problem
If so, what kind of violence? 
- Has it been getting better during the last 10 y
- Is violence a problem in your life? 
If so, in which way? 
- Have you ever ex
If so, what kind and how?
- Do you feel at risk of becoming the victim
- Where do you see the main threat? 
- Do considerations about violen
out, choosing a holiday destination or m
- What about domestic violence? 
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- Is violence a problem in South Africa
- Are things better now than they were 10 years ago? 
r been the vi lence
an issue in the country today?  
your life? 
or hostility due to your skin colour in 
years? 
et your news fr
 factors influence your choice? 
Appendix B: Questionnaire used in my street surveys  
 
Violence: 
 today? 
- Have you personally eve
If so what kind? 
ctim of vio ? 
 
Racism: 
- Is ‘race’ still 
- Is it in 
- Have you personally experienced discrim
the last 5 
ination 
 
Media: 
- What source do you g om? 
- Do you read any newspapers? 
If so, which one(s)? 
- What
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Africa Appendix C: Institutions I visited during my time in South 
 
Institution Date of 
Meeting 
City 
   
Cape Community Newspapers 01-03-02 Cape Town 
Centre for Cultural and Media Studies, 
University of Natal 
09-04-02 Durban 
The Mercury 11-04-02 Durban 
Sunday Tribune 10-04-02 Durban 
Independent on Saturday 11-04-02 Durban 
Cape Town Supreme Court  07-05-02 Cape Town 
Institute for African Studies, University of
Cape Town 
 08-05-02 Cape Town 
Department of Modern Foreign 
lenbosch University 
sch 
Languages, Stel
10-05-02 Stellenbo
Die Burger 14-05-01 Cape Town 
Press office in the Office of the State 
President 
17-05-02 Cape Town 
Parliament 22-05-02 and 
12-06-02 
Cape Town 
E-tv 29-05-02 Cape Town 
Independent Online 05-06-02 Cape Town 
South African Union of Journalists 10-06-02 Cape Town 
Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) 
10-06-02 Cape Town 
The Big Issue 13-06-02 Cape Town 
Pollsmoor Prison 19-06-02 Cape Town 
Media Liaison Office for the Minister of 
Safety and Security 
21-06-02 Cape Town 
Volksblad 01-07-02 Bloemfontein 
Democratic Alliance in the Free State 02-07-02 Bloemfontein 
Centre for Citizenship Education and 
Conflict Handling 
02-07-02 Bloemfontein 
Diamond Fields Advertiser 03-07-02 Kimberly 
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Media Monitoring Project 11-07-02 Johannesburg 
New Africa Publications Limited 16-07-02 Johannesburg 
Mafube Publishing -02 sburg 16-07 Johanne
The Star 17-07-02 burg Johannes
Institute for the Advancement of 18-07-02 Johannesburg 
Journalism 
Freedom of Expression Insti -02 Johannesburg tute 18-07
Media Tenor  Potchefstroom 18-07-02
Mail & Guardian 2 burg 19-07-0 Johannes
Southern Africa Report Johannesburg 19-07-02 
Centre for the Stu
Reconciliatio
dy of Viole
n 
2 burg nce and 22-07-0 Johannes
Department of Anthropology  burg , University 22-07-02
of the Witwatersrand 
Johannes
Institute for Security Studies Pretoria  23-07-02 
Freedom Front Pretoria 23-07-02 
Pretoria News 24-07-02 Pretoria 
Beeld 24-07-02 Johannesburg 
The Citizen 25-07-02 burg Johannes
City Press 7-02 Johannesburg 30-0
Independent News Network burg 31-07-02 Johannes
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People  m in S frica 
 
Name  / Position Date of Location 
Appendix D:  I spoke with during y time outh A
Institution
meeting  
    
Rolf Annas 
  Languages, 
10-05-02 Stellenbosch Department for Modern 
Foreign
Stellenbosch University 
Mansoor Jaffer r of Cape 
 
01-03-02 Cape Town Deputy edito
Community Newspapers
Asked to remain 13-03-02 Cape Town 
anonymous 
Former manager of the 
Argus Company 
Glenda Nevill 13-06-02 Cape Town Editor of The Big Issue 
Keyan Tomaselli Centre for 
ies, 
, Durban 
09-04-02 Durban Director of the 
Cultural and Media Stud
University of Natal
Ruth Teer-Tomaselli  University of Natal, Durban 09-04-02 Durban 
Ryland Fisher itor Cape Times 23-04-02  Cape Town Former ed
William Bird  dia Director of the Me
Monitoring Project 
11-07-02 Johannesburg 
Bronwyn Harris Researcher at the Race and 
Reconciliation Project at th
CSVR 
e 
burg 18-07-02 Johannes
Lisa Vetten der Unit 22-07-02 Johannesburg Manager of the Gen
at the CSVR 
Dennis Pather Editor of The Mercury 11-04-02 Durban 
Greg Dardagan Assistant editor of The 
Mercury 
10-04-02 Durban 
Peter Davis Editor of the Sunday Tribune 10-04-02 Durban 
Debbie Reynolds 
ent on Saturday 
11-04-02 Durban Acting editor of the 
Independ
Cyril Madlala 12-04-02 Durban Editor of UmAfrika 
Sipho Khumalo all 
Independent publications 
12-04-02 Durban Political Reporter for 
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T 
 the 1994 
 
Cosmas Desmond - Editor of ChildrenFIRS
- PAC candidate in
elections 
11-04-02 Durban 
Tony Heard dent’s 
 
17-05-02 Cape Town - Head of the Presi
press office  
- Former editor of the Cape
Times 
Raymond Louw nd  - Former editor of the Ra
Daily Mail 
- Editor & Publisher of 
Southern Africa Report 
19-07-02 Johannesburg
Nick Shepherd turer, Centre for 08-05-02 Cape Town Senior Lec
African Studies, University 
of Cape Town 
Justice Essa Moosa t Justice 07-05-02 Cape Town Supreme Cour
Moegsin Williams Editor of The Star 17-07-02 Johannesburg 
Johann de Villiers 25-07-02 Johannesburg Senior executive editor of 
The Star 
Vusi Mona Editor City Press 30-07-02 Johannesburg 
André le Roux  burg Deputy Editor City Press 11-07-02 Johannes
Martin Schönteich r at the ISS 23-07-02 Pretoria Senior researche
Robert Thornton Head of the Anthropolo
Department, University of 
gy 
 
burg 
the Witwatersrand
22-07-02 Johannes
Willem Breytenbach 14-05-01 Cape Town News editor of Die Burger 
Henry Jeffreys Political editor at Beeld 24-07-02 Johannesburg 
Mike Tissong Managing Director of New
Africa Publica
 
tions Ltd. 
 16-07-02 Johannesburg
Thami Mazwai  
ident of 
an of the 
Black Editors Forum 
 - CEO of Mafube Publishing
- Former Pres
SANEF 
- Former Chairm
16-07-02 Johannesburg
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lessis 
 
Johann du P Deputy editor Diamond 
Fields Advertiser 
03-07-02 Kimberly 
Kevin Ritchie ond 03-07-02 Kimberly Managing editor Diam
Fields Advertiser 
Thabo Leshilo 24-07-02 Pretoria Editor Pretoria News 
Name unknown Deputy Editor of Pretoria 
News 
24-07-02 Pretoria 
Pallo Jordan ad of Radio 
he ANC’S first 
 
r Posts, 
ns and 
22-05-02 and Cape Town - Former he
Freedom 
- Director of t
internal mass propaganda
campaign 
- Former Minister fo
Telecommunicatio
Broadcasting 
12-06-02 
Andre Martin iaison officer of Mr. 
 
21-06-02 Cape Town Media l
Charles Nqakula, Minister
for Safety and Security 
Babs Abba Omar IOL Content Manager of 05-06-02 Cape Town 
Piet Uys  retary of the 23-07-02 Pretoria General Sec
Freedom Front 
Antoinette Louw e Crime and 
at the ISS
23-07-02 Pretoria Head of th
Justice Programme 
Jeremy Gordin  
ork  
31-07-02 Johannesburg Managing Editor 
Independent News Netw
Gary van Standen  f the Citizen 25-07-02 Johannesburg News editor o
Ayesha Ismail Senior reporter and news 
editor at E-tv 
29-05-02 Cape Town 
Gerald Shaw Former deputy editor of 
Cape Times  
the 22-05-02 Cape Town 
Willem Steenkamp 12-06-02 Cape Town Former defence reporter at 
the Cape Times 
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Rand Daily Mail 
er editor of the 
Sunday Express, Business 
d the Sunday Times 
 
Ken Owen - Former deputy editor of the 30-05-02 Cape Town 
- Form
Day an
Arnold de Beer School for Communication 
Studies, Potchefstroom 
University 
18-07-02 Potchefstroom 
Ronnie
e SAUJ 
  Morris Western Cape Vice President 10-06-02 Cape Town
of th
Tony Ehrenreich Western Cape Regional 10-06-02 
Secretary of COSATU 
Cape Town 
Joh Jan nsen Deputy Director of 
Pollsmoor Prison 
19-06-02 Cape Town 
Name unknown Head warder at Pollsmoor 
Prison 
19-06-02 Cape Town 
Name unknown Former leader of a prison 19-06-02 Cape 
gang at Pollsmoor Prison 
Town 
Gert Coetzee In-depth reporter at 
Volksblad 
01-07-02 Bloemfontein 
Stefaans Brummer Reporter at the Mail & 19-07-02 Johannesburg 
Guardian 
Leon Mellet Former director of 26-06-02 George 
 information for internal 
media at the Bureau for 
Information 
Liana van Wyk Member of the Democratic 02-07-02 Bloemfontein 
Alliance in the Free State 
Willem Ellis Director of the Unit for 02-07-02 Bloemfontein 
Conflict Resolution & 
Mediation Programme at the 
Centre for Citizenship 
Education and Conflict 
Handling 
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h 
frican journalists 
e? How did being a journalist influence your 
 purely suggestions, though, and I certainly don’t insist on them 
ast and present? What do you take 
h language press propagate racial differences and/or separation? 
er of management at the Argus Company told me in an interview that there 
iolence as an item of news: 
- Can you give me some insight into the process of news production? How stories get chosen 
for publishing in a newspaper? What criteria determine what gets printed, how it is presented 
and where within the newspaper it is put? 
- What importance does violence have as an item of news? 
- While at the xxx (newspaper), what kinds of violence did you consider to be newsworthy? 
What made them newsworthy? 
- Do you think violence is represented in a reasonable and fair way in today’s newspapers? 
 
The issue of race/skin colour: 
- What role does skin colour play in every day South African life? 
- What role does it play in the media’s reporting? 
- In your opinion, are either social class, or rather income, or skin colour connected to violence? 
- What do you think the majority of South Africans would answer to this question? 
 
My research question: 
- Do the media shape the way white South Africans perceive the world around them and the 
violence that is going on in this country? 
- If so, how? 
Appendix E: Questionnaires used in my interviews with Sout
A
Questions put to journalists 
 
Getting to know the journalist: 
- Tell me a bit about yourself.  
This is meant to be an open question. I’m really looking for whatever you yourself consider 
relevant to introduce yourself. However, issues that do interest me are: How long have you 
been working as a journalist? What was your career path? How long were you xxx (job 
description)? What can you tell me about that tim
view of events? Theses are
being answered if these questions do not seem relevant while others should be asked. 
 
Your time at the xxx (newspaper): 
- What did you consider your newspaper’s role in South African society? 
- What can you tell me about your relationship with the government and the management? 
 
The e m dia in South Africa: 
- What can you tell me about being a journalist in South Africa? Does the profession have a 
specific significance in this country? And is it different being a journalist here compared to, 
for example, Europe?  
- What is your view of the South African media landscape p
the role of a newspaper to be? Do others share this view? 
 
The e m dia during the apartheid years: 
alist in South Africa in the past? - What did it mean to be a journ
- In your opinion, did the Englis
- A former memb
was a complete news blackout, “We didn’t know what was going on.” Did the management 
really not know what was going on during the apartheid years? Or did they suppress 
ple about state violence? information, for exam
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ists 
- What is your view of the South African media landscape past and present?  
do you ole of a ne
 opini e Eng ga  differences
separation? 
- A former member of management at the Argus Company told me in an interview
the apartheid years there was a complete news blackout. “We didn’t know what 
on,” he said. ent really not know what was going on or did they
information, for example about state violence? 
Being a journalist in South Africa 
yo t being th Afric e pro e a 
specific significance in this country? And is it different being a journalist here co
ple
your relation governm ana
 item 
ve  d
ing times w d en for pub spap
criteria determine what gets printed, how it is presented and where within the ne
- What importance does violence have as an item of news? 
The issue of race/skin colour: 
e di  in the me ng apar
e do oday? 
estio
believe that the media shape the way te South Af e the  
nd the  that is goin try? 
- If so, in which way? 
Questions put to the spokesman of the South African Union of Journal
 
The media in South Africa: 
- What 
- In your
 take the r
on, does/did th
wspaper to be? 
lish language press propa te racial  and/or 
 that during 
was going 
 suppress Did the managem
 
- What can u tell me abou  a journalist in Sou a? Does/Did th fession hav
mpared to, 
for exam
- What can you
, Europe?  
 tell me about ship with the ent and the m gement? 
 
Violence as an of news: 
- Can you gi
try
me some insight int
 of apartheid? Ho
o the process of news production, 
o stories get chos
particularly
lishing in a new
uring the 
er? What 
wspaper it is 
put? 
 
- What rol
- What rol
d race play
es it play t
dia’s reporting duri theid? 
 
My research qu n: 
- Do you 
them a
 whi
g on in this coun
ricans perceiv world around
 violence
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s u y in a
 
Newspaper Place of 
Publication 
Language/Frequency 
of Publication 
Owner Readership 
igures  
) 
Appendix F: Newspaper Ownership and Circulation in 2000 
Newspaper nder scrutin  the present dissert tion: 
F 1
(and 
Circulation 
2
     
Cape Argus Cape Town English Daily Independent 351,000 
(79,326 *) 
Saturday Argus Cape Town English Weekly Independent 
 *) 
397,000 
(106,749
Sunday Argus Cape Town Independent 
49 *) 
English Weekly 304,000 
(106,7
Cape Times aily Independent 
 *) 
Cape Town English D 255,000 
(51,193
The Star Johannesburg English Daily Independent 855,000 
(163,746) 
Saturday Star   Johannesburg English Weekly Independent 503,000 
(135,936) 
Pretoria News Pretoria English Daily Independent 
 
202,000 
(27,402)
Pretoria News 
Weekend 
Pretoria English Weekly Independent 
226) 
73,000 
(15,
The Mercury dent Durban English Daily Indepen 249,000 
(40,389 *) 
Daily News Durban English Daily Independent 0 
 
367,00
(61,978 *)
Independent on 
y 
Durban English Weekly Independent 
) Saturda
338,000 
(62,159 *
Sunday 
ent 
Johannesburg English Weekly Independent 
Independ (nationwide) 
184,000 
(40,875) 
Diamond Fields 
Advertiser 
English Daily Independent 
(8,264) 
Kimberly 40,000 ² 
Citizen Johannesburg English Daily Caxton 897,000 
 *¹) (121,435
Daily Dispatch East London English Daily 
¹) 
TML 218,000 
(37,927 *
Eastern 
rovince Herald 
Port Elizabeth English Daily 
(unknown) P
TML 181,000 
Evening Post Port Elizabeth English Daily TML 116,000 
) (unknown
Sunday Times Johannesburg 
nationwide) 
English Weekly TML 2,300,000 
 (distributed (506,474 *²)
Mail & 
Guardian 
Johannesburg English Weekly Mail & 192,000 
Guardian Media (37,456 *²) 
                                                 
1 Source: All Media Products Survey
2
 (AMPS) 2000A quoted in The Government of South Africa (2000: 64-65) 
 Source: All Media Products Survey (AMPS) 2000B quoted on company websites 
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ot analysed in the present dissertation: 
ewspaper Place of Language/Frequency Owner Readership 
(and 
rculation)
Newspapers n
 
N
Publication of Publication Figures 
Ci
     
Sowetan Johannesburg English Daily New Africa 
Publications 
2,145,000
(206,000 *¹
(NAP) 
 
) 
Sowetan 
Sunday World 
Johannesburg English Weekly NAP/TML 323,000 
(65,291 *²) 
Daily Sun Johannesburg English Daily Media24 874,000 *³ 
(71,742 **) 
Post Durban English Wednesday & 
Friday (since 2001) 
Independent 314,000 
(45,305 *) 
Ilanga Durban Zulu T
(KwaZulu Natal 
& Eastern Cape) 
Thursday 1,440,000 
Thurs: 
1,313,000 
uesday & Mandla-Matla Tues: 
(1,612,000) 
City Press Johannesburg 
(nationwide) 
English Weekly Naspers/Dynamo 
Investments 
2,381,000 
(220,559) 
Die Volksblad Bloemfontein Afrikaans Daily Naspers 127,000 
) 
(31,928 
week-days 
*¹
Die Burger Cape Town Afrikaans Daily Naspers 600,000
(88,000 W. 
Cape 
 
24,977 E. 
 *¹) Cape
Beeld Johannesburg Afrikaans Daily Naspers 459,000 
(91,201 *¹) 
Rapport Johannesburg, Afrikaans W
Cape Town, 
Bloemfontein 
(nationwide) 
(343,665 *¹) 
eekly Naspers 1,762,000 
The Natal Pietermaritzburg English Dai
Witness Witness (unknown)
ly Naspers/Natal 141,000 
 
Business Day Johannesburg English Daily TML/Pearson 
Group 
146,000 
(44,341 *¹) 
 
* Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) January-June 2001 quoted on company websites 
*¹ Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) July-December 1999 quoted in The Government of 
South Africa (2000: 64-65) 
² Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) July-December 2001 q* uoted in Business Day (4th May 
2002 b: 1) 
*³ All Media Products Survey 2003A quoted in SAARF (2004: 1) (2003 was the first full year 
f sale for the Daily Sun which was launched in July 2002) o
** Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) July-December 2002 quoted on company website 
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